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  1. Reshef Agam-Segal (2012). Kant's Non-Aristotelian Conception of Morality. Sounthwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):121-133.
    Interpreters today often take Kant’s practical philosophy to share some of the basic insights of Aristotle’s. Such, for instance, is the main tone of Christine Korsgaard’s reading. I make a case for a different, non-Aristotelian, reading of Kant’s moral philosophy. In particular, I distinguish between two senses of self-legislation: Aristotelian and Kantian. Aristotelian self-legislation is a general project we are involved in as humans, and in which we determine the organizing principle of our practical life. Every action of ours takes (...)
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  2. Lars Bergström (1975). Reply to Professor Hintikka. Theoria 41 (2):84-84.
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  3. Lars Bergström (1970). Imperatives and Contradiction. Mind 79 (315):421-424.
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  4. Lars Bergström (1962). Comments on Castañeda's Semantics of Prescriptive Discourse. Theoria 28 (1):70-72.
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  5. Gunnar Björnsson & Stephen Finlay (2010). Metaethical Contextualism Defended. Ethics 121 (1):7-36.
    We defend a contextualist account of deontic judgments as relativized both to (i) information and to (ii) standards or ends, against recent objections that turn on practices of moral disagreement. Kolodny & MacFarlane argue that information-relative contextualism cannot accommodate the connection between deliberation and advice; we suggest in response that they misidentify the basic concerns of deliberating agents. For pragmatic reasons, semantic assessments of normative claims sometimes are evaluations of propositions other than those asserted. Weatherson, Schroeder and others have raised (...)
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  6. H. G. Callaway (1993). Review of Reese-Schafer, Karl-Otto Apel Zur Einfuhrung. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 43 (170):118-119.
    This small book is a clear and concise introduction to sources, themes and conclusions in the philosophy of Karl-Otto Apel, Emeritus Professor at Frankfurt, and close colleague of Habermas. Apel characterizes his viewpoint as a “transcendental pragmatism” in which a Kantian concern for questions regarding “the conditions for the possibility of something,” (p.10) mixes with deontological discourse-ethics, semeiotic themes from Peirce, an approach to fallibilism, the demand for “final justifications” (Letztbegründung) and German hermeneutics. Marvelous: a basic orientation to Apel’s work.
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  7. Matthew Chrisman (2012). On the Meaning of 'Ought'. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 7. Oxford University Press. 304.
    Discussions about the meaning of the word “ought” are pulled in two apparently competing directions. First, in ethical theory this word is used in the paradigmatic statement of ethical principles and conclusions about what some agent is obligated to do. This leads some ethical theorists to claim that the word “ought” describes a real relation, roughly, of being obligated to (realism) or expresses some non-cognitive attitude toward agents acting in certain ways (expressivism). Second, in theoretical linguistics this word is classified (...)
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  8. Matti Eklund, Evaluative Language and Evaluative Reality.
  9. Matti Eklund (2012). Alternative Normative Concepts. Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):139-157.
  10. Eva Erman (2011). Freedom as Non-Domination or How to Throw the Agent Out of the Space of Reasons. Journal of Power 3 (1).
    This paper analyzes agency in Pettit’s republican conception of freedom. By understanding freedom intersubjectively in terms of agency, Pettit makes an important contribution to the contemporary debate on negative liberty. At the same time, some of the presumptions about agency are problematic. The paper defends the thesis that Pettit is not able to provide the sufficient conditions for freedom as non-domination that he sets out to do. In order to show why this is the case and how we can address (...)
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  11. Stephen Finlay & Justin Snedegar (2013). One Ought Too Many. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):102-124.
    Some philosophers hold that „ought‟ is ambiguous between a sense expressing a propositional operator and a sense expressing a relation between an agent and an action. We defend the opposing view that „ought‟ always expresses a propositional operator against Mark Schroeder‟s recent objections that it cannot adequately accommodate an ambiguity in „ought‟ sentences between evaluative and deliberative readings, predicting readings of sentences that are not actually available. We show how adopting an independently well-motivated contrastivist semantics for „ought‟, according to which (...)
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  12. Geoffrey P. Goodwin & John M. Darley (2010). The Perceived Objectivity of Ethical Beliefs: Psychological Findings and Implications for Public Policy. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):161-188.
    Ethical disputes arise over differences in the content of the ethical beliefs people hold on either side of an issue. One person may believe that it is wrong to have an abortion for financial reasons, whereas another may believe it to be permissible. But, the magnitude and difficulty of such disputes may also depend on other properties of the ethical beliefs in question—in particular, how objective they are perceived to be. As a psychological property of moral belief, objectivity is relatively (...)
