This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
78 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 78
  1. Vuko Andrić (2010). David Gauthiers kontraktualistische Moralbegründung. Aufklärung Und Kritik 33:80-104.
    Dies ist eine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit David Gauthiers kontraktualistischer Moralbegründung.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. John M. Armstrong (1997). Epicurean Justice. Phronesis 42 (3):324-334.
    Epicurus is one of the first social contract theorists, holding that justice is an agreement neither to harm nor be harmed. He also says that living justly is necessary and sufficient for living pleasantly, which is the Epicurean goal. Some say that there are two accounts of justice in Epicurus -- one as a personal virtue, the other as a virtue of institutions. I argue that the personal virtue derives from compliance with just social institutions, and so we need to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Richard E. Ashcroft (2005). Access to Essential Medicines: A Hobbesian Social Contract Approach. Developing World Bioethics 5 (2):121–141.
  4. Ken Binmore (2004). Reciprocity and the Social Contract. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 3 (1):5-35.
    This article is extracted from a forthcoming book, ‘Natural Justice’. It is a nontechnical introduction to the part of game theory immediately relevant to social contract theory. The latter part of the article reviews how concepts such as trust, responsibility, and authority can be seen as emergent phenomena in models that take formal account only of equilibria in indefinitely repeated games. Key Words: game theory • equilibrium • evolutionary stability • reciprocity • folk theorem • trust • altruism • responsibility (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Ken Binmore (1997). Evolution of the Social Contract, Brain Skyrms. Cambridge University Press, 1996, Xii+ 143 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 13 (2):352-.
  6. David Boucher (1994). David Gauthier and Robert Sugden, Eds., Rationality, Justice and the Social Contract: Themes From 'Morals by Agreement', London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993, Pp. Xii + 201. Utilitas 6 (02):317-.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. David Braybrooke (1987). Social Contract Theory's Fanciest Flight. Ethics 97 (4):750-764.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. David Braybrooke (1976). The Insoluble Problem of the Social Contract. Dialogue 15 (01):3-37.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Andrew I. Cohen (2007). Contractarianism, Other-Regarding Attitudes, and the Moral Standing of Nonhuman Animals. Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (2):188–201.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Simon Cushing (1998). Agreement in Social Contract Theories. Social Philosophy Today 13:349-371.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Fred D'Agostino, John Thrasher & Gerald Gaus, Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  12. Peter Danielson (1998). Evolution of the Social Contract. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):627-652.
  13. Stephen L. Darwall (2006). The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability. Harvard University Press.
    The result is nothing less than a fundamental reorientation of moral theory that enables it at last to account for morality's supreme authority--an account that ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Stephen L. Darwall (ed.) (2003). Contractarianism, Contractualism. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Contractualism/Contractarianism collects, for the first time, both major classical sources and central contemporary discussions of these important approaches to philosophical ethics. Edited and introduced by Stephen Darwall, these readings are essential for anyone interested in normative ethics.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Peter de Marneffe (2001). The Problem of Evil, the Social Contract, and the History of Ethics. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (1):11–25.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. O. de Selincourt (1937). The Social Contract: A Critical Study of Its Development. By J. W. Gough. (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, London: Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. Viii + 234. Price 12s. 6d. Net.). [REVIEW] Philosophy 12 (47):362-.
  17. Joseph P. DeMarco (1989). The Problems of Preference Based Morality: A Critique of "Morals by Agreement". Journal of Social Philosophy 20 (3):77-91.
  18. Thomas Donaldson (1986). Fact, Fiction, and the Social Contract. Business and Professional Ethics Journal 5 (1):40-46.
  19. Mohammed Dore (1997). On Playing Fair: Professor Binmore on Game Theory and the Social Contract. Theory and Decision 43 (3):219-239.
    This paper critically reviews Ken Binmore’s non- utilitarian and game theoretic solution to the Arrow problem. Binmore’s solution belongs to the same family as Rawls’ maximin criterion and requires the use of Nash bargaining theory, empathetic preferences, and results in evolutionary game theory. Harsanyi has earlier presented a solution that relies on utilitarianism, which requires some exogenous valuation criterion and is therefore incompatible with liberalism. Binmore’s rigorous demonstration of the maximin principle for the first time presents a real alternative to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Zachary Ernst (2001). Explaining the Social Contract. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):1-24.
