This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
185 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 185
  1. K. Abramson (2009). A Sentimentalist's Defense of Contempt, Shame and Disdain. In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Christopher P. Adkins (2011). Once More with Feeling : Integrating Emotion in Teaching Business Ethics' Educational Implications From Cognitive Neuroscience and Social Psychology. In Ronald R. Sims & William I. Sauser (eds.), Experiences in Teaching Business Ethics. Information Age Pub..
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Nicola Ansell & Lorraine Van Blerk (2005). Joining the Conspiracy? Negotiating Ethics and Emotions in Researching (Around) AIDS in Southern Africa. Ethics, Place and Environment 8 (1):61 – 82.
    Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is an emotive subject, particularly in southern Africa. Among those who have been directly affected by the disease, or who perceive themselves to be personally at risk, talking about AIDS inevitably arouses strong emotions - amongst them fear, distress, loss and anger. Conventionally, human geography research has avoided engagement with such emotions. Although the ideal of the detached observer has been roundly critiqued, the emphasis in methodological literature on 'doing no harm' has led even qualitative (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. David Badcott (2003). The Basis and Relevance of Emotional Dignity. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 6 (2):123-131.
    The paper is a preliminary examination of the origin and role of psychological perception or “feeling” of dignity in human beings. Following Ayala's naturalistic account of morality, a sense of emotional dignity is seen as an outcome of processes of natural selection, cultural evolution, and above all a need for social inclusion. It is suggested that the existence of emotional dignity as part of a human species-related continuum provides an explanation of why we treat those in a persistent vegetative state, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Carla Bagnoli (2011). The Exploration of Moral Life. In Justin Broakes (ed.), Iris Murdoch, Philosopher. Oxford.
  6. Carla Bagnoli (ed.) (2011). Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press.
    What is their relation to practical rationality? Are they roots of our identity or threats to our autonomy? This volume is born out of the conviction that philosophy provides a distinctive approach to these problems.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Carla Bagnoli (2007). Phenomenology of the Aftermath: Ethical Theory and the Intelligibility of Moral Experience. In Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.), New Trends in Moral Psychology. Kluwer. 185-212.
  8. D. Baltzly (2002). Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):235 – 236.
    Book Information Emotion and Peace of Mind: from Stoic agitation to Christian temptation. By Richard Sorabji. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 2000. Pp. xi + 499. Hardback, £30.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Dirk Baltzly (2007). The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duty, Fate. Review of Metaphysics 60 (4):855-856.
    This is a brief book note on Tad Brennan's fine book on Stoic ethics.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Jonathan Baron (2011). Utilitarian Emotions: Suggestions From Introspection. Emotion Review 3 (3):286-286.
    In folk psychology and some academic psychology, utilitarian thinking is associated with coldness and deontological thinking is associated with emotion. I suggest, mostly through personal examples, that these associations are far from perfect. Utilitarians experience emotions, which sometimes derive from, and sometimes cause or reinforce, their moral judgments.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. C. Daniel Batson (2011). What’s Wrong with Morality? Emotion Review 3 (3):230-236.
    Why do moral people so often fail to act morally? Standard scientific answers point to poor moral judgment (based on deficient character development, reason, or intuition) or to situational pressure. I consider a third possibility: a relative lack of truly moral motivation and emotion. What has been taken for moral motivation is often instead a subtle form of egoism. Recent research provides considerable evidence for moral hypocrisy—motivation to appear moral while, if possible, avoid the cost of actually being moral—but very (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Kathy Behrendt (2013). Hirsch, Sebald, and the Uses and Limits of Postmemory. In Russell J. A. Kilbourn & Eleanor Ty (eds.), The Memory Effect: The Remediation of Memory in Literature and Film. Wilfrid Laurier University Press. 51-67.
    Marianne Hirsch’s influential concept of postmemory articulates the ethical significance of representing trauma in art and literature. Postmemory, for Hirsch, “describes the relationship of children of survivors of cultural or collective trauma to the experiences of their parents, experiences that they ‘remember’ only as the narratives and images with which they grew up, but that are so powerful, so monumental, as to constitute memories in their own right”. Through appeal to recent philosophical work on memory, the ethics of remembering, and (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Aaron Ben-Ze'ev (2002). Are Envy, Anger, and Resentment Moral Emotions? Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):148 – 154.
    The moral status of emotions has recently become the focus of various philosophical investigations. Certain emotions that have traditionally been considered as negative, such as envy, jealousy, pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, and pride, have been defended. Some traditionally "negative" emotions have even been declared to be moral emotions. In this brief paper, I suggest two basic criteria according to which an emotion might be considered moral, and I then examine whether envy, anger, and resentment are moral emotions.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Sandrine Berges (2010). Mirrors to One Another: Emotion and Value in Jane Austen and David Hume – E.M. Dadlez. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):864-865.
