Related categories
Siblings:History/traditions: Moral Expressivism
299 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 299
  1. Zed Adams (2006). Moral Fictionalism by Kalderon, Mark. [REVIEW] Ethics 117 (1).
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Jamin Asay (2013). Truthmaking, Metaethics, and Creeping Minimalism. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):213-232.
    Creeping minimalism threatens to cloud the distinction between realist and anti-realist metaethical views. When anti-realist views equip themselves with minimalist theories of truth and other semantic notions, they are able to take on more and more of the doctrines of realism (such as the existence of moral truths, facts, and beliefs). But then they start to look suspiciously like realist views. I suggest that creeping minimalism is a problem only if moral realism is understood primarily as a semantic doctrine. I (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Jamin Asay (2012). Review of Truth, Reference and Realism. [REVIEW] International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 26 (3):345-348.
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 26, Issue 3, Page 345-348, September 2012.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Kent Bach, Statements and Beliefs Without Truth-Aptitude.
    Minimalism about truth-aptitude, if correct, would undercut expressivism about moral discourse. Indeed, it would undercut nonfactualism about any area of discourse. But it cannot be correct, for there are areas, about which people hold beliefs and make statements, to which nonfactualism uncontroversially applies. Or so I will argue. I will be thereby challenging John Divers and Alexander Miller’s [3] appeal to minimalism about truth-aptitude in defending a certain argument against expressivism about value. But I will not be defending expressivism. For (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Nicholas Baima (2014). The Problem of Ethical Vagueness for Expressivism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):593-605.
    Ethical vagueness has garnered little attention. This is rather surprising since many philosophers have remarked that the science of ethics lacks the precision that other fields of inquiry have. Of the few philosophers who have discussed ethical vagueness the majority have focused on the implications of vagueness for moral realism. Because the relevance of ethical vagueness for other metaethical positions has been underexplored, my aim in this paper is to investigate the ramifications of ethical vagueness for expressivism. Ultimately, I shall (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Carl Baker (2011). Expressivism and Moral Dilemmas: A Response to Marino. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (4):445-455.
    Simon Blackburn’s expressivist logic of attitudes aims to explain how we can use non-assertoric moral judgements in logically valid arguments. Patricia Marino has recently argued that Blackburn’s logic faces a dilemma: either it cannot account for the place of moral dilemmas in moral reasoning or, if it can, it makes an illicit distinction between two different kinds of moral dilemma. Her target is the logic’s definition of validity as satisfiability, according to which validity requires an avoidance of attitudinal inconsistency. Against (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Derek Baker & Jack Woods (forthcoming). How Expressivists Can and Should Explain Inconsistency. Ethics.
    Mark Schroeder has argued that all reasonable forms of inconsistency of attitude consist of having the same attitude type towards a pair of inconsistent contents (A-type inconsistency). We suggest that he is mistaken in this, offering a number of intuitive examples of pairs of distinct attitudes types with consistent contents which are intuitively inconsistent (B-type inconsistency). We further argue that, despite the virtues of Schroeder's elegant A-type expressivist semantics, B-type inconsistency is in many ways the more natural choice in developing (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Dorit Bar-On & Matthew Chrisman (2009). Ethical Neo-Expressivism. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 4. Oup Oxford. 132-65.
    A standard way to explain the connection between ethical claims and motivation is to say that these claims express motivational attitudes. Unless this connection is taken to be merely a matter of contingent psychological regularity, it may seem that there are only two options for understanding it. We can either treat ethical claims as expressing propositions that one cannot believe without being at least somewhat motivated (subjectivism), or we can treat ethical claims as nonpropositional and as having their semantic content (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Stephen Barker (2014). Pure Versus Hybrid Expressivism and the Enigma of Conventional Implicature. In Guy Fletcher & Mike Ridge (eds.), Having it Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern
Metaethics. Oxford.
    Can hybridism about moral claims be made to work? I argue it can if we accept the conventional implicature approach developed in Barker (Analysis 2000). However, this kind of hybrid expressivism is only acceptable if we can make sense of conventional implicature, the kind of meaning carried by operators like ‘even’, ‘but’, etc. Conventional implictures are a form of pragmatic presupposition, which involves an unsaid mode of delivery of content. I argue that we can make sense of conventional implicatures, but (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Stephen Barker (2006). Truth and the Expressing in Expressivism. In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press. 299.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Stephen J. Barker (2010). Cognitive Expressivism, Faultless Disagreement, and Absolute but Non-Objective Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):183-199.
