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  1. Louise M. Antony (2000). Natures and Norms. Ethics 111 (1):8-36.
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  2. Guy Axtell & Philip Olson (2009). Three Independent Factors in Epistemology. Contemporary Pragmatism 6 (2):89–109.
    We articulate John Dewey’s “independent factors” approach to moral philosophy and then adapt and extend this approach to address contemporary debate concerning the nature and sources of epistemic normativity. We identify three factors (agent reliability, synchronic rationality, and diachronic rationality) as each making a permanent contribution to epistemic value. Critical of debates that stem from the reductionistic ambitions of epistemological systems that privilege of one or another of these three factors, we advocate an axiological pluralism that acknowledges each factor as (...)
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  3. Carla Bagnoli (2009). The Appeal of Kantian Intuitionism. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):152-158.
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  4. Selim Berker, The Unity of Grounding.
    I argue that there is only one grounding/in-virtue-of relation, and that it is indispensable for normative inquiry.
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  5. Selim Berker (forthcoming). Does Evolutionary Psychology Show That Normativity Is Mind-Dependent? In Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (eds.), Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Essays on the New Science of Ethics.
    Suppose we grant that evolutionary forces have had a profound effect on the contours of our normative judgments and intuitions. Can we conclude anything from this about the correct metaethical theory? I argue that, for the most part, we cannot. Focusing my attention on Sharon Street’s justly famous argument that the evolutionary origins of our normative judgments and intuitions cause insuperable epistemological difficulties for a metaethical view she calls "normative realism," I argue that there are two largely independent lines of (...)
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  6. J. M. Bernstein (2011). Is Ethical Naturalism Possible? From Life to Recognition. Constellations 18 (1):8-20.
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  7. David O. Brink (2007). „The Autonomy of Ethics “. In Michael Martin (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Atheism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 149--65.
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  8. Hugh S. Chandler (2007). Platonistic and Disenchanting Theories of Ethics. Peter Lang.
    In this book I try to defend a traditional kind of dualism in regard to ethical theory. The idea is that Conscience and Self-love offer distinct but rational and reasonable objectives in our decision-making. When they conflict, pure reason does not resolve the issue. With this picture in mind, I argue that a kind of Platonistic realism in regard to morality is (still) intellectually permissible – has not yet been defeated. That is to say, it is permissible to hold that (...)
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  9. Stephen R. L. Clark (2000). Biology and Christian Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
    This stimulating and wide-ranging book mounts a profound enquiry into some of the most pressing questions of our age, by examining the relationship between biological science and Christianity. The history of biological discovery is explored from the point of view of a leading philosopher and ethicist. What effect should modern biological theory and practice have on Christian understanding of ethics? How much of that theory and practice should Christians endorse? Can Christians, for example, agree that biological changes are not governed (...)
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  10. Stephen R. L. Clark (1993). Does the Burgess Shale Have Moral Implications? Inquiry 36 (4):357 – 380.
    Stephen Jay Gould's Wonderful Life is a study of the fossils of the Burgess Shale of British Columbia. My concern is with the morals that Gould draws, with the ?new picture of life? that, he says, the reinterpreted Burgess animals compel. I conclude that his case is not established. (1) There may have been reasons to do with ?fitness? why most of the Burgess animals left no descendants, even if we cannot guess exactly what they were. (2) We do not (...)
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  11. Stephen R. L. Clark (1972). The Use of `Man's Function' in Aristotle. Ethics 82 (4):269-283.
  12. Christine Clavien (forthcoming). Evolution, Society, and Ethics: Social Darwinism Versus Evolutionary Ethics. In Thomas Heams (ed.), Handbook of Evolutionary Biology (provis. Title). Springer.
    Evolutionary ethics (EE) is a branch of philosophy that arouses both fascination and deep suspicion. It claims that Darwinian mechanisms and evolutionary data on animal sociality are relevant to ethical reflection. This field of study is often misunderstood and rarely fails to conjure up images of Social Darwinism as a vector for nasty ideologies and policies. However, it is worth resisting the temptation to reduce EE to Social Darwinism and developing an objective analysis of whether it is appropriate to adopt (...)
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  13. Christine Clavien (2012). Kitcher’s Revolutionary Reasoning Inversion in Ethics. Analyse and Kritk 34 (1):117-128.
