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  1. Robert Merrihew Adams (2003). Anti-Consequentialism and the Transcendence of the Good. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):114–132.
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  2. Zed Adams (2014). Against Moral Intellectualism. Philosophical Investigations 37 (1):37-56.
    This paper argues that non-cognitivism about moral judgements is compatible with moral realism. In order to reveal the possibility, and plausibility, of this hitherto under-explored position in metaethics, it surveys a series of four increasingly fine-grained formulations of the distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. It argues that all but the last of these distinctions should be rejected, on the grounds that they lead advocates of non-cognitivism away from what initially motivated them to advocate non-cognitivism in the first place. One significant (...)
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  3. Zed Adams (2006). Moral Fictionalism by Kalderon, Mark. [REVIEW] Ethics 117 (1).
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  4. Matthew D. Adler (2005). Cognitivism, Controversy, and Moral Heuristics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):542-543.
    Sunstein aims to provide a nonsectarian account of moral heuristics, yet the account rests on a controversial meta-ethical view. Further, moral theorists who reject act consequentialism may deny that Sunstein's examples involve moral mistakes. But so what? Within a theory that counts consequences as a morally weighty feature of actions, the moral judgments that Sunstein points to are indeed mistaken, and the fact that governmental action at odds with these judgments will be controversial doesn't bar such action.
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  5. Alexandra Plakias (2013). The Good and the Gross. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):261-278.
    Recent empirical studies have established that disgust plays a role in moral judgment. The normative significance of this discovery remains an object of philosophical contention, however; ‘disgust skeptics’ such as Martha Nussbaum have argued that disgust is a distorting influence on moral judgment and has no legitimate role to play in assessments of moral wrongness. I argue, pace Nussbaum, that disgust’s role in the moral domain parallels its role in the physical domain. Just as physical disgust tracks physical contamination and (...)
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  6. Carl David Alm (1998). A Defense of Non-Cognitivism. Dissertation, Cornell University
    There are three parts. Formulation of a form of non-cognitivism which gives a central role to moral emotions. Defense of the standard arguments for non-cognitivism. Response to standard objections to non-cognitivism. Throughout I give considerable attention to relevant important contributions by earlier writers. ; An emotion is grounded if it is held for a certain reason and the subject does not feel uncomfortable about having it for that reason. My central theses are: Thinking that one ought to do A is (...)
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  7. Carla Bagnoli (forthcoming). Vulnerability and the Incompleteness of Practical Reason. In Christine Strahele (ed.), Vulnerability in Context. Routledge chapter 4.
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  8. Carla Bagnoli (2011). The Exploration of Moral Life. In Justin Broakes (ed.), Iris Murdoch, Philosopher. Oxford
  9. Carla Bagnoli, Constructivism in Metaethics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Constructivism in ethics is the view that insofar as there are normative truths, for example, truths about what we ought to do, they are in some sense determined by an idealized process of rational deliberation, choice, or agreement. As a “first-order moral account”--an account of which moral principles are correct-- constructivism is the view that the moral principles we ought to accept or follow are the ones that agents would agree to or endorse were they to engage in a hypothetical (...)
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  10. Carla Bagnoli (2009). Review of Christine M. Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (6).
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  11. Carla Bagnoli & Gabriele Usberti (2002). Introduction. Topoi 21 (1-2):1-10.
    The articles of this volume address only some aspects of Nozick's philosophy: his conception of argument, knowledge, rationality, and identity. In examining Nozick's approach to these topics, one has to take issue, ultimately, with his peculiar conception of philosophy whose manifesto appears at the outset of Philosophical Explanations and is echoed in the introduction to philosophical method of Invariances . To transform philosophy into a science or build an impeccable deductive system was not Nozick's dream. He thought of philosophy as (...)
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  12. K. Baier (1953). Proving a Moral Judgment. Philosophical Studies 4 (3):33 - 44.
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  13. Nicholas Baima (2014). The Problem of Ethical Vagueness for Expressivism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):593-605.
    Ethical vagueness has garnered little attention. This is rather surprising since many philosophers have remarked that the science of ethics lacks the precision that other fields of inquiry have. Of the few philosophers who have discussed ethical vagueness the majority have focused on the implications of vagueness for moral realism. Because the relevance of ethical vagueness for other metaethical positions has been underexplored, my aim in this paper is to investigate the ramifications of ethical vagueness for expressivism. Ultimately, I shall (...)
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  14. Brian Barry (1997). James Griffin, Value Judgement: Improving Our Ethical Beliefs, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996, Pp. Xii + 180. Utilitas 9 (3):361.
