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  1. K. Abramson (2009). A Sentimentalist's Defense of Contempt, Shame and Disdain. In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press
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  2. Christopher P. Adkins (2011). Once More with Feeling : Integrating Emotion in Teaching Business Ethics' Educational Implications From Cognitive Neuroscience and Social Psychology. In Ronald R. Sims & William I. Sauser (eds.), Experiences in Teaching Business Ethics. Information Age Pub.
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  3. Mark Alfano (2014). Emotions in the Moral Life, by Robert Roberts. Mind 123 (492):1238-1242.
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  4. Nicola Ansell & Lorraine Van Blerk (2005). Joining the Conspiracy? Negotiating Ethics and Emotions in Researching (Around) AIDS in Southern Africa. Ethics, Place and Environment 8 (1):61 – 82.
    Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is an emotive subject, particularly in southern Africa. Among those who have been directly affected by the disease, or who perceive themselves to be personally at risk, talking about AIDS inevitably arouses strong emotions - amongst them fear, distress, loss and anger. Conventionally, human geography research has avoided engagement with such emotions. Although the ideal of the detached observer has been roundly critiqued, the emphasis in methodological literature on 'doing no harm' has led even qualitative (...)
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  5. Rodolfo Arango (2011). Emociones y transformación social. Logos 19:199-212.
    In reflection, emotions have been relegated to the field of subjectivity. A long time ago they were considered as an object of psychology, devoid of any interest for philosophical analysis. Thus, for scientific positivism and ethical emotivism, emotions lack epistemic value. Such convictions started to crumble after the studies pursued by thinkers such as Richard Rorty, Martha Nussbaum or Jon Elster. This paper highlights the importance of emotions for philosophy, referring to moral and political learning based on Colombian experiences It (...)
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  6. David Badcott (2003). The Basis and Relevance of Emotional Dignity. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 6 (2):123-131.
    The paper is a preliminary examination of the origin and role of psychological perception or “feeling” of dignity in human beings. Following Ayala's naturalistic account of morality, a sense of emotional dignity is seen as an outcome of processes of natural selection, cultural evolution, and above all a need for social inclusion. It is suggested that the existence of emotional dignity as part of a human species-related continuum provides an explanation of why we treat those in a persistent vegetative state, (...)
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  7. Carla Bagnoli (2011). The Exploration of Moral Life. In Justin Broakes (ed.), Iris Murdoch, Philosopher. Oxford
  8. Carla Bagnoli (ed.) (2011). Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press.
    What is their relation to practical rationality? Are they roots of our identity or threats to our autonomy? This volume is born out of the conviction that philosophy provides a distinctive approach to these problems.
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  9. Carla Bagnoli (2007). Phenomenology of the Aftermath: Ethical Theory and the Intelligibility of Moral Experience. In Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.), Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities. Kluwer 185-212.
  10. Olivia Bailey (forthcoming). Empathy, Care, and Understanding in Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. The Adam Smith Review.
  11. D. Baltzly (2002). Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):235 – 236.
    Book Information Emotion and Peace of Mind: from Stoic agitation to Christian temptation. By Richard Sorabji. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 2000. Pp. xi + 499. Hardback, £30.
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  12. Dirk Baltzly (2007). The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duty, Fate. Review of Metaphysics 60 (4):855-856.
    This is a brief book note on Tad Brennan's fine book on Stoic ethics.
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  13. Jonathan Baron (2011). Utilitarian Emotions: Suggestions From Introspection. Emotion Review 3 (3):286-286.
    In folk psychology and some academic psychology, utilitarian thinking is associated with coldness and deontological thinking is associated with emotion. I suggest, mostly through personal examples, that these associations are far from perfect. Utilitarians experience emotions, which sometimes derive from, and sometimes cause or reinforce, their moral judgments.
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  14. C. Daniel Batson (2011). What’s Wrong with Morality? Emotion Review 3 (3):230-236.
    Why do moral people so often fail to act morally? Standard scientific answers point to poor moral judgment (based on deficient character development, reason, or intuition) or to situational pressure. I consider a third possibility: a relative lack of truly moral motivation and emotion. What has been taken for moral motivation is often instead a subtle form of egoism. Recent research provides considerable evidence for moral hypocrisy—motivation to appear moral while, if possible, avoid the cost of actually being moral—but very (...)
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  15. Kathy Behrendt (2013). Hirsch, Sebald, and the Uses and Limits of Postmemory. In Russell J. A. Kilbourn & Eleanor Ty (eds.), The Memory Effect: The Remediation of Memory in Literature and Film. Wilfrid Laurier University Press 51-67.