    This paper examines three specific issues raised by The Ethical Project. First, I discuss the varieties of altruism and spell out the differences between the definitions proposed by Kitcher and the ways altruism is usually conceived in biology, philosophy, psychology, and economics literature. Second, with the example of Kitcher’s account, I take a critical look at evolutionary stories of the emergence of human ethical practices. Third, I point to the revolutionary implications of the Darwinian methodology when it is thoughtfully applied (...)
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  14. David Copp (2007). Morality in a Natural World: Selected Essays in Metaethics. Cambridge University Press.
    The central philosophical challenge of metaethics is to account for the normativity of moral judgment without abandoning or seriously compromising moral realism. In Morality in a Natural World, David Copp defends a version of naturalistic moral realism that can accommodate the normativity of morality. Moral naturalism is often thought to face special metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic problems as well as the difficulty in accounting for normativity. In the ten essays included in this volume, Copp defends solutions to these problems. Three (...)
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  15. David Copp (2006). Review: Ethics and the A Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics. [REVIEW] Mind 115 (458):476-481.
  16. David Copp (2003). Why Naturalism? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2):179-200.
    My goal in this paper is to explain what ethical naturalism is, to locate the pivotal issue between naturalists and non-naturalists, and to motivate taking naturalism seriously. I do not aim to establish the truth of naturalism nor to answer the various familiar objections to it. But I do aim to motivate naturalism sufficiently that the attempt to deal with the objections will seem worthwhile. I propose that naturalism is best understood as the view that the moral properties are natural (...)
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  17. David Copp (2000). Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (Supplement):31-74.
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  18. David Copp (2000). Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth. Synthese 124 (1-2):113-137.
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  19. Heather Dyke (ed.) (2003). Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Ethics seeks answers to questions about the moral status of human actions and human lives. What should I do, and what should I not do? What sort of life should I lead? Actions and lives are temporal things. Actions are performed at certain times, are informed by past events and have consequences for the future. Lives have temporal extension, and are experienced from a sequence of temporal perspectives. Thus, one would think that answers to ethical questions should take account some (...)
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  20. Stephen S. Hanson (2009). Pt. 4. The Challenge of Deriving an Ought From an Is. Can Moral Norms Be Derived From Nature? The Incompatibility of Natural Scientific Investigation and Moral Norm Generation / Ian Nyberg ; Moral Acquaintances and Natural Facts in the Darwinian Age. [REVIEW] In Mark J. Cherry (ed.), The Normativity of the Natural: Human Goods, Human Virtues, and Human Flourishing. Springer.
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  21. Gilbert Harman (1986). Moral Explanations of Natural Facts-Can Moral Claims Be Tested Against Moral Reality? Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):57-68.
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  22. Chris Heathwood (2013). Reductionism in Ethics. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley.
    An encyclopedia entry on the issue of whether morality is reducible -- that is, whether moral facts are identical to facts that can be expressed in non-moral terms.
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  23. Chris Heathwood (2012). Could Morality Have a Source? Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (2):1-19.
    It is a common idea that morality, or moral truths, if there are any, must have some sort of source, or grounding. It has also been claimed that constructivist theories in metaethics have an advantage over realist theories in that the former but not the latter can provide such a grounding. This paper has two goals. First, it attempts to show that constructivism does not in fact provide a complete grounding for morality, and so is on a par with realism (...)
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  24. Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons (1991). New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:447-465.
    There have been times in the history of ethical theory, especially in this century, when moral realism was down, but it was never out. The appeal of this doctrine for many moral philosophers is apparently so strong that there are always supporters in its corner who seek to resuscitate the view. The attraction is obvious: moral realism purports to provide a precious philosophical good, viz., objectivity and all that this involves, including right answers to (most) moral questions, and the possibility (...)
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  25. Michael Huemer (2000). Naturalism and the Problem of Moral Knowledge. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):575-597.
    Ethical naturalists interpret moral knowledge as analogous to scientific knowledge and not dependent on intuition. For their account to succeed, moral truths must explain observable phenomena, and these explanations (i) must be better than any explanations framed in non-moral terms, (ii) must not rely on ad hoc posits about the causal powers of moral properties, and (iii) must not presuppose the existence of an independent means of awareness of moral truths. No moral explanations satisfy these criteria.
