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  1. Roman Altshuler (2013). Practical Necessity and the Constitution of Character. In Alexandra Perry & Chris Herrera (eds.), The Moral Philosophy of Bernard Williams. Cambridge Scholars Publishing 40-53.
    Deliberation issues in decision, and so might be taken as a paradigmatic volitional activity. Character, on the other hand, may appear pre-volitional: the dispositions that constitute it provide the background against which decisions are made. Bernard Williams offers an intriguing picture of how the two may be connected via the concept of <span class='Hi'>practical</span> necessities, which are at once constitutive of character and deliverances of deliberation. Necessities are thus the glue binding character and the will, allowing us to take responsibility (...)
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  2. Alfred Archer (2016). Evil and Moral Detachment: Further Reflections on The Mirror Thesis. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (2):201-218.
    A commonly accepted claim by philosophers investigating the nature of evil is that the evil person is, in some way, the mirror image of the moral saint. In this paper I will defend a new version of this thesis. I will argue that both the moral saint and the morally evil person are characterized by a lack of conflict between moral and non-moral concerns. However, while the saint achieves this unity through a reconciliation of the two, the evil person does (...)
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  3. Konrad Banicki (2014). Positive Psychology on Character Strengths and Virtues. A Disquieting Suggestion. New Ideas in Psychology 33:21-34.
    The Values in Action (VIA) classification of character strengths and virtues has been recently proposed by two leading positive psychologists, Christopher Peterson and Martin Seligman as “the social science equivalent of virtue ethics.” The very possibility of developing this kind of an “equivalent,” however, is very doubtful in the light of the cogent criticism that has been leveled at modern moral theory by Alasdair MacIntyre as well as the well argued accusations that positive psychology, despite its official normative neutrality, is (...)
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  4. Susanne Bobzien (2006). Moral Responsibility and Moral Development in Epicurus’ Philosophy. In B. Reis & S. Haffmans (eds.), The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics. CUP
    ABSTRACT: 1. This paper argues that Epicurus had a notion of moral responsibility based on the agent’s causal responsibility, as opposed to the agent’s ability to act or choose otherwise; that Epicurus considered it a necessary condition for praising or blaming an agent for an action, that it was the agent and not something else that brought the action about. Thus, the central question of moral responsibility was whether the agent was the, or a, cause of the action, or whether (...)
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  5. Sarah Byers (2007). Augustine on the 'Divided Self': Platonist or Stoic? Augustinian Studies 38 (1):105-118.
  6. David Carr (1988). The Cardinal Virtues and Plato's Moral Psychology. Philosophical Quarterly 38 (151):186-200.
  7. Miller Christian (forthcoming). Do People Have the Virtues or Vices? Some Results From Psychology. In Bradshaw David (ed.), Ethics and the Challenge of Secularism: Russian and Western Perspectives. Council for Research in Values and Philosophy
    In section one of this paper, I review some of the leading research on cheating behavior, and in section two I do the same for cheating motivation. Section three then outlines several requirements for honesty and dishonesty, and I explain why, in light of the current psychological evidence, these requirements do not seem to be met. Finally in section four I step back and consider an important implication if my conclusions are correct.
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  8. Adam M. Croom (2014). Vindicating Virtue: A Critical Analysis of the Situationist Challenge Against Aristotelian Moral Psychology. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science 48:18-47.
    This article provides a critical analysis of the situationist challenge against Aristotelian moral psychology. It first outlines the details and results from 4 paradigmatic studies in psychology that situationists have heavily drawn upon in their critique of the Aristotelian conception of virtuous characteristics, including studies conducted by Hartshorne and May (1928), Darley and Batson (1973), Isen and Levin (1972), and Milgram (1963). It then presents 10 problems with the way situationists have used these studies to challenge Aristotelian moral psychology. After (...)
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  9. Jason D'Cruz (2015). Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Moral Consequence of Consistency. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (3):467-484.