    I offer a new theory of faultless disagreement, according to which truth is absolute (non-relative) but can still be non-objective. What's relative is truth-aptness: a sentence like ‘Vegemite is tasty’ (V) can be truth-accessible and bivalent in one context but not in another. Within a context in which V fails to be bivalent, we can affirm that there is no issue of truth or falsity about V, still disputants, affirming and denying V, were not at fault, since, in their context (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Stephen J. Barker (2002). Troubles with Horgan and Timmons' Nondescriptivist Cognitivism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):235-255.
    Emotivist, or non-descriptivist metaethical theories hold that value-statements do not function by describing special value-facts, but are the mere expressions of naturalistically describable motivational states of (valuing) agents. Non-descriptivism has typically been combined with the claim that value-statements are non-cognitive: they are not the manifestations of genuine belief states. However, all the linguistic, logical and phenomenological evidence indicates that value-statements are cognitive. Non-descriptivism then has a problem. Horgan and Timmons propose to solve it by boldly combining a non-descriptivist thesis about (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Anne Barnhill (2013). Bringing the Body Back to Sexual Ethics. Hypatia 28 (1):1-17.
    The body and bodily experience make little appearance in analytic moral philosophy. This is true even of analytic sexual ethics—the one area of ethical inquiry we might have expected to give a starring role to bodily experience. I take a small step toward remedying that by identifying one way in which the bodily experience of sex is ethically significant: some of the physical actions of sex have a default expressive significance, conveying trust, affection, care, sensitivity, enjoyment, and pleasure. When people (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Arvid Båve (2013). Compositional Semantics for Expressivists. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):633-659.
    I here propose a hitherto unnoticed possibility of solving embedding problems for noncognitivist expressivists in metaethics by appeal to Conceptual Role Semantics. I show that claims from the latter as to what constitutes various concepts can be used to define functions from states expressed by atomic sentences to states expressed by complex sentences, thereby allowing an expressivist semantics that satisfies a rather strict compositionality constraint . The proposal can be coupled with several different types of concept individuation claim , and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Matthew S. Bedke (2012). The Ought-Is Gap: Trouble For Hybrid Semantics. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):657-670.
    When it comes to the meanings of normative expressions, descriptivist theories and expressivist theories have distinct explanatory virtues. Noting this, and with the hope of not compromising on explanatory resources, hybrid semantic theories refuse to choose. Here, I examine how well the strategy works for Moorean open questions and associated is-ought gaps. Though hybrid theorists typically rely on their expressivist resources for this explanandum, there is a type of open question that unadulterated expressivist theories can handle but hybrid theories cannot (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Gunnar Björnsson (forthcoming). Disagreement, Correctness, and the Evidence for Metaethical Absolutism. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford.
    Metaethical absolutism is the view that moral concepts have non-relative satisfaction conditions that are constant across judges and their particular beliefs, attitudes, and cultural embedding. If it is correct, there is an important sense in which parties of moral disputes are concerned to get the same things right, such that their disputes can be settled by the facts. If it is not correct, as various forms of relativism and non-cognitivism imply, such coordination of concerns will be limited. The most influential (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Gunnar Björnsson (2013). Quasi-Realism, Absolutism, and Judgment-Internal Correctness Conditions. In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Ontos Verlag. 96-120.
    The traditional metaethical distinction between cognitivist absolutism,on the one hand, and speaker relativism or noncognitivism, on the other,seemed both clear and important. On the former view, moral judgmentswould be true or false independently on whose judgments they were, andmoral disagreement might be settled by the facts. Not so on the latter views. But noncognitivists and relativists, following what Simon Blackburn has called a “quasi-realist” strategy, have come a long way inmaking sense of talk about truth of moral judgments and itsindependence (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Gunnar Björnsson (2002). How Emotivism Survives Immoralists, Irrationality, and Depression. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):327-344.
    Argues that emotivism is compatible with cases where we seem to lack motivation to act according to our moral opinions.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Gunnar Björnsson (2001). Why Emotivists Love Inconsistency. Philosophical Studies 104 (1):81 - 108.
    Emotivists hold that moral opinions are wishes and desires, and that the function of moral language is to “express” such states. But if moral opinions were but wishes or desires, why would we see certain opinions as inconsistent with, or following from other opinions? And why should our reasoning include complex opinions such as the opinion that a person ought to be blamed only if he has done something wrong? Indeed, why would we think that anything is conditional on his (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Gunnar Björnsson & Arvid Båve (2007). Meaning as a Normative Concept. Theoria 73 (3):190-206.
    IN LATE SPRING 2007, professor Allan Gibbard gave the Hägerström Lectures at Uppsala University, Sweden, under the title of “Meaning as a Normative Concept”. He met up with Gunnar Björnsson and Arvid Båve to talk about the views he develops and defends in the lectures.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Gunnar Björnsson & Tristram McPherson (2014). Moral Attitudes for Non-Cognitivists: Solving the Specification Problem. Mind 123 (489):1-38.