    Marianne Hirsch’s influential concept of postmemory articulates the ethical significance of representing trauma in art and literature. Postmemory, for Hirsch, “describes the relationship of children of survivors of cultural or collective trauma to the experiences of their parents, experiences that they ‘remember’ only as the narratives and images with which they grew up, but that are so powerful, so monumental, as to constitute memories in their own right”. Through appeal to recent philosophical work on memory, the ethics of remembering, and (...)
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  16. Aaron Ben-Ze'ev (2002). Are Envy, Anger, and Resentment Moral Emotions? Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):148 – 154.
    The moral status of emotions has recently become the focus of various philosophical investigations. Certain emotions that have traditionally been considered as negative, such as envy, jealousy, pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, and pride, have been defended. Some traditionally "negative" emotions have even been declared to be moral emotions. In this brief paper, I suggest two basic criteria according to which an emotion might be considered moral, and I then examine whether envy, anger, and resentment are moral emotions.
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  17. Hagit Benbaji (2014). Emotional Insight, by Michael S. Brady. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):173-175.
  18. Sandrine Berges (2010). Mirrors to One Another: Emotion and Value in Jane Austen and David Hume – E.M. Dadlez. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):864-865.
  19. Lorraine Besser-Jones (2006). The Role of Justice in Hume's Theory of Psychological Development. Hume Studies 32 (2):253-276.
    Hume’s theory of justice, intricately linked to his account of moral development, is at once simplistic and mysterious, combining familiar conventionalistelements with perplexing, complicated elements of his rich moral psychology. These dimensions of his theory make interpreting it no easy task, although many have tried. Emerging from these many different attempts is a picture of Hume as defending an account of justice according to which justice consists of expedient rules designed to advance one’s self-interest. The mistake of this view, I (...)
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  20. Mavis Biss (2014). Empathy and Interrogation. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (2):277-288.
    Against the background of not-so-distant debate regarding “enhanced” interrogation techniques used by the United States during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which many understand to be torture, this essay explores the moral complexities of “ordinary” interrogation practices, those that are clearly not forms of torture. Based on analysis of the written reflections of two United States interrogators on the work they did during the Iraq war, I categorize the roles played by multiple modes of empathy within interrogation and argue (...)
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  21. Megan Boler (1997). Disciplined Emotions: Philosophies of Educated Feelings. Educational Theory 47 (2):203-227.
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  22. Donald M. Borchert (ed.) (2005). The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Ed.
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  23. Michael S. Brady (2011). Emotions, Perceptions, and Reasons. In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press
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  24. Hillel Braude & Jonathan Kimmelman (2012). The Ethics of Managing Affective and Emotional States to Improve Informed Consent: Autonomy, Comprehension, and Voluntariness. Bioethics 26 (3):149-156.
    Over the past several decades the ‘affective revolution’ in cognitive psychology has emphasized the critical role affect and emotion play in human decision-making. Drawing on this affective literature, various commentators have recently proposed strategies for managing therapeutic expectation that use contextual, symbolic, or emotive interventions in the consent process to convey information or enhance comprehension. In this paper, we examine whether affective consent interventions that target affect and emotion can be reconciled with widely accepted standards for autonomous action. More (...)
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  25. Talbot Brewer (2011). On Alienated Emotions. In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press
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  26. Svend Brinkmann (2012). Emotions and the Moral Order. In Paul Wilson (ed.), Dynamicity in Emotion Concepts. Peter Lang
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  27. David Carr (2005). On the Contribution of Literature and the Arts to the Educational Cultivation of Moral Virtue, Feeling and Emotion. Journal of Moral Education 34 (2):137-151.
    This paper sets out to explore connections between a number of plausible claims concerning education in general and moral education in particular: (i) that education is a matter of broad cultural initiation rather than narrow academic or vocational training; (ii) that any education so conceived would have a key concern with the moral dimensions of personal formation; (iii) that emotional growth is an important part of such moral formation; and (iv) that literature and other arts have an important part to (...)
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  28. Arindam Chakrabarti (1992). Individual and Collective Pride. American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (1):35 - 43.
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  29. Stephen Chanderbhan (2013). The Shifting Prominence of Emotions in the Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Diametros 38:62-85.
    In this article, I claim that emotions, as we understand the term today, have a more prominent role in the moral life described by Thomas Aquinas than has been traditionally thought. First, clarity is needed about what exactly the emotions are in Aquinas. Second, clarity is needed about true virtue: specifically, about the relationship of acquired virtue to infused, supernatural virtues. Given a fuller understanding of both these things, I claim that emotions are not only auxiliary to the life of (...)
