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Siblings:History/traditions: Moral Emotivism and Sentimentalism
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  1. K. Abramson (2009). A Sentimentalist's Defense of Contempt, Shame and Disdain. In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press.
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  2. Lilli K. Alanen (2003). What Are Emotions About? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):311-354.
    This paper discusses the interrelations between three aspects of human emotions: their intentionality, their expressivity and their moral significance. It distinguishes three kinds of philosophical views of emotions: the cognitivist (classically held by the Stoics), the emotivist which reduces emotions to non-intentional bodily sensations and physiological states, and the moral phenomenologist, the latter being held by Annette Baier, whose work is the focus of the discussion. Her view, which represents an original development of ideas found in Descartes and Hume, avoids (...)
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  3. Mark Alfano (2009). A Danger of Definition: Polar Predicates in Moral Theory. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3 (3).
    In this paper, I use an example from the history of philosophy to show how independently defining each side of a pair of contrary predicates is apt to lead to contradiction. In the Euthyphro, piety is defined as that which is loved by some of the gods while impiety is defined as that which is hated by some of the gods. Socrates points out that since the gods harbor contrary sentiments, some things are both pious and impious. But “pious” and (...)
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  4. Fritz Allhoff (2009). The Evolution of the Moral Sentiments and the Metaphysics of Morals. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):97 - 114.
    So-called evolutionary error theorists, such as Michael Ruse and Richard Joyce, have argued that naturalistic accounts of the moral sentiments lead us to adopt an error theory approach to morality. Roughly, the argument is that an appreciation of the etiology of those sentiments undermines any reason to think that they track moral truth and, furthermore, undermines any reason to think that moral truth actually exists. I argue that this approach offers us a false dichotomy between error theory and some form (...)
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  5. Alberto Artosi (2000). The Limits of Emotivism. Some Remarks on Professor von Wright's Paper "Valuations". Ratio Juris 13 (4):358-363.
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  6. Annette Baier (1991). A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise. Harvard University Press.
  7. Stephen J. Barker (2002). Troubles with Horgan and Timmons' Nondescriptivist Cognitivism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):235-255.
    Emotivist, or non-descriptivist metaethical theories hold that value-statements do not function by describing special value-facts, but are the mere expressions of naturalistically describable motivational states of (valuing) agents. Non-descriptivism has typically been combined with the claim that value-statements are non-cognitive: they are not the manifestations of genuine belief states. However, all the linguistic, logical and phenomenological evidence indicates that value-statements are cognitive. Non-descriptivism then has a problem. Horgan and Timmons propose to solve it by boldly combining a non-descriptivist thesis about (...)
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  8. Bertil Belfrage (1986). Berkeley's Theory of Emotive Meaning (1708). Hisory of European Ideas 7 (6):643-649.
  9. Bertil Belfrage (1986). Development of Berkeley's Early Theory of Meaning. Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 176 (3):319-330.
  10. Brian Besong (2014). Being Appropriately Disgusted. Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (1):131-150.
    Empirical research indicates that feelings of disgust actually affect our moral beliefs and moral motivations. The question is, should they? Daniel Kelly argues that they should not. More particularly, he argues for what we may call the irrelevancy thesis and the anti-moralization thesis. According to the irrelevancy thesis, feelings of disgust should be given no weight when judging the moral character of an action (or norm, practice, outcome, or ideal). According to the anti-moralization thesis, feelings of disgust should not be (...)
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  11. Lorraine Besser-Jones (2012). The Role of Practical Reason in an Empirically Informed Moral Theory. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):203-220.
    Empirical research paints a dismal portrayal of the role of reason in morality. It suggests that reason plays no substantive role in how we make moral judgments or are motivated to act on them. This paper explores how it is that an empirically oriented philosopher, committed to methodological naturalism, ought to respond to the skeptical challenge presented by this research. While many think taking this challenge seriously requires revising, sometimes dramatically, how we think about moral agency, this paper will defend (...)
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  12. J. S. Biehl (2005). Ethical Instrumentalism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):353 - 369.
    The present essay offers a sketch of a philosophy of value, what I shall here refer to as ‘ethical instrumentalism.’ My primary aim is to say just what this view involves and what its commitments are. In the course of doing so, I find it necessary to distinguish this view from another with which it shares a common basis and which, in reference to its most influential proponent, I refer to as ‘Humeanism.’ A second, more general, aim is to make (...)