    Moral non-cognitivists hope to explain the nature of moral agreement and disagreement as agreement and disagreement in non-cognitive attitudes. In doing so, they take on the task of identifying the relevant attitudes, distinguishing the non-cognitive attitudes corresponding to judgements of moral wrongness, for example, from attitudes involved in aesthetic disapproval or the sports fan’s disapproval of her team’s performance. We begin this paper by showing that there is a simple recipe for generating apparent counterexamples to any informative specification of the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Review author[S.]: Simon Blackburn (1992). Gibbard on Normative Logic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):947-952.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Simon Blackburn, Conference Paper on Representation and Pragmatism.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Simon Blackburn, Social and Individual Expression.
    The idea behind expressivism as a philosophy of ethics faces a number of different challenges, and has a number of different choices to make as it tries to meet them. Perhaps the first is to specify what is the primitive of the theory, which will be something that is expressed, and is usually identified as a state of mind. Later in this paper, I shall suggest caution about this, but for the moment we can go along with it. Emotion was (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Simon Blackburn, Human Reasons.
    In this paper I contemplate two phenomena that have impressed theorists concerned with the domain of reasons and of normativity. One is the much-discussed ‘externality’ of reasons. Reasons are just there, anyway. They exist whether or not agents take any notice of them. They do not only exist in the light of contingent desires or mere inclinations. They are ‘external’ not ‘internal’. They bear on us, even when through ignorance or wickedness we take no notice of them. They thus very (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Simon Blackburn (forthcoming). Blessed Are the Peacemakers. Philosophical Studies:1-11.
    In this paper I explore the points of similarity and difference that distinguish expressivists such as myself from the position known as Cornell realism. I argue that there are considerable overlaps of doctrine, although these doctrines are arrived at in very different ways. I urge that Cornell realism can only benefit by taking on some of the commitments of expressivism.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Simon Blackburn (2010). The Majesty of Reason. Philosophy 85 (1):5-27.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Simon Blackburn (2010). The Steps From Doing to Saying. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1):1-13.
    In this paper I consider recent developments in neo-pragmatism, and in particular the degree of convergence between such approaches and those placing greater emphasis on truth and truth-makers. I urge that although a global pragmatism has its merits, it by no means closes the space for a more Wittgensteinian, finer-grained, approach to the diversity of functions served by modal, causal, moral, or other modes of thought.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Simon Blackburn (2010). Practical Tortoise Raising: And Other Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Practical philosophy and ethics -- Practical tortise raising -- Truth, beauty, and goodness -- Dilemmas: dithering, plumping, and grief -- Group minds and expressive harm -- Trust, cooperation, and human psychology -- Must we weep for sentimentalism? -- Through thick and thin -- Perspectives, fictions, errors, play -- The steps from doing to saying -- Success semantics -- Wittgenstein's irrealism -- Circles, finks, smells, and biconditionals -- The absolute conception: Putnam vs. Williams -- Julius Caesar and George Berkeley play leapfrog (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Simon Blackburn (2009). Truth and A Priori Possibility: Egan's Charge Against Quasi-Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):201-213.
    In this journal Andy Egan argued that, contrary to what I have claimed, quasi-realism is committed to a damaging asymmetry between the way a subject regards himself and the way he regards others. In particular, a subject must believe it to be a priori that if something is one of his stable or fundamental beliefs, then it is true. Whereas he will not hold that this is a priori true of other people. In this paper I rebut Egan's argument, and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Simon Blackburn (2006). Antirealist Expressivism and Quasi-Realism. In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. 146--162.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Simon Blackburn (2005). Quasi-Realism No Fictionalism. In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. 322--338.
  33. Simon Blackburn (2001). Normativity À la Mode. Journal of Ethics 5 (2):139-153.
    This paper sets out to raise questions about the metaphor of the spaceof reasons. It argues that a proper appreciation of Wittgensteinundermines the metaphysical or dualistic way of taking the metaphor thatis supposed to prevent the naturalization of reason.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Simon Blackburn (1999). Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-Realist Foundation? Inquiry 42 (2):213 – 227.
    This essay juxtaposes the position in metaethics defended, expressivism with quasirealistic trimmings, with the ancient problem of relativism. It argues that, perhaps surprisingly, there is less of a problem of normative truth on this approach than on others. Because ethics is not in the business of representing aspects of the world, there is no way to argue for a plurality of moral truths, simply from the existence of a plurality of moral opinions. The essay also argues that other approaches, which (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Simon Blackburn (1998/2000). Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press.
