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  1. Reshef Agam-Segal (2012). Kant's Non-Aristotelian Conception of Morality. Sounthwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):121-133.
    Interpreters today often take Kant’s practical philosophy to share some of the basic insights of Aristotle’s. Such, for instance, is the main tone of Christine Korsgaard’s reading. I make a case for a different, non-Aristotelian, reading of Kant’s moral philosophy. In particular, I distinguish between two senses of self-legislation: Aristotelian and Kantian. Aristotelian self-legislation is a general project we are involved in as humans, and in which we determine the organizing principle of our practical life. Every action of ours takes (...)
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  2. Leslie Allan, A Defence of Emotivism.
    As a non-cognitivist analysis of moral language, Charles Stevenson's sophisticated emotivism is widely regarded by moral philosophers as a substantial improvement over its historical antecedent, radical emotivism. None the less, it has come in for its share of criticism. In this essay, Leslie Allan responds to the key philosophical objections to Stevenson's thesis, arguing that the criticisms levelled against his meta-ethical theory rest largely on a too hasty reading of his works.
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  3. Marco Aurelio Sousa Alves (2013). Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Making Moral Judgments? Ethic@ - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 12 (1):113-126.
    Jesse Prinz (2006, 2007) claimed that emotions are necessary and sufficient for moral judgments. First of all, I clarify what this claim amounts to. The view that he labels emotionism will then be critically assessed. Prinz marshals empirical findings to defend a series of increasingly strong theses about how emotions are essential for moral judgments. I argue that the empirical support upon which his arguments are based is not only insufficient, but it even suggests otherwise, if properly interpreted. My criticism (...)
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  4. Andrew Alwood (2010). Imperative Clauses and the Frege–Geach Problem. [REVIEW] Analysis 70 (1):105-117.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  5. Pierre Baumann (2015). On Aquinas on Evil. Dialogos 97:7-22.
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  6. Lars Bergström (1975). Reply to Professor Hintikka. Theoria 41 (2):84-84.
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  7. Lars Bergström (1970). Imperatives and Contradiction. Mind 79 (315):421-424.
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  8. Lars Bergström (1962). Comments on Castañeda's Semantics of Prescriptive Discourse. Theoria 28 (1):70-72.
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  9. Gunnar Björnsson (2015). Disagreement, Correctness, and the Evidence for Metaethical Absolutism. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford
    Metaethical absolutism is the view that moral concepts have non-relative satisfaction conditions that are constant across judges and their particular beliefs, attitudes, and cultural embedding. If it is correct, there is an important sense in which parties of moral disputes are concerned to get the same things right, such that their disputes can be settled by the facts. If it is not correct, as various forms of relativism and non-cognitivism imply, such coordination of concerns will be limited. The most influential (...)
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  10. Gunnar Björnsson & Stephen Finlay (2010). Metaethical Contextualism Defended. Ethics 121 (1):7-36.
    We defend a contextualist account of deontic judgments as relativized both to (i) information and to (ii) standards or ends, against recent objections that turn on practices of moral disagreement. Kolodny & MacFarlane argue that information-relative contextualism cannot accommodate the connection between deliberation and advice; we suggest in response that they misidentify the basic concerns of deliberating agents. For pragmatic reasons, semantic assessments of normative claims sometimes are evaluations of propositions other than those asserted. Weatherson, Schroeder and others have raised (...)
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  11. Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson & Fredrik Björklund (2015). Motivational Internalism: Contemporary Debates. In Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson & Fredrik Björklund (eds.), Motivational Internalism. Oxford University Press 1–20.
    Motivational internalism—the idea that moral judgments are intrinsically or necessarily connected to motivation—has played a central role in metaethical debates. In conjunction with a Humean picture of motivation, internalism has provided a challenge for theories that take moral judgments to concern objective aspects of reality, and versions of internalism have been seen as having implications for moral absolutism, realism, and rationalism. But internalism is a controversial thesis, and the apparent possibility of amoralists and the rejection of strong forms of internalism (...)