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  13. Gunnar Bjömsson (2002). How Emotivism Survives Immoralists, Irrationality, and Depression. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):327-344.
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  14. Gunnar Björnsson (2002). How Emotivism Survives Immoralists, Irrationality, and Depression. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):327-344.
    Argues that emotivism is compatible with cases where we seem to lack motivation to act according to our moral opinions.
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  15. Gunnar Björnsson (2001). Why Emotivists Love Inconsistency. Philosophical Studies 104 (1):81 - 108.
    Emotivists hold that moral opinions are wishes and desires, and that the function of moral language is to “express” such states. But if moral opinions were but wishes or desires, why would we see certain opinions as inconsistent with, or following from other opinions? And why should our reasoning include complex opinions such as the opinion that a person ought to be blamed only if he has done something wrong? Indeed, why would we think that anything is conditional on his (...)
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  16. Gunnar Björnsson, John Eriksson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder & Fredrik Björklund (forthcoming). Motivational Internalism and Folk Intuitions. Philosophical Psychology:1-20.
    Motivational internalism postulates a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. In arguing for and against internalism, metaethicists traditionally appeal to intuitions about cases, but crucial cases often yield conflicting intuitions. One way to try to make progress, possibly uncovering theoretical bias and revealing whether people have conceptions of moral judgments required for noncognitivist accounts of moral thinking, is to investigate non-philosophers' willingness to attribute moral judgments. A pioneering study by Shaun Nichols seemed to undermine internalism, as a large majority (...)
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  17. Gunnar Björnsson & Tristram McPherson (2014). Moral Attitudes for Non-Cognitivists: Solving the Specification Problem. Mind 123 (489):1-38.
    Moral non-cognitivists hope to explain the nature of moral agreement and disagreement as agreement and disagreement in non-cognitive attitudes. In doing so, they take on the task of identifying the relevant attitudes, distinguishing the non-cognitive attitudes corresponding to judgements of moral wrongness, for example, from attitudes involved in aesthetic disapproval or the sports fan’s disapproval of her team’s performance. We begin this paper by showing that there is a simple recipe for generating apparent counterexamples to any informative specification of the (...)
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  18. Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson & Fredrik Björklund (eds.) (forthcoming). Motivational Internalism. Oxford University Press.
    Motivational internalism—the idea that there is an intrinsic or necessary connection between moral judgment and moral motivation—is a central thesis in a number of metaethical debates. In conjunction with a Humean picture of motivation, it provides a challenge for cognitivist theories that take moral judgments to concern objective aspects of reality. Versions of internalism have potential implications for moral absolutism, realism, non-naturalism, and rationalism. Being a constraint on more detailed conceptoins of moral motivation and moral judgment, it is also directly (...)
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  19. Simon Blackburn (1998/2000). Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press.
    Simon Blackburn puts forward a compelling and original philosophy of human motivation and morality. Why do we behave as we do? Can we improve? Is our ethics at war with our passions, or is it an upshot of those passions? Blackburn seeks the answers to such questions in an exploration of the nature of moral emotions and the structures of human motivation. He develops a naturalistic ethics, which integrates our understanding of ethics with the rest of our understanding of the (...)
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  20. William Thomas Blackstone (1958). Objective Emotivism. Journal of Philosophy 55 (24):1054-1062.
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  21. Lawrence Blum (2011). Empathy and Empirical Psychology: A Critique of Shaun Nichols's Neo-Sentimentalism. In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press.
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  22. Daniel R. Boisvert (forthcoming). Charles Leslie Stevenson. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  23. J. Bonar (1926). “The Theory of Moral Sentiments,” By Adam Smith, 1759. Philosophy 1 (03):333-.
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  24. Emily Brady (2011). Adam Smith's ''Sympathetic Imagination'' and the Aesthetic Appreciation of Environment. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 9 (1):95-109.
    This paper explores the significance of Adam Smith's ideas for defending non-cognitivist theories of aesthetic appreciation of nature. Objections to non-cognitivism argue that the exercise of emotion and imagination in aesthetic judgement potentially sentimentalizes and trivializes nature. I argue that although directed at moral judgement, Smith's views also find a place in addressing this problem. First, sympathetic imagination may afford a deeper and more sensitive type of aesthetic engagement. Second, in taking up the position of the impartial spectator, aesthetic judgements (...)