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  30. Hanah A. Chapman & Adam K. Anderson (2011). Varieties of Moral Emotional Experience. Emotion Review 3 (3):255-257.
    Although much research on emotion and morality has treated emotion as a relatively undifferentiated construct, recent work shows that moral transgressions can evoke a variety of distinct emotions. To accommodate these results, we propose a multiple-appraisal model in which distinct appraisals lead to different moral emotions. The implications of this model for our understanding of the relationship between appraisals, emotions and judgments are discussed. The complexity of moral emotional experience presents a methodological challenge to researchers, but we submit that a (...)
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  31. Louis Charland & Peter Zachar (eds.) (2008). Fact and Value in Emotion; Consciousness and Emotion Book Series. John Benjamins Publishing Company.
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  32. Wayne Christensen & John Sutton (2012). Reflections on Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning Toward an Integrated, Multidisciplinary Approach to Moral Cognition. In Robyn Langdon & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning. Psychology Press 327-347.
    B eginning with the problem of integrating diverse disciplinary perspectives on moral cognition, we argue that the various disciplines have an interest in developing a common conceptual framework for moral cognition research. We discuss issues arising in the other chapters in this volume that might serve as focal points for future investigation and as the basis for the eventual development of such a framework. These include the role of theory in binding together diverse phenomena and the role of philosophy in (...)
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  33. Christopher Ciocchetti (2009). Emotions, Retribution, and Punishment. Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (2):160-173.
    I examine emotional reactions to wrongdoing to determine whether they offer support for retributivism. It is often thought that victims desire to see their victimizer suffer and that this reaction offers support for retributivism. After rejecting several attempts to use different theories of emotion and different approaches to using emotions to justify retributivism, I find that, assuming a cognitive theory of emotion is correct, emotions can be used as heuristic guides much as suggested by Michael Moore. Applying this method to (...)
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  34. Stephen R. L. Clark (2002). Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation by Richard Sorabji, Clarendon Press: Oxford 2000. Pp. XII+499pp., £30.00, ISBN 019-8250053. [REVIEW] Philosophy 77 (1):125-141.
  35. Christine Clavien (2009). Comment Comprendre les Émotions Morales. Dialogue 48 (3):601.
    The two main goals of this paper are to question the possibility of the existence of moral emotions and to decipher the notion of moral emotion. I start with a brief critical analysis of various philosophical understandings of moral emotions before setting out an evolutionary line of approach that seems promising at first glance: according to the functional evolutionary approach, moral emotions have the evolutionary function of sustaining cooperation. It turns out ultimately that this approach has its own drawbacks. I (...)
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  36. W. Scott Cleveland (2015). The Emotions of Courageous Activity. Res Philosophica 92 (4):855-882.
    An apparent paradox concerning courageous activity is that it seems to require both fear and fearlessness – on the one hand, mastering one’s fear, and, on the other, eliminating fear. I resolve the paradox by isolating three phases of courageous activity: the initial response to the situation, the choice of courageous action, and the execution of courageous action. I argue that there is an emotion that is proper to each of these phases and that each emotion positively contributes to the (...)
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  37. Zac Cogley (2013). Basic Desert of Reactive Emotions. Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):165-177.
    In this paper, I explore the idea that someone can deserve resentment or other reactive emotions for what she does by attention to three psychological functions of such emotions – appraisal, communication, and sanction – that I argue ground claims of their desert. I argue that attention to these functions helps to elucidate the moral aims of reactive emotions and to distinguish the distinct claims of desert, as opposed to other moral considerations.
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  38. Taya R. Cohen (2010). Moral Emotions and Unethical Bargaining: The Differential Effects of Empathy and Perspective Taking in Deterring Deceitful Negotiation. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 94 (4):569-579.
    Two correlational studies tested whether personality differences in empathy and perspective taking differentially relate to disapproval of unethical negotiation strategies, such as lies and bribes. Across both studies, empathy, but not perspective taking, discouraged attacking opponents' networks, misrepresentation, inappropriate information gathering, and feigning emotions to manipulate opponents. These results suggest that unethical bargaining is more likely to be deterred by empathy than by perspective taking. Study 2 also tested whether individual differences in guilt proneness and shame proneness inhibited the endorsement (...)
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  39. Yishai Cohen (2014). Emotions in the Moral Life, by Robert C. Roberts. Faith and Philosophy 31 (3):337-340.
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  40. John M. Cooper (2005). The Emotional Life of the Wise. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (S1):176-218.
