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  1. Lawrence Alexander (1984). Another Look at Moral Blackmail. Philosophy Research Archives 10:189-196.
    In this paper I describe cases of moral blackmail as cases where A is told by B that if A does not commit an otherwise immoral act, B will commit an immoral act of equal or greater gravity. I describe cases of moral dilemma as cases where A must commit an otherwise immoral act to avert a natural disaster of equal or greater gravity. I then argue that cases of moral blackmail are structurally identical to cases of moral dilemma in (...)
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  2. Carl Baker (2011). Expressivism and Moral Dilemmas: A Response to Marino. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (4):445-455.
    Simon Blackburn’s expressivist logic of attitudes aims to explain how we can use non-assertoric moral judgements in logically valid arguments. Patricia Marino has recently argued that Blackburn’s logic faces a dilemma: either it cannot account for the place of moral dilemmas in moral reasoning or, if it can, it makes an illicit distinction between two different kinds of moral dilemma. Her target is the logic’s definition of validity as satisfiability, according to which validity requires an avoidance of attitudinal inconsistency. Against (...)
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  3. Johannes Bechert (1991). The Problem of Semantic Incomparability. In Dietmar Zaefferer (ed.), Semantic Universals and Universal Semantics. Foris Publications. 12--60.
  4. Walter Brogan (2006). Double Archê. Angelaki 11 (3):85 – 92.
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  5. Val Brooks (2004). Double Marking Revisited. British Journal of Educational Studies 52 (1):29 - 46.
    In 2002, the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA) published the report of an independent panel of experts into maintaining standards at Advanced Level (A-Level). One of its recommendations was for: 'limited experimental double marking of scripts in subjects such as English to determine whether the strategy would significantly reduce errors of measurement' (p. 24). This recommendation provided the impetus for this paper which reviews the all but forgotten literature on double marking and considers its relevance now.
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  6. Thomas A. Cavanaugh (1996). The Intended/Foreseen Distinction's Ethical Relevance. Philosophical Papers 25 (3):179-188.
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  7. Ruth Chang (2013). Incommensurability (and Incomparability). In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
  8. Adam Cureton (2009). Degrees of Fairness and Proportional Chances. Utilitas 21 (2):217-221.
    Suppose the following: Two groups of people require our aid but we can help only one group; there are more people in the first group than the second group; every person in both groups has an equal claim on our aid; and we have a duty to help and no other special obligations or duties. I argue that there exists at least one fairness function, which is a function that measures the goodness of degrees of fairness, that implies that we (...)
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  9. Please Delete, Double Please Delete.
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  10. Tom Dougherty (2013). Aggregation, Beneficence and Chance. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (2):1-19.
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  11. Cécile Fabre (2012). Internecine War Killings. Utilitas 24 (02):214-236.
    In his recent book Killing in War, McMahan develops a powerful argument for the view that soldiers on opposite sides of a conflict are not morally on a par once the war has started: whether they have the right to kill depends on the justness of their war. In line with just war theory in general, McMahan scrutinizes the ethics of killing the enemy. In this article, I accept McMahan's account, but bring it to bear on the entirely neglected, but (...)
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  12. William J. FitzPatrick (2009). Thomson's Turnabout on the Trolley. Analysis 69 (4):636-643.
    The famous ‘trolley problem’ began as a simple variation on an example given in passing by Philippa Foot , involving a runaway trolley that cannot be stopped but can be steered to a path of lesser harm. By switching from the perspective of the driver to that of a bystander, Judith Jarvis Thomson showed how the case raises difficulties for the normative theory Foot meant to be defending, and Thomson compounded the challenge with further variations that created still more puzzles (...)
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  13. Alistair Fruish (2007). Double Bubble. Philosophy Now 61:52-54.
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  14. George Stuart Fullerton (1907). The Doctrine of the Eject II. The Doctrine of Direct Communion. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 4 (21):561-567.
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  15. Benjamín García-Hernández (2003). Paradoxes in the Argumentation of the Comic Double and Classemic Contradiction. Argumentation 17 (1):99-111.
    In the comedies of errors, and more precisely in the comedies of double, in which two identities become confused, the characters get into paradoxical situations reigned by the principle of contradiction. The classemic relationships that are based on the criterion of subjectivity are broken due to the intervention of the character appearing as the double, for the doubled and the double can appear as one subject or as two. In fact, in the added double one + one equals one (1 (...)
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  16. Patricia Greenspan (1995). Practical Guilt: Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms. Oxford University Press.
    In its treatment of the role of emotion in ethics the argument of the book outlines a new way of packing motivational force into moral meaning that allows for a ...
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  17. Matthew Hanser (2005). Permissibility and Practical Inference. Ethics 115 (3):443-470.
    I wish to examine a rather different way of thinking about permissibility, one according to which, roughly speaking, an agent acts impermissibly if and only if he acts for reasons insufficient to justify him in doing what he does. For reasons that will emerge in Section II, I call this the inferential account of permissibility. I shall not here try to prove that this account is superior to its rivals. My aims are more modest. I shall develop the inferential account, (...)