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  26. Rosalind Hursthouse (2012). Human Nature and Aristotelian Virtue Ethics. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 70:169-188.
  27. Whitley Kaufman (2012). Can Science Determine Moral Values? A Reply to Sam Harris. Neuroethics 5 (1):55-65.
    Sam Harris’ new book “The Moral Landscape” is the latest in a series of attempts to provide a new “science of morality.” This essay argues that such a project is unlikely to succeed, using Harris’ text as an example of the major philosophical problems that would be faced by any such theory. In particular, I argue that those trying to construct a scientific ethics need pay far more attention to the tradition of moral philosophy, rather than assuming the debate is (...)
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  28. Erin Kelly (2004). Against Naturalism in Ethics. In Mario De Caro & David Macarthur (eds.), Naturalism in Question. Harvard University Press. 259--274.
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  29. James Lenman (2009). Naturalism Without Tears. Ratio 22 (1):1-18.
    Parfit argues that naturalistic theories that seek to understand normative concepts either as simply descriptive of certain natural facts about our desires or as expressive of our desires commit us to a bleak normative nihilism whereby nothing matters. I here defend such naturalism, in particular its expressivist variety, against this charge. It is true that such views commit us to there being no reasons as Parfit understands them. But for Parfit to suppose that equivalent to there being no reasons leaves (...)
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  30. James Lenman (2005). The Saucer of Mud, The Kudzu Vine and the Uxorious Cheetah: Against Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism in Metaethics. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1 (2):37-50.
    Let me say something, to begin with, about wanting weird stuff. Stuff like saucers of mud. The example, famously, is from Anscombe’s Intention (Anscombe Anscombe 957)) where she is, in effect, defending a version of the old scholastic maxim, Omne appetitum appetitur sub specie boni. If your Latin is rusty like mine, what that says is just that every appetite – for better congruence with modern discussions, let’s say every desire – desires under the aspect of the good, or in (...)
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  31. Joseph Long (2012). Right-Making and Reference. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3):277-80.
    The following is a prominent version of the causal theory of reference, held by certain moral philosophers and philosophers of science: -/- (CTR) A general term 'T' rigidly designates a property F iff the use of 'T' by competent users of the term is causally regulated by F. -/- In a series of papers, Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons present a thought experiment our intuitive responses to which provide evidence against (CTR). The present essay goes beyond Horgan and Timmons by (...)
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  32. Kevin Magill (1998). The Idea of a Justification for Punishment. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 1 (1):86-101.
    The argument between retributivists and consequentialists about what morally justifies the punishment of offenders is incoherent. If we were to discover that all of the contending justifications were mistaken, there is no realistic prospect that this would lead us to abandon legal punishment. Justification of words, beliefs and deeds, can only be intelligible on the assumption that if one's justification were found to be invalid and there were no alternative justification, one would be prepared to stop saying, believing or doing (...)
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  33. Brad Majors (2009). The Natural and the Normative. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:29-52.
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  34. Kate Manne & David Sobel (2014). Disagreeing About How to Disagree. Philosophical Studies 168 (3):823-34.
    David Enoch, in Taking Morality Seriously, argues for a broad normative asymmetry between how we should behave when disagreeing about facts and how we should behave when disagreeing due to differing preferences. Enoch claims that moral disputes have the earmarks of a factual dispute rather than a preference dispute and that this makes more plausible a realist understanding of morality. We try to clarify what such claims would have to look like to be compelling and we resist his main conclusions.
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  35. Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.) (2011). Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates. Cambridge University Press.
    Machine generated contents note: Introduction; 1. Naturalism in moral philosophy Gilbert Harman; 2. Normativity and reasons: five arguments from Parfit against normative naturalism David Copp; 3. Naturalism: feel the width Roger Crisp; 4. On ethical naturalism and the philosophy of language Frank Jackson; 5. Metaethical pluralism: how both moral naturalism and moral skepticism may be permissible positions Richard Joyce; 6. Moral naturalism and categorical reasons Terence Cuneo; 7. Does analytical moral naturalism rest on a mistake? Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay; (...)
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  36. Sarah K. Paul (2011). Reasons From Within: Desires and Values, by Alan Goldman. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  37. Charles Pigden (2010). Letter From a Gentleman in Dunedin to a Lady in the Countryside. In Hume on Is and Ought.