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  15. Lawrence C. Becker (1973). The Finality of Moral Judgments: A Reply to Mrs. Foot. Philosophical Review 82 (3):364-370.
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  16. David M. Bersoff (1999). Explaining Unethical Behaviour Among People Motivated to Act Prosocially. Journal of Moral Education 28 (4):413-428.
    Moral reasoning theorists working in the constructivist tradition have tended to explain unethical behaviour by assuming that a breakdown occurs in the link between a person's moral judgement within a particular situation and his ultimate behaviour in that situation. This breakdown is usually seen as being the result of the individual ignoring his deontic judgement in favour of meeting a competing, non-moral social obligation or of fulfilling a selfish interest. This model of unethical behaviour has led to suggestions that moral (...)
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  17. Gunnar Björnsson, Contextualism in Ethics. International Encyclopedia of Ethics.
    In more than one way, context matters in ethics. Most clearly, the moral status of an action might depend on context: though it is typically wrong not to keep a promise, some contexts make it permissible. More radically, proponents of moral particularism (see PARTICULARISM) have argued that a reason for an action in one context is not guaranteed to be even a defeasible reason in every context: whether it counts against an act that it breaks a promise or inflicts pain (...)
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  18. Gunnar Björnsson & Stephen Finlay (2010). Metaethical Contextualism Defended. Ethics 121 (1):7-36.
    We defend a contextualist account of deontic judgments as relativized both to (i) information and to (ii) standards or ends, against recent objections that turn on practices of moral disagreement. Kolodny & MacFarlane argue that information-relative contextualism cannot accommodate the connection between deliberation and advice; we suggest in response that they misidentify the basic concerns of deliberating agents. For pragmatic reasons, semantic assessments of normative claims sometimes are evaluations of propositions other than those asserted. Weatherson, Schroeder and others have raised (...)
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  19. Gunnar Björnsson & Ragnar Francén Olinder (2016). Enoch's Defense of Robust Meta-Ethical Realism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (1):101–112.
    Taking Morality Seriously is David Enoch’s book-length defense of meta-ethical and meta-normative non-naturalist realism. After describing Enoch’s position and outlining the argumentative strategy of the book, we engage in a critical discussion of what we take to be particularly problematic central passages. We focus on Enoch’s two original positive arguments for non-naturalist realism, one argument building on first order moral implications of different meta-ethical positions, the other attending to the rational commitment to normative facts inherent in practical deliberation. We also (...)
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  20. Reid D. Blackman (2015). Meta‐Ethical Realism with Good of a Kind. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):273-292.
    There is a difference between an object's being good simpliciter and an object's being good of its kind, and the vast majority of philosophers have supposed that it is the former variety of goodness that is relevant to ethics. I argue that one may be a meta-ethical realist while employing the notion of good of a kind to the exclusion of good simpliciter; I call such a view kindism. I distinguish between two varieties of kindism, explicate the details of one (...)
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  21. David Brax, Hedonic Naturalism.
    Published (in Swedish) in the journal Filosofisk tidskrift as "Hedonistisk naturalism", 2011/3.
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  22. David O. Brink, A Puzzle About Moral Motivation.
    Our puzzle about moral motivation can be seen as a tension that we encounter when we try to reconcile intellectual and practical aspects of morality. Cognitivists interpret moral judgments as expressing cognitive attitudes, such as belief. Moral judgments ascribe properties – axiological, deontic, and aretaic – to persons, actions, institutions, and policies. Internalists believe that moral judgments necessarily engage the will and motivate. We expect people to be motivated to act in accord with their moral judgments and would find it (...)
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  23. David O. Brink (1999). Objectivity and Dialectical Methods in Ethics. Inquiry 42 (2):195 – 212.
    A cognitivist interpretation of moral inquiry treats it, like other kinds of inquiry, as aiming at true belief. A dialectical conception of moral inquiry represents the justification for a given moral belief as consisting in its intellectual fit with other beliefs, both moral and nonmoral. The essay appeals to semantic considerations to defend cognitivism as a default metaethical view; it defends a dialectical conception of moral inquiry by examining Sidgwick's ambivalence about the probative value of appeal to common moral beliefs (...)
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  24. David Owen Brink (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a systematic and constructive treatment of a number of traditional issues at the foundations of ethics. These issues concern the objectivity of ethics, the possibility and nature of moral knowledge, the relationship between the moral point of view and a scientific or naturalist world-view, the nature of moral value and obligation, and the role of morality in a person's rational lifeplan. In striking contrast to traditional and more recent work in the field, David Brink offers an integrated (...)