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  18. Matthew Hanser (1999). Killing, Letting Die and Preventing People From Being Saved. Utilitas 11 (03):277-.
    The distinction between killing and letting die is too simple. A third category must also be recognized. Like killing, preventing a person from being saved is a species of doing harm; like killing, it infringes one of the victim's negative rights. Yet preventing a person from being saved is morally on a par with letting die, which infringes one of the victim's positive rights. It follows that we cannot explain the moral inequivalence of killing and letting die by saying, as (...)
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  19. Bengt Hansson (1968). Choice Structures and Preference Relations. Synthese 18 (4):443 - 458.
  20. Hans Harbers & Gerard de Vries (1993). Empirical Consequences of the 'Double Hermeneutic'. Social Epistemology 7 (2):183 – 192.
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  21. Carol Gibb Harding (ed.) (1985/2010). Moral Dilemmas and Ethical Reasoning. Transaction Publishers.
    This book deals with moral dilemmas and the development of ethical reasoning in two senses.
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  22. D. W. Haslett (2011). Boulders and Trolleys. Utilitas 23 (03):268-287.
    This discussion attempts to show that the elusive solution to the trolley problem lies hidden in the solution to another perennial problem in moral philosophy: the ducking puzzle. The key to solving the ducking puzzle is an important, but overlooked, exception to our obligation not to harm others, an exception for , which, it is argued here, is also the key to solving the trolley problem.
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  23. Bashshar Haydar (2010). The Consequences of Rejecting the Moral Relevance of the Doing–Allowing Distinction. Utilitas 22 (2):222-227.
    The claim that one is never morally permitted to engage in non-optimal harm doing enjoys a great intuitive appeal. If in addition to this claim, we reject the moral relevance of the doingallowing distinction. In this short essay, I propose a different take on the argument in question. Instead of opting to reject its conclusion by defending the moral relevance of the doingallowing distinction, we can no longer rely on the strong intuitive appeal of the claim that one is never (...)
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  24. Daniel Holbrook (1994). Lincoln Allison, Ecology and Utility: The Philosophical Dilemmas of Planetary Management, Leicester University Press, 1991, Pp. 185. Utilitas 6 (01):145-.
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  25. N. Hsieh (forthcoming). Is Incomparability a Problem for Anyone?, Forthcoming In. Economics and Philosophy.
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  26. Peter Van Inwagen (2000). Double Dactyls. Mind 109:23 - 24.
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  27. F. M. Kamm (2013). Trolley Problem. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  28. F. M. Kamm (2008). Responses to Commentators on Intricate Ethics. Utilitas 20 (1):111-142.
    Some of the commentators on Intricate Ethics complain of my method. One finds the main ideas ‘Kammouflaged’ because the relevant causal distinctions are so fine-grained and the cases that illustrate them so numerous . Some say that they do not have the intuitions about many cases that I have, that I concoct dubious and ad hoc distinctions and invest them with moral significance; I am Ptolemaic in that new crystalline spheres and epicycles are constantly being added in an attempt to (...)
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  29. F. M. Kamm (1998). Grouping and the Imposition of Loss. Utilitas 10 (3):292-.
    In this article, I critically examine Peter Unger's arguments for the claim that there is a duty to cause physical harm to oneself and others in order to save lives. This includes discussion of his view that when the method of cases involves several rather than merely two options our intuitive judgements support his radical thesis. In conclusion, I consider his attempt to reconcile his claims with common sense moral judgements.
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  30. David Kaspar (2011). Can Morality Do Without Prudence? Philosophia 39 (2):311-326.
    This paper argues that morality depends on prudence, or more specifically, that one cannot be a moral person without being prudent. Ethicists are unaware of this, ignore it, or imply it is wrong. Although this thesis is not obvious from the current perspective of ethics, I believe that its several implications for ethics make it worth examining. In this paper I argue for the prudence dependency thesis by isolating moral practice from all reliance on prudence. The result is that in (...)
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  31. Hallvard Lillehammer (2010). Scanlon on Intention and Permissibility. Analysis 70 (3):578-585.
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  32. Xiaofei Liu (2012). A Robust Defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Utilitas 24 (01):63-81.
    Philosophers debate over the truth of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the thesis that there is a morally significant difference between doing harm and merely allowing harm to happen. Deontologists tend to accept this doctrine, whereas consequentialists tend to reject it. A robust defence of this doctrine would require a conceptual distinction between doing and allowing that both matches our ordinary use of the concepts in a wide range of cases and enables a justification for the alleged moral difference. (...)
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  33. Domenico Losurdo (2010). Moral Dilemmas and Broken Promises: A Historical-Philosophical Overview of the Nonviolent Movement. Historical Materialism 18 (4):85-134.
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  34. Bryan Lueck (forthcoming). Moral Dilemma and Moral Sense: A Phenomenological Account. Journal of Speculative Philosophy.
