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  1. Francisco Ayala (2010). What the Biological Sciences Can and Cannot Contribute to Ethics. In Francisco José Ayala & Robert Arp (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Biology. Wiley-Blackwell Pub..
    The question whether ethical behavior is biologically determined may refer either to the capacity for ethics (i.e., the proclivity to judge human actions as either right or wrong), or to the moral norms accepted by human beings for guiding their actions. I herein propose: (1) that the capacity for ethics is a necessary attribute of human nature; and (2) that moral norms are products of cultural evolution, not of biological evolution. Humans exhibit ethical behavior by nature because their biological makeup (...)
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  2. Susan Babbitt (2000). Moral Naturalism and the Normative Question. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (Supplement):139-173.
    (2000). Moral Naturalism and the Normative Question. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 30, Supplementary Volume 26: Moral Epistemology Naturalized, pp. 139-173.
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  3. Carla Bagnoli (2009). Review of Christine M. Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (6).
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  4. Arthur James Balfour (1894). Naturalism and Ethics. International Journal of Ethics 4 (4):415-429.
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  5. David Barnett (2002). Against a Posteriori Moral Naturalism. Philosophical Studies 107 (3):239 - 257.
    A posteriori Moral Naturalism posits a posteriorimoral/naturalistic identities. Versions of this view thatposit necessary identities purport to rely on theKripke/Putnam doctrine of scientific essentialism.Versions that posit only contingent identities requirethat moral terms are non-rigid designators. I argue thatmetaethics does not fall within the scope of scientificessentialism and that moral terms are not non-rigid designators.
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  6. Matthew S. Bedke (2012). Against Normative Naturalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):111 - 129.
    This paper considers normative naturalism, understood as the view that (i) normative sentences are descriptive of the way things are, and (ii) their truth/falsity does not require ontology beyond the ontology of the natural world. Assuming (i) for the sake of argument, I here show that (ii) is false not only as applied to ethics, but more generally as applied to practical and epistemic normativity across the board. The argument is a descendant of Moore's Open Question Argument and Hume's Is-Ought (...)
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  7. C. Bicchieri, E. Xiao & R. Muldoon (2011). Trustworthiness is a Social Norm, but Trusting is Not. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (2):170-187.
    Previous literature has demonstrated the important role that trust plays in developing and maintaining well-functioning societies. However, if we are to learn how to increase levels of trust in society, we must first understand why people choose to trust others. One potential answer to this is that people view trust as normative: there is a social norm for trusting that imposes punishment for noncompliance. To test this, we report data from a survey with salient rewards to elicit people’s attitudes regarding (...)
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  8. Simon Blackburn (forthcoming). Blessed Are the Peacemakers. Philosophical Studies:1-11.
    In this paper I explore the points of similarity and difference that distinguish expressivists such as myself from the position known as Cornell realism. I argue that there are considerable overlaps of doctrine, although these doctrines are arrived at in very different ways. I urge that Cornell realism can only benefit by taking on some of the commitments of expressivism.
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  9. Simon Blackburn (1998/2000). Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press.
    Simon Blackburn puts forward a compelling and original philosophy of human motivation and morality. Why do we behave as we do? Can we improve? Is our ethics at war with our passions, or is it an upshot of those passions? Blackburn seeks the answers to such questions in an exploration of the nature of moral emotions and the structures of human motivation. He develops a naturalistic ethics, which integrates our understanding of ethics with the rest of our understanding of the (...)
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  10. Simon Blackburn & Nicholas L. Sturgeon (1991). Just Causes. Philosophical Studies 61 (1-2):3-42.
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  11. Richard Boyd (2003). Finite Beings, Finite Goods: The Semantics, Metaphysics and Ethics of Naturalist Consequentialism, Part I. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):505–553.
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  12. Richard Boyd (2003). Finite Beings, Finite Goods: The Semantics, Metaphysics and Ethics of Naturalist Consequentialism, Part II. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):24–47.
  13. Richard Boyd (1988). How to Be a Moral Realist. In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press. 181-228.
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  14. David Brax, Hedonic Naturalism.
    Published (in Swedish) in the journal Filosofisk tidskrift as "Hedonistisk naturalism", 2011/3.
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  15. David Brax (2009). Hedonism as the Explanation of Value. Dissertation, Lund University
    This thesis defends a hedonistic theory of value consisting of two main components. Part 1 offers a theory of pleasure. Pleasures are experiences distinguished by a distinct phenomenological quality. This quality is attitudinal in nature: it is the feeling of liking. The pleasure experience is also an object of this attitude: when feeling pleasure, we like what we feel, and part of how it feels is how this liking feels: Pleasures are Internally Liked Experiences. Pleasure plays a central role in (...)
