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Moral Coherentism
- Elvio Baccarini (2009). Moral Epistemological Coherentism, Contextualism, and Consensualism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):69-89.
- Luc Bovens (1994). Coherence Arguments and Cyclical Moral Rankings. Philosophical Studies 74 (3):369 - 384.
- Michael R. DePaul (1998). Liberal Exclusions and Foundationalism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):103-120.
- Michael R. DePaul (1993). Balance and Refinement: Beyond Coherence Methods of Moral Inquiry. Routledge.
- Dale Dorsey (2006). A Coherence Theory of Truth in Ethics. Philosophical Studies 127 (3):493 - 523.
- Mylan Engel Jr (2012). Coherentism and the Epistemic Justification of Moral Beliefs: A Case Study in How to Do Practical Ethics Without Appeal to a Moral Theory. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):50-74.
- Ellen-Marie Forsberg (2007). Value Pluralism and Coherentist Justification of Ethical Advice. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 20 (1).
- Bernward Gesang (2010). Are Moral Philosophers Moral Experts? Bioethics 24 (4):153-159.
- Marcello Guarini (2007). Computation, Coherence, and Ethical Reasoning. Minds and Machines 17 (1).
- Antti Kauppinen (forthcoming). Moral Intuition in Philosophy and Psychology. In Neil Levy & Jens Clausen (eds.), Springer Handbook of Neuroethics. Springer.
- Carl Knight (2006). The Method of Reflective Equilibrium: Wide, Radical, Fallible, Plausible. Philosophical Papers 35 (2):205-229.
- Aristophanes Koutoungos (2005). Moral Coherence, Moral Worth and Explanations of Moral Motivation. Acta Analytica 20 (3):59-79.
- Patricia Marino (2010). Moral Rationalism and the Normative Status of Desiderative Coherence. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2):227-252.
- Patricia Marino (2009). On Essentially Conflicting Desires. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):274-291.
- Linda Radzik (2002). A Coherentist Theory of Normative Authority. Journal of Ethics 6 (1):21-42.
- Linda Radzik (2000). Incorrigible Norms: Foundationalist Theories of Normative Authority. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):633-649.
- P. T. Raju (1940). Coherence and the Moral Criterion. Ethics 50 (2):206-218.
- James A. Ryan (2000). Coherentist Naturalism in Ethics. Journal of Philosophical Research 25:471-487.
- Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (1996). Coherentist Epistemology and Moral Theory. In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.), Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
- William Lad Sessions (1987). Coherence, Proper Basicality and Moral Arguments for Theism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 22 (3):119 - 137.
- David Shatz (1983). Foundationalism, Coherentism, and the Levels Gambit. Synthese 55 (1):97 - 118.
- Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.) (1996). Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
- Carson Strong (2010). Theoretical and Practical Problems with Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Bioethics. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (2):123-140.
- Torbjörn Tännsjö (2011). Applied Ethics. A Defence. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (4):397-406.
Moral Intuitionism
- Leo Abraham (1933). The Logic of Ethical Intuitionism. International Journal of Ethics 44 (1):37-55.
- Robert Audi (2008). Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):475 - 492.
- Robert Audi (2001). A Kantian Intuitionism. Mind 110 (439):601-635.
- Robert Audi (1998). Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgment. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):15-44.
- Carla Bagnoli (2000). Moral Dilemmas and the Limits of Ethical Theory. LED.
- Karen Bartsch & Jennifer Cole Wright (2005). Towards an Intuitionist Account of Moral Development. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):546-547.
- Matthew S. Bedke (2010). Intuitional Epistemology in Ethics. Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1069-1083.
- Matthew S. Bedke (2009). Intuitive Non-Naturalism Meets Cosmic Coincidence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):188-209.
- Matthew S. Bedke (2008). Ethical Intuitions: What They Are, What They Are Not, and How They Justify. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (3):253-270.
- Henry Calderwood (1896). The Relation of Intuitionism to the Ethical Doctrine of Self-Realization. Philosophical Review 5 (4):337-351.
- Terence Cuneo (2008). Intuitionism's Burden: Thomas Reid on the Problem of Moral Motivation. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 6 (1):21-44.
- Dan Demetriou (2009). A Modest Intuitionist Reply to Greene's fMRI-Based Objections to Deontology. Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1):107-117.
- Raphael Demos (1945). Moral Value as Irreducible, Objective, and Cognizable. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 6 (2):163-194.
- Harold A. Durfee (1980). The A Priori, Intuitionism and Moral Language. Philosophical Studies 27:55-66.
- Ben Eggleston (2003). Everything is What It is, and Not Another Thing: Comments on Austin. Southwest Philosophy Review 19 (2):101-105.
- Cordelia Fine (2006). Is the Emotional Dog Wagging its Rational Tail, or Chasing It? Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):83 – 98.
- James R. Flynn (1974). Do We Really Want a Moral Justification of Our Basic Ideals? Inquiry 17 (1-4):151 – 173.
- Ellen-Marie Forsberg (2007). Value Pluralism and Coherentist Justification of Ethical Advice. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 20 (1).
- Robert Frazier, Entry on Inutitionism in Ethics.
- Gebhard Geiger (1992). Why There Are No Objective Values: A Critique of Ethical Intuitionism From an Evolutionary Point of View. Biology and Philosophy 7 (3):315-330.
- Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog Gets Mistaken for a Possum.