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  12. James Francis Bohman (1985). Language and Social Criticism: On the Philosophical Foundations of Normative Social Inquiry. Dissertation, Boston University
    The social critic must be able to supply participants with truthful insights into their practices, particularly with regard to the representation and constitution of these practices in speaking and acting. Marx offers one form of such criticism in the critique of ideology and lays its foundations in a general theory of linguistic representation; the particular theory he employs must be criticized, but this methodology should not abandoned. His error was to restrict the function of language to mere reflection and meaning (...)
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  13. Renée Jorgensen Bolinger (2015). The Pragmatics of Slurs. Noûs 49 (1).
    I argue that the offense generation pattern of slurring terms parallels that of impoliteness behaviors, and is best explained by appeal to similar purely pragmatic mechanisms. In choosing to use a slurring term rather than its neutral counterpart, the speaker signals that she endorses the term . Such an endorsement warrants offense, and consequently slurs generate offense whenever a speaker's use demonstrates a contrastive preference for the slurring term. Since this explanation comes at low theoretical cost and imposes few constraints (...)
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  14. Aaron Bronfman & Janice Dowell, J. L., Contextualism About Deontic Conditionals.
  15. H. G. Callaway (1993). Review of Reese-Schafer, Karl-Otto Apel Zur Einfuhrung. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 43 (170):118-119.
    This small book is a clear and concise introduction to sources, themes and conclusions in the philosophy of Karl-Otto Apel, Emeritus Professor at Frankfurt, and close colleague of Habermas. Apel characterizes his viewpoint as a “transcendental pragmatism” in which a Kantian concern for questions regarding “the conditions for the possibility of something,” (p.10) mixes with deontological discourse-ethics, semeiotic themes from Peirce, an approach to fallibilism, the demand for “final justifications” (Letztbegründung) and German hermeneutics. Marvelous: a basic orientation to Apel’s (...)
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  16. Matthew Chrisman (2012). On the Meaning of 'Ought'. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 7. Oxford University Press 304.
    Discussions about the meaning of the word “ought” are pulled in two apparently competing directions. First, in ethical theory this word is used in the paradigmatic statement of ethical principles and conclusions about what some agent is obligated to do. This leads some ethical theorists to claim that the word “ought” describes a real relation, roughly, of being obligated to (realism) or expresses some non-cognitive attitude toward agents acting in certain ways (expressivism). Second, in theoretical linguistics this word is classified (...)
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  17. Michael Clark (1972). Obligations. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73:53 - 67.
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  18. Luís Duarte D'almeida (2011). Legal Statements and Normative Language. Law and Philosophy 30 (2):167 - 199.
    Can there be a non-reductivist, source-based explanation of the use of normative language in statements describing the law and legal situations? This problem was formulated by Joseph Raz, who also claimed to have solved it. According to his well-known doctrine of 'detached' statements, normative legal statements can be informatively made by speakers who merely adopt, without necessarily sharing, the point of view of someone who accepts that legal norms are justified and ought to be followed. In this paper I defend (...)
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  19. Edmund Dain (forthcoming). Eliminating Ethics: Wittgenstein, Ethics and the Limits of Sense. Philosophical Topics.
    This paper is about what might be called the philosophical tradition of ethics, and Wittgenstein’s opposition or hostility to that tradition. My aim will be to argue that ethics, or a large part of what we think of as ethics, is nonsense, and in doing so I shall be developing the line of argument that I take to lie behind Wittgenstein’s claim in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus that there can be no ethical propositions. That argument has its basis in the simple (...)
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  20. Edmund Dain (2007). Review of Mark Kalderon, Moral Fictionalism. [REVIEW] International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (1):146-9.
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  21. Benjamin De Mesel (2015). Do Moral Questions Ask for Answers? Philosophia 43 (1):43-61.
    It is often assumed that moral questions ask for answers in the way other questions do. In this article, moral and non-moral versions of the question ‘Should I do x or y?’ are compared. While non-moral questions of that form typically ask for answers of the form ‘You should do x/y’, so-called ‘narrow answers’, moral questions often do not ask for such narrow answers. Rather, they ask for answers recognizing their delicacy, the need for a deeper understanding of the meaning (...)