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  16. David O. Brink (2007). „The Autonomy of Ethics “. In Michael Martin (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Atheism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 149--65.
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  17. David O. Brink (2001). Realism, Naturalism, and Moral Semantics. Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (02):154-.
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  18. David O. Brink (1986). Externalist Moral Realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):23-41.
    SOME THINK THAT MORAL REALISTS CANNOT RECOGNIZE THE PRACTICAL OR ACTION-GUIDING CHARACTER OF MORALITY AND SO REJECT MORAL REALISM. THIS FORM OF ANTI-REALISM DEPENDS UPON AN INTERNALIST MORAL PSYCHOLOGY. BUT AN EXTERNALIST MORAL PSYCHOLOGY IS MORE PLAUSIBLE AND ALLOWS THE REALIST A SENSIBLE EXPLANATION OF THE ACTION-GUIDING CHARACTER OF MORALITY. CONSIDERATION OF THE PRACTICAL CHARACTER OF MORALITY, THEREFORE, DOES NOT UNDERMINE AND, INDEED, SUPPORTS MORAL REALISM.
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  19. David Owen Brink (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a systematic and constructive treatment of a number of traditional issues at the foundations of ethics. These issues concern the objectivity of ethics, the possibility and nature of moral knowledge, the relationship between the moral point of view and a scientific or naturalist world-view, the nature of moral value and obligation, and the role of morality in a person's rational lifeplan. In striking contrast to traditional and more recent work in the field, David Brink offers an integrated (...)
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  20. Mark J. Cherry (ed.) (2009). The Normativity of the Natural: Human Goods, Human Virtues, and Human Flourishing. Springer.
    Perhaps nature is simply a challenge to be addressed, overcome, and set aside.This volume is a critical exploration of natural law theory.
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  21. Mark J. Cherry (2009). The Normativity of the Natural : Can Philosophers Pull Morality Out of the Magic Hat of Human Nature? In , The Normativity of the Natural: Human Goods, Human Virtues, and Human Flourishing. Springer.
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  22. Christine Clavien (2012). Kitcher’s Revolutionary Reasoning Inversion in Ethics. Analyse and Kritk 34 (1):117-128.
    This paper examines three specific issues raised by The Ethical Project. First, I discuss the varieties of altruism and spell out the differences between the definitions proposed by Kitcher and the ways altruism is usually conceived in biology, philosophy, psychology, and economics literature. Second, with the example of Kitcher’s account, I take a critical look at evolutionary stories of the emergence of human ethical practices. Third, I point to the revolutionary implications of the Darwinian methodology when it is thoughtfully applied (...)
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  23. Cristian Constantinescu (2014). Moral Vagueness: A Dilemma for Non-Naturalism. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 9. Oxford University Press. 152-185.
    In this paper I explore the implications of moral vagueness (viz., the vagueness of moral predicates) for non-naturalist metaethical theories like those recently championed by Shafer-Landau, Parfit, and others. I characterise non-naturalism in terms of its commitment to 7 theses: Cognitivism, Correspondence, Atomism, Objectivism, Supervenience, Non-reductivism, and Rationalism. I start by offering a number of reasons for thinking that moral predicates are vague in the same way in which ‘red’, ‘tall’, and ‘heap’ are said to be. I then argue that (...)
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  24. David Copp (2013). Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism: Naturalized Epistemology and the First-Person Perspective. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (sup1):30-74.
    (2000). Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism: Naturalized Epistemology and the First-Person Perspective. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 30, Supplementary Volume 26: Moral Epistemology Naturalized, pp. 30-74.
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  25. David Copp (2012). Varieties of Moral Naturalism. Filosofia Unisinos 13 (2 - suppl.).
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  26. David Copp (2007). Morality in a Natural World: Selected Essays in Metaethics. Cambridge University Press.
    The central philosophical challenge of metaethics is to account for the normativity of moral judgment without abandoning or seriously compromising moral realism. In Morality in a Natural World, David Copp defends a version of naturalistic moral realism that can accommodate the normativity of morality. Moral naturalism is often thought to face special metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic problems as well as the difficulty in accounting for normativity. In the ten essays included in this volume, Copp defends solutions to these problems. Three (...)
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  27. David Copp (2005). A Skeptical Challenge to