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Moral Intuitionism

Edited by Christopher Michael Cloos (University of California at Santa Barbara)
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  1. Leo Abraham (1933). The Logic of Ethical Intuitionism. International Journal of Ethics 44 (1):37-55.
    Philosophers have in the past had difficulty in determining how to define ethical terms. here they are defined as open-context terms with a loosely limited range of substitution instances, in conformity with actual language usage. ethical terms are in themselves meaningless. it is a misuse to say, "x is wrong in itself." ethical terms then reduce to empirical terms concerning wants, likes, knowledge of cause and effect and consequences, knowledge of how ethical terms themselves work. ethical commands reduce to if-then (...)
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  2. Thomas Aquinas & Arendt Ed Liliane Weissberg Trans Richard (1998). Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character. By Robert Audi. New York: Oxford. Philosophical Review 107 (1).
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  3. Robert Audi (2008). Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):475 - 492.
    This paper defends a moderate intuitionism by extending a version of that view previously put forward and responding to some significant objections to it that have been posed in recent years. The notion of intuition is clarified, and various kinds of intuition are distinguished and interconnected. These include doxastic intuitions and intuitive seemings. The concept of inference is also clarified. In that light, the possibility of non-inferential intuitive justification is explained in relation to both singular moral judgments, which intuitionists do (...)
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  4. Robert Audi (2005). The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. Princeton Up.
    "Robert Audi's magisterial "The Good in the Right" offers the most comprehensive and developed account of rational ethical intuitionism to date."--Roger Crisp, St. Anne's College, University of Oxford "This is an excellent book.
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  5. Robert Audi (2002). Prospects for a Value-Based Intuitionism. In Phillip Stratton-Lake (ed.), Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations. Oxford University Press 29--55.
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  6. Robert Audi (2001). A Kantian Intuitionism. Mind 110 (439):601-635.
    Kant famously said that one could not do morality a worse disservice than to derive it from examples, and this pronouncement, taken together with his formulations and explanations of the categorical imperative, has led some critics to regard him as too abstract. Ross, by contrast, has been widely viewed as taking individual cases of duty to have a kind of epistemic priority over principles of duty, and some of his critics have thus considered him insufficiently systematic, or even dogmatically limited (...)
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  7. Robert Audi (1999). Moral Knowledge and Ethical Pluralism. In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Blackwell 271-302.
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  8. Robert Audi (1998). Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgment. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):15-44.
    This paper outlines and defends a moderate intuitionism. The point of departure is the intuitionism of W. D. Ross (1930) in The Right and the Good, conceived as ethically pluralist and epistemologically rationalist. The paper articulates a conception of self-evidence – including mediate as well as immediate kinds – appropriate to a moderate intuitionism, explores some of the resources and varieties of that position, and considers some problems and prospects for a rationalist version of intuitionism. The final section addresses the (...)
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  9. Michael W. Austin (2004). It is Ethical Intuitionism, and Not Another Thing. Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (2):155-157.
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  10. Michael W. Austin (2003). On the Alleged Irrationality of Ethical Intuitionism. Southwest Philosophy Review 19 (1):205-213.
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  11. Carla Bagnoli (2000). Moral Dilemmas and the Limits of Ethical Theory. LED.
    In this book, I consider whether the hypothesis of moral dilemmas undermines ethics' pretensions to objectivity. I argue against the view that moral dilemmas challenge the very possibility of ethical theory, as a practical and theoretical enterprise. By examining Kantian, Intuitionist and Utilitarian arguments about moral dilemmas, I show that no ethical theory is capable of avoiding them. I further argue that an adequate ethical theory should admit dilemmas. Dilemmas do not reveal a logical or normative flaw in the theory (...)
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  12. Tom Baldwin (2002). The Three Phases of Intuitionism. In Philip Stratton-Lake (ed.), Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations. Clarendon Press
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  13. Nathan Ballantyne & Joshua C. Thurow (2013). Moral Intuitionism Defeated? American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):411-421.
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  14. Nathan Ballantyne & Joshua C. Thurow (2013). Moral Intuitionism Defeated? American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):411-422.
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has developed and progressively refined an argument against moral intuitionism—the view on which some moral beliefs enjoy non-inferential justification. He has stated his argument in a few different forms, but the basic idea is straightforward. To start with, Sinnott-Armstrong highlights facts relevant to the truth of moral beliefs: such beliefs are sometimes biased, influenced by various irrelevant factors, and often subject to disagreement. Given these facts, Sinnott-Armstrong infers that many moral beliefs are false. What then shall we think (...)
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  15. Karen Bartsch & Jennifer Cole Wright (2005). Towards an Intuitionist Account of Moral Development. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):546-547.
    Sunstein's characterization of moral blunders jointly indicts an intuitive process and the structure of heuristics. But intuitions need not lead to error, and the problems with moral heuristics apply also to moral principles. Accordingly, moral development may well involve more, rather than less, intuitive responsiveness. This suggests a novel trajectory for future research into the development of appropriate moral judgments.
