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  1. Annette Baier (1999). Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. International Studies in Philosophy 31 (4):140-141.
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  2. Dorit Bar-On (2012). Expression, Truth, and Reality : Some Variations on Themes From Wright. In Crispin Wright & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes From the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford University Press.
    Expressivism, broadly construed, is the view that the function of utterances in a given area of discourse is to give expression to our sentiments or other (non-cognitive) mental states or attitudes, rather than report or describe some range of facts. This view naturally seems an attractive option wherever it is suspected that there may not be a domain of facts for the given discourse to be describing. Familiarly, to avoid commitment to ethical facts, the ethical expressivist suggests that ethical utterances (...)
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  3. Jack Barbalet (2007). The Moon Before the Dawn : A Seventeenth Century Precursor of Smith's the Theory of Moral Sentiments. In Geoff Cockfield, Ann Firth & John Laurent (eds.), New Perspectives on Adam Smith's the Theory of Moral Sentiments. E. Elgar. 84--105.
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  4. G. Bealer, D. Braun, G. Ebbs, C. L. Elder, A. S. Gillies, J. Jones, M. A. Khalidi, K. Levy, M. K. McGowan & C. L. Stephens (2001). Kalderon, ME, 129. Philosophical Studies 105 (311).
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  5. Anthony Brueckner (2008). Neo-Expressivism. In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
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  6. John A. Burgess (1998). Error Theories and Values. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):534 – 552.
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  7. Keith Burgess-Jackson (1996). Mackie on Kant's Moral Argument. Sophia 35 (1):5-20.
  8. Stephen R. L. Clark (1989). Review: Mackie and the Moral Order. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 39 (154):98 - 114.
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  9. Robert Coburn (1976). Relativism and the Basis of Morality. Philosophical Review 85 (1):87-93.
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  10. David Copp (1982). Harman on Internalism, Relativism, and Logical Form. Ethics 92 (2):227-242.
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  11. Josep E. Corbí (2002). The Relevance of Moral Disagreement. Some Worries About Nondescriptivist Cognitivism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):217-233.
    Nondescriptivist Cognitivism vindicates the cognitive value of moral judgements despite their lack of descriptive content. In this paper,I raise a few worries about the proclaimed virtues of this new metaethical framework Firstly, I argue that Nondescriptivist Cognitivism tends to beg the question against descriptivism and, secondly, discuss Horgan and Timmons' case against Michael Smith's metaethical rationalism. Although I sympathise with their main critical claims against the latter, I am less enthusiastic about the arguments that they provide to support them.
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  12. Russell Cornett, Moral Objectivism.
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  13. Chris Daly (2007). Fictionalism in Metaphysics - Edited by Mark Eli Kalderon. Philosophical Books 48 (3):272-274.
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  14. John Devlin (2003). An Argument for an Error Theory of Truth. Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):51–82.
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  15. John Dewey (1945). Ethical Subject-Matter and Language. Journal of Philosophy 42 (26):701-712.
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  16. Paul Dumouchel (2004). Y a-T-Il Des Sentiments Moraux? Dialogue 43 (3):471-489.
    A quick survey of the literature reveals that authors disagree as to which sentiments are moral and which are not, they disagee as to how to distinguish between moral and other sentiments, and finally that often the same author will claim a sentiment is moral at some times but not at others. These difficulties arise, I argue, from an underlying concept of emotion that I call atomism. Viewing emotions as means of coordination among agents, rather than as psychic atoms, suggests (...)
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  17. S. A. E. (1964). Ethics and Metaethics. Review of Metaphysics 18 (1):187-187.
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  18. Abraham Edel (1992). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. International Studies in Philosophy 24 (3):143-144.
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  19. Jeremy Fantl (2006). Is Metaethics Morally Neutral? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):24–44.
    I argue, contra Dreier, Blackburn, and others, that there are no morally neutral metaethical positions. Every metaethical position commits you to the denial of some moral statement. So, for example, the metaethical position that there are no moral properties commits you to the denial of the (quite plausible) moral conjunction of 1) it is right to interfere violently when someone is wrongly causing massive suffering and 2) it is wrong to interfere violently when only non-moral properties are at stake. The (...)
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  20. James Gordon Finlayson (2005). Habermas's Moral Cognitivism and the Frege-Geach Challenge. European Journal of Philosophy 13 (3):319–344.
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  21. Andrew Fisher (2007). Moral Fictionalism – Mark Eli Kalderon. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):145–148.
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  22. J. L. A. Garcia (1988). Relativism and Moral Divergence. Metaphilosophy 19 (3-4):264-281.
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  23. P. T. Geach (1965). Assertion. Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.
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  24. Jyl Gentzler (2005). How to Know the Good: The Moral Epistemology of Plato's Republic. Philosophical Review 114 (4):469-496.
    John Mackie famously dismissed the rational tenability of moral objectivism with two quick arguments. The second, the so-called “argument from queerness,” proceeds as follows. A commitment to moral objectivism brings with it a commitment to the existence of moral properties as “queer” as Platonic Forms that are apprehended only through occult faculties like so-called “moral intuition” (Mackie 1977, 38). Since we have no reason to believe that there is any faculty such as moral intuition that serves as a reliable Form (...)
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  25. Allan Gibbard (1985). Reply to Sturgeon. Ethics 96 (1):34-41.
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  26. Michael B. Gill (2008). Teaching & Learning Guide For: Moral Rationalism Vs. Moral Sentimentalism: Is Morality More Like Math or Beauty? Philosophy Compass 3 (2):397–400.
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  27. Alan H. Goldman (1991). The Expressivist Theory of Normative Judgment. Inquiry 34 (4):509-523.
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  28. R. H. (1956). The Logic of Moral Discourse. Review of Metaphysics 9 (3):517-518.
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  29. John Hill (1976). Moral Cognitivism: More Unlikely Analogues. Ethics 86 (3):252-255.
    The article is a reply to joseph margolis, "moral cognitivism", "ethics", Volume 85, 1975, Pages 136-141. It is contended that margolis has neglected an important criterion of moral cognitivism: he is quite right in asserting that a cognitive theory, Beyond maintaining that we know moral propositions to be right or wrong and that we are competent so to judge, Must specify the mode of nonpropositional knowledge on which the propositional assertion is based--But his acceptance of naturalism and intuitionism as types (...)
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  30. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2000). Nondescriptivist Cognitivism: Framework for a New Metaethic. Philosophical Papers 29 (2):121-153.
    Abstract We propose a metaethical view that combines the cognitivist idea that moral judgments are genuine beliefs and moral utterances express genuine assertions with the idea that such beliefs and utterances are nondescriptive in their overall content. This sort of view has not been recognized among the standard metaethical options because it is generally assumed that all genuine beliefs and assertions must have descriptive content. We challenge this assumption and thereby open up conceptual space for a new kind of metaethical (...)
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  31. David A. Horner (2007). Error: (On Our Predicament When Things Go Wrong). Review of Metaphysics 61 (2):443-444.
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  32. Paul Horwich (2006). A World Without Isms: Life After Realism, Fictionalism, Non-Cognitivism. In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism. Oxford University Press. 188.
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  33. Paul Horwich (2005). The Frege‐Geach Point. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):78–93.
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  34. Colin Howson (1997). Error Probabilities in Error. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):194.
    The Bayesian theory is outlined and its status as a logic defended. In this it is contrasted with the development and extension of Neyman-Pearson methodology by Mayo in her recently published book (1996). It is shown by means of a simple counterexample that the rule of inference advocated by Mayo is actually unsound. An explanation of why error-probablities lead us to believe that they supply a sound rule is offered, followed by a discussion of two apparently powerful objections to the (...)
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  35. John Ibberson (1979). A Doubt About Universal Prescriptivism. Analysis 39 (3):153 - 158.
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  36. Richard Jennings (1989). Scientific Quasi-Realism. Mind 98 (390):225-245.
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  37. Craig M. Joseph (2009). Is Emotivism More Authentic Than Cognitivism? Some Reflections on Contemporary Research in Moral Psychology. In Mikko Salmela & Verena Mayer (eds.), Emotions, Ethics, and Authenticity. John Benjamins. 155--178.
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  38. Richard Joyce (2008). Morality, Schmorality. In Paul Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest. Oxford University Press.
    In his contribution to this volume, Paul Bloomfield analyzes and attempts to answer the question “Why is it bad to be bad?” I too will use this question as my point of departure; in particular I want to approach the matter from the perspective of a moral error theorist. This discussion will preface one of the principal topics of this paper: the relationship between morality and self-interest. Again, my main goal is to clarify what the moral error theorist might say (...)
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  39. Jeff Kasser & Nishi Shah (2006). The Metaethics of Belief: An Expressivist Reading of "the Will to Believe". Social Epistemology 20 (1):1 – 17.
    We argue that an expressivist interpretation of "The Will to Believe" provides a fruitful way of understanding this widely-read but perplexing document. James approaches questions about our intellectual obligations from two quite different standpoints. He first defends an expressivist interpretation of judgments of intellectual obligation; they are "only expressions of our passional life". Only then does James argue against evidentialism, and both his criticisms of Clifford and his defense of a more flexible ethics of belief presuppose this independently-defended expressivism. James (...)
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  40. Antti Kauppinen (2010). A Sentimentalist Solution to the Moral Attitude Problem. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 5. Oup Oxford.
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  41. Peter Kivy (1980). A Failure of Aesthetic Emotivism. Philosophical Studies 38 (4):351 - 365.
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  42. Noah M. Lemos (1986). Two Types of Epistemic Evaluative Cognitivism. Philosophical Studies 49 (3):313 - 327.
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  43. J. Ralph Lindgren (1970). The Theory of Moral Sentiments. New Scholasticism 44 (1):177-180.
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  44. A. O. Lovejoy (1913). Error and the New Realism. Philosophical Review 22 (4):410-423.
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  45. Cei Maslen (2006). Review of Mark Eli Kalderon (Ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (10).
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  46. Evander Bradley McGilvary (1918). Error in Professor Holt's Realism. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 15 (10):267-270.
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  47. Hugo Meynell (2007). Moral Fictionalism. By Mark Eli Kalderon. Heythrop Journal 48 (5):827–829.
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  48. A. W. Moore (2002). Quasi-Realism and Relativism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):150–156.
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  49. A. W. Moore (1913). The Aviary Theory of Truth and Error. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 10 (20):542-546.
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  50. Jan Narveson (1967). Duncan-Jones on Moral Error. Analysis 27 (3):111 - 112.
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