  15. Lorraine Besser-Jones (2006). The Role of Justice in Hume's Theory of Psychological Development. Hume Studies 32 (2):253-276.
    Hume’s theory of justice, intricately linked to his account of moral development, is at once simplistic and mysterious, combining familiar conventionalistelements with perplexing, complicated elements of his rich moral psychology. These dimensions of his theory make interpreting it no easy task, although many have tried. Emerging from these many different attempts is a picture of Hume as defending an account of justice according to which justice consists of expedient rules designed to advance one’s self-interest. The mistake of this view, I (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Mavis Biss (forthcoming). Empathy and Interrogation. International Journal of Applied Philosophy.
    Against the background of not-so-distant debate regarding “enhanced” interrogation techniques used by the United States during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which many understand to be torture, this essay explores the moral complexities of “ordinary” interrogation practices, those that are clearly not forms of torture. Based on analysis of the written reflections of two United States interrogators on the work they did during the Iraq war, I categorize the roles played by multiple modes of empathy within interrogation and argue (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Megan Boler (1997). Disciplined Emotions: Philosophies of Educated Feelings. Educational Theory 47 (2):203-227.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Donald M. Borchert (ed.) (2005). The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Ed.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Michael S. Brady (2011). Emotions, Perceptions, and Reasons. In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Hillel Braude & Jonathan Kimmelman (2012). The Ethics of Managing Affective and Emotional States to Improve Informed Consent: Autonomy, Comprehension, and Voluntariness. Bioethics 26 (3):149-156.
    Over the past several decades the ‘affective revolution’ in cognitive psychology has emphasized the critical role affect and emotion play in human decision-making. Drawing on this affective literature, various commentators have recently proposed strategies for managing therapeutic expectation that use contextual, symbolic, or emotive interventions in the consent process to convey information or enhance comprehension. In this paper, we examine whether affective consent interventions that target affect and emotion can be reconciled with widely accepted standards for autonomous action. More specifically, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Talbot Brewer (2011). On Alienated Emotions. In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Svend Brinkmann (2012). Emotions and the Moral Order. In Paul Wilson (ed.), Dynamicity in Emotion Concepts. Peter Lang.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. David Carr (2005). On the Contribution of Literature and the Arts to the Educational Cultivation of Moral Virtue, Feeling and Emotion. Journal of Moral Education 34 (2):137-151.
    This paper sets out to explore connections between a number of plausible claims concerning education in general and moral education in particular: (i) that education is a matter of broad cultural initiation rather than narrow academic or vocational training; (ii) that any education so conceived would have a key concern with the moral dimensions of personal formation; (iii) that emotional growth is an important part of such moral formation; and (iv) that literature and other arts have an important part to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Arindam Chakrabarti (1992). Individual and Collective Pride. American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (1):35 - 43.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Stephen Chanderbhan (2013). The Shifting Prominence of Emotions in the Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Diametros 38:62-85.
    In this article, I claim that emotions, as we understand the term today, have a more prominent role in the moral life described by Thomas Aquinas than has been traditionally thought. First, clarity is needed about what exactly the emotions are in Aquinas. Second, clarity is needed about true virtue: specifically, about the relationship of acquired virtue to infused, supernatural virtues. Given a fuller understanding of both these things, I claim that emotions are not only auxiliary to the life of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Hanah A. Chapman & Adam K. Anderson (2011). Varieties of Moral Emotional Experience. Emotion Review 3 (3):255-257.
    Although much research on emotion and morality has treated emotion as a relatively undifferentiated construct, recent work shows that moral transgressions can evoke a variety of distinct emotions. To accommodate these results, we propose a multiple-appraisal model in which distinct appraisals lead to different moral emotions. The implications of this model for our understanding of the relationship between appraisals, emotions and judgments are discussed. The complexity of moral emotional experience presents a methodological challenge to researchers, but we submit that a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Louis Charland & Peter Zachar (eds.) (2008). Fact and Value in Emotion; Consciousness and Emotion Book Series. John Benjamins Publishing Company.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Wayne Christensen & John Sutton (2012). Reflections on Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning Toward an Integrated, Multidisciplinary Approach to Moral Cognition. In Robyn Langdon & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning. Psychology Press. 327-347.
    B eginning with the problem of integrating diverse disciplinary perspectives on moral cognition, we argue that the various disciplines have an interest in developing a common conceptual framework for moral cognition research. We discuss issues arising in the other chapters in this volume that might serve as focal points for future investigation and as the basis for the eventual development of such a framework. These include the role of theory in binding together diverse phenomena and the role of philosophy in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Christopher Ciocchetti (2009). Emotions, Retribution, and Punishment. Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (2):160-173.
