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  1. Don Adams (2009). Aquinas and Modern Contractualism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (4):509 – 530.
    When modern ethical contractualists defend their view against “teleology,” they typically have in mind utilitarian or consequentialist theories according to which valuable states of affairs are to be promoted. But if we look to older teleological theories e.g. that found in the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas we will find a kind of teleology that can be incorporated beneficially into contractualist ethics. In this paper I argue that Scanlon would be well served, on grounds to which he appeals, to make (...)
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  2. Robert Merrihew Adams (2001). Scanlon's Contractualism: Critical Notice of T. M. Scanlon, "What We Owe to Each Other". Philosophical Review 110 (4):563-586.
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  3. David Alm (2008). Contractualism, Reciprocity, Compensation. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2 (3):1-23.
    Two generally recognized moral duties are to reciprocate benefits one has received from others and to compensate harms one has done to others. In this paper I want to show that it is not possible to give an adequate account of either duty – or at least one that corresponds to our actual practices – within a contractualist moral theory of the type developed by T. M. Scanlon (1982, 1998). This fact is interesting in its own right, as contractualism is (...)
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  4. Richard Arneson, The End of Welfare as We Know It? Scanlon Versus Welfarist Consequentialism.
    (Forthcoming in Social Theory and Practice, 2002) Richard J. Arneson A notable achievement of T.M. <span class='Hi'>Scanlon</span>'s What We Owe to Each Other1 is its sustained critique of welfarist consequentialism.2 Consequentialism is the doctrine that one morally ought always to do an act, of the alternatives, that brings about a state of affairs that is no less good than any other one could bring about. Welfarism is the view that what makes a state of affairs better or worse is some (...)
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  5. Elizabeth Ashford (2003). The Demandingness of Scanlon's Contractualism. Ethics 113 (2):273-302.
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  6. Stephen W. Ball (1998). Critical Review of Rawls's Political Liberalism: A Utilitarian and Decision-Theoretical Analysis of the Main Arguments. Utilitas 10 (02):222-.
  7. Stephen W. Ball (1993). Maximin Justice, Sacrifice, and the Reciprocity Argument: A Pragmatic Reassessment of the Rawls/Nozick Debate. Utilitas 5 (02):157-.
  8. R. Eric Barnes (2012). Contractualism and the Foundations of Morality. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):815-818.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 90, Issue 4, Page 815-818, December 2012.
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  9. Brian Barry (1996). Contractual Justice: A Modest Defence. Utilitas 8 (03):357-.
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  10. John Charvet (1998). Fundamental Equality. Utilitas 10 (03):337-.
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  11. Michael Cholbi (2002). A Contractualist Account of Promising. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):475-91.
    T.M. Scanlon (1998) proposes that promise breaking is wrong because it shows manipulative disregard for the expectations for future behavior created by promising. I argue that this account of promissory obligation is mistaken in it own right, as well as being at odds with Scanlon's contractualism. I begin by placing Scanlon's account of promising within a tradition that treats the creation of expectations in promise recipients as central to promissory obligation. However, a counterexample to Scanlon's account, his case of the (...)
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  12. David Copp & David Sobel (2000). What We Owe to Each Other, T. M. Scanlon, the Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998, IX + 420 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 16 (2):333-378.
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  13. Fred D'Agostino, John Thrasher & Gerald Gaus, Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  14. Stephen L. Darwall (ed.) (2003). Contractarianism, Contractualism. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Contractualism/Contractarianism collects, for the first time, both major classical sources and central contemporary discussions of these important approaches to philosophical ethics. Edited and introduced by Stephen Darwall, these readings are essential for anyone interested in normative ethics.
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  15. Samuel Freeman (1990). Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views. Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 (2):122-157.
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  16. Samuel Richard Freeman (2007). Justice and the Social Contract: Essays on Rawlsian Political Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    John Rawls (1921-2002) was one of the 20th century's most important philosophers and continues to be among the most widely discussed of contemporary thinkers. His work, particularly A Theory of Justice, is integral to discussions of social and international justice, democracy, liberalism, welfare economics, and constitutional law, in departments of philosophy, politics, economics, law, public policy, and others. Samuel Freeman is one of Rawls's foremost interpreters. This volume contains nine of his essays on Rawls and Rawlsian justice, two of which (...)