    The ancient Stoics notoriously argued, with thoroughness and force, that all ordinary “emotions” (passions, mental affections: in Greek, pãyh) are thoroughly bad states of mind, not to be indulged in by anyone, under any circumstances: anger, resentment, gloating; pity, sympathy, grief; delight, glee, pleasure; impassioned love (i.e. ¶rvw), agitated desires of any kind, fear; disappointment, regret, all sorts of sorrow; hatred, contempt, schadenfreude. Early on in the history of Stoicism, however, apparently in order to avoid the objection that human nature (...)
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  41. Amy Coplan & Peter Goldie (eds.) (2011). Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    Empathy has for a long time, at least since the eighteenth century, been seen as centrally important in relation to our capacity to gain a grasp of the content of other people's minds, and predict and explain what they will think, feel, and do; and in relation to our capacity to respond to others ethically. In addition, empathy is seen as having a central role in aesthetics, in the understanding of our engagement with works of art and with fictional characters. (...)
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  42. Paolo Costa (2011). A Secular Wonder. In George Levine (ed.), The Joy of Secularism.
    What is it like to be an earthly, worldly, “secular” creature? Is it a blessing or is it a curse? During the last two centuries, this question has generally been answered with an appeal to disengagedness and objectivity, that is, to an indisputable “scientific” representation of the whole of “reality.” The world then seems to serve as a justification, through the “facts of the matter,” of the superiority of optimism or pessimism. On the contrary, I want in this essay to (...)
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  43. Florian Cova, Julien Deonna & David Sander (2015). Introduction: Moral Emotions. Topoi 34 (2):397-400.
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  44. Fiery A. Cushman (2011). Moral Emotions From the Frog’s Eye View. Emotion Review 3 (3):261-263.
    To understand the structure of moral emotions poses a difficult challenge. For instance, why do liberals and conservatives see some moral issues similarly, but others starkly differently? Or, why does punishment depend on accidental variation in the severity of a harmful outcome, while judgments of wrongfulness or character do not? To resolve the complex design of morality, it helps to think in functional terms. Whether through learning, cultural evolution or natural selection, moral emotions will tend to guide behavior adaptively in (...)
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  45. E. M. Dadlez (2009). Mirrors to One Another: Emotion and Value in Jane Austen and David Hume. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Illustrates how Hume and Austen complement one another, each providing a lens that allows us to expand and elaborate on the ideas of the other Proposes that ...
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  46. Ellis Van Dam & Jan Steutel (1996). On Emotion and Rationality: A Response to Barrett. Journal of Moral Education 25 (4):395-400.
    Abstract In a recent paper Richard Barrett criticises Solomon (and the so?called cognitivists in general) for dismissing irrational emotions as marginal and atypical. This paper argues that Barrett's criticism is unwarranted. Two explanations are suggested for his misconception of Solomon's view (and, more generally, of the cognitive view) on irrational emotions. First, Barrett mistakenly conceives the reconciliation of emotion and reason as a conciliation of emotion and rationality in an evaluative or normative sense. Secondly, Barrett disregards the difference between the (...)
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  47. Ronald de Sousa (2006). Review of David Pugmire, Sound Sentiments: Integrity in the Emotions. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (3).
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  48. Ronald de Sousa (1999). Valuing Emotions Michael Stocker with Elizabeth Hegeman Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1996, Xxviii + 353 Pp., US $64.95, US$21.95 Paper. [REVIEW] Dialogue 38 (01):219-.
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  49. Remy Debes (2010). Which Empathy? Limitations in the Mirrored “Understanding” of Emotion. Synthese 175 (2):219-239.
    The recent discovery of so-called “mirror-neurons” in monkeys and a corresponding mirroring “system” in humans has provoked wide endorsement of the claim that humans understand a variety of observed actions, somatic sensations, and emotions via a kind of direct representation of those actions, sensations, and emotions. Philosophical efforts to assess the import of such “mirrored understanding” have typically focused on how that understanding might be brought to bear on theories of mindreading, and usually in cases of action. By contrast, this (...)
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  50. Michael J. Deem & Grant Ramsey (2016). Guilt by Association? Philosophical Psychology:1-16.
    Recent evolutionary perspectives on guilt tend to focus on how guilt functions as a means for the individual to self-regulate behavior and as a mechanism for reinforcing cooperative tendencies. While these accounts highlight important dimensions of guilt and provide important insights into its evolutionary emergence, they pay scant attention to the large empirical literature on its maladaptive effects on individuals. This paper considers the nature of guilt, explores its biological function, and provides an evolutionary perspective on whether it is an (...)
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