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  22. Marjolaine Deschênes (2015). L'attention aux récits sur soi. Paul Ricoeur et Carol Gilligan autour du tragique freudien. Logoi.Ph (En Ligne: Http://Logoi.Ph) 1 (2):322-338.
    This article shows that Paul Ricoeur and Carol Gilligan develop their theories of the self by borrowing critically from Freudian aesthetics, adding an ethical dimension missing in it. Ricoeur critiques, completes and endorses the Freudian interpretation of the Oedipus, while Gilligan rejects it, since she considers it distorted by patriarchal ideology. Both are reclaiming the Freudian theory of culture by focusing on what Freud called the «life drive» as opposed to the «death drive». But Ricoeur does not pay the same (...)
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  23. Tom Dougherty (2014). Vague Value. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):352-372.
    You are morally permitted to save your friend at the expense of a few strangers, but not at the expense of very many. However, there seems no number of strangers that marks a precise upper bound here. Consequently, there are borderline cases of groups at the expense of which you are permitted to save your friend. This essay discusses the question of what explains ethical vagueness like this, arguing that there are interesting metaethical consequences of various explanations.
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  24. J. L. Dowell (forthcoming). Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language. Mind:fzv148.
  25. Luís Duarte D'Almeida (2011). Legal Statements and Normative Language. Law and Philosophy 30 (2):167-199.
    Can there be a non-reductivist, source-based explanation of the use of normative language in statements describing the law and legal situations? This problem was formulated by Joseph Raz, who also claimed to have solved it. According to his well-known doctrine of ‘detached’ statements, normative legal statements can be informatively made by speakers who merely adopt, without necessarily sharing, the point of view of someone who accepts that legal norms are justified and ought to be followed. In this paper I defend (...)
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  26. Matti Eklund, Evaluative Language and Evaluative Reality.
  27. Matti Eklund (2012). Alternative Normative Concepts. Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):139-157.
  28. Daniel Y. Elstein & Thomas Hurka (2009). From Thick to Thin: Two Moral Reduction Plans. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):pp. 515-535.
    Many philosophers of the last century thought all moral judgments can be expressed using a few basic concepts — what are today called ‘thin’ moral concepts such as ‘good,’ ‘bad,’ ‘right,’ and ‘wrong.’ This was the view, fi rst, of the non-naturalists whose work dominated the early part of the century, including Henry Sidgwick, G.E. Moore, W.D. Ross, and C.D. Broad. Some of them recognized only one basic concept, usually either ‘ought’ or ‘good’; others thought there were two. But they (...)
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  29. Eva Erman (2011). Freedom as Non-Domination or How to Throw the Agent Out of the Space of Reasons. Journal of Power 3 (1).
    This paper analyzes agency in Pettit’s republican conception of freedom. By understanding freedom intersubjectively in terms of agency, Pettit makes an important contribution to the contemporary debate on negative liberty. At the same time, some of the presumptions about agency are problematic. The paper defends the thesis that Pettit is not able to provide the sufficient conditions for freedom as non-domination that he sets out to do. In order to show why this is the case and how we can address (...)
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  30. Stephen Finlay (2014). Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language. OUP Usa.
    Can normative words like "good," "ought," and "reason" be defined in non-normative terms? Stephen Finlay argues that they can, advancing a new theory of the meaning of this language and providing pragmatic explanations of the specially problematic features of its moral and deliberative uses which comprise the puzzles of metaethics.
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  31. Stephen Finlay (2013). Ought. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell
    Encyclopedia article on the meaning of 'ought'.
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  32. Stephen Finlay & Justin Snedegar (2014). One Ought Too Many. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):102-124.
    Some philosophers hold that „ought‟ is ambiguous between a sense expressing a propositional operator and a sense expressing a relation between an agent and an action. We defend the opposing view that „ought‟ always expresses a propositional operator against Mark Schroeder‟s recent objections that it cannot adequately accommodate an ambiguity in „ought‟ sentences between evaluative and deliberative readings, predicting readings of sentences that are not actually available. We show how adopting an independently well-motivated contrastivist semantics for „ought‟, according to which (...)
