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  1. Vuko Andrić (2010). David Gauthiers kontraktualistische Moralbegründung. Aufklärung Und Kritik 33:80-104.
    Dies ist eine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit David Gauthiers kontraktualistischer Moralbegründung.
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  2. John M. Armstrong (1997). Epicurean Justice. Phronesis 42 (3):324-334.
    Epicurus is one of the first social contract theorists, holding that justice is an agreement neither to harm nor be harmed. He also says that living justly is necessary and sufficient for living pleasantly, which is the Epicurean goal. Some say that there are two accounts of justice in Epicurus -- one as a personal virtue, the other as a virtue of institutions. I argue that the personal virtue derives from compliance with just social institutions, and so we need to (...)
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  3. Richard E. Ashcroft (2005). Access to Essential Medicines: A Hobbesian Social Contract Approach. Developing World Bioethics 5 (2):121–141.
    ABSTRACTMedicines that are vital for the saving and preserving of life in conditions of public health emergency or endemic serious disease are known as essential medicines. In many developing world settings such medicines may be unavailable, or unaffordably expensive for the majority of those in need of them. Furthermore, for many serious diseases these essential medicines are protected by patents that permit the patent‐holder to operate a monopoly on their manufacture and supply, and to price these medicines well above marginal (...)
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  4. Lawrence C. Becker (1992). Social Contract. In Lawrence C. Becker & Charlotte B. Becker (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Ethics. Garland Publishing Inc 2--1170.
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  5. Martin A. Bertman (1997). The Limits of Hobbesean Contractarianism. International Studies in Philosophy 29 (2):133-134.
  6. K. G. Binmore (1994). Game Theory and the Social Contract. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
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  7. Ken Binmore (2004). Reciprocity and the Social Contract. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 3 (1):5-35.
    This article is extracted from a forthcoming book, ‘Natural Justice’. It is a nontechnical introduction to the part of game theory immediately relevant to social contract theory. The latter part of the article reviews how concepts such as trust, responsibility, and authority can be seen as emergent phenomena in models that take formal account only of equilibria in indefinitely repeated games. Key Words: game theory • equilibrium • evolutionary stability • reciprocity • folk theorem • trust • altruism • responsibility (...)
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  8. Ken Binmore (2001). Game Theory and the Social Contract, Vol. II: Just Playing. Mind 110 (437):168-171.
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  9. Ken Binmore (1997). Evolution of the Social Contract, Brain Skyrms. Cambridge University Press, 1996, Xii+ 143 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 13 (2):352-.
  10. Michele Bocchiola (2015). Nicholas Southwood: Contractualism and the Foundations of Morality. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (4):873-875.
    In the contemporary philosophical debate, there are two opposing contractualist views. On the one side, Hobbesian contractualisms take moral principles as side-constraints to redress the failures of the interaction among self-interested individuals. On the other, Kantian versions of the social contract ground morality on an impartial and moralized viewpoint. In his recent Contractualism and the Foundations of Morality, Nicholas Southwood proposes a third and novel form of contractualism, with the aim to overcome the “implausibly personal and partial characterization of the (...)
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  11. David Boucher (1994). David Gauthier and Robert Sugden, Eds., Rationality, Justice and the Social Contract: Themes From 'Morals by Agreement', London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993, Pp. Xii + 201. Utilitas 6 (02):317-.
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  12. David Braybrooke (1987). Social Contract Theory's Fanciest Flight. Ethics 97 (4):750-764.
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  13. David Braybrooke (1976). The Insoluble Problem of the Social Contract. Dialogue 15 (01):3-37.
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  14. Ronald J. Broach (1998). Contractarianism in Ethics. Social Philosophy Today 13:331-347.
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  15. Ronald J. Broach (1998). Contractarianism in Ethics: Actual Contracts Vs. Hypothetical Contracts. Social Philosophy Today 13:331-347.
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  16. Justin P. Bruner (forthcoming). Diversity, Tolerance, and the Social Contract. Politics, Philosophy and Economics:1470594-14560763.