    Brian Skyrms has argued that the evolution of the social contract may be explained using the tools of evolutionary game theory. I show in the first half of this paper that the evolutionary game-theoretic models are often highly sensitive to the specific processes that they are intended to simulate. This sensitivity represents an important robustness failure that complicates Skyrms's project. But I go on to make the positive proposal that we may none the less obtain robust results by simulating the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Daniel M. Farrell (1988). Taming Leviathan: Reflections on Some Recent Work on Hobbes:Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. Jean Hampton; Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Gregory S. Kavka. [REVIEW] Ethics 98 (4):793-.
  22. Daniel M. Farrell (1988). Symposium Papers, Comments and an Abstract: Comments on "Hobbes' Social Contract". Noûs 22 (1):83-84.
  23. James S. Fishkin (1990). Symposia Papers: Towards a New Social Contract. Noûs 24 (2):217-226.
  24. Branden Fitelson (1999). Review: Models and Reality-A Review of Brian Skyrms's Evolution of the Social Contract. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):237 - 241.
    Human beings are peculiar. In laboratory experiments, they often cooperate in one-shot prisoners’ dilemmas, they frequently offer 1/2 and reject low offers in the ultimatum game, and they often bid 1/2 in the game of divide-the-cake All these behaviors are puzzling from the point of view of game theory. The first two are irrational, if utility is measured in a certain way.1 The last isn’t positively irrational, but it is no more rational than other possible actions, since there are infinitely (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Antony Flew (1997). Evolution of the Social Contract By Skyrms Brian Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, Xiii + 146pp. [REVIEW] Philosophy 72 (282):604-.
  26. Danny Frederick (2013). Social Contract Theory Should Be Abandoned. Rationality, Markets and Morals 4:178-89.
    I argue that social-contract theory cannot succeed because reasonable people may always disagree, and that social-contract theory is irrelevant to the problem of the legitimacy of a form of government or of a system of moral rules. I note the weakness of the appeal to implicit agreement, the conflation of legitimacy with stability, the undesirability of “public justification” and the apparent blindness to the evolutionary critical-rationalist approach of Hayek and Popper. I employ that approach to sketch answers to the theoretical, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Celeste M. Friend (1999). Gauthier, Translucency, and Trust. Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1):107-113.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. David Gauthier (2001). Trust Within Reason. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):487-490.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. David Gauthier (1995). Game Theory and the Social Contract Volume 1: Playing Fair, Binmore Ken. The MIT Press, 1994, Xxii + 364 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 11 (02):391-.
  30. David Gauthier (1988). Hobbes's Social Contract. In G. A. J. Rogers & Alan Ryan (eds.), Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes. Oxford University Press. 71-84.
  31. David Gauthier (1988). Symposium Papers, Comments and an Abstract: Hobbes's Social Contract. Noûs 22 (1):71-82.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. David Gauthier (1977). The Social Contract as Ideology. Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (2):130-164.
    The conception of social relationships as contractual lies at the core of our ideology. Indeed, that core is constituted by the intersection of this conception with the correlative conceptions of human activity as appropriate and of rationality as utility-maximizing. My concern is to clarify this thesis and to enhance its descriptive plausibility as a characterization of our ideology, but to undermine its normative plausibility as ideologically effective.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Everett W. Hall (1957). II. Justice as Fairness: A Modernized Version of the Social Contract. Journal of Philosophy 54 (22):662-670.
  34. Jean Hampton (2007). The Intrinsic Worth of Persons: Contractarianism in Moral and Political Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
    Contractarianism in some form has been at the center of recent debates in moral and political philosophy. Jean Hampton was one of the most gifted philosophers involved in these debates and provided both important criticisms of prominent contractarian theories plus powerful defenses and applications of the core ideas of contractarianism. In these essays, she brought her distinctive approach, animated by concern for the intrinsic worth of persons, to bear on topics such as guilt, punishment, self-respect, family relations, and the maintenance (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Jean Hampton (1988). Symposium Papers, Comments and an Abstract: Comments on "Hobbes' Social Contract". Noûs 22 (1):85-86.
  36. Jean Hampton (1986/1988). Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. Cambridge University Press.
    This major study of Hobbes's political philosophy draws on recent developments in game and decision theory to explore whether the thrust of the argument in Leviathan, that it is in the interests of the people to create a ruler with absolute power, can be shown to be cogent. Professor Hampton has written a book of vital importance to political philosophers, political and social scientists, and intellectual historians.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Joseph Heath (2006). The Benefits of Cooperation. Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (4):313–351.
    There is an idea, extremely common among social contract theorists, that the primary function of social institutions is to secure some form of cooperative benefit. If individuals simply seek to satisfy their own preferences in a narrowly instrumental fashion, they will find themselves embroiled in collective action problems – interactions with an outcome that is worse for everyone involved than some other possible outcome. Thus they have reason to accept some form of constraint over their conduct, in order to achieve (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Adam Hosein (2013). Contractualism, Politics, and Morality. Acta Analytica 28 (4):495-508.