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  25. Danielle Bromwich (2011). How Not to Argue for Motivational Internalism. In Thom Brooks (ed.), New Waves in Ethics. Palgrave MacMillan 64-87.
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  26. Danielle Bromwich (2010). Clearing Conceptual Space for Cognitivist Motivational Internalism. Philosophical Studies 148 (3):343 - 367.
    Cognitivist motivational internalism is the thesis that, if one believes that 'It is right to ϕ', then one will be motivated to ϕ. This thesis—which captures the practical nature of morality—is in tension with a Humean constraint on belief: belief cannot motivate action without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire. When defending cognitivist motivational internalism it is tempting to either argue that the Humean constraint only applies to non-moral beliefs or that moral beliefs only motivate ceteris paribus . But (...)
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  27. Tommaso Bruni, Matteo Mameli & Regina A. Rini (2014). The Science of Morality and its Normative Implications. Neuroethics 7 (2):159-172.
    Neuromoral theorists are those who claim that a scientific understanding of moral judgment through the methods of psychology, neuroscience and related disciplines can have normative implications and can be used to improve the human ability to make moral judgments. We consider three neuromoral theories: one suggested by Gazzaniga, one put forward by Gigerenzer, and one developed by Greene. By contrasting these theories we reveal some of the fundamental issues that neuromoral theories in general have to address. One important issue concerns (...)
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  28. H. G. Callaway (1997). Values and Conflicts of Values in the Pragmatist Tradition. In Natale And Fenton (ed.), Business Education and Training: A Value-Laden Process. Volume I: Education and Value Conflict.
    This paper proceeds from an analysis (Callaway 1992, pp. 239-240) of a role of conflict in the origin of value commitments, a pervasive sociological pattern in the development of unifying group values which transforms personal conflicts, or differences, into large-scale collective conflicts. I have urged that these forces are capable of distorting even the cognitive processes of science and that they are a chief reason why value claims are regarded as incapable of objective evaluation. The thesis of the present paper (...)
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  29. Richmond Campbell (2007). What is Moral Judgment? Journal of Philosophy 104 (7):321-349.
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  30. George R. Carlson (1994). Moral Realism and Wanton Cruelty. Philosophia 24 (1-2):49-56.
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  31. Spencer Case (2015). Review of Terence Cuneo's Speech and Morality: On the Metaethical Implications of Speaking. [REVIEW] Tradition and Discovery 42 (1):59-62.
  32. Wayne Christensen & John Sutton (2012). Reflections on Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning Toward an Integrated, Multidisciplinary Approach to Moral Cognition. In Robyn Langdon & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning. Psychology Press 327-347.
    B eginning with the problem of integrating diverse disciplinary perspectives on moral cognition, we argue that the various disciplines have an interest in developing a common conceptual framework for moral cognition research. We discuss issues arising in the other chapters in this volume that might serve as focal points for future investigation and as the basis for the eventual development of such a framework. These include the role of theory in binding together diverse phenomena and the role of philosophy in (...)
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  33. Andy Clark (2000). Word and Action: Reconciling Rules and Know-How in Moral Cognition. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (sup1):267-289.
    Recent work in cognitive science highlights the importance of exem- plar-based know-how in supporting human expertise. Influenced by this model, certain accounts of moral knowledge now stress exemplar- based, non-sentential know-how at the expense of rule-and-principle based accounts. I shall argue, however, that moral thought and reason cannot be understood by reference to either of these roles alone. Moral cognition – like other forms of ‘advanced’ cognition – depends crucially on the subtle interplay and interaction of multiple factors and forces (...)
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  34. Steve Clarke (2008). Sim and the City: Rationalism in Psychology and Philosophy and Haidt's Account of Moral Judgment. Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):799 – 820.
    Jonathan Haidt ( 2001 ) advances the 'Social Intuitionist' account of moral judgment , which he presents as an alternative to rationalist accounts of moral judgment , hitherto dominant in psychology. Here I consider Haidt's anti-rationalism and the debate that it has provoked in moral psychology , as well as some anti-rationalist philosophical claims that Haidt and others have grounded in the empirical work of Haidt and his collaborators. I will argue that although the case for anti-rationalism in moral psychology (...)
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  35. David Copp (2006). Review: Ethics and the A Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics. [REVIEW] Mind 115 (458):476-481.
  36. David Copp (2001). Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism. Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):1-43.
    Moral realism and antirealist-expressivism are of course incompatible positions. They disagree fundamentally about the nature of moral states of mind, the existence of moral states of affairs and properties, and the nature and role of moral discourse. The central realist view is that a person who has or expresses a moral thought is thereby in, or thereby expresses, a cognitive state of mind; she has or expresses a belief that represents a moral state of affairs in a way that might (...)