    Philosophers and social scientists have recently turned to game theory and agent-based models to better understand social contract formation. The stag hunt game is an idealization of social contract formation. Using the stag hunt game, we attempt to determine what, if any, barrier diversity is to the formation of an efficient social contract. We uncover a deep connection between tolerance, diversity, and the social contract. We investigate a simple model in which individuals possess salient traits and behave cooperatively when the (...)
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  17. Jon D. Carlson, Sage Kings & the State of Nature: Comparative Preconditions and the Social Contract.
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  18. Ian J. Carroll (2009). Neutrality and the Social Contract. Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 4 (2):134-150.
    Given the fact of moral disagreement, theories of state neutrality which rely on moral premises will have limited application, in that they will fail to motivate anyone who rejects the moral premises on which they are based. By contrast, contractarian theories can be consistent with moral scepticism, and can therefore avoid this limitation. In this paper, I construct a contractarian model which I claim is sceptically consistent and includes a principle of state neutrality as a necessary condition. The principle of (...)
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  19. Andrew I. Cohen (2007). Contractarianism, Other-Regarding Attitudes, and the Moral Standing of Nonhuman Animals. Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (2):188–201.
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  20. Ann E. Cudd (1992). Peter Vallentyne, Ed., Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 12 (4):299-301.
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  21. Simon Cushing (1998). Agreement in Social Contract Theories. Social Philosophy Today 13:349-371.
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  22. Fred D'Agostino, John Thrasher & Gerald Gaus, Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  23. Osten Dahl (1981). The Contract Game. In Jeroen Groenendijk (ed.), Formal Methods in the Study of Language. U of Amsterdam 79--86.
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  24. Peter Danielson (1998). Evolution of the Social Contract. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):627-652.
  25. Stephen L. Darwall (2006). The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability. Harvard University Press.
    The result is nothing less than a fundamental reorientation of moral theory that enables it at last to account for morality's supreme authority--an account that ...
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  26. Stephen L. Darwall (ed.) (2003). Contractarianism, Contractualism. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Contractualism/Contractarianism collects, for the first time, both major classical sources and central contemporary discussions of these important approaches to philosophical ethics. Edited and introduced by Stephen Darwall, these readings are essential for anyone interested in normative ethics.
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  27. Peter de Marneffe (2001). The Problem of Evil, the Social Contract, and the History of Ethics. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (1):11–25.
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  28. O. de Selincourt (1937). The Social Contract: A Critical Study of Its Development. By J. W. Gough. (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, London: Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. Viii + 234. Price 12s. 6d. Net.). [REVIEW] Philosophy 12 (47):362-.
  29. Joseph P. DeMarco (1989). The Problems of Preference Based Morality: A Critique of "Morals by Agreement". Journal of Social Philosophy 20 (3):77-91.
  30. Thomas Donaldson (1986). Fact, Fiction, and the Social Contract. Business and Professional Ethics Journal 5 (1):40-46.
  31. Mohammed Dore (1997). On Playing Fair: Professor Binmore on Game Theory and the Social Contract. Theory and Decision 43 (3):219-239.
    This paper critically reviews Ken Binmore’s non- utilitarian and game theoretic solution to the Arrow problem. Binmore’s solution belongs to the same family as Rawls’ maximin criterion and requires the use of Nash bargaining theory, empathetic preferences, and results in evolutionary game theory. Harsanyi has earlier presented a solution that relies on utilitarianism, which requires some exogenous valuation criterion and is therefore incompatible with liberalism. Binmore’s rigorous demonstration of the maximin principle for the first time presents a real alternative to (...)
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  32. Zachary Ernst (2001). Explaining the Social Contract. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):1-24.
    Brian Skyrms has argued that the evolution of the social contract may be explained using the tools of evolutionary game theory. I show in the first half of this paper that the evolutionary game-theoretic models are often highly sensitive to the specific processes that they are intended to simulate. This sensitivity represents an important robustness failure that complicates Skyrms's project. But I go on to make the positive proposal that we may none the less obtain robust results by simulating the (...)
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  33. Daniel M. Farrell (1988). Taming Leviathan: Reflections on Some Recent Work on Hobbes:Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. Jean Hampton; Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Gregory S. Kavka. [REVIEW] Ethics 98 (4):793-.
  34. Daniel M. Farrell (1988). Symposium Papers, Comments and an Abstract: Comments on "Hobbes' Social Contract". Noûs 22 (1):83-84.
