 | 1 — 100 / 209 |  |
Amoralists
- Carla Bagnoli (2006). The Alleged Paradox of Moral Perfection. In Elvio Baccarini (ed.), Rationality in Belief and Action,. Rijeka.
- M. S. Bedke (2009). Moral Judgment Purposivism: Saving Internalism From Amoralism. Philosophical Studies 144 (2):189 - 209.
- Fredrik Björklund, Gunnar Björnsson, John Eriksson, Ragnar Francén Olinder & Caj Strandberg (2012). Recent Work on Motivational Internalism. Analysis 72 (1):124-137.
- Stephen Finlay (2011). The Selves and the Shoemaker: Psychopaths, Moral Judgement, and Responsibility. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):125–133.
- Ragnar Francén Olinder (forthcoming). Svavarsdóttir's Burden. Philosophia.
- Jeanette Kennett (2002). Autism, Empathy and Moral Agency. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):340-357.
- Lawrence Kohlberg (1973). The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of Moral Judgment. Journal of Philosophy 70 (18):630-646.
- Arie W. Kruglanski & Yoel Yinon (1974). Evaluating an Immoral Act Under Threat Versus Temptation: An Illustration of the Achievement Principle in Moral Judgment1. Journal of Moral Education 3 (2):167-175.
- Neil Levy (2005). Imaginative Resistance and the Moral/Conventional Distinction. Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):231 – 241.
- Ron Mallon, Alan M. Leslie & Jennifer DiCorcia, Transgressors, Victims, and Cry Babies: Is Basic Moral Judgment Spared in Autism? Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Christian Miller (2008). Motivational Internalism. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):233 - 255.
- Christian Miller (2004). Agency and Moral Realism. Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
- Shaun Nichols (2004). After Objectivity: An Empirical Study of Moral Judgment. Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):3 – 26.
- Caj Strandberg (2011). The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation. Journal of Ethics 15 (4):341-369.
- Caj Strandberg (2004). Moral Reality. A Defence of Moral Realism. Lund University.
- Caj Strandberg & Fredrik Björklund (forthcoming). Is Moral Internalism Supported by Folk Intuitions? Philosophical Psychology.
- Matej Sušnik (2009). The Amoralist Objection and the Method of Moral Reasoning. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):91-100.
- Sigrun Svavarsdottir (1999). Moral Cognitivism and Motivation. Philosophical Review 108 (2):161-219.
Internalism and Externalism about Moral Judgment
- M. S. Bedke (2009). Moral Judgment Purposivism: Saving Internalism From Amoralism. Philosophical Studies 144 (2):189 - 209.
- Fredrik Björklund, Gunnar Björnsson, John Eriksson, Ragnar Francén Olinder & Caj Strandberg (2012). Recent Work on Motivational Internalism. Analysis 72 (1):124-137.
- Gunnar Björnsson (2003). How Emotivism Survives Immoralists, Irrationality, and Depression. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):327-344.
- E. J. Bond (1983). Reason and Value. Cambridge University Press.
- David O. Brink, A Puzzle About Moral Motivation.
- David O. Brink, Handout #3: Moral Motivation and Externalism.
- Danielle Bromwich (2010). Clearing Conceptual Space for Cognitivist Motivational Internalism. Philosophical Studies 148 (3).
- Charlotte Brown (1988). Is Hume an Internalist? Journal of the History of Philosophy 26 (1).
- Richmond Campbell (2007). What is Moral Judgment? Journal of Philosophy 104 (7):321-49.
- Michael Cholbi (2011). Depression, Listlessness, and Moral Motivation. Ratio 24 (1):28-45.
- Michael Cholbi (2006). Belief Attribution and the Falsification of Motive Internalism. Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):607 – 616.
- Michael Cholbi (2006). Moral Belief Attribution: A Reply to Roskies. Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):629 – 638.
- Philip Clark (2004). Kantian Morals and Humean Motives. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):109–126.
- Allen Coates (2006). Ethical Internalism and Cognitive Theories of Motivation. Philosophical Studies 129 (2):295 - 315.
- Terence D. Cuneo (1999). An Externalist Solution to the "Moral Problem". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):359-380.
- Jonathan Dancy (1993). Moral Reasons. Blackwell.
- James Dreier (2000). Dispositions and Fetishes: Externalist Models of Moral Motivation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):619-638.
- James Dreier (2000). Dispositions and Fetishes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):619 - 638.
- James Dreier (1990). Internalism and Speaker Relativism. Ethics 101 (1):6-26.
- James Lawrence Dreier (2006). Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Blackwell Pub..
- Kenneth M. Ehrenberg (2008). Archimedean Metaethics Defended. Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):508-529.
- Ragnar Francén Olinder (forthcoming). Svavarsdóttir's Burden. Philosophia.
- Ragnar Francén (2010). Moral Motivation Pluralism. Journal of Ethics 14 (2):117-148.