    I examine emotional reactions to wrongdoing to determine whether they offer support for retributivism. It is often thought that victims desire to see their victimizer suffer and that this reaction offers support for retributivism. After rejecting several attempts to use different theories of emotion and different approaches to using emotions to justify retributivism, I find that, assuming a cognitive theory of emotion is correct, emotions can be used as heuristic guides much as suggested by Michael Moore. Applying this method to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Stephen R. L. Clark (2002). Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation by Richard Sorabji, Clarendon Press: Oxford 2000. Pp. XII+499pp., £30.00, ISBN 019-8250053. [REVIEW] Philosophy 77 (1):125-141.
  31. Christine Clavien (2009). Comment Comprendre les Émotions Morales. Dialogue 48 (03):601-.
    The two main goals of this paper are to question the possibility of the existence of moral emotions and to decipher the notion of moral emotion. I start with a brief critical analysis of various philosophical understandings of moral emotions before setting out an evolutionary line of approach that seems promising at first glance: according to the functional evolutionary approach, moral emotions have the evolutionary function of sustaining cooperation. It turns out ultimately that this approach has its own drawbacks. I (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Zac Cogley (2013). Basic Desert of Reactive Emotions. Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):165-177.
    In this paper, I explore the idea that someone can deserve resentment or other reactive emotions for what she does by attention to three psychological functions of such emotions – appraisal, communication, and sanction – that I argue ground claims of their desert. I argue that attention to these functions helps to elucidate the moral aims of reactive emotions and to distinguish the distinct claims of desert, as opposed to other moral considerations.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Taya R. Cohen (2010). Moral Emotions and Unethical Bargaining: The Differential Effects of Empathy and Perspective Taking in Deterring Deceitful Negotiation. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 94 (4):569 - 579.
    Two correlational studies tested whether personality differences in empathy and perspective taking differentially relate to disapproval of unethical negotiation strategies, such as lies and bribes. Across both studies, empathy, but not perspective taking, discouraged attacking opponents' networks, misrepresentation, inappropriate information gathering, and feigning emotions to manipulate opponents. These results suggest that unethical bargaining is more likely to be deterred by empathy than by perspective taking. Study 2 also tested whether individual differences in guilt proneness and shame proneness inhibited the endorsement (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. John M. Cooper (2005). The Emotional Life of the Wise. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (S1):176-218.
    The ancient Stoics notoriously argued, with thoroughness and force, that all ordinary “emotions” (passions, mental affections: in Greek, pãyh) are thoroughly bad states of mind, not to be indulged in by anyone, under any circumstances: anger, resentment, gloating; pity, sympathy, grief; delight, glee, pleasure; impassioned love (i.e. ¶rvw), agitated desires of any kind, fear; disappointment, regret, all sorts of sorrow; hatred, contempt, schadenfreude. Early on in the history of Stoicism, however, apparently in order to avoid the objection that human nature (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Amy Coplan & Peter Goldie (eds.) (2011). Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    Empathy has for a long time, at least since the eighteenth century, been seen as centrally important in relation to our capacity to gain a grasp of the content of other people's minds, and predict and explain what they will think, feel, and do; and in relation to our capacity to respond to others ethically. In addition, empathy is seen as having a central role in aesthetics, in the understanding of our engagement with works of art and with fictional characters. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Fiery A. Cushman (2011). Moral Emotions From the Frog’s Eye View. Emotion Review 3 (3):261-263.
    To understand the structure of moral emotions poses a difficult challenge. For instance, why do liberals and conservatives see some moral issues similarly, but others starkly differently? Or, why does punishment depend on accidental variation in the severity of a harmful outcome, while judgments of wrongfulness or character do not? To resolve the complex design of morality, it helps to think in functional terms. Whether through learning, cultural evolution or natural selection, moral emotions will tend to guide behavior adaptively in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. E. M. Dadlez (2009). Mirrors to One Another: Emotion and Value in Jane Austen and David Hume. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Illustrates how Hume and Austen complement one another, each providing a lens that allows us to expand and elaborate on the ideas of the other Proposes that ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Ellis Van Dam & Jan Steutel (1996). On Emotion and Rationality: A Response to Barrett. Journal of Moral Education 25 (4):395-400.
    Abstract In a recent paper Richard Barrett criticises Solomon (and the so?called cognitivists in general) for dismissing irrational emotions as marginal and atypical. This paper argues that Barrett's criticism is unwarranted. Two explanations are suggested for his misconception of Solomon's view (and, more generally, of the cognitive view) on irrational emotions. First, Barrett mistakenly conceives the reconciliation of emotion and reason as a conciliation of emotion and rationality in an evaluative or normative sense. Secondly, Barrett disregards the difference between the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Ronald de Sousa (2006). Review of David Pugmire, Sound Sentiments: Integrity in the Emotions. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (3).
