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Moral Emotivism and Sentimentalism
- Mark Alfano (2009). A Danger of Definition: Polar Predicates in Moral Theory. Journal of Ethics and Social Practice 3 (3).
- Fritz Allhoff (2009). The Evolution of the Moral Sentiments and the Metaphysics of Morals. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):97 - 114.
- Alberto Artosi (2000). The Limits of Emotivism. Some Remarks on Professor von Wright's Paper "Valuations". Ratio Juris 13 (4):358-363.
- Annette Baier (1991). A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise. Harvard University Press.
- Bertil Belfrage (1986). Berkeley's Theory of Emotive Meaning (1708). Hisory of European Ideas 7 (6):643-649.
- Lorraine Besser-Jones (forthcoming). The Role of Practical Reason in an Empirically Informed Moral Theory. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
- J. S. Biehl (2005). Ethical Instrumentalism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):353 - 369.
- Gunnar Bjömsson (2002). How Emotivism Survives Immoralists, Irrationality, and Depression. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):327-344.
- Gunnar Björnsson (2003). How Emotivism Survives Immoralists, Irrationality, and Depression. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):327-344.
- Gunnar Björnsson (2001). Why Emotivists Love Inconsistency. Philosophical Studies 104 (1):81 - 108.
- Simon Blackburn (1998/2000). Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press.
- William Thomas Blackstone (1958). Objective Emotivism. Journal of Philosophy 55 (24):1054-1062.
- Daniel R. Boisvert (forthcoming). Charles Leslie Stevenson. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- J. Bonar (1926). “The Theory of Moral Sentiments,” By Adam Smith, 1759. Philosophy 1 (03):333-.
- Michael S. Brady (2008). Value and Fitting Emotions. Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (4).
- Michael S. Brady (2003). Some Worries About Normative and Metaethical Sentimentalism. Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):144-153.
- David Braybrooke (1965). How Are Moral Judgments Connected with Displays of Emotion? Dialogue 4 (02):206-223.
- Nathan Brett (1999). Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility Paul Russell Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, 200 Pp., $66.95. Dialogue 38 (03):659-.
- John Bricke (1996). Mind and Morality: An Examination of Hume's Moral Psychology. Oxford University Press.
- C. D. Broad (1944). Some Reflections on Moral-Sense Theories in Ethics. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 45:131-166.
- Richard Brown (2008). The Semantics of Moral Communication. Dissertation, The Graduate Center, CUNY
- Daniel Callcut (2009). Mill, Sentimentalism and the Problem of Moral Authority. Utilitas 21 (1):22-35.
- V. Chappell (1999). Freedom and Moral Sentiment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1).
- Philip Clark (2004). Kantian Morals and Humean Motives. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):109–126.
- Steve Clarke (2008). Sim and the City: Rationalism in Psychology and Philosophy and Haidt's Account of Moral Judgment. Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):799 – 820.
- Mark Collier (2010). Hume's Theory of Moral Imagination. History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (3):255-273.
- David Copp (2011). Jesse Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): Prinz's Subjectivist Moral Realism1. Noûs 45 (3):577-594.
- Justin D'Arms, Sensibility Theory and Projectivism.
- Justin D'Arms (2005). Two Arguments for Sentimentalism. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):1–21.
- Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (2000). Sentiment and Value. Ethics 110 (4):722-748.
- Justin D.’Arms (2005). Two Arguments for Sentimentalism. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):1-21.
- Lisa Damm (2011). Emotions and Moral Agency. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):275-292.
- Ronald de Sousa (2008). Review of Jesse Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (6).
- Ronald de Sousa (2001). Moral Emotions. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2):109-126.
- Fabian Dorsch (2007). Sentimentalism and the Intersubjectivity of Aesthetic Evaluations. Dialectica 61 (3).
- Dale Dorsey, Humean Constructivism and the Relativity Problem(S).
- Julia Driver (2008). Imaginative Resistance and Psychological Necessity. Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):301-313.
- John J. Drummond (1995). Moral Objectivity: Husserl's Sentiments of the Understanding. Husserl Studies 12 (2).
- Susan Dwyer (2009). Moral Dumbfounding and the Linguistic Analogy: Methodological Implications for the Study of Moral Judgment. Mind and Language 24 (3):274-296.
- Jeffrey Edwards (2006). Hutcheson's “Sentimentalist Deontology?”. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 4 (1):17-36.
- J. N. Findlay (1935). Emotional Presentation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 13 (2):111 – 121.
- Guy Fletcher (2010). Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication – Rachel Cohon. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):861-863.
- Guy Fletcher (2009). Sentimental Value. Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (1).
- Robert Fudge (2009). Sympathy, Beauty, and Sentiment: Adam Smith's Aesthetic Morality. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 7 (2):133-146.
- Lucius Garvin (1958). Emotivism, Expression, and Symbolic Meaning. Journal of Philosophy 55 (3):111-118.
- Allan Gibbard (1992). Moral Concepts: Substance and Sentiment. Philosophical Perspectives 6:199-221.
- Allan Gibbard (1985). Moral Judgment and the Acceptance of Norms. Ethics 96 (1):5-21.
- Michael B. Gill (2010). From Cambridge Platonism to Scottish Sentimentalism. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 8 (1):13-31.
- Michael B. Gill (2007). Moral Rationalism Vs. Moral Sentimentalism: Is Morality More Like Math or Beauty? Philosophy Compass 2 (1):16–30.
- Michael B. Gill & Shaun Nichols (2008). Sentimentalist Pluralism: Moral Psychology and Philosophical Ethics. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):143-163.