    Situationists such as John Doris, Gilbert Harman, and Maria Merritt suppose that appeal to reliable behavioral dispositions can be dispensed with without radical revision to morality as we know it. This paper challenges this supposition, arguing that abandoning hope in reliable dispositions rules out genuine trust and forces us to suspend core reactive attitudes of gratitude and resentment, esteem and indignation. By examining situationism through the lens of trust we learn something about situationism (in particular, the radically revisionary moral implications (...)
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  10. Lara Denis (2008). Animality and Agency: A Kantian Approach to Abortion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):117-37.
    This paper situates abortion in the context of women’s duties to themselves. I argue that Kant’s fundamental moral requirement to respect oneself as a rational being, combined with Kant’s view of our animal nature, form the basis for a view of pregnancy and abortion that focuses on women’s agency and moral character without diminishing the importance of their bodies and emotions. The Kantian view of abortion that emerges takes abortion to be morally problematic, but sometimes permissible, and sometimes even required. (...)
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  11. Jeremy Fischer (2012). Being Proud and Feeling Proud: Character, Emotion, and the Moral Psychology of Personal Ideals. Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (2):209-222.
    Much of the philosophical attention directed to pride focuses on the normative puzzle of determining how pride can be both a central vice and a central virtue. But there is another puzzle, a descriptive puzzle, of determining how the emotion of pride and the character trait of pride relate to each other. A solution is offered to the descriptive puzzle that builds upon the accounts of Hume and Gabriele Taylor, but avoids the pitfalls of those accounts. In particular, the emotion (...)
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  12. William J. Frey (2010). Teaching Virtue: Pedagogical Implications of Moral Psychology. [REVIEW] Science and Engineering Ethics 16 (3):611-628.
    Moral exemplar studies of computer and engineering professionals have led ethics teachers to expand their pedagogical aims beyond moral reasoning to include the skills of moral expertise. This paper frames this expanded moral curriculum in a psychologically informed virtue ethics. Moral psychology provides a description of character distributed across personality traits, integration of moral value into the self system, and moral skill sets. All of these elements play out on the stage of a social surround called a moral ecology. Expanding (...)
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  13. Margaret Gilbert (1971). Vices and Self-Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 68 (15):443-453.
    Towards an account of character traits in self-Knowledge, With an assessment of the sartrean thesis ("spectatorism") that character trait concepts are fitted for other-Ascription rather than self-Ascription. The logic of ascriptions of evil character and specific vices is dealt with. The relationship of self-Ascription to self-Falsification and "seeing oneself as an object" is examined. Self-Ascription has peculiarities, But at most a very mild form of spectatorism is born out.
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  14. Robert J. Hartman (forthcoming). Against Luck-Free Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    Every account of moral responsibility has conditions that distinguish between the consequences, actions, or traits that warrant praise or blame and those that do not. One intuitive condition is that praiseworthiness and blameworthiness cannot be affected by luck, that is, by factors beyond the agent’s control. Several philosophers build their accounts of moral responsibility on this luck-free condition, and we may call their views Luck-Free Moral Responsibility (LFMR). I offer moral and metaphysical arguments against LFMR. First, I (...)
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  15. Tim Henning (2009). Person Sein Und Geschichten Erzählen - Eine Studie Über Personale Autonomie Und Narrative Gründe. DeGruyter.
    This monograph develops an argument for the following view: In leading an autonomous life, persons make choices and adopt attitudes of a distinctive kind. To justify these choices and attitudes, they need to draw on knowledge about their biographies. More specifically, their biographies are a source of a distinctive type of practical reasons. These reasons are typically such that their adequate articulation will have a narrative structure. Along the way, the book develops what has been called "the best analysis of (...)
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  16. Steven A. Jauss (2008). What's Wrong with Moralism? Edited by C. A. J. Coady. Metaphilosophy 39 (2):251–256.
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  17. Hugh LaFollette (2005). Living on a Slippery Slope. Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4):475 - 499.