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  16. Matthew S. Bedke (2010). Intuitional Epistemology in Ethics. Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1069-1083.
    Here I examine the major theories of ethical intuitions, focusing on the epistemic status of this class of intuitions. We cover self-evidence theory, seeming-state theory, and some of the recent contributions from experimental philosophy.
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  17. Matthew S. Bedke (2009). Intuitive Non-Naturalism Meets Cosmic Coincidence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):188-209.
    Having no recourse to ways of knowing about the natural world, ethical non-naturalists are in need of an epistemology that might apply to a normative breed of facts or properties, and intuitionism seems well suited to fill that bill. Here I argue that the metaphysical inspiration for ethical intuitionism undermines that very epistemology, for this pair of views generates what I call the defeater from cosmic coincidence. Unfortunately, we face not a happy union, but a difficult choice: either ethical intuitionism (...)
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  18. Matthew S. Bedke (2008). Ethical Intuitions: What They Are, What They Are Not, and How They Justify. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (3):253-270.
    There are ways that ethical intuitions might be, and the various possibilities have epistemic ramifications. This paper criticizes some extant accounts of what ethical intuitions are and how they justify, and it offers an alternative account. Roughly, an ethical intuition that p is a kind of seeming state constituted by a consideration whether p, attended by positive phenomenological qualities that count as evidence for p, and so a reason to believe that p. They are distinguished from other kinds of seemings, (...)
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  19. Brian Besong (2014). Moral Intuitionism and Disagreement. Synthese 191 (12):2767-2789.
    According to moral intuitionism, at least some moral seeming states are justification-conferring. The primary defense of this view currently comes from advocates of the standard account, who take the justification-conferring power of a moral seeming to be determined by its phenomenological credentials alone. However, the standard account is vulnerable to a problem. In brief, the standard account implies that moral knowledge is seriously undermined by those commonplace moral disagreements in which both agents have equally good phenomenological credentials supporting their disputed (...)
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  20. Brian Besong (2014). The Prudent Conscience View. International Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2):127-141.
    Moral intuitionism, which claims that some moral seemings are justification-conferring, has become an increasingly popular account in moral epistemology. Defenses of the position have largely focused on the standard account, according to which the justification-conferring power of a moral seeming is determined by its phenomenal credentials alone. Unfortunately, the standard account is a less plausible version of moral intuitionism because it does not take etiology seriously. In this paper, I provide an outline and defense of a non-standard account of moral (...)
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  21. Andrew Brook (1998). Kant's Intuitionism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (2):247-268.
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  22. Georg Brun (2014). Reflective Equilibrium Without Intuitions? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):237-252.
    In moral epistemology, the method of reflective equilibrium is often characterized in terms of intuitions or understood as a method for justifying intuitions. An analysis of reflective equilibrium and current theories of moral intuitions reveals that this picture is problematic. Reflective equilibrium cannot be adequately characterized in terms of intuitions. Although the method presupposes that we have initially credible commitments, it does not presuppose that they are intuitions. Nonetheless, intuitions can enter the process of developing a reflective equilibrium and, if (...)
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  23. L. H. C. (1967). Ethical Intuitionism. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 21 (2):371-372.
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  24. Henry Calderwood (1896). The Relation of Intuitionism to the Ethical Doctrine of Self-Realization. Philosophical Review 5 (4):337-351.
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  25. Angelo Campodonico (2003). Between Epistemology and Ethics. The Moderate Institutionalism of Robert Audi. Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 95 (3-4):545-578.
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  26. Christopher Michael Cloos (2009). The Evidential Weight of Considered Moral Judgments. Dissertation, San Jose State University
    The input objection to reflective equilibrium (RE) claims that the method fails as a method of moral justification. According to the objection considered moral judgments(CMJs) are not truth‐conducive. Because the method uses inputs that are not credible the method does not generate justified moral beliefs. I solve the input objection by reinterpreting RE using contemporary developments in ethical intuitionism. In the first half of the thesis I setup the input objection, explore potential responses to the objection and uncover the best (...)
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  27. J. Cogburn (2000). Logical Revision Re-Revisited: The Wright/Salerno Argument for Intuitionism. Philosophical Studies 60:5-12.
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  28. Roy Cook (2005). Intuitionism Reconsidered. In Stewart Shapiro (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic. Oxford University Press 387--411.
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  29. Harold P. Cooke (1913). Ethics and the New Intuitionists. Mind 22 (85):82-86.
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  30. Robert Cowan (2014). Moral Perception, by Robert Audi. Mind 123 (492):1167-1171.
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  31. Robert Cowan, Review Of: Moral Perception by Robert Audi. [REVIEW]
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  32. Robert Cowan (2013). Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):n/a-n/a.
    In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in Ethical Intuitionism, whose core claim is that normal ethical agents can and do have non-inferentially justified first-order ethical beliefs. Although this is the standard formulation, there are two senses in which it is importantly incomplete. Firstly, ethical intuitionism claims that there are non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs, but there is a worrying lack of consensus in the ethical literature as to what non-inferentially justified belief is. Secondly, it has been overlooked (...)