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  25. Michael S. Brady (2008). Value and Fitting Emotions. Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (4):465-475.
  26. Michael S. Brady (2003). Some Worries About Normative and Metaethical Sentimentalism. Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):144-153.
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  27. Walter Brand (1993). Hume's Theory of Moral Judgment. Hume Studies 19 (2):324-326.
  28. Michael Bray (2007). Sympathy, Disenchantment, and Authority: Adam Smith and the Construction of Moral Sentiments. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 28 (1):159-193.
  29. David Braybrooke (1965). How Are Moral Judgments Connected with Displays of Emotion? Dialogue 4 (02):206-223.
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  30. Nathan Brett (1999). Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility Paul Russell Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, 200 Pp., $66.95. [REVIEW] Dialogue 38 (03):659-.
  31. John Bricke (1996). Mind and Morality: An Examination of Hume's Moral Psychology. Oxford University Press.
    This book is a penetrating study of the theory of mind and morality that Hume developed in his Treatise of Human Nature and other writings. Hume rejects any conception of moral beliefs and moral truths. He understands morality in terms of distinctive desires and other sentiments that arise through the correction of sympathy. Hume's theory presents a powerful challenge to recent cognitivist theories of moral judgement, Bricke argues, and suggests significant limitations to recent conventionalist and contractarian accounts of morality's content.
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  32. C. D. Broad (1944). Some Reflections on Moral-Sense Theories in Ethics. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 45:131-166.
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  33. Richard Brown (2008). The Semantics of Moral Communication. Dissertation, The Graduate Center, CUNY
    Adviser: Professor Stefan Baumrin In the first chapter I introduce the distinction between metaethics and normative ethics and argue that metaethics, properly conceived, is a part of cognitive science. For example, the debate between rationalism and sentimentalism can be informed by recent empirical work in psychology and the neurosciences. In the second chapter I argue that the traditional view that one’s theory of semantics determines what one’s theory of justification must be is mistaken. Though it has been the case that (...)
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  34. Vivienne Brown & Samuel Fleischacker (eds.) (2010). The Philosophy of Adam Smith: Essays Commemorating the 250th Anniversary of the Theory of Moral Sentiments. Routledge.
    The Philosophy of Adam Smith contains essays by some of the most prominent philosophers and scholars working on Adam Smith today. It is a special issue of The Adam Smith Review, commemorating the 250th anniversary of Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments. Introduction Part 1: Moral phenomenology 1. The virtue of TMS 1759 D.D. Raphael 2. The Theory of Moral Sentiments and the inner life Emma Rothschild 3. The standpoint of morality in Adam Smith and Hegel Angelica Nuzzo Part 2: Sympathy (...)
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  35. Daniel Callcut (2009). Mill, Sentimentalism and the Problem of Moral Authority. Utilitas 21 (1):22-35.
    Mill’s aim in chapter 3 of Utilitarianism is to show that his revisionary moral theory can preserve the kind of authority typically and traditionally associated with moral demands. One of his main targets is the idea that if people come to believe that morality is rooted in human sentiment then they will feel less bound by moral obligation. Chapter 3 emphasizes two claims: (1) The main motivation to ethical action comes from feelings and not from beliefs and (2) Ethical feelings (...)
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  36. V. Chappell (1999). Freedom and Moral Sentiment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):263-265.
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  37. Philip Clark (2004). Kantian Morals and Humean Motives. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):109–126.
    The idea that moral imperatives are categorical is commonly used to support internalist claims about moral judgment. I argue that the categorical quality of moral requirements shows at most that moral motivation need not flow from a background desire to be moral. It does not show that moral judgments can motivate by themselves, or that amoralism is impossible.
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  38. Randolph Clarke (1997). Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):230-232.
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  39. Steve Clarke (2008). Sim and the City: Rationalism in Psychology and Philosophy and Haidt's Account of Moral Judgment. Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):799 – 820.
    Jonathan Haidt ( 2001 ) advances the 'Social Intuitionist' account of moral judgment , which he presents as an alternative to rationalist accounts of moral judgment , hitherto dominant in psychology. Here I consider Haidt's anti-rationalism and the debate that it has provoked in moral psychology , as well as some anti-rationalist philosophical claims that Haidt and others have grounded in the empirical work of Haidt and his collaborators. I will argue that although the case for anti-rationalism in moral psychology (...)