    Our actions, individually and collectively, inevitably affect others, ourselves, and our institutions. They shape the people we become and the kind of world we inhabit. Sometimes those consequences are positive, a giant leap for moral humankind. Other times they are morally regressive. This propensity of current actions to shape the future is morally important. But slippery slope arguments are a poor way to capture it. That is not to say we can never develop cogent slippery slope arguments. Nonetheless, given their (...)
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  18. Michael LaPorte (2013). Philosophy Questions. Michael LaPorte.
  19. Piotr Machura (2009). Ideał Człowieka-Filozofa W Koncepcji Alasdaira Macintyre'a. Uniwersytet Śląski.
    Celem pracy jest przedstawienie wzorca moralnego formułowanego na gruncie koncepcji Alasdaira MacIntyre’a. Filozof ten w cyklu swoich prac, rozpoczętym publikacją Dziedzictwa cnoty, rozwija ideę etyki zogniskowanej wokół pojęcia cnoty i dobrego życia, którego spełnienie ma być możliwe dzięki praktyce cnót. W tym kontekście pojawia się idea człowieka rozumianego jako jednocześnie przedmiot i podmiot poszukiwań dobrego życia. Koncepcja ta powraca do starożytnego rozumienia etyki jako eudajmonologii, przy czym MacIntyre czerpie tu nie tylko z tradycji filozofii klasycznej, ale pozostaje w ścisłym związku (...)
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  20. W. Merritt Maria, M. Doris John & Gilbert Harman (2010). Character. In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press
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  21. Lawrence Masek (2010). Intentions, Motives and the Doctrine of Double Effect. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):567-585.
    I defend the doctrine of double effect and a so-called ‘strict’ definition of intention: A intends an effect if and only if A has it as an end or believes that it is a state of affairs in the causal sequence that will result in A's end. Following Kamm's proposed ‘doctrine of triple effect’, I distinguish an intended effect from an effect that motivates an action, and show that this distinction is morally significant. I use several contrived cases as illustrations, (...)
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  22. Christian Miller (forthcoming). A New Approach to Character Traits in Light of Psychology. In Iskra Fileva (ed.), Character. Oxford University Press
    The goal of this paper is to summarize a novel empirical framework that I have developed for thinking about the moral character traits which I claim are widely possessed by many people today. Given limitations of space, though, I will not be able to motivate or defend the framework. Instead I will simply outline some of the main ideas. Also, to help make the discussion less abstract, I will focus on harming motivation and behavior, but the framework is intended to (...)
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  23. Christian Miller (forthcoming). Categorizing Character: Moving Beyond the Aristotelian Framework. In David Carr (ed.), Varieties of Virtue Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan
    Philosophers have inherited a familiar taxonomy of character types from Aristotle. We are all acquainted with the labels of the virtuous, vicious, continent, and incontinent person. The goal of this paper is to argue that we should jettison this framework. The main reason is that psychological research in the past fifty years has suggested a much more complex picture of moral character than what can be usefully captured by these four categories. In its place, I will suggest a better taxonomy (...)
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  24. Christian Miller (2015). Empathy as the Only Hope for the Virtue of Compassion and as Support for a Limited Unity of the Virtues. Philosophy, Theology, and the Sciences 2:89-113.
    This paper claims that altruistic motivation is necessary for possessing the virtue of compassion, and that research on empathy (in particular, work by Dan Batson) has been the only promising source of evidence for such motivation. Challenges to using empathy as a means to cultivating compassion are also considered.
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  25. Christian Miller (2015). Lack of Virtue and Vice: Studies of Aggression and Their Implications for the Empirical Adequacy of Character. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. Oxford University Press 80-112.
    In two recent books, I have drawn on hundreds of studies in psychology in order to systematically develop and empirically support a new conception of the character traits which I claim most people possess. Here I will focus on just one underexplored area of the psychological literature – research on harmful as opposed to helpful behavior – and use it in a preliminary way to further support my positive view.