    I argue 1) That in his celebrated Is/Ought passage, Hume employs ‘deduction’ in the strict sense, according to which if a conclusion B is justly or evidently deduced from a set of premises A, A cannot be true and B false, or B false and the premises A true. 2) That Hume was following the common custom of his times which sometimes employed ‘deduction’ in a strict sense to denote inferences in which, in the words of Dr Watts’ Logick, ‘the (...)
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  38. Charles Pigden (1991). Naturalism. In Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics. Blackwell. 421-431.
    Survey article on Naturalism dealing with Hume's NOFI (including Prior's objections), Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy and the Barren Tautology Argument. Naturalism, as I understand it, is a form of moral realism which rejects fundamental moral facts or properties. Thus it is opposed to both non-cognitivism, and and the error theory but also to non-naturalism. General conclusion: as of 1991: naturalism as a program has not been refuted though none of the extant versions look particularly promising.
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  39. James Rachels (2000). Naturalism. In Hugh LaFollette - (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory. Blackwell Publishers.
    Twentieth century philosophy began with the rejection of naturalism. Many modern philosophers had assumed that their subject was continuous with the sciences, and that facts about human nature and other such information were relevant to the great questions of ethics, logic, and knowledge. Against this, Frege argued that “psychologism” in logic was a mistake. Logic, he said, is an autonomous subject with its own standards of truth and falsity, and those standards have nothing to do with how the mind works (...)
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  40. Andrew Reisner (2010). Metaethics for Everyone. Problema 4:39-64.
    As Dworkin puts it: moral scepticism is a moral view. This is in contrast to the more popular idea that the real challenge for moral realism is external scepticism, scepticism which arises because of non-moral considerations about the metaphysics of morality. I, too, do not concur with Dworkin’s strongest conclusions about the viability of external scepticism. But, I think his criticism of error scepticism offers a much needed corrective to more traditional metaethical projects. My aim in this paper is to (...)
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  41. Debbie Roberts (2011). Shapelessness and the Thick. Ethics 121 (3):489-520.
    This article aims to clarify the view that thick concepts are irreducibly thick. I do this by putting the disentangling argument in its place and then setting out what nonreductivists about the thick are committed to. To distinguish the view from possible reductive accounts, defenders of irreducible thickness are, I argue, committed to the claim that evaluative concepts and properties are nonevaluatively shapeless. This in turn requires a commitment to (radical) holism and particularism. Nonreductivists are also committed to the claim (...)
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  42. Johannes Schmitt & Mark Schroeder (2011). Supervenience Arguments Under Relaxed Assumptions. Philosophical Studies 155 (1):133 - 160.
    When it comes to evaluating reductive hypotheses in metaphysics, supervenience arguments are the tools of the trade. Jaegwon Kim and Frank Jackson have argued, respectively, that strong and global supervenience are sufficient for reduction, and others have argued that supervenience theses stand in need of the kind of explanation that reductive hypotheses are particularly suited to provide. Simon Blackburn's arguments about what he claims are the specifically problematic features of the supervenience of the moral on the natural have also been (...)
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  43. Ernest Sosa (1997). Water, Drink, and "Moral Kinds&Quot;. Philosophical Issues 8:303-312.
    Geoffrey Sayre-McCord puts before us an interesting and original line of thought. Here is its main structure: (a) Naturalist semantics would bring important benefits to ethics. But (b) it has very high costs. Fortunately, (c) we can secure such benefits without the costs, by substituting, for the natural kinds of naturalist semantics, a set of moral kinds determined not by scientific but by moral theory. I find myself stumped by the preliminaries at (a), however, which need further support, or so (...)
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  44. Elizabeth Tropman (2008). Naturalism and the New Moral Intuitionism. Journal of Philosophical Research 33:163-84.
    The aim of this paper is to defend moral intuitionism, in its new formulations, against the criticism that there is something objectionably non-natural about its conception of moral properties. The force of this complaint depends crucially on what it means to be a non-natural property. I consider a number of ways of drawing the natural/non-natural distinction and argue that, once the notion of 'non-natural property' is sufficiently clarified, it fails to figure in a compelling argument against moral intuitionism.
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