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  17. Tamra Frei (2009). The Redundancy Objection, and Why Scanlon is Not a Contractualist. Journal of Political Philosophy 17 (1):47-65.
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  18. Barbara H. Fried (2012). Can Contractualism Save Us From Aggregation? Journal of Ethics 16 (1):39-66.
    This paper examines the efforts of contractualists to develop an alternative to aggregation to govern our duty not to harm (duty to rescue) others. I conclude that many of the moral principles articulated in the literature seem to reduce to aggregation by a different name. Those that do not are viable only as long as they are limited to a handful of oddball cases at the margins of social life. If extended to run-of-the-mill conduct that accounts for virtually all unintended (...)
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  19. Robert Garner (2012). Much Ado About Nothing?: Barry, Justice and Animals. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 15 (3):363-376.
    This article examines the extent to which Brian Barry?s contractarian political theory ? justice as impartiality ? is able to incorporate the interests of animals. Despite the initial optimism that Barry might provide a theory of justice that can provide substantial protection for the interests of animals, it is clear that he offers relatively little. Insofar as animals can be protected within justice as impartiality, they are not being protected as a result of their intrinsic value, but merely as one, (...)
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  20. David P. Gauthier (2006). Rousseau: The Sentiment of Existence. Cambridge University Press.
    The distinguished philosopher David Gauthier examines Rousseau's evolving notion of freedom, particularly in his later works, where he focuses on a single quest: Can freedom and the independent self be regained? Rousseau's first answer is given in Emile, where he seeks to create a self-sufficient individual, neither materially nor psychologically enslaved to others. His second answer comes in the Social Contract, where he seeks to create a citizen who identifies totally with his community, so that he experiences his dependence on (...)
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  21. Allan Gibbard (2008). Reconciling Our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics. Oxford University Press.
    In these three Tanner lectures, distinguished ethical theorist Allan Gibbard explores the nature of normative thought and the bases of ethics. In the first lecture he explores the role of intuitions in moral thinking and offers a way of thinking about the intuitive method of moral inquiry that both places this activity within the natural world and makes sense of it as an indispensable part of our lives as planners. In the second and third lectures he takes up the kind (...)
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  22. Pablo Gilabert (2010). Kant and the Claims of the Poor. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):382-418.
  23. Pablo Gilabert (2007). Contractualism and Poverty Relief. Social Theory and Practice 33 (2):277-310.
  24. Pablo Gilabert (2006). Global Justice, Democracy and Solidarity. Res Publica 12 (4).
  25. A. H. Goldman (2012). Contractualism and the Foundations of Morality, by Nicholas Southwood. Mind 121 (482):539-543.
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  26. Everett W. Hall (1957). II. Justice as Fairness: A Modernized Version of the Social Contract. Journal of Philosophy 54 (22):662-670.
  27. Jean Hampton (1980). Contracts and Choices: Does Rawls Have a Social Contract Theory? Journal of Philosophy 77 (6):315-338.
  28. Carl G. Hedman (1987). Making the Social Contract Relevant. Social Theory and Practice 13 (3):327-360.
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  29. Pamela Hieronymi (2011). Of Metaethics and Motivation: The Appeal of Contractualism. In R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar & Samuel Richard Freeman (eds.), Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon. Oxford University Press.
    In 1982, when T. M. Scanlon published “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” he noted that, despite the widespread attention to Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, the appeal of contractualism as a moral theory had been under appreciated. In particular, the appeal of contractualism’s account of what he then called “moral motivation” had been under appreciated.1 It seems to me that, in the intervening quarter century, despite the widespread discussion of Scanlon’s work, the appeal of contractualism, in precisely this regard, has still been (...)
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  30. Alison Hills (2010). Utilitarianism, Contractualism and Demandingness. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):225-242.
    One familiar criticism of utilitarianism is that it is too demanding. It requires us to promote the happiness of others, even at the expense of our own projects, our integrity, or the welfare of our friends and family. Recently Ashford has defended utilitarianism, arguing that it provides compelling reasons for demanding duties to help the needy, and that other moral theories, notably contractualism, are committed to comparably stringent duties. In response, I argue that utilitarianism is even more demanding than is (...)
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  31. Brad Hooker (2003). Contractualism, Spare Wheel, Aggregation. In Matt Matravers (ed.), Scanlon and Contractualism. Frank Cass.
    This essay explores the reasons for thinking that Scanlon's contractualist principle serves merely as a ?spare wheel?, an element that spins along nicely but bears no real weight, because it presupposes too much of what it should be explaning. The ambitions and scope of Scanlon's contractualism are discussed, as is Scanlon's thesis that contracualism will assess candidate moral principles individually rather than as sets. The final third of the paper critizes Scanlon's account of fairness and his approach to cases where (...)
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  32. John Horton (1996). The Good, the Bad, and the Impartial. Utilitas 8 (03):307-.
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  33. John Horton (1991). A Theory of Social Justice? Utilitas 3 (01):121-.
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  34. Adam Hosein, Numbers, Fairness and Charity.
    This paper discusses the "numbers problem," the problem of explaining why you should save more people rather than fewer when forced to choose. Existing non-consequentialist approaches to the problem appeal to fairness to explain why. I argue that this is a mistake and that we can give a more satisfying answer by appealing to requirements of charity or beneficence.
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  35. Michael Howard (2008). Justice and the Social Contract: Essays on Rawlsian Political Philosophy - by Samuel Freeman. Philosophical Books 49 (1):81-83.
  36. Jonathan Hughes & Stephen de Wijze (2001). Moral Contractualism Comes of Age. [REVIEW] Res Publica 7 (2):189--196.
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  37. Aaron James (2004). Rights and Circularity in Scanlon’s Contractualism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (3):367-374.
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  38. Scott James (2009). The Caveman's Conscience: Evolution and Moral Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):215-233.
    An increasingly popular moral argument has it that the story of human evolution shows that we can explain the human disposition to make moral judgments without relying on a realm of moral facts. Such facts can thus be dispensed with. But this argument is a threat to moral realism only if there is no realist position that can explain, in the context of human evolution, the relationship between our particular moral sense and a realm of moral facts. I sketch a (...)
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  39. Leonard Kahn (2010). Review of "Essays on Derek Parfit's ON WHAT MATTERS". [REVIEW] Metapsychology 14 (24).
  40. Mark Kalderon, How Not to Be a Normative Irrealist.
    Jimmy expresses sympathy for Scanlon’s contractualism but wonders whether it might be better developed in the context of a Humean expressivism. Jimmy presses this point, in part, by observing that much of what Scanlon wants to say about moral and normative discourse, such as their logical discipline and apparent truth-aptitude, can be accommodated by the expressivist. If all that Scanlon wants to say about moral and normative discourse can be accommodated by the expressivist then what content can be given to (...)
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  41. F. M. Kamm (2002). Owing, Justifying, and Rejecting. [REVIEW] Mind 111 (442):323-354.
    What We Owe to Each Other, by Thomas <span class='Hi'>Scanlon</span>. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999. Pp. 432. H/b £27.50, $39.95; P/b £13.95, $19.95.
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  42. Aharon F. Kleinberger (1976). The Social‐Contract Strategy for the Justification of Moral Principles. Journal of Moral Education 5 (2):107-126.
    Abstract: Rawls? arguments in defence of his claim to derive principles of morality and justice from his hypothetical? original position? are critically examined and found to be unconvincing. In particular, it is pointed out that a theory of justice cannot be at one and the same time (a) descriptive?explanatory and therefore tested against people's actual judgments in particular cases, and (b) prescriptive?justificatory and therefore providing rationally derived principles against which people's actual judgments are tested for correctness. Rawls? attempt to conflate (...)
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  43. Regina Kreide (2000). Context-Sensitive Universalism - on Thomas Scanlon's What We Owe to Each Other. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Social Criticism 26 (5):123-132.
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  44. Rahul Kumar (2003). Reasonable Reasons in Contractualist Moral Argument. Ethics 114 (1):6-37.
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  45. Rahul Kumar (2001). Contractualism on Saving the Many. Analysis 61 (2):165–170.
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  46. Rahul Kumar (1999). Defending the Moral Moderate: Contractualism and Common Sense. Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 (4):275–309.
  47. A. Faik Kurtulmus (2012). Uncertainty Behind the Veil of Ignorance. Utilitas 24 (01):41-62.
    This article argues that the decision problem in the original position should be characterized as a decision problem under uncertainty even when it is assumed that the denizens of the original position know that they have an equal chance of ending up in any given individual’s place. It supports this claim by arguing that (a) the continuity axiom of decision theory does not hold between all of the outcomes the denizens of the original position face and that (b) neither us (...)
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  48. A. Faik Kurtulmus (2009). Rawls and Cohen on Facts and Principles. Utilitas 21 (4):489-505.
    G. A. Cohen has recently argued for a thesis about the relationship between facts and principles. He claims that Rawls denies this thesis, and the truth of this thesis vitiates Rawls’s constructivist procedure. I argue against both claims by developing an account of Rawls’s justificatory strategy and the role of facts in this strategy, which I claim is similar to the role of facts in some defences of utilitarianism.
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  49. James Lenman (2008). Contractualism and Risk Imposition. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 7 (1):99-122.
    The article investigates the resources of contractualist moral theory to make sense of the ethics of risk imposition. In some ways, contractualism seems well placed to explain how it can be reasonable to accept exposure to risk of harms whose direct imposition would not be acceptable. However, there are difficulties getting clear about what directness comes to here, especially given the difficulty of adequately motivating traditional views that assign ethical significance to what the agent intends as opposed to merely foreseeing. (...)
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  50. Andrew Levine (1976). The Politics of Autonomy: A Kantian Reading of Rousseau's Social Contract. University of Massachusetts Press.
  51. S. Matthew Liao, What We Owe to Each Other by T. M. Scanlon.
    Scanlon’s book aims to offer us a moral theory of right and wrong and of our obligations to one another. The theory is called contractualism and its central claim is that an act is right or wrong if and only if it could or could not be justified to others on grounds that they could not reasonably reject (p. 4). Scanlon recognizes that so stated, his contractualism might seem empty in the sense that one might think that the aim of (...)
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  52. Hallvard Lillehammer (2010). Scanlon on Intention and Permissibility. Analysis 70 (3):578-585.
    The physical dimensions of a book are sometimes a misleading guide to its philosophical importance.1 T. M. Scanlon's Moral Dimensions is one such book. Although it is modest in size and refreshingly brief, it manages to include serious proposals for how to rethink each of three different issues at the heart of ethical thought, namely the nature blame, the grounds of permissibility, and the moral relevance of facts about intention.
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  53. Eric Mack (2007). Scanlon as Natural Rights Theorist. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 6 (1):45-73.
    This article examines the character of Scanlon’s contractualism as presented in What We Owe to Each Other . I offer a range of reasons for thinking of Scanlon’s contractualism as a species of natural rights theorizing. I argue that to affirm the principle that actions are wrongful if and only if they are disallowed by principles that people could not reasonably reject is equivalent to affirming a natural right (of an admittedly non-standard sort) against being subject to such reasonably disallowed (...)
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  54. Jon Mandle (2002). John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2001, Pp. Xviii + 214. Utilitas 14 (02):265-.
  55. Jon Mandle (2001). John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1999, Pp. Viii + 199. Utilitas 13 (01):125-.
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  56. Sarah Marshall (2003). Scanlon and Reasons. In Matt Matravers (ed.), Scanlon and Contractualism. Frank Cass.
    Scanlon's account of reasons is essential to his contractualism as a whole, providing an extensive foundation in practical reasoning for his theory. A full understanding of his account of reasons is therefore vital to understanding the nature of Scanlon's contractualism. With the aim of contributing to such an understanding, in this essay I reconstruct several of Scanlon's most significant arguments concerning reasons. I focus on two areas: his discussion of the role of desire in practical reasoning and his arguments for (...)
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  57. Andrew Mason (1996). Justice, Contestability, and Conceptions of the Good. Utilitas 8 (03):295-305.
    Brian Barry's Justice as Impartiality is a highly enjoyable and rewarding book. It throws new light on some familiar theories of justice, and shows how the idea that principles of justice are those principles which no one could reasonably reject can yield prescriptions for constitutional design. But I shall argue that Barry's defence of his theory is less robust than he thinks, and more generally that there is reason to suppose that principles of justice are as contestable as conceptions of (...)
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  58. Matt Matravers (2003). Responsibility and Choice. In Matt Matravers (ed.), Scanlon and Contractualism. Frank Cass.
    In this essay I agrue that contemporary Anglo-American liberal egalitarianism has at its heart a tension: the goal is to find principles of justice that are fair in respecting the distinction between choice and chance and that do not invoke controversial metaphysical arguments. This is a tension because distinguishing between choice and chance itself requires invoking controversial metaphysical arguments. I proceed by offering, and then examining, the thought that Scanlon's distinction between ?attributive? and ?substantive? responsibility offers a route out of (...)
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  59. Matt Matravers (ed.) (2003). Scanlon and Contractualism. Frank Cass.
    This collection brings together essays which reflect on the detailed arguments of "What We Owe to Each Other", and which comment critically both on Scanlon's contractualism and his revised understandings of motivation and morality. The essays illustrate the uses of Scanlon's contractualism by applying it to moral and political problems and in so doing they provide an assessment of the ability of Scanlon's contractualism by applying it to other forms of ethical theory. So, the central questions are: "What is the (...)
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  60. Matt Matravers (2002). Intoduction: Scanlon's Contractualism. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 5 (2):1-12.
  61. Matt Matravers (1996). What's 'Wrong' in Contractualism? Utilitas 8 (03):329-.
    Brian Barry's Justice as Impartiality is an important book. One of its contributions to the discipline is a characteristically clear presentation of what follows if one accepts a commitment to equality, and the reasonableness of continuing and profound disagreements about the nature of the good life (the reasonableness of pluralism). I take the argument of Justice as Impartiality to be an important next step in the attempt to give an account of the content of justice which is impartial, fair, or (...)
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  62. David McNaughton & Piers Rawling (2003). Can Scanlon Avoid Redundancy by Passing the Buck? Analysis 63 (4):328–331.
    Scanlon suggests a buck-passing account of goodness. To say that something is good is not to give a reason to, say, favour it; rather it is to say that there are such reasons. When it comes to wrongness, however, Scanlon rejects a buck-passing account: to say that j ing is wrong is, on his view, to give a sufficient moral reason not to j. Philip Stratton-Lake 2003 argues that Scanlon can evade a redundancy objection against his (Scanlon’s) view of wrongness (...)
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  63. Susan Mendus (2003). The Magic in the Pronoun My. In Matt Matravers (ed.), Scanlon and Contractualism. Frank Cass.
    In What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon says that any acceptable moral teory must answer what he calls the priority question: the question of why moral value should takes priority over other values, such as the values of love and friendship. In this essay I discuss Scanlon's answer to the priority question and contrast it with the answer offered by Christine Korsgaard in Sources of Normativity. I argue that each account contains important insights but that neither is completely (...)
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  64. Thaddeus Metz (2002). The Reasonable and the Moral. Social Theory and Practice 28 (2):277-301.
    I construct a new theory of unreasonable action, one that is analogous to commonsensical judgments of unreasonable emotion, and I then argue that a theory of wrongness qua unreasonable action does a better job of accounting for several important aspects of wrongness than Scanlon's theory of wrongness qua reasonable rejection among hypothetical social contractors.
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  65. M. Millar (2012). Constraining the Use of Antibiotics: Applying Scanlon's Contractualism. Journal of Medical Ethics 38 (8):465-469.
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  66. Richard W. Miller (2002). Moral Contractualism and Moral Sensitivity. Social Theory and Practice 28 (2):193-220.
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  67. Michael Moehler (2012). A Hobbesian Derivation of the Principle of Universalization. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):83-107.
    In this article, I derive a weak version of Kant's categorical imperative within an informal game-theoretic framework. More specifically, I argue that Hobbesian agents would choose what I call the weak principle of universalization, if they had to decide on a rule of conflict resolution in an idealized but empirically defensible hypothetical decision situation. The discussion clarifies (i) the rationality requirements imposed on agents, (ii) the empirical conditions assumed to warrant the conclusion, and (iii) the political institutions that are necessary (...)
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  68. Michael Otsuka (2000). Scanlon and the Claims of the Many Versus the One. Analysis 60 (3):288–293.
    In "What We Owe to Each Other", T. M. <span class='Hi'>Scanlon</span> argues that one should save the greater number when faced with the choice between saving one life and two or more different lives. It is, <span class='Hi'>Scanlon</span> claims, a virtue of this argument (which is traceable to Frances Kamm) that it does not appeal to the claims of groups of individuals but only to the claims of individuals. I demonstrate that this argument for saving the greater number, indeed, depends, (...)
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  69. Derek Parfit (2003). Justifiability to Each Person. Ratio 16 (4):368–390.
    sonable, in this sense, if we ignore, or give too little weight to, some other people's well-being or moral claims.' Some critics have suggested that, because Scanlon appeals to this sense of 'reasonable', his formula is empty. On this objection, whenever we believe that some act is wrong, we shall believe that people have moral claims not to be treated in this way. We could therefore argue that such acts are disallowed by some principle which no one could reasonably reject, (...)
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  70. Joseph Persky (2010). Rawls's Thin (Millean) Defense of Private Property. Utilitas 22 (2):134-147.
  71. Philip Pettit (2000). Review: Two Construals of Scanlon's Contractualism. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):148 - 164.
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  72. Joseph Raz (2003). Numbers, with and Without Contractualism. Ratio 16 (4):346–367.
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  73. Henry S. Richardson (2006). Rawlsian Social-Contract Theory and the Severely Disabled. Journal of Ethics 10 (4):419 - 462.
    Martha Nussbaum has powerfully argued in Frontiers ofJustice and elsewhere that John Rawls’s sort of social-contract theory cannot usefully be deployed to deal with issues pertaining to justice for the disabled. To counter this claim, this article deploys Rawls’s sort of social-contract theory in order to deal with issues pertaining to justice for the disabled—or, since, as Nussbaum stresses, we all have some degree of disability—for the severely disabled. In this way, rather than questioning one by one Nussbaum’s interpretive claims (...)
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  74. Michael Ridge (2001). Saving Scanlon: Contractualism and Agent-Relativity. Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (4):472–481.
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  75. Michael Ridge, Scanlon, Permissions, and Redundancy: Response to McNaughton and Rawling.
    According to one formulation of <span class='Hi'>Scanlon</span>’s contractualist principle, certain acts are wrong if they are permitted by principles that are reasonably rejectable because they permit such acts. According to the redundancy objection, if a principle is reasonably rejectable because it permits actions which have feature F, such actions are wrong simply in virtue of having F and not because their having F makes principles permitting them reasonably rejectable. Consequently <span class='Hi'>Scanlon</span>’s contractualist principle adds nothing to the reasons we have (...)
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  76. Gideon Rosen (2009). Might Kantian Contractualism Be the Supreme Principle of Morality? Ratio 22 (1):78-97.
    According to Parfit, the best version of Kantian ethics takes as its central principle Kantian Contractualism: the thesis that everyone ought to follow the principles whose universal acceptance everyone could rationally will. This paper examines that thesis, identifies a class of annoying counterexamples, and suggests that when Kantian Contractualism is modified in response to these examples, the resulting principle is too complex and ad hoc to serve as the 'supreme principle of morality'.
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  77. T. M. Scanlon (2003). Review: Précis of "What We Owe to Each Other". [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):159 - 161.
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  78. T. M. Scanlon (2003). Reply to Gauthier and Gibbard. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):176–189.
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  79. T. M. Scanlon (2003). Précis of What We Owe to Each Other. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):159–161.
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  80. T. M. Scanlon (2000). A Contractualist Reply. Theoria 66 (3):237-245.
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  81. Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
    In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other.
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  82. Hanoch Sheinman (2011). Act and Principle Contractualism. Utilitas 23 (03):288-315.
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  83. David Shoemaker (2000). Reductionist Contractualism: Moral Motivation and the Expanding Self. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):343-370.
    According to a popular contemporary contractualist account of moral motivation, the most plausible explanation for why those who are concerned with morality take moral reasons seriously — why these reasons strike those who are moved by them with a particular inescapability — is that they stem from, and are grounded by, a desire to be able to justify one’s actions to others on grounds they could not reasonably reject.1 My.
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  84. David Sosa (2004). T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998) A Big, Good Thing. Noûs 38 (2):359-377.
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  85. David Sosa (2004). A Big, Good Thing: T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998). Noûs 38 (2):359–377.
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  86. Nicholas Southwood (2010). Contractualism and the Foundations of Morality. Oxford University Press.
    Contractualism has a venerable history and considerable appeal. Yet as an account of the foundations or ultimate grounds of morality it has been thought by many philosophers to be subject to fatal objections. This book argues otherwise. It begins by detailing and diagnosing the shortcomings of the main existing models of contractualism, “Hobbesian” contractualism (or contractarianism) and “Kantian” contractualism. It then proposes a novel, "deliberative" model, based on an interpersonal, deliberative conception of practical reason. It argues that the deliberative model (...)
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  87. Nicholas Southwood (2009). Moral Contractualism. Philosophy Compass 4 (6):926-937.
    This article provides a critical introduction to contractualism as a moral or ethical theory, that is, as a theory of the rightness and wrongness of individual conduct – focusing specifically on the influential 'Kantian' version of contractualism due to T. M. Scanlon. I begin by elucidating the key features of Scanlon's contractualism: justifiability to others; reasonable rejectability; the individualist restriction; and mutual recognition. I then turn to discuss both its appeal and the main objections that have been raised to it (...)
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  88. Nicholas Southwood (2008). A Deliberative Model of Contractualism. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 7 (2):183-208.
    Despite an impressive philosophical pedigree, contractualism (or contractarianism) has only been properly developed in two ways: by appeal to the idea of an instrumentally rational bargain or contract between self-interested individuals (Hobbesian contractualism) and by appeal to the idea of a substantively reasonable agreement among individuals who regard one another as free and equal persons warranting equal moral respect (Kantian contractualism). Both of these existing models of contractualism are susceptible to apparently devastating objections. In this article, I outline a third, (...)
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  89. Philip Stratton-Lake (ed.) (2004). On What We Owe to Each Other. Blackwell.
    In "On What We Owe to Each Other," five leading moral philosophers assess various aspects of Scanlon's moral theory as laid out in this seminal work.
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  90. Philip Stratton-Lake (2003). Scanlon, Permissions, and Redundancy: Response to McNaughton and Rawling. Analysis 63 (4):332–337.
    According to one formulation of Scanlon’s contractualist principle, certain acts are wrong if they are permitted by principles that are reasonably rejectable because they permit such acts. According to the redundancy objection, if a principle is reasonably rejectable because it permits actions which have feature F, such actions are wrong simply in virtue of having F and not because their having F makes principles permitting them reasonably rejectable. Consequently Scanlon’s contractualist principle adds nothing to the reasons we have not to (...)
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  91. Philip Stratton–Lake (2003). Scanlon's Contractualism and the Redundancy Objection. Analysis 63 (277):70–76.
    Ebbhinghaus, H., J. Flum, and W. Thomas. 1984. Mathematical Logic. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag. Forster, T. Typescript. The significance of Yablo’s paradox without self-reference. Available from http://www.dpmms.cam.ac.uk. Gold, M. 1965. Limiting recursion. Journal of Symbolic Logic 30: 28–47. Karp, C. 1964. Languages with Expressions of Infinite Length. Amsterdam.
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  92. Jussi Suikkanen (2007). T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1998), Pp. 420. Utilitas 19 (4):524-526.
    This paper is a short review of T.M. Scanlon's book What We Owe to Each Other. The book itself is already a philosophical classic. It defence a contractualist ethical theory but also has many interesting things to say about reasons, value, well-being, promises, relativism, and so on.
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  93. Jussi Suikkanen (2005). Contractualist Replies to the Redundancy Objections. Theoria 71 (1):38-58.
    This paper is a defence of T.M. Scanlon's contractualism - the view that an action is wrong if it is forbidden by the principles which no one could reasonably reject. Such theories have been argued to be redundant in two ways. They are claimed to assume antecedent moral facts to explain which principles could not be reasonably rejected, and the reasons they provide to follow the non-rejectable principles are said to be unnecessary given that we already have sufficient reasons not (...)
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  94. Kyle Swan & Kevin Vallier (2012). The Normative Significance of Conscience. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (3):1-21.
    Despite the increasing amount of literature on the legal and political questions triggered by a commitment to liberty of conscience, an explanation of the normative significance of conscience remains elusive. We argue that the few attempts to address this fail to capture the reasons people have to respect the consciences of others. We offer an alternative account that utilizes the resources of the contractualist tradition in moral philosophy to explain why conscience matters.
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  95. Matthew Talbert (2006). Contractualism and Our Duties to Nonhuman Animals. Environmental Ethics 28 (2):201-215.
    The influential account of contractualist moral theory offered recently by T. M. Scanlon in What We Owe to Each Other is not intended to account for all the various moral commitments that people have; it covers only a narrow—though important—range of properly moral concerns and claims. Scanlon focuses on what he calls the morality of right and wrong or, as he puts it in his title, what we owe to each other. The question arises as to whether nonhuman animals can (...)
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  96. Julia Tanner (2013). Contractarianism and Secondary Direct Moral Standing for Marginal Humans and Animals. Res Publica 19 (2):1-16.
    It is commonly thought that neo-Hobbesian contractarianism cannot yield direct moral standing for marginal humans and animals. However, it has been argued that marginal humans and animals can have a form of direct moral standing under neo-Hobbesian contractarianism: secondary moral standing. I will argue that, even if such standing is direct, this account is unsatisfactory because it is counterintuitive and fragile.
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  97. Julia Tanner (2011). Rowlands, Rawlsian Justice and Animal Experimentation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (5):569-587.
    Mark Rowlands argues that, contrary to the dominant view, a Rawlsian theory of justice can legitimately be applied to animals. One of the implications of doing so, Rowlands argues, is an end to animal experimentation. I will argue, contrary to Rowlands, that under a Rawlsian theory there may be some circumstances where it is justifiable to use animals as experimental test subjects (where the individual animals are benefited by the experiments).
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  98. Alan Thomas (2009). Internal Reasons and Contractualist Impartiality. Utilitas 14 (02):135-.
    This paper interprets Bernard Williams's claim that all practical reasons must meet the internal reasons constraint. It is argued that this constraint is independent of any substantive Humean claims about reasons and its rationale is a content scepticism about the capacity of pure reason to supply reasons for action. The final sections attempt a positive reconciliation of the internal reasons account with the motivation for external reasons, namely, securing practical objecitivy in the form of a commitment to impartiality. Impartiality is (...)
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  99. Peter Vallentyne (2000). What We Owe to Each Other. International Philosophical Quarterly 40 (1):102-103.
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  100. Peter Vallentyne (1986). Gauthier on Rationality and Morality. Eidso 5 (1):79-95.
    David Gauthier's book represents the culmination of his work over the last twenty years on the theory of rational choice and on contractarian moral theory. It is the most important book on contractarianisni since Rawls‘ A Theory of Justice' and is mandatory reading for anyone specializing in contemporary moral theory. Gauthier does two distinct, although closely related, things in his book: (l) he defends a theory of rational choice, and (2) he defends a contractarian theory of morality. The two are (...)
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