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  26. Christian Miller (2015). The Mixed Trait Model of Character Traits and the Moral Domains of Resource Distribution and Stealing. In Character: New Directions from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology. Oxford University Press 164-191.
    In this paper my goal is to extend my earlier discussion, at least in a preliminary way, to two additional areas – fairness and stealing. In doing so, I will consider whether the existing research is compatible with my Mixed Trait model, or whether instead it gives me reason to be concerned with how broadly applicable the model really is. My conclusion will be that the results are, so to speak, a mixed bag. With respect to fairness research, some careful (...)
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  27. Christian Miller (2013). Moral Character: An Empirical Theory. Oxford University Press.
    The goal of this book is to develop a new framework for thinking about what moral character looks like today. My central claim will be that most people have moral character traits, but at the same time they do not have either the traditional  ...
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  28. Christian Miller (2011). Guilt, Embarrassment, and Global Character Traits Associated with Helping. In Thom Brooks (ed.), New Waves in Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan
    The first section of this paper briefly summarizes my positive view of global helping traits. The remaining sections then develop the view in two new directions by examining the relationship between guilt, embarrassment, and helping behavior. It turns out that guilt and embarrassment reliably and cross-situationally enhance helping behavior, but in such a way that is incompatible with the nature of compassion as traditionally understood.
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  29. Christian Miller (2010). Guilt and Helping. International Journal of Ethics 6 (2/3):231-252.
    A wealth of research in social psychology over the past twenty years has examined the role that guilt plays in our mental lives. In this paper, I examine just one aspect of this vast literature, namely the relationship between guilt and prosocial behavior. Researchers have typically found a robust positive correlation between feelings of guilt and helping, and have advanced psychological models to explain why guilt seems to have this effect. Here I present some of their results as well as (...)
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  30. Christian Miller (2009). Empathy, Social Psychology, and Global Helping Traits. Philosophical Studies 142 (2):247-275.
    The central virtue at issue in recent philosophical discussions of the empirical adequacy of virtue ethics has been the virtue of compassion. Opponents of virtue ethics such as Gilbert Harman and John Doris argue that experimental results from social psychology concerning helping behavior are best explained not by appealing to so-called ‘global’ character traits like compassion, but rather by appealing to external situational forces or, at best, to highly individualized ‘local’ character traits. In response, a number of philosophers have argued (...)
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  31. Christian Miller & Angela Knobel (2015). Some Foundational Questions About Character. In Miller Christian (ed.), Character: New Directions from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology. Oxford University Press 19-40.
    This chapter for our edited volume (Character: New Directions from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology) provides background material on what we consider to be several of the fundamental questions about character, such as whether character traits exist, what their makeup is, and how they can be improved.
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  32. Emer O’Hagan (2009). Moral Self-Knowledge in Kantian Ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):525 - 537.
    Kant’s duty of self-knowledge demands that one know one’s heart—the quality of one’s will in relation to duty. Self-knowledge requires that an agent subvert feelings which fuel self-aggrandizing narratives and increase self-conceit; she must adopt the standpoint of the rational agent constrained by the requirements of reason in order to gain information about her moral constitution. This is not I argue, contra Nancy Sherman, in order to assess the moral goodness of her conduct. Insofar as sound moral practice requires moral (...)
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  33. Roy W. Perrett (2002). Evil and Human Nature. The Monist 85 (2):304-19.
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  34. Jeffrey Seidman (2010). Caring and Incapacity. Philosophical Studies 147 (2):301 - 322.
    This essay seeks to explain a morally important class of psychological incapacity—the class of what Bernard Williams has called “incapacities of character.” I argue for two main claims: (1) Caring is the underlying psychological disposition that gives rise to incapacities of character. (2) In competent, rational adults, caring is, in part, a cognitive and deliberative disposition. Caring is a mental state which disposes an agent to believe certain considerations to be good reasons for deliberation and action. And caring is a (...)