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  33. Guy Fletcher (2014). Moral Utterances, Attitude Expression, and Implicature. In Guy Fletcher & Mike Ridge (eds.), Having it Both Ways: Hybrid Theories in Meta-Normative Theory. OUP
    This paper examines implicaturist hybrid theories by examining how closely attitude expression by moral utterances fits with the varieties of implicature (conventional, particular conversational, generalized conversational) using five standard criteria for implicature: indeterminacy (§3), reinforceability (§4), non-detachability (§5), cancellability (§6), and calculability (§7). I argue (1) that conventional implicature is a clear non-starter as a model of attitude expression by moral utterances (2) that generalised conversational implicature yields the most plausible implicaturist hybrid but (3) that a non-implicaturist, and non-hybrid, alternative (...)
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  34. Mary Gore Forrester (1982). Moral Language. University of Wisconsin Press.
    And the Light Shineth in Darkness Stephen: the refusal In Ulysses the character of Stephen Dedalus is free of the institutional attachments confronted in ...
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  35. Christopher Freiman (2014). Goodness and Moral Twin Earth. Erkenntnis 79 (2):445-460.
    Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons’s “Moral Twin Earth” thought experiment allegedly undercuts virtually any form of naturalist moral realism. I argue that a neo-Aristotelian conception of moral properties defeats Moral Twin Earth. Developing themes in the work of Peter Geach, Philippa Foot, and Rosalind Hursthouse, I sketch an Aristotelian moral semantics that is unique in construing terms like ‘right’ and ‘good’ exclusively as attributive adjectives that denote relational properties. On this view, moral goodness is a relational property predicated of those (...)
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  36. Geoffrey P. Goodwin & John M. Darley (2010). The Perceived Objectivity of Ethical Beliefs: Psychological Findings and Implications for Public Policy. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):161-188.
    Ethical disputes arise over differences in the content of the ethical beliefs people hold on either side of an issue. One person may believe that it is wrong to have an abortion for financial reasons, whereas another may believe it to be permissible. But, the magnitude and difficulty of such disputes may also depend on other properties of the ethical beliefs in question—in particular, how objective they are perceived to be. As a psychological property of moral belief, objectivity is relatively (...)
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  37. Jarek Gryz (2011). On the Relationship Between the Aretaic and the Deontic. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (5):493-501.
    There are two fundamental classes of terms traditionally distinguished within moral vocabulary: the deontic and the aretaic. The terms from the first set serve in the prescriptive function of a moral code. The second class contains terms used for a moral evaluation of an action. The problem of the relationship between the aretaic and the deontic has not been discussed often by philosophers. It is, however, a very important and interesting issue: any normative ethical theory which takes as basic one (...)
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  38. Oswald Hanfling (2003). Learning About Right and Wrong: Ethics and Language. Philosophy 78 (1):25-41.
    The difference between right and wrong is not something that is taught; it is, necessarily, picked up by a child in the course of learning its native language, and parents have no choice about this. In learning the meaning of ‘steal’, for example, the child learns that such actions are wrong. It also develops, through a kind of conditioning, the appropriate feelings and attitudes. The very concept of a reason has a moral content; so that, in acquiring this concept, the (...)
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  39. Todd Jacob Hawbaker (1995). Which One Way Wittgenstein on Meaning, Normative Language, and Grammar.
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  40. C. S. Jenkins & Daniel Nolan (2010). Maximising, Satisficing and Context. Noûs 44 (3):451-468.
  41. Guy Kahane (2013). Must Metaethical Realism Make a Semantic Claim? Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (2):148-178.
    Mackie drew attention to the distinct semantic and metaphysical claims made by metaethical realists, arguing that although our evaluative discourse is cognitive and objective, there are no objective evaluative facts. This distinction, however, also opens up a reverse possibility: that our evaluative discourse is antirealist, yet objective values do exist. I suggest that this seemingly farfetched possibility merits serious attention; realism seems committed to its intelligibility, and, despite appearances, it isn‘t incoherent, ineffable, inherently implausible or impossible to defend. I argue (...)