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  40. Geoff Cockfield, Ann Firth & John Laurent (eds.) (2007). New Perspectives on Adam Smith's the Theory of Moral Sentiments. Edward Elgar.
    1. Introduction Geoff Cockfield, Ann Firth and John Laurent -/- 2. The Role of Thumos in Adam Smith’s System Lisa Hill -/- 3. Adam Smith’s Treatment of the Greeks in The Theory of Moral Sentiments: The Case of Aristotle Richard Temple-Smith -/- 4. Adam Smith, Religion and the Scottish Enlightenment Pete Clarke -/- 5. The ‘New View’ of Adam Smith and the Development of his Views Over Time James E. Alvey -/- 6. The Moon Before the Dawn: A Seventeenth-Century Precursor (...)
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  41. Mark Collier (2010). Hume's Theory of Moral Imagination. History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (3):255-273.
    David Hume endorses three claims that are difficult to reconcile: (1) sympathy with those in distress is sufficient to produce compassion towards their plight, (2) adopting the general point of view often requires us to sympathize with the pain and suffering of distant strangers, but (3) our care and concern is limited to those in our close circle. Hume manages to resolve this tension, however, by distinguishing two types of sympathy. We feel compassion towards those around us because associative sympathy (...)
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  42. David Copp (2011). Jesse Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): Prinz's Subjectivist Moral Realism1. Noûs 45 (3):577-594.
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  43. Jillian Craigie (2011). Thinking and Feeling: Moral Deliberation in a Dual-Process Framework. Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):53-71.
    Empirical research in the field of moral cognition is increasingly being used to draw conclusions in philosophical moral psychology, in particular regarding sentimentalist and rationalist accounts of moral judgment. This paper calls for a reassessment of both the empirical and philosophical conclusions being drawn from the moral cognition research. It is proposed that moral decision making is best understood as a species of Kahneman and Frederick's dual-process model of decision making. According to this model, emotional intuition-generating processes and reflective processes (...)
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  44. Justin D'Arms (2013). Value and the Regulation of the Sentiments. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):3-13.
    “Sentiment” is a term of art, intended to refer to object-directed, irruptive states, that occur in relatively transient bouts involving positive or negative affect, and that typically involve a distinctive motivational profile. Not all the states normally called “emotions” are sentiments in the sense just characterized. And all the terms for sentiments are sometimes used in English to refer to longer lasting attitudes. But this discussion is concerned with boutish affective states, not standing attitudes. That poses some challenges that will (...)
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  45. Justin D'Arms (2011). Empathy, Approval, and Disapproval in Moral Sentimentalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):134-141.
    This discussion explores the moral psychology and metaethics of Michael Slote's Moral Sentimentalism. I argue that his account of empathy has an important lacuna, because the sense in which an empathizer feels the same feeling that his target feels requires explanation, and the most promising candidates are unavailable to Slote. I then argue that the (highly original) theory of moral approval and disapproval that Slote develops in his book is implausible, both phenomenologically and for the role it accords to empathy. (...)
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  46. Justin D'Arms (2005). Two Arguments for Sentimentalism. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):1-21.
    ‘Sentimentalism’ is an old-fashioned name for the philosophical suggestion that moral or evaluative concepts or properties depend somehow upon human sentiments. This general idea has proven attractive to a number of contemporary philosophers with little else in common. Yet most sentimentalists say very little about the nature of the sentiments to which they appeal, and many seem prepared to enlist almost any object-directed pleasant or unpleasant state of mind as a sentiment. Furthermore, because battles between sentimentalism and its rivals have (...)
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  47. Justin D'Arms (2005). Two Arguments for Sentimentalism. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):1–21.
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  48. Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (2006). Sensibility Theory and Projectivism. In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. 186--218.
  49. Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (2000). Sentiment and Value. Ethics 110 (4):722-748.
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  50. Lisa Damm (2011). Emotions and Moral Agency. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):275-292.
    In this paper, I present a general profile of individuals with psychopathy, autism, and acquired sociopathy as well as look specifically at the abilities of these individuals with respect to the moral domain. These individuals are individually and collectively interesting because of their significant affective and social impairments. I argue that none of these individuals should be considered full moral agents based on a proposed account of moral agency consisting of the following two necessary conditions: (1) the capacity for moral (...)
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