  35. Roberto Festa (1999). Modelli Evoluzionistici Del Contratto Sociale. Etica E Politica 1 (1).
    In a recent book on The Evolution of Social Contract, Brian Skyrms shows how evolutionary game theory can be used to explain how the implicit social contract we live by might have evolved. In this paper, after describing the main lines of Skyrms’s approach, we will examine some problems arising from it, on the basis of a comparison with von Hayek’s evolutionary view. Finally, we will make some remarks on the possible relevance of the outcomes achieved by Skyrms for the (...)
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  36. James S. Fishkin (1990). Symposia Papers: Towards a New Social Contract. Noûs 24 (2):217-226.
  37. Branden Fitelson (1999). Review: Models and Reality-A Review of Brian Skyrms's Evolution of the Social Contract. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):237 - 241.
    Human beings are peculiar. In laboratory experiments, they often cooperate in one-shot prisoners’ dilemmas, they frequently offer 1/2 and reject low offers in the ultimatum game, and they often bid 1/2 in the game of divide-the-cake All these behaviors are puzzling from the point of view of game theory. The first two are irrational, if utility is measured in a certain way.1 The last isn’t positively irrational, but it is no more rational than other possible actions, since there are infinitely (...)
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  38. Antony Flew (1997). Evolution of the Social Contract By Skyrms Brian Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, Xiii + 146pp. [REVIEW] Philosophy 72 (282):604-.
  39. Danny Frederick (2013). Social Contract Theory Should Be Abandoned. Rationality, Markets and Morals 4:178-89.
    I argue that social-contract theory cannot succeed because reasonable people may always disagree, and that social-contract theory is irrelevant to the problem of the legitimacy of a form of government or of a system of moral rules. I note the weakness of the appeal to implicit agreement, the conflation of legitimacy with stability, the undesirability of “public justification” and the apparent blindness to the evolutionary critical-rationalist approach of Hayek and Popper. I employ that approach to sketch answers to the theoretical, (...)
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  40. Celeste M. Friend (1999). Gauthier, Translucency, and Trust. Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1):107-113.
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  41. Gerald Gaus (2012). Justification, Choice and Promise: Three Devices of the Consent Tradition in a Diverse Society. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 15 (2):109-127.
    The twin ideas at the heart of the social contract tradition are that persons are naturally free and equal, and that genuine political obligations must in some way be based on the consent of those obligated. The Lockean tradition has held that consent must be in the form of explicit choice; Kantian contractualism has insisted on consent as rational endorsement. In this paper I seek to bring the Kantian and Lockean contract traditions together. Kantian rational justification and actual choice are (...)
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  42. David Gauthier (2001). Trust Within Reason. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):487-490.
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  43. David Gauthier (1998). Why Contractarianism? In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical Theory 2: Theories About How We Should Live. OUP Oxford
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  44. David Gauthier (1995). Game Theory and the Social Contract Volume 1: Playing Fair, Binmore Ken. The MIT Press, 1994, Xxii + 364 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 11 (02):391-.
  45. David Gauthier (1988). Hobbes's Social Contract. In G. A. J. Rogers & Alan Ryan (eds.), Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes. Oxford University Press 71-84.
  46. David Gauthier (1988). Symposium Papers, Comments and an Abstract: Hobbes's Social Contract. Noûs 22 (1):71-82.
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  47. David Gauthier (1977). The Social Contract as Ideology. Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (2):130-164.
    The conception of social relationships as contractual lies at the core of our ideology. Indeed, that core is constituted by the intersection of this conception with the correlative conceptions of human activity as appropriate and of rationality as utility-maximizing. My concern is to clarify this thesis and to enhance its descriptive plausibility as a characterization of our ideology, but to undermine its normative plausibility as ideologically effective.
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  48. David P. Gauthier & Robert Sugden (1993). Rationality, Justice and the Social Contract Themes From Morals by Agreement.
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  49. J. W. Gough (1958). The Social Contract. Philosophical Review 67 (2):267-269.
  50. Everett W. Hall (1957). II. Justice as Fairness: A Modernized Version of the Social Contract. Journal of Philosophy 54 (22):662-670.
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