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  13. Matthias Kiesselbach (2010). Zwischen Partikularismus Und Generalismus: Ethische Probleme Als Grammatische Spannungen. Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 35 (1):2010.
    This essay argues that there is room for a third position between moral particularism and moral generalism in their orthodox forms. The view proposed in this essay is inspired by the later Wittgenstein's conception of grammar and holds that formulations of ethical principles can be interpreted as grammatical statements, while ethical problems can be interpreted as instances of grammatical tension. On this reading, situations in which ethical principles turn out to conict come out as moments in the evolution of language. (...)
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  14. Tristram McPherson (2008). Moral Fictionalism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 117 (3):445-448.
    This is a short review of Mark Kalderon's book Moral Fictionalism.
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  15. José Ortega Y. Gasset (2004). Frazeologie a upřímnost / Phraseology and Sincerity. Filosoficky Casopis 52 (1):93-101.
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  16. Charles Pigden (2003). Bertrand Russell: Moral Philosopher or UnPhilosophical Moralist? In Nicholas Griffin (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell. Cambridge University Press. 475-506.
    Until very recently the received wisdom on Russell’s moral philosophy was that it is uninspired and derivative, from Moore in its first phase and from Hume and the emotivists in its second. In my view this is a consensus of error. In the latter part of this essay I contend: 1) that Russell’s ‘work in moral philosophy’ had at least three, and (depending how you look at it) up to six ‘main phases’; 2) that in some of those phases, it (...)
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  17. Charles Pigden (1988). Anscombe on `Ought'. Philosophical Quarterly 38 (150):20-41.
    n ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ Anscombe argues that the moral ‘ought’ should be abandoned as the senseless survivor from a defunct conceptual scheme. I argue 1) That even if the moral ‘ought’ derives its meaning from a Divine Law conception of ethics it does not follow that it cannot sensibly survive the Death of God. 2) That anyway Anscombe is mistaken since ancestors of the emphatic moral ‘ought’ predate the system of Christian Divine Law from which the moral ‘ought’ supposedly derives (...)
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  18. Olga Ramirez (2012). ‘BOGHOSSIAN's BLIND REASONING’, CONDITIONALIZATION AND THICK CONCEPTS A FUNCTIONAL MODEL. Ethics in Progress Quarterly 3 (1):31-52.
    Boghossian’s (2003) proposal to conditionalize concepts as a way to secure their legitimacy in disputable cases applies well, not just to pejoratives – on whose account Boghossian first proposed it – but also to thick ethical concepts. It actually has important advantages when dealing with some worries raised by the application of thick ethical terms, and the truth and facticity of corresponding statements. In this paper, I will try to show, however, that thick ethical concepts present a specific case, whose (...)
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  19. Olga Ramirez (2011). Between Non-Cognitivism and Realism in Ethics: A Three Fold Model. Prolegomena (Croatia) 10 (1):101-11202.
    Abstracts The aim of the paper is to propose an alternative model to realist and non-cognitive explanations of the rule-guided use of thick ethical concepts and to examine the implications that may be drawn from this and similar cases for our general understanding of rule-following and the relation between criteria of application, truth and correctness. It addresses McDowell’s non-cognitivism critique and challenges his defence of the entanglement thesis for thick ethical concepts. Contrary to non-cognitivists, however, I propose to view the (...)
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  20. Bastian Reichardt (2014). Asserting Moral Sentences. SATS 15 (1):1-19.
    During the last century of meta-ethical debates, moral realism was much criticized for its ontological assumptions. These assumptions arise from the semantic intuition that lies at the heart of realist theories – namely, the intuition that language represents states of affairs. This makes moral realism hardly compatible with a naturalist world view and gives rise to consider ontologically more economic approaches. Moral constructivists can explain objectivity in ethics without inheriting the realist’s ontological burden. Nevertheless, constructivists tend to ignore the semantic (...)
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  21. Krzysztof Saja (2008). Język a Utylitaryzm. Filozofia Moralna Richarda M. Hare'a. Aureus.
  22. Mark Schroeder (2007). Teleology, Agent‐Relative Value, and 'Good'. Ethics 117 (2):265-000.
    It is now generally understood that constraints play an important role in commonsense moral thinking and generally accepted that they cannot be accommodated by ordinary, traditional consequentialism. Some have seen this as the most conclusive evidence that consequentialism is hopelessly wrong,1 while others have seen it as the most conclusive evidence that moral common sense is hopelessly paradoxical.2 Fortunately, or so it is widely thought, in the last twenty-five years a new research program, that of Agent-Relative Teleology, has come to (...)
