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  1. Jorge V. Arregui (1996). On the Intentionality of Moods: Phenomenology and Linguistic Analysis. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 70 (3):397-411.
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  2. Bruce Aune (1963). Feelings, Moods, and Introspection. Mind 72 (April):187-208.
  3. Robert Brown (1965). Moods and Motives. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (December):277-294.
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  4. Valérie De Prycker (2007). Critical Remarks on Shortcuts to Happiness: The Relevance of Effort and Pain. Philosophica 79.
    This paper discloses and questions two assumptions on happiness that are implied by medical and technological proposals for mood enhancement. The first assumption holds that happiness consists of the indiscriminate maximization of positive and minimization of negative emotions. Second, mood enhancement implies the belief that an effortless enhancement of positive emotions will increase happiness. These assumptions are questioned by investigating the validity of the common sense slogan ‘No pain, no gain’. Support for this claim is found in literature on adversity (...)
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  5. Craig Stephen Delancey (2006). Basic Moods. Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):527-538.
    The hypothesis that some moods are emotions has been rejected in philosophy, and is an unpopular alternative in psychology. This is because there is wide agreement that moods have a number of features distinguishing them from emotions. These include: lack of an intentional object and the related notion of lack of a goal; being of long duration; having pervasive or widespread effects; and having causes rather than reasons. Leading theories of mood have tried to explain these purported features by describing (...)
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  6. William Fish (2005). Emotions, Moods, and Intentionality. In Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173). Rodopi NY.
    Under the general heading of what we might loosely call emotional states, a familiar distinction can be drawn between emotions (strictly so-called) and moods. In order to judge under which of these headings a subject’s emotional episode falls, we advance a question of the form: What is the subject’s emotion of or about? In some cases (for example fear, sadness, and anger) the provision of an answer is straightforward: the subject is afraid of the loose tiger, or sad about England’s (...)
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  7. William C. Fish (2005). Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173). Rodopi NY.
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  8. George Graham (1990). Melancholic Epistemology. Synthese 82 (3):399-422.
    Too little attention has been paid by philosophers to the cognitive and epistemic dimensions of emotional disturbances such as depression, grief, and anxiety and to the possibility of justification or warrant for such conditions. The chief aim of the present paper is to help to remedy that deficiency with respect to depression. Taxonomy of depression reveals two distinct forms: depression (1) with intentionality and (2) without intentionality. Depression with intentionality can be justified or unjustified, warranted or unwarranted. I argue that (...)
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  9. Paul E. Griffiths (1989). Folk, Functional and Neurochemical Aspects of Mood. Philosophical Psychology 2 (1):17-32.
    It has been suggested that moods are higher order-dispositions. This proposal is considered, and various shortcomings uncovered. The notion of a higher-order disposition is replaced by the more general notion of a higher-order functional state. An account is given in which moods are higher-order functional states, and the overall system of moods is a higher-order functional description of the mind. This proposal is defended in two ways. First, it is shown to capture some central features of our pre-scientific conception of (...)
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  10. Amy Kind (2013). The Case Against Representationalism About Moods. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind.
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  11. Uriah Kriegel (ed.) (2013). Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge.
    Philosophy of mind is one of the most dynamic fields in philosophy, and one that invites debate around several key questions. There currently exist annotated tomes of primary sources, and a handful of single-authored introductions to the field, but there is no book that captures philosophy of mind’s recent dynamic exchanges for a student audience. By bringing compiling ten newly commissioned pieces in which leading philosophers square off on five central, related debates currently engaging the field, editor Uriah Kriegel has (...)
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  12. Eric Lormand (1985). Toward a Theory of Moods. Philosophical Studies 47 (May):385-407.
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  13. Angela Mendelovici (2013). Intentionalism About Moods. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):126-136.
    According to intentionalism, phenomenal properties are identical to, supervenient on, or determined by representational properties. Intentionalism faces a special challenge when it comes to accounting for the phenomenal character of moods. First, it seems that no intentionalist treatment of moods can capture their apparently undirected phenomenology. Second, it seems that even if we can come up with a viable intentionalist account of moods, we would not be able to motivate it in some of the same kinds of ways that intentionalism (...)
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  14. Matthew Ratcliffe (2011). Depression, Guilt and Emotional Depth. Inquiry 53 (6):602-626.