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  35. Neil Sinhababu (forthcoming). Virtue, Desire, and Silencing Reasons. In Iskra Fileva (ed.), Questions of Character. Oxford University Press
    John McDowell claims that virtuous people recognize moral reasons using a perceptual capacity that doesn't include desire. I show that the phenomena he cites are better explained if desire makes us see considerations favoring its satisfaction as reasons. The salience of moral considerations to the virtuous, like the salience of food to the hungry, exemplifies the emotional and attentional effects of desire. I offer a desire-based account of how we can follow uncodifiable rules of common-sense morality and how some reasons (...)
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  36. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Christian Miller (eds.) (forthcoming). Moral Psychology, Vol. 5: Virtue & Happiness. MIT Press.
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  37. Saul Smilansky (1997). Moral Accountancy and Moral Worth. Metaphilosophy 28 (1‐2):123-134.
    People do good or bad things, and get or do not get good or bad credit for their actions, depending (in part) on knowledge of their actions. I attempt to unfold some of the interconnections between these matters, and between them and the achievement of moral worth. The main conclusion is that the heights of moral worth seem to appear in the oddest places.
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  38. Holly Smith (1983). Culpable Ignorance. Philosophical Review 92 (4):543-571.
  39. Kelly Sorensen (2010). Effort and Moral Worth. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1):89 - 109.
    One of the factors that contributes to an agent’s praiseworthiness and blameworthiness — his or her moral worth — is effort. On the one hand, agents who act effortlessly seem to have high moral worth. On the other hand, agents who act effortfully seem to have high moral worth as well. I explore and explain this pair of intuitions and the contour of our views about associated cases.
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  40. Kelly Sorensen (2004). The Paradox of Moral Worth. Journal of Philosophy 101 (9):465 - 483.
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  41. Anita Superson (2004). Privilege, Immorality, and Responsibility for Attending to the "Facts About Humanity". Journal of Social Philosophy 35 (1):34–55.
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  42. Jason D. Swartwood (2013). Wisdom as an Expert Skill. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):511-528.
    Practical wisdom is the intellectual virtue that enables a person to make reliably good decisions about how, all-things-considered, to live. As such, it is a lofty and important ideal to strive for. It is precisely this loftiness and importance that gives rise to important questions about wisdom: Can real people develop it? If so, how? What is the nature of wisdom as it manifests itself in real people? I argue that we can make headway answering these questions (...)
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  43. Owen Ware (2009). The Duty of Self-Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):671-698.
    Kant is well known for claiming that we can never really know our true moral disposition. He is less well known for claiming that the injunction "Know Yourself" is the basis of all self-regarding duties. Taken together, these two claims seem contradictory. My aim in this paper is to show how they can be reconciled. I first address the question of whether the duty of self-knowledge is logically coherent (§1). I then examine some of the practical problems surrounding the duty, (...)
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  44. Jonathan Webber (2006). Sartre's Theory of Character. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):94–116.
    Various ethical theories recommend developing a morally sound character, and therefore require an understanding of the nature and development of traits. Philosophers usually accept the Aristotelian view that traits are a combination of habit and insight. Sartre’s early work offers an alternative: traits consist in projects. One aim of this paper is to show that this is indeed Sartre’s view, by explaining the errors that have lead philosophers to ignore his theory of character or deny that he has one. The (...)
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  45. Ryan West (2015). Contempt and the Cultivation of Character. Journal of Religious Ethics 43 (3):493-519.
    Macalester Bell urges the cultivation of apt contempt as the best response to what she calls “the vices of superiority”. In this essay, I sketch two character profiles. The first—the ideal contemnor—paradigmatically answers the vices of superiority with contempt. The second—the ideal Christian neighbor—is marked by humility and love, and answers the vices of superiority in non-contemptuous ways. I argue that the latter character rivals the former as a fitting moral response to the vices of superiority. Furthermore, I argue that (...)
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