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  23. Justin Snedegar (forthcoming). Deontic Reasoning Across Contexts. In F. Cariani (ed.), DEON 2014. Springer. 208-223.
    Contrastivism about ‘ought’ holds that ‘ought’ claims are relativized, at least implicitly, to sets of mutually exclusive but not necessarily jointly exhaustive alternatives. This kind of theory can solve puzzles that face other linguistic theories of ‘ought’, via the rejection or severe restriction of principles that let us make inferences between ‘ought’ claims. By rejecting or restricting these principles, however, the contrastivist takes on a burden of recapturing acceptable inferences that these principles let us make. This paper investigates the extent (...)
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  24. Justin Snedegar (2013). Reason Claims and Contrastivism About Reasons. Philosophical Studies 166 (2):231-242.
    Contrastivism about reasons is the view that ‘reason’ expresses a relation with an argument place for a set of alternatives. This is in opposition to a more traditional theory on which reasons are reasons for things simpliciter. I argue that contrastivism provides a solution to a puzzle involving reason claims that explicitly employ ‘rather than’. Contrastivism solves the puzzle by allowing that some fact might be a reason for an action out of one set of alternatives without being a reason (...)
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  25. Justin Snedegar (2012). Contrastive Semantics for Deontic Modals. In Martijn Blaauw (ed.), Contrastivism in Philosophy: New Perspectives. Routledge.
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  26. Kyle Swan (2002). Emotivism and Deflationary Truth. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (3):270–281.
    The paper investigates different ways to understand the claim that non-cognitivist theories of morality are incoherent. According to the claim, this is so because, on one theory of truth, non-cognitivists are not able to deny objective truth to moral judgments without taking a substantive normative position. I argue that emotivism is not self-defeating in this way. The charge of incoherence actually only amounts to a claim that emotivism is incompatible with deflationary truth, but this claim is based upon a mistake. (...)
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  27. J. Jocelyn Trueblood (2012). Moral “Ought”-Judgments and “Morally Ought”-Judgments. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):39-54.
    In this paper I distinguish moral “ought”-judgments, meaning “ought”- judgments that qualify as moral judgments, from “morally ought”-judgments, meaning “ought”-judgments whose “ought” is either prefaced (or followed) by the word “morally” or construable as so prefaced. Specifically, I argue that the former class of judgments is wider than the second. (As I show in section 3, this is not to argue for the already familiar distinction, or putative distinction, between a broad and a narrow sense of “moral.”) I also speculate (...)
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  28. J. Jocelyn Trueblood (2006). Moral 'Should's and 'Morally Should's, or, Rachels on the Moral Point of View. Manuscrito 29 (1):37-70.
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  29. Siegfried van Duffel, The Nature of Rights.
    The debate between the 'Will Theory' and the 'Interest Theory' of rights is actually a debate over stipulative definitions. I argue how this could have happened, and suggest how we might proceed building a theory of rights.
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  30. Pekka Väyrynen (2014). Shapelessness in Context. Noûs 48 (3):573-593.
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  31. Pekka Väyrynen (2011). Thick Concepts and Variability. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (1):1-17.
    Some philosophers hold that so-called "thick" terms and concepts in ethics (such as 'cruel,' 'selfish,' 'courageous,' and 'generous') are contextually variable with respect to the valence (positive or negative) of the evaluations that they may be used to convey. Some of these philosophers use this variability claim to argue that thick terms and concepts are not inherently evaluative in meaning; rather their use conveys evaluations as a broadly pragmatic matter. I argue that one sort of putative examples of contextual variability (...)
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  32. Pekka Väyrynen (2009). Objectionable Thick Concepts in Denials. Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):439-469.
    So-called "thick" moral concepts are distinctive in that they somehow "hold together" evaluation and description. But how? This paper argues against the standard view that the evaluations which thick concepts may be used to convey belong to sense or semantic content. That view cannot explain linguistic data concerning how thick concepts behave in a distinctive type of disagreements and denials which arise when one speaker regards another's thick concept as "objectionable" in a certain sense. The paper also briefly considers contextualist, (...)
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  33. Jack Woods (2014). Expressivism and Moore's Paradox. Philosophers' Imprint 14 (5):1-12.
    Expressivists explain the expression relation which obtains between sincere moral assertion and the conative or affective attitude thereby expressed by appeal to the relation which obtains between sincere assertion and belief. In fact, they often explicitly take the relation between moral assertion and their favored conative or affective attitude to be exactly the same as the relation between assertion and the belief thereby expressed. If this is correct, then we can use the identity of the expression relation in the two (...)
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