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Ronald de Sousa (1999). Valuing Emotions Michael Stocker with Elizabeth Hegeman Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1996, Xxviii + 353 Pp., US $64.95, US$21.95 Paper. [REVIEW] Dialogue 38 (01):219-.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Remy Debes (2010). Which Empathy? Limitations in the Mirrored “Understanding” of Emotion. Synthese 175 (2):219-239.
    The recent discovery of so-called “mirror-neurons” in monkeys and a corresponding mirroring “system” in humans has provoked wide endorsement of the claim that humans understand a variety of observed actions, somatic sensations, and emotions via a kind of direct representation of those actions, sensations, and emotions. Philosophical efforts to assess the import of such “mirrored understanding” have typically focused on how that understanding might be brought to bear on theories of mindreading (how we represent other creatures as having mental states), (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. John Deigh (1996). The Sources of Moral Agency: Essays in Moral Psychology and Freudian Theory. Cambridge University Press.
    The essays in this collection are concerned with the psychology of moral agency. They focus on moral feelings and moral motivation, and seek to understand the operations and origins of these phenomena as rooted in the natural desires and emotions of human beings. An important feature of the essays, and one that distinguishes the book from most philosophical work in moral psychology, is the attention to the writings of Freud. Many of the essays draw on Freud's ideas about conscience and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. John Deigh (ed.) (1992). Ethics and Personality: Essays in Moral Psychology. University of Chicago Press.
    This anthology focuses on emotions and motives that relate to our status as moral agents, our capacity for moral judgement, and the practices that help to define our social lives. Attachment, trust, respect, conscience, guilt, revenge, depravity, and forgiveness are among the topics discussed. Collectively, the thirteen essays in this collection represent a time-honored tradition in ethics: the effort to throw light on fundamental questions concerning the complexities of the human soul.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. John Deigh (1988). Book Review:Pride, Shame and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment. Gabriele Taylor. [REVIEW] Ethics 98 (2):391-.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Lara Denis (2000). Kant's Cold Sage and the Sublimity of Apathy. Kantian Review 4:48-73.
    Some Kantian ethicists, myself included, have been trying to show how, contrary to popular belief, Kant makes an important place in his moral theory for emotions–especially love and sympathy. This paper confronts claims of Kant that seem to endorse an absence of sympathetic emotions. I analyze Kant’s accounts of different sorts of emotions (“affects,” “passions,” and “feelings”), and different sorts of emotional coolness (“apathy,” “self-mastery,” and “cold-bloodedness”). I focus on the particular way that Kant praises apathy, as “sublime,” in order (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2008). Differentiating Shame From Guilt. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1063-1400..
    How does shame differ from guilt? Empirical psychology has recently offered distinct and seemingly incompatible answers to this question. This article brings together four prominent answers into a cohesive whole. These are that (a) shame differs from guilt in being a social emotion; (b) shame, in contrast to guilt, affects the whole self; (c) shame is linked with ideals, whereas guilt concerns prohibitions and (d) shame is oriented towards the self, guilt towards others. After presenting the relevant empirical evidence, we (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2008). Shame's Guilt Disproved. Critical Quarterly 50 (4):65-72.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Peter H. Ditto & Spassena P. Koleva (2011). Moral Empathy Gaps and the American Culture War. Emotion Review 3 (3):331-332.
    Our inability to feel what others feel makes it difficult to understand how they think. Because moral intuitions organize political attitudes, moral empathy gaps can exacerbate political conflict (and other kinds of conflict as well) by contributing to the perception that people who do not share our moral opinions are unintelligent and/or have malevolent intentions.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Daniel Dohrn, Emotions, Morals, Modals.
    I scrutinize the relationship between the way emotions give rise to modal judgement and the metaphysical necessity we ascribe to the latter. While moral concepts are often described as response-dependent, I propose to analyse them as response-enabled or grokking. I discuss how grokkingness is embedded in the emotional mechanisms that provoke imaginative resistance; how it shapes our manifest image of the world and the place of morality in it; the latter’s deep contingency as contrasted to its metaphysical necessity; and what (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Sabine A. Döring (2003). Explaining Action by Emotion. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):214-230.
    I discuss two ways in which emotions explain actions: in the first, the explanation is expressive; in the second, the action is not only explained but also rationalized by the emotion's intentional content. The belief-desire model cannot satisfactorily account for either of these cases. My main purpose is to show that the emotions constitute an irreducible category in the explanation of action, to be understood by analogy with perception. Emotions are affective perceptions. Their affect gives them motivational force, and they (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 185