- Nathan Hanna (2010). Cosmic Coincidence and Intuitive Non-Naturalism. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
- Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang (eds.) (2012). Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams. Oxford University Press, USA.
- Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2007). Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):279 - 295.
- Michael Huemer (2009). Apology of a Modest Intuitionist. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):222-236.
- Michael Huemer (2009). Précis of Ethical Intuitionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):192-196.
- Michael Huemer (2008). Revisionary Intuitionism. Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):368-392.
- Michael Huemer (2005). Ethical Intuitionism. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Thomas Hurka, On Audi's Marriage of Ross and Kant.
- Terence Irwin (2009). The Development of Ethics, Volume 3: From Kant to Rawls. OUP Oxford.
- Mohsen Javadi (2007). Ibn Sina and the Status of Moral Sentences. Topoi 26 (2):247-254.
- Richard Joyce (2009). The Skeptick's Tale. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):213-221.
- Klemens Kappel (2002). Challenges to Audi's Ethical Intuitionism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (4):391-413.
- David Kaspar (2012). Intuitionism. Continuum International Pub. Group.
- Antti Kauppinen (forthcoming). Moral Intuition in Philosophy and Psychology. In Neil Levy & Jens Clausen (eds.), Springer Handbook of Neuroethics. Springer.
- Jeanette Kennett & Cordelia Fine (2009). Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):77–96.
- Neil Levy (2006). The Wisdom of the Pack. Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):99 – 103.
- Sanford S. Levy (1999). Thomas Reid's Defense of Conscience. History of Philosophy Quarterly 16 (4):413 - 435.
- Hallvard Lillehammer (2011). The Epistemology of Ethical Intuitions. Philosophy 86 (336):175-200.
- Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Ethical Intuitionism and Moral Skepticism. In Jill Graper Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism.
- Kelby Mason (2011). Moral Psychology And Moral Intuition: A Pox On All Your Houses. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):441-458.
- Imtiaz Moosa (2007). Naturalistic Explanations of Apodictic Moral Claims: Brentano's Ethical Intuitionism and Nietzsche's Naturalism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (2):159 - 182.
- Thomas Nadelhoffer & Adam Feltz (2008). The Actor–Observer Bias and Moral Intuitions: Adding Fuel to Sinnott-Armstrong's Fire. Neuroethics 1 (2):133-144.
- Mark Nelson (1999). Morally Serious Critics of Moral Intuitions. Ratio 12 (1):54–79.
- Mark T. Nelson (1991). Intuitionism and Subjectivism. Metaphilosophy 22 (1-2):115-121.
- Mark T. Nelson (1990). Intuitionism and Conservatism. Metaphilosophy 21 (3):282-293.
- Felix E. Oppenheim (1998). The Subjectivity of Moral Judgements: A Defence. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 1 (4):42-61.
- Francesco Orsi (2012). David Ross, Ideal Utilitarianism, and the Intrinsic Value of Acts. Journal for the History of Analytic Philosophy 1 (2).
- H. A. Prichard (2002). Moral Writings. Oxford University Press.
- Louis Arnaud Reid (1925). Moral Intuitionism, Feeling, and Reason: I. Aspects of the Problem of Intuitionism. Journal of Philosophy 22 (19):505-516.
- Sabine Roeser (2009). Reid and Moral Emotions. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 7 (2):177-192.
- Sabine Roeser (2006). A Particularist Epistemology: 'Affectual Intuitionism'. Acta Analytica 21 (1):33-44.
- Sabine Roeser (2005). Intuitionism, Moral Truth, and Tolerance. Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (1).
- W. D. Ross (2002). The Right and the Good. Clarendon Press.
- Joakim Sandberg & Niklas Juth (2011). Ethics and Intuitions: A Reply to Singer. Journal of Ethics 15 (3):209-226.
- Mark Schroeder (2009). Huemer's Clarkeanism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):197-204.
- Russ Shafer-landau (2007). Audi's Intuitionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):250–261.
- Henry Sidgwick (1901/2009). Methods of Ethics. Kaplan Pub..
- Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2006). Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology. In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press.
- Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2002). Moral Relativity and Intuitionism. Noûs 36 (s1):305 - 328.
- Anthony Skelton (2010). Henry Sidgwick's Moral Epistemology. Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (4):491-519.
- Anthony Skelton (2007). Critical Notice of Robert Audi, The Good in the Right. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):305-325.
- Jonathan Smith (2010). On Sinnott-Armstrong's Case Against Moral Intuitionism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1).
- Thomas W. Smythe & Thomas G. Evans (2007). Intuition as a Basic Source of Moral Knowledge. Philosophia 35 (2):233-247.
- Andrew Sneddon (2007). A Social Model of Moral Dumbfounding: Implications for Studying Moral Reasoning and Moral Judgment. Philosophical Psychology 20 (6):731 – 748.
- Jordan Howard Sobel (2001). Blackburn's Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):361 - 383.
- Jordan Howard Sobel (2001). Blackburn's Problem: On its Not Insignificant Residue. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):361-383.
- Daniel Star (2008). Moral Knowledge, Epistemic Externalism, and Intuitionism. Ratio 21 (3):329-343.
- Vojko Strahovnik (2005). The Good in the Right. [REVIEW] Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (15):583-589.
- Philip Stratton-Lake (1999). Why Externalism is Not a Problem for Ethical Intuitionists. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):77–90.
- Phillip Stratton-Lake (ed.) (2002). Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations. Oxford University Press.
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