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  42. Matthias Kiesselbach (2010). Zwischen Partikularismus und Generalismus: Ethische Probleme als Grammatische Spannungen. Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 35 (1):2010.
    This essay argues that there is room for a third position between moral particularism and moral generalism in their orthodox forms. The view proposed in this essay is inspired by the later Wittgenstein's conception of grammar and holds that formulations of ethical principles can be interpreted as grammatical statements, while ethical problems can be interpreted as instances of grammatical tension. On this reading, situations in which ethical principles turn out to conict come out as moments in the evolution of language. (...)
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  43. Berel Lang (1991). Writing and the Moral Self. Routledge.
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  44. Adam Lerner & Sarah‐Jane Leslie (2013). Generics, Generalism, and Reflective Equilibrium: Implications for Moral Theorizing From the Study of Language. Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):366-403.
  45. Joseph C. Long, Kinds and Their Terms: On the Language and Ontology of the Normative and the Empirical.
    At the intersection of meta-ethics and philosophy of science, Nicholas Sturgeon’s “Moral Explanation” ([1985] 1988), Richard Boyd’s “How to be a Moral Realist” (1988), and David Brink’s Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (1989) inaugurated a sustained argument for the claim that moral kinds like right action and virtuous agent are scientifically investigable natural kinds. The corresponding position is called “non-reductive ethical naturalism,” or “NEN.” Ethical nonnaturalists, by contrast, argue that moral kinds are genuine and objective, but not natural. (...)
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  46. Maurilio Lovatti (2007). Meta-Ethics and Analysis of Language From Wittgenstein to Deontic Logic Systems. Analysis and Metaphysics 6:120-135.
    In this paper, partly historical and partly theoretical, after having shortly outlined the development of the meta-ethics in the 1900?s starting from the Tractatus of Wittgenstein, I argue it is possible to sustain that emotivism and intuitionism are unsatisfactory ethical conceptions, while on the contrary, reason (intended in a logical-deductive sense) plays an effective role both in ethical discussions and in choices. There are some characteristics of the ethical language (prescriptivity, universalizability and predominance) that cannot be eluded (pain the non (...)
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  47. Teresa Marques (2015). Disagreeing in Context. Frontiers in Psychology 6 (257):1-12.
    This paper argues for contextualism about predicates of personal taste and evaluative predicates in general, and offers a proposal of how apparently resilient disagreements are to be explained. The present proposal is complementary to others that have been made in the recent literature. Several authors, for instance (López de Sa, 2008; Sundell, 2011; Huvenes, 2012; Marques and García-Carpintero, 2014; Marques, 2014a), have recently defended semantic contextualism for those kinds of predicates from the accusation that it faces the problem of lost (...)
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  48. Tristram McPherson (2008). Moral Fictionalism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 117 (3):445-448.
    This is a short review of Mark Kalderon's book Moral Fictionalism.
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  49. John M. Mikhail (2011). Elements of Moral Cognition: Rawls' Linguistic Analogy and the Cognitive Science of Moral and Legal Judgment. Cambridge University Press.
    Is the science of moral cognition usefully modeled on aspects of Universal Grammar? Are human beings born with an innate "moral grammar" that causes them to analyze human action in terms of its moral structure, with just as little awareness as they analyze human speech in terms of its grammatical structure? Questions like these have been at the forefront of moral psychology ever since John Mikhail revived them in his influential work on the linguistic analogy and its implications for (...)
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  50. John M. Mikhail (2000). Rawls' Linguistic Analogy. Dissertation, Cornell University
    The aim of the dissertation is to formulate a research program in moral cognition modeled on aspects of Universal Grammar and organized around three classic problems in moral epistemology: What constitutes moral knowledge? How is moral knowledge acquired? How is moral knowledge put to use? Drawing on the work of Rawls and Chomsky, a framework for investigating -- is proposed. The framework is defended against a range of philosophical objections and contrasted with the approach of developmentalists like Piaget and Kohlberg. (...)
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