    In this paper I argue that a phenomenological account of moral sense-bestowal can provide valuable insight into the possibility of moral dilemmas. I propose an account of moral sense-bestowal that is grounded in the phenomenology of expression that Maurice Merleau-Ponty developed throughout the course of his philosophical work, and most explicitly in the period immediately following the publication of Phenomenology of Perception. Based on this Merleau-Pontian account of moral sense-bestowal, I defend the view that there are genuine moral dilemmas, i.e., (...)
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  35. Terrance McConnell, Moral Dilemmas. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  36. Thaddeus Metz (2001). Review of Heidi Hurd, Moral Combat. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 110 (3):434-436.
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  37. Phillip Montague (2000). Forcing the Choice Between Lives', Journal of Applied Philosophy, Ix (1992). For a Reply© Edinburgh University Press 2000 Utilitas Vol. 12, No. 1, March 2000. [REVIEW] Utilitas 12 (1).
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  38. Sarah Moss (2014). Credal Dilemmas. Noûs 48 (3).
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  39. Kuninori Nakamura (2013). A Closer Look at Moral Dilemmas: Latent Dimensions of Morality and the Difference Between Trolley and Footbridge Dilemmas. Thinking and Reasoning 19 (2):178-204.
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  40. Richard P. Nielsen (1996). Single-, Double-, and Triple-Loop Politics. The Ruffin Series in Business Ethics:187-211.
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  41. Tyler Paytas (2014). Sometimes Psychopaths Get It Right: A Utilitarian Response to 'The Mismeasure of Morals'. Utilitas 26 (2):178-191.
    A well-publicized study entitled (Bartels and Pizarro, 2011) purportedly provides evidence that utilitarian solutions to a particular class of moral dilemmas are endorsed primarily by individuals with psychopathic traits. According to the authors, these findings give researchers reason to refrain from classifying utilitarian judgements as morally optimal. This article is a two-part response to the study. The first part comprises concerns about the methodology used and the adequacy of the data for supporting the authors’ conclusions. The second part seeks to (...)
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  42. Mozaffar Qizilbash (2007). The Mere Addition Paradox, Parity and Vagueness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):129–151.
    Derek Parfit’s mere addition paradox has generated a large literature. This paper articulates one response to this paradox - which Parfit hirnself suggested - in terms of a formal account of the relation of parity. I term this response the ‘parity view’. It is consistent with transitivity of ‘at least as good as’, but implies incompleteness of this relation. The parity view is compatible with critical-band utilitarianism if this is adjusted to allow for vagueness. John Broome argues against accounts which (...)
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  43. Philip L. Quinn (1991). Moral Dilemmas, by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (3):693-697.
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  44. Warren S. Quinn (1989). Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Philosophical Review 98 (3):287-312.
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  45. Wlodek Rabinowicz, Value Relations: Old Wine in New Barrels.
    In Rabinowicz 2008, I considered how value relations can best be analyzed in terms of fitting pro-­‐attitudes. In the formal model presented in that paper fitting pro-­‐attitudes are represented by the class of permissible preference orderings on a domain of items that are being compared. As it turns out, this approach opens up for a multiplicity of different types of value relationships, along with the standard relations of "better", "worse", "equally as good as" and "incomparable in value". Unfortunately, though, the (...)
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  46. Alex Rajczi (2002). When Can One Requirement Override Another? Philosophical Studies 108 (3):309 - 326.
    I argue that any theory of moral obligation must be able to explain two things: why we cannot be thrust into a moral dilemma through no fault of our own, and why we can get into a moral dilemma through our own negligence. The most intuitive theory of moral obligation cannot do so. However, I offer a theory of moral obligation that satisfies both of these criteria, one that is founded on the principle that if you are required to do (...)
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  47. Luke Robinson (2013). A Dispositional Account of Conflicts of Obligation. Noûs 47 (2):203-228.
    I address a question in moral metaphysics: How are conflicts between moral obligations possible? I begin by explaining why we cannot give a satisfactory answer to this question simply by positing that such conflicts are conflicts between rules, principles, or reasons. I then develop and defend the “Dispositional Account,” which posits that conflicts between moral obligations are conflicts between the manifestations of obligating dispositions (obligating powers, capacities, etc.), just as conflicts between physical forces are conflicts between the manifestations of (certain) (...)
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  48. Julian Savulescu (2007). Future People, Involuntary Medical Treatment in Pregnancy and the Duty of Easy Rescue. Utilitas 19 (1):1-20.
    I argue that pregnant women have a duty to refrain from behaviours or to allow certain acts to be done to them for the sake of their foetus if the foetus has a reasonable chance of living and being in a harmed state if the woman does not refrain from those behaviours or allow those things to be done to her. There is a proviso: that her refraining from acting or allowing acts to be performed upon her does not significantly (...)
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  49. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (1987). Moral Realisms and Moral Dilemmas. Journal of Philosophy 84 (5):263-276.
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  50. Heidi Storl (1994). How a Double Success Can Be a Fallure. Southwest Philosophy Review 10 (1):125-135.
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