    Rawls developed a contractualist theory of social justice and Scanlon attempted to extend the Rawlsian framework to develop a theory of rightness, or morality more generally. I argue that there are some good reasons to adopt a contractualist theory of social justice, but that it is a mistake to adopt a contractualist theory of rightness. I begin by illustrating the major shared features of Scanlon and Rawls’ theories. I then show that the justification for these features in Rawls’ theory, the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Paul J. Johnson (1990). Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. International Studies in Philosophy 22 (3):112-112.
  40. I. Individualistic Justification (2006). Against Individualistic Justifications of Property Rights. Utilitas 18 (2).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Philip Kitcher (1999). Review: Games Social Animals Play: Commentary on Brian Skyrms's Evolution of the Social Contract. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):221 - 228.
  42. Aharon F. Kleinberger (1976). The Social‐Contract Strategy for the Justification of Moral Principles. Journal of Moral Education 5 (2):107-126.
    Abstract: Rawls? arguments in defence of his claim to derive principles of morality and justice from his hypothetical? original position? are critically examined and found to be unconvincing. In particular, it is pointed out that a theory of justice cannot be at one and the same time (a) descriptive?explanatory and therefore tested against people's actual judgments in particular cases, and (b) prescriptive?justificatory and therefore providing rationally derived principles against which people's actual judgments are tested for correctness. Rawls? attempt to conflate (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. M. H. Lessnoff (1978). Justice, Social Contract, and Universal Prescriptivism. Philosophical Quarterly 28 (110):65-73.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. H. D. Lewis (1939). Plato and the Social Contract. Mind 48 (189):78-81.
  45. Alejandra Mancilla (2013). Det vi eide førfast eiendom. Hugo Grotius og suum (What We Own Before Property: Hugo Grotius and the suum). Arr, Idéhistorisk Tiddskrift 3:3-14.
    At the basis of modern natural law theories, the concept of the suum, or what belongs to the person (in Latin, his, her, its, their own), has received little scholarly attention despite its importance both in explaining and justifying not only the genealogy of property, but also that of morality and war.1 In this paper I examine Hugo Grotius's what it is, what things it includes, what rights it gives rise to and how it is extended in the transition from (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Joe Mintoff (1997). Rational Cooperation, Intention, and Reconsideration. Ethics 107 (4):612-643.
    In their attempt to provide a reason to be moral, contractarians such as David Gauthier are concerned with situations allowing a group of agents the chance of mutual benefit, so long as at least some of them are prepared to constrain their maximising behaviour. But what justifies this constraint? Gauthier argues that it could be rational (because maximising) to intend to constrain one's behaviour, and in certain circumstances to act on this intention. The purpose of this paper is to examine (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Joe Mintoff (1996). On a Problem for Contractarianism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):98 – 116.
    To show it is sometimes rational to cooperate in the Prisoner's Dilemma, David Gauthier has claimed that if it is rational to form an intention then it is sometimes rational act on it. However, the Paradox of Deterrence and the Toxin Puzzle seem to put this general type of claim into doubt. For even if it is rational to form a deterrent intention, it is not rational act on it (if it is not successful); and even if it is rational (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Joe Mintoff (1993). Rational Cooperation, Irrational Retaliation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (4):362-380.
    David Gauthier has argued that, under certain conditions, cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma is rational. A crucial principle he employs in this argument, however, also implies the pointless retaliation after a failed threat could also be rational. In this paper, I introduce one possible reformulation of the Cooperation Argument, by replacing its second premise with a principle connecting rationally adopted intentions, rational action, and rational reconsideration, and a specific theory of rational reconsideration. I then argue that this reformulated Cooperation Argument (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. John Mizzoni (2010). Recent Work on Evolution and Social Contract Ethics. Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (3):377-388.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Michael Moehler (2013). Contractarian Ethics and Harsanyi's Two Justifications of Utilitarianism. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 12 (1):24-47.
    Harsanyi defends utilitarianism by means of an axiomatic proof and by what he calls the 'equiprobability model'. Both justifications of utilitarianism aim to show that utilitarian ethics can be derived from Bayesian rationality and some weak moral constraints on the reasoning of rational agents. I argue that, from the perspective of Bayesian agents, one of these constraints, the impersonality constraint, is not weak at all if its meaning is made precise, and that generally, it even contradicts individual rational agency. Without (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 78