    It is generally maintained that emotions consist of intentional states and /or bodily feelings. This paper offers a phenomenological analysis of guilt in severe depression, in order to illustrate how such conceptions fail to adequately accommodate a way in which some emotional experiences are said to be deeper than others. Many emotions are intentional states. However, I propose that the deepest emotions are not intentional but pre-intentional, meaning that they determine which kinds of intentional state are possible. I go on (...)
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  15. Matthew Ratcliffe (2002). Heidegger's Attunement and the Neuropsychology of Emotion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3):287-312.
    I outline the early Heidegger's views on mood and emotion, and then relate his central claims to some recent finding in neuropsychology. These findings complement Heidegger in a number of important ways. More specifically, I suggest that, in order to make sense of certain neurological conditions that traditional assumptions concerning the mind are constitutionally incapable of accommodating, something very like Heidegger's account of mood and emotion needs to be adopted as an interpretive framework. I conclude by supporting Heidegger's insistence that (...)
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  16. Nathan Rotenstreich (1984). A Conceptual Analysis of a Philosophy of Mood. Philosophia 14 (1-2):201-212.
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  17. Andrea Sauchelli (2014). Horror and Mood. American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):39-50.
    Horror is a popular genre or style in many different forms of art. In this essay I propose a definition of horror that is meant to capture our intuitions about the extension of this category over a variety of forms of art. In particular, I claim that horror is individuated by a specific atmosphere and mood, rather than by any singular entity in the horror representation.
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  18. Barkur S. Shastry (1997). On the Functions of Lithium: The Mood Stabilizer. Bioessays 19 (3):199-200.
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  19. M. Siemer (2009). Mood Experience: Implications of a Dispositional Theory of Moods. Emotion Review 1 (3):256-263.
    The core feature that distinguishes moods from emotions is that moods, in contrast to emotions, are diffuse and global. This article outlines a dispositional theory of moods (DTM) that accounts for this and other features of mood experience. DTM holds that moods are temporary dispositions to have or to generate particular kinds of emotion-relevant appraisals. Furthermore, DTM assumes that the cognitions and appraisals one is disposed to have in a given mood partly constitute the experience of mood. This article outlines (...)
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  20. Laura Sizer (2000). Towards a Computational Theory of Mood. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):743-770.
    Moods have global and profound effects on our thoughts, motivations and behavior. To understand human behavior and cognition fully, we must understand moods. In this paper I critically examine and reject the methodology of conventional ?cognitive theories? of affect. I lay the foundations of a new theory of moods that identifies them with processes of our cognitive functional architecture. Moods differ fundamentally from some of our other affective states and hence require distinct explanatory tools. The computational theory of mood I (...)
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  21. Marco Solinas (2012). Review of Elena Pulcini, Invidia. La passione triste. [REVIEW] Iride (65):200-201.
  22. Marco Solinas (2009). Sulle tracce della malinconia. Un approccio filosofico-sociale. Costruzioni Psicoanalitiche (17):83-102.
    The essay aims to analyse the gradual historical process of the partial overlap, replacement and expansion of the theoretical paradigm of depression with respect to that of melancholy. The first part is devoted to analysing some of the central features of the multivalent thematizations of melancholy drawn up during modernity, also with relation to the spirit of capitalism (in its Weberian acceptation). This is followed by an overview of the birth of the modern category of depression, and the process that (...)
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  23. Tanja Staehler (2007). How is a Phenomenology of Fundamental Moods Possible? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (3):415 – 433.
    In Being and Time as well as in his later writings, Heidegger comes to distinguish between fundamental moods and everyday or inauthentic moods. He also claims that phenomenology, rather than psychology, is the appropriate method for examining moods. This article employs a schematic approach to investigate a phenomenology of fundamental moods in terms of its possibilities and limits. Since, in Being and Time, the distinction between fundamental moods and ordinary moods is tied to the division between authenticity and inauthenticity, the (...)
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  24. Alberto Voltolini (2013). The Mark of the Mental. Phenomenology and Mind 4:124-136.
    In this paper, I want to show that the so-called intentionalist programme, according to which the qualitative aspects of the mental have to be brought back to its intentional features, is doomed to fail. For, pace Brentano, the property that constitutes the main part of such intentional features, i.e., intentionality, is not the mark of the mental, neither in the proper Brentanian sense, according to which intentionality is the both necessary and sufficient condition of the mental, nor in its ‘watered (...)
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