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  33. Terence Cuneo (2008). Intuitionism's Burden: Thomas Reid on the Problem of Moral Motivation. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 6 (1):21-44.
    Hume bequeathed to rational intuitionists a problem concerning moral judgment and the will – a problem of sufficient severity that it is still cited as one of the major reasons why intuitionism is untenable.1 Stated in general terms, the problem concerns how an intuitionist moral theory can account for the intimate connection between moral judgment and moral motivation. One reason that this is still considered to be a problem for intuitionists is that it is widely assumed that the early intuitionists (...)
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  34. Trevor Curnow (1999). Wisdom, Intuition and Ethics. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
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  35. Norman O. Dahl (1986). Obligation and Moral Worth: Reflections on Prichard and Kant. Philosophical Studies 50 (3):369 - 399.
  36. Jonathan Dancy (2012). McDowell, Williams, and Intuitionism. In Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang (eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams. Oxford University Press, Usa
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  37. Jonathan Dancy (2011). Has Anyone Ever Been a Non-Intuitionist? In T. Hurka (ed.), Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers From Sidgwick to Ewing. OUP Oxford
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  38. Jonathan Dancy (1982). Intuitionism in Meta-Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 42 (3):395 - 408.
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  39. Stephen Darwall (2002). Ethical Intuitionism and the Motivation Problem,”. In Phillip Stratton-Lake (ed.), Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations. Oxford University Press
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  40. Stephen Darwall (2002). Intuitionism and the Motivation Problem. In Philip Stratton-Lake (ed.), Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations. Clarendon Press
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  41. Dan Demetriou (2009). A Modest Intuitionist Reply to Greene's fMRI-Based Objections to Deontology. Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1):107-117.
    I argue that Greene’s research, although fascinating for many reasons, doesn’t undermine deontological moral philosophy. This is because both sentimentalist and rationalist moral epistemologies, applied to deontological value, predict exactly the data Greene has found. My discussion proceeds in three steps. In the first section I summarize Greene’s brief against deontology. In the second section I draw on standard accounts of moral emotions to suggest that there are ‘deontological emotions’ made rational by appearances of ‘deontological value.’ Finally, I outline a (...)
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  42. Raphael Demos (1945). Moral Value as Irreducible, Objective, and Cognizable. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 6 (2):163-194.
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  43. Simon John Duffy (2001). An Intuitionist Response to Moral Scepticism: A Critique of Mackie's Scepticism, and an Alternative Proposal Combining Ross's Intuitionism with a Kantian Epistemology. Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    This thesis sets out an argument in defence of moral objectivism. It takes Mackie as the critic of objectivism and it ends by proposing that the best defence of objectivism may be found in what I shall call Kantian intuitionism, which brings together elements of the intuitionism of Ross and a Kantian epistemology. The argument is fundamentally transcendental in form and it proceeds by first setting out what we intuitively believe, rejecting the sceptical attacks on those beliefs, and by then (...)
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  44. Michael Dummett (1982). Principles of Intuitionism. Philosophical Review 91 (2):253-262.
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  45. Harold A. Durfee (1980). The A Priori, Intuitionism and Moral Language. Philosophical Studies 27:55-66.
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  46. Ben Eggleston (2003). Everything is What It is, and Not Another Thing: Comments on Austin. Southwest Philosophy Review 19 (2):101-105.
    To specify the aspects of Austin’s position that I want to focus on, let me start by reviewing some of the things that Austin says in order to characterize ethical intuitionism. He writes, “I take an ethical intuition to be a type of synthetic a priori insight into the necessary character of reality specifically concerning that which is right and/or good” (p. 205), and he adds that he regards “ethical intuition as a source of foundationally justified belief” (p. 205). He (...)
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  47. Cordelia Fine (2006). Is the Emotional Dog Wagging its Rational Tail, or Chasing It? Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):83 – 98.
    According to Haidt's (2001) social intuitionist model (SIM), an individual's moral judgment normally arises from automatic 'moral intuitions'. Private moral reasoning - when it occurs - is biased and post hoc, serving to justify the moral judgment determined by the individual's intuitions. It is argued here, however, that moral reasoning is not inevitably subserviant to moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Social cognitive research shows that moral reasoning may sometimes disrupt the automatic process of judgment formation described by (...)
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  48. James R. Flynn (1974). Do We Really Want a Moral Justification of Our Basic Ideals? Inquiry 17 (1-4):151 – 173.
    It is commonly held that when there is a conflict of basic ideals, e.g. a humane man v. an elitist or a Social Darwinist or someone who holds a revenge ethic, no moral justification is possible. This paper attempts to go further and show that such a justification would be undesirable, would carry a price few would be willing to pay. The thesis is developed to shed light not only on classical thinkers (Plato, Locke, Kant) but also on the attractions (...)
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  49. Robert J. Fogelin (1968). Wittgenstein and Intuitionism. American Philosophical Quarterly 5 (4):267 - 274.
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  50. Andrew T. Forcehimes (2013). David Kaspar: Intuitionism. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):1093-1094.
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