    Simon Blackburn puts forward a compelling and original philosophy of human motivation and morality. Why do we behave as we do? Can we improve? Is our ethics at war with our passions, or is it an upshot of those passions? Blackburn seeks the answers to such questions in an exploration of the nature of moral emotions and the structures of human motivation. He develops a naturalistic ethics, which integrates our understanding of ethics with the rest of our understanding of the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Simon Blackburn (1996). Securing the Nots: Moral Epistemology for the Quasi-Realist. In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong Mark Timmons (ed.), Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 82--100.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Simon Blackburn (1995). Practical Tortoise Raising. Mind 104 (416):695-711.
    In this paper I am not so much concerned with movements of the mind, as movements of the will. But my question bears a similarity to that of the tortoise. I want to ask whether the will is under the control of fact and reason, combined. I shall try to show that there is always something else, something that is not under the control of fact and reason, which has to be given as a brute extra, if deliberation is ever (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Simon Blackburn (1993). Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford University Press.
    This volume collects some influential essays in which Simon Blackburn, one of our leading philosophers, explores one of the most profound and fertile of philosophical problems: the way in which our judgments relate to the world. This debate has centered on realism, or the view that what we say is validated by the way things stand in the world, and a variety of oppositions to it. Prominent among the latter are expressive and projective theories, but also a relaxed pluralism that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Simon Blackburn (1993). Gibbard on Normative Logic. Philosophical Issues 4 (4):60-66.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Simon Blackburn (1992). Wise Feelings, Apt Reading:Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Allan Gibbard. Ethics 102 (2):342-.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Simon Blackburn (1988). How to Be an Ethical Antirealist. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):361-375.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Simon Blackburn (1988). Attitudes and Contents. Ethics 98 (3):501-517.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Simon Blackburn (1982). Alasdair Maclntyre: After Virtue. Philosophical Investigations 5 (2):146-153.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Simon Blackburn, A Short Note on Reasons.
    Reasons have recently occupied the centre of the theory of value. Some writers, such as Tim Scanlonthink that they are not only central, but exhaust the topic, since everything important that we want to say about the good or the valuable, or the obligatory and the required, can be phrased in terms of reason. An action is good to perform if the reasons in favour of performing it are stronger than those in favour of doing anything else or doing nothing. (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Simon Blackburn & Neil Sinclair (2006). Comments on Gibbard's "Thinking How to Live". [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):699 - 706.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. By Daniel R. Boisvert (2008). Expressive-Assertivism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):169–203.
    Hybrid metaethical theories attempt to incorporate essential elements of expressivism and cognitivism, and thereby to accrue the benefits of both. Hybrid theories are often defended in part by appeals to slurs and other pejoratives, which have both expressive and cognitivist features. This paper takes far more seriously the analogy between pejoratives and moral predicates. It explains how pejoratives work, identifies the features that allow pejoratives to do that work, and models a theory of moral predicates on those features. The result (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Michael Brady (ed.) (2011). New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Metaethics occupies a central place in analytical philosophy, and the last forty years has seen an upsurge of interest in questions about the nature and practice of morality. This collection presents original and ground-breaking research on metaethical issues from some of the very best of a new generation of philosophers working in this field.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. David O. Brink, Bookreviews.
    Allan Gibbard’s book Thinking How to Live is an important sequel to his earlier and very in uential book Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. His earlier book defended a conception of morality as involving distinctive moral feelings of guilt, shame, and resentment that it is rational for someone to have and went on to defend an expressivist conception of rationality according to which judgments of rationality involve acceptance of norms for behavior and feeling. Though Gibbard offered a novel conception of the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Berit Brogaard (2012). Moral Relativism and Moral Expressivism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):538-556.
    Though moral relativism has had its supporters over the years, it is not a dominant position in philosophy. I will argue here, though, that the view is an attractive position. It evades some hardcore challenges that face absolutism, and it is reconcilable with an appealing emotivist approach to moral attitudes. In previous work, I have offered considerations in favor of a version of moral relativism that I call “perspectivalism.” These considerations are primarily grounded in linguistic data. Here I offer a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Richard Brown (2008). The Semantics of Moral Communication. Dissertation, The Graduate Center, CUNY
    Adviser: Professor Stefan Baumrin In the first chapter I introduce the distinction between metaethics and normative ethics and argue that metaethics, properly conceived, is a part of cognitive science. For example, the debate between rationalism and sentimentalism can be informed by recent empirical work in psychology and the neurosciences. In the second chapter I argue that the traditional view that one’s theory of semantics determines what one’s theory of justification must be is mistaken. Though it has been the case that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 299