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  37. Adam M. Croom (2010). Thick Concepts, Non-Cognitivism, and Wittgenstein's Rule Following Considerations. South African Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):286-309.
    Non-cognitivists claim that thick concepts can be disentangled into distinct descriptive and evaluative components and that since thick concepts have descriptive shape they can be mastered independently of evaluation. In Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following, John McDowell uses Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations to show that such a non-cognitivist view is untenable. In this paper I do several things. I describe the non-cognitivist position in its various forms and explain its driving motivations. I then explain McDowell’s argument against non-cognitivism and the Wittgensteinian considerations upon (...)
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  38. A. S. Cua (1970). Moral Judgment and Understanding. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 30 (4):614-616.
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  39. Fiery Cushman, Distinguishing the Roles of Causal and Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment.
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  40. Fiery Cushman (2008). Crime and Punishment: Distinguishing the Roles of Causal and Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment. Cognition 108 (2):353-380.
    Recent research in moral psychology has attempted to characterize patterns of moral judgments of actions in terms of the causal and intentional properties of those actions. The present study directly compares the roles of consequence, causation, belief and desire in determining moral judgments. Judgments of the wrongness or permissibility of action were found to rely principally on the mental states of an agent, while judgments of blame and punishment are found to rely jointly on mental states and the causal connection (...)
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  41. Fiery Cushman, Liane Young & Marc Hauser (2006). The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment. Psychological Science 17 (12):1082-1089.
    ��Is moral judgment accomplished by intuition or conscious reasoning? An answer demands a detailed account of the moral principles in question. We investigated three principles that guide moral judgments: (a) Harm caused by action is worse than harm caused by omission, (b) harm intended as the means to a goal is worse than harm foreseen as the side effect of a goal, and (c) harm involving physical contact with the victim is worse than harm involving no physical contact. Asking whether (...)
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  42. Edmund Dain (2007). Review of Mark Kalderon, Moral Fictionalism. [REVIEW] International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (1):146-9.
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  43. Michael J. Deem (2016). Dehorning the Darwinian Dilemma for Normative Realism. Biology and Philosophy:1-20.
    Normative realists tend to consider evolutionary debunking arguments as posing epistemological challenges to their view. By understanding Sharon Street’s ‘Darwinian dilemma’ argument in this way, they have overlooked and left unanswered her unique scientific challenge to normative realism. This paper counters Street’s scientific challenge and shows that normative realism is compatible with an evolutionary view of human evaluative judgment. After presenting several problems that her adaptive link account of evaluative judgments faces, I outline and defend an evolutionary byproduct perspective on (...)
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  44. Kevin Michael DeLapp (2009). The Merits of Dispositional Moral Realism. Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (1):1-18.
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  45. Raphael Demos (1945). Moral Value as Irreducible, Objective, and Cognizable. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 6 (2):163-194.
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  46. Ulrich Diehl (1996). Sittliche Erkenntnis ohne objektive Werte? Logos 3 (2):134-167.
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  47. James Dreier (2000). Dispositions and Fetishes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):619 - 638.
    Internalism says that if an agent judges that it is right for her to φ, then she is motivated to φ. The disagreement between Internalists and Externalists runs deep, and it lingers even in the face of clever intuition pumps. An argument in Michael Smith’s The Moral Problem seeks some leverage against Externalism from a point within normative theory. Smith argues by dilemma: Externalists either fail to explain why motivation tracks moral judgment in a good moral agent or they attribute (...)
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  48. James Dreier (1996). Book Review: The Moral Problem by Michael Smith. [REVIEW] Mind 105 (418):363-367.
  49. James Dreier (1992). The Supervenience Argument Against Moral Realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):13-38.
    In 1971, Simon Blackburn worked out an argument against moral realism appealing to the supervenience of the moral realm on the natural realm.1 He has since revised the argument, in part to take account of objections,2 but the basic structure remains intact. While commentators3 seem to agree that the argument is not successful, they have not agreed upon what goes wrong. I believe this is because no attempt has been made to see what happens when Blackburn's argument is addressed to (...)
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  50. Ronald Dworkin (2011). Diamonds in the Cosmic Sands. The Philosophers' Magazine 54 (54):22-31.
    “Even the statement ‘There are no such things as moral duties’ is a claim about moral duties. There is no neutral position. If I say, ‘Are there any such things as moral duties?’ and you say, ‘No’, you’re not being neutral. You’re making a decision. You’re deciding that rich people have no duty to help poor people. That’s what you’re saying.”.
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