- Ragnar Francén (2007). Metaethical Relativism: Against the Single Analysis Assumption. Dissertation, University of Gothenburg
- Joshua Gert (2008). Michael Smith and the Rationality of Immoral Action. Journal of Ethics 12 (1):1 - 23.
- Edward Hinchman (2005). Advising as Inviting to Trust. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):355-386.
- Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2007). Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):279 - 295.
- Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2006). Motivational Cognitivism and the Argument From Direction of Fit. Philosophical Studies 127 (3):561 - 580.
- Antti Kauppinen (2008). Moral Internalism and the Brain. Social Theory and Practice 34 (1):1-24.
- Daniel Kelly, Stephen Stich & Jennifer Nado, Moral Judgment.
- Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Moral Motivation, Moral Phenomenology, and the Alief/Belief Distinction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
- James Lenman (2003). Moral Deviants and Amoral Saints: A Dilemma for Moral Externalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):223-240.
- Hallvard Lillehammer (1997). Smith on Moral Fetishism. Analysis 57 (3):187–195.
- Robert Lockie (1998). What's Wrong with Moral Internalism. Ratio 11 (1):14–36.
- Elinor Mason (2008). An Argument Against Motivational Internalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1part2):135-156.
- Joshua May, Because I Believe It’s the Right Thing to Do.
- Alexander Miller (1996). An Objection to Smith's Argument for Internalism. Analysis 56 (3):169–174.
- Christian Miller (2008). Motivational Internalism. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):233 - 255.
- Christian Miller (2004). Agency and Moral Realism. Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
- Shaun Nichols (2004). After Objectivity: An Empirical Study of Moral Judgment. Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):3 – 26.
- Shaun Nichols (2004). Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment. Oxford University Press.
- Jonas Olson (2002). Are Desires de Dicto Fetishistic? Inquiry 45 (1):89 – 96.
- Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe (1996). How Does the Humean Sense of Duty Motivate? Journal of the History of Philosophy 34 (3).
- Adina Roskies (2006). Patients with Ventromedial Frontal Damage Have Moral Beliefs. Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):617 – 627.
- Adina Roskies (2003). Are Ethical Judgments Intrinsically Motivational? Lessons From "Acquired Sociopathy". Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):51 – 66.
- Adina Roskies (2003). Are Ethical Judgments Intrinsically Motivational? Lessons From "Acquired Sociopathy" [1]. Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):51-66.
- François Schroeter (2005). Normative Concepts and Motivation. Philosophers' Imprint 5 (3):1-23.
- Russ Shafer-Landau (2006). Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 3. Oxford University Press.
- Russ Shafer-Landau (1998). Moral Judgement and Moral Motivation. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):353-358.
- Michael Smith (2001). The Incoherence Argument: Reply to Schafer-Landau. Analysis 61 (3):254–266.
- Michael Smith (1996). The Argument for Internalism: Reply to Miller. Analysis 56 (3):175–184.
- Michael A. Smith (1995). Internalism's Wheel. Ratio 8 (3):277-302.
- Andrew Sneddon (2009). Alternative Motivation: A New Challenge to Moral Judgment Internalism. Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):41 – 53.
- Daniel Star (2010). Michael Smith. In Graham Oppy & N. N. Trakakis (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy in Australasia. Monash University Publishing.
- Jesse Steinberg, Weak Motivational Internalism Lite: Dispositions, Moral Judgments, and What We're Motivated to Do.
- Caj Strandberg (forthcoming). An Internalist Dilemma—and an Externalist Solution. Journal of Moral Philosophy.
- Caj Strandberg (forthcoming). An Internalist Dilemma—and an Externalist Solution. Journal of Moral Philosophy.
- Caj Strandberg (2012). A Dual Aspect Account of Moral Language. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):87-122.
- Caj Strandberg (2011). The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation. Journal of Ethics 15 (4):341-369.
- Caj Strandberg (2004). Moral Reality. A Defence of Moral Realism. Lund University.
- Caj Strandberg (1999). Dispositional Moral Properties and Moral Motivation. Theoria 65 (2):171–192.
- Caj Strandberg & Fredrik Björklund (forthcoming). Is Moral Internalism Supported by Folk Intuitions? Philosophical Psychology.
- Nicholas L. Sturgeon (1985). Gibbard on Moral Judgment and Norms. Ethics 96 (1):22-33.
- Sigrun Svavarsdottir (2006). How Do Moral Judgments Motivate? In James Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Wiley-Blackwell.
- Sigrun Svavarsdottir (1999). Moral Cognitivism and Motivation. Philosophical Review 108 (2):161-219.
- Sergio Tenenbaum (forthcoming). Externalism, Motivation, and Moral Knowledge. In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Ethical Naturalism.
- Sergio Tenenbaum (2006). Direction of Fit and Motivational Cognitivism. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press.
 | 1 — 100 / 209 |  |
|
Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Click here to configure this browser for off-campus access.
Monitor this page
Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it:
Email
|
RSS feed
|
|