- Peter Goldie (forthcoming). Seeing What is the Kind Thing to Do: Perception and Emotion in Morality. Dialectica.
- P. S. Greenspan, Emotions, Evaluation, and Ethics: The Role of Emotions in Formulating and Justifying Ethical Judgments.
- Steve Guglielmo (2010). Questioning the Influence of Moral Judgment. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (04):338-339.
- Jonathan D. Haidt, Moral Judgment, Affect, and Culture, or, Is It Wrong to Eat Your Dog?
- Jonathan Haidt & Fredrik Bjorklund (2008). Social Intuitionists Answer Six Questions About Morality. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology Vol. 2. MIT Press.
- Ishtiyaque Haji (2003). Determinism and its Threat to the Moral Sentiments. The Monist 86 (2):242-260.
- Bernard Harrison (1984). Moral Judgment, Action and Emotion. Philosophy 59 (229):295 - 321.
- Anthony Hatzimoysis (2003). Sentimental Value. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):373–379.
- Thomas K. Hearn (1973). Árdal on the Moral Sentiments in Hume's "Treatise". Philosophy 48 (185):288 - 292.
- Review author[S.]: Thomas E. Hill Jr (1992). Gibbard on Morality and Sentiment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):957-960.
- E. W. Hirst (1917). Moral Sense, Moral Reason, and Moral Sentiment. Mind 26 (102):146-161.
- Richard Holton (2000). Minimalism and Truth-Value Gaps. Philosophical Studies 97 (2):135-165.
- Christopher Hookway (1993). Mimicking Foundationalism: On Sentiment and Self-Control. European Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):156-174.
- Thomas Hurka, Soames on Ethics.
- Henry Jack (1966). Moral Judgments and Emotional Displays: A Comment. Dialogue 4 (04):536-539.
- M. R. Jack (1980). The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Journal of the History of Philosophy 18 (3).
- Mark Johnston (2001). The Authority of Affect. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):181-214.
- Karen Jones (2006). Metaethics and Emotions Research: A Response to Prinz. Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):45-53.
- Andrew Jordan & Stephanie Patridge (forthcoming). Against the Moralistic Fallacy: A Modest Defense of a Modest Sentimentalism About Humor. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
- R. Joyce (2009). Review: Jesse J. Prinz: The Emotional Construction of Morals. Mind 118 (470):508-518.
- Leonard Kahn (2011). Moral Blameworthiness and the Reactive Attitudes. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):131-142.
- Mark Kalderon, Groundwork for a Nonconcessive Expressivism.
- Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Moral Rules, the Moral Sentiments, and Behavior: Toward a Theory of an Optimal Moral System.
- Antti Kauppinen (forthcoming). What Makes a Sentiment Moral? In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics vol. 5. Oxford University Press.
- John Kemp (1951). Moral Attitudes and Moral Judgments. Philosophical Quarterly 1 (4):338-347.
- John Kilcullen, Adam Smith: The Moral Sentiments.
- Joshua Knobe (2007). Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):727–729.
- Erich H. Loewy (1995). Compassion, Reason, and Moral Judgment. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 4 (04):466-.
- Alice MacLachlan (2010). Unreasonable Resentments. Journal of Social Philosophy 41 (4):422-441.
- Andrew McGonigal (2005). Moral Facts and Suitably Informed Subjects: A Reply to Denham. Ratio 18 (1):82–92.
- Alexander Miller (1998). Emotivism and the Verification Principle. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):103–124.
- Asher Moore (1961). Emotivism and Intentionality. Ethics 71 (3):175-187.
- Asher Moore (1958). Emotivism: Theory and Practice. Journal of Philosophy 55 (9):375-382.
- Thomas Mormann (2006). Carnap's Logical Empiricism, Values, and American Pragmatism. Journal of General Philosophy of Science 38 (1):127 - 146.
- Jennifer Nado, Daniel Kelly & Stephen Stich (forthcoming). Moral Judgment. In John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.
- Shaun Nichols, Sentimentalist Pluralism: Moral Psychology and Philosophical Ethics.
- Shaun Nichols, Sentiment, Intention, and Disagreement: Replies to Blair & D'Arms.
- Shaun Nichols, Sentimentalism Naturalized.
- Shaun Nichols (2004). Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment. Oxford University Press.
- Nathan Nobis (2004). Ayer and Stevenson's Epistemological Emotivisms. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):59-79.
- Robert G. Olson (1959). Emotivism and Moral Skepticism. Journal of Philosophy 56 (18):722-730.
- Terence Penelhum (1985). Scepticism, Sentiment, and Common Sense in Hume. Dialogue 24 (03):515-.
- Charles Pigden, Russell's Moral Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Charles R. Pigden (1996). Bertrand Russell: Meta-Ethical Pioneer. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 26 (2):181-204.
- David Pizarro (2000). Nothing More Than Feelings? The Role of Emotions in Moral Judgment. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 30 (4):355–375.
- A. W. Price (1988). Book Review:Ethical Emotivism. Stephen Satris. Ethics 98 (3):579-.
- Jesse Prinz (2009). The Emotional Construction of Morals • by Jesse Prinz: Summary. Analysis 69 (4).
- Jesse J. Prinz (2007). The Emotional Construction of Morals. Oxford University Press.
- David Pugmire (2005). Sound Sentiments: Integrity in the Emotions. Oxford University Press.
- James Quigley (2011). Michael Slote, Moral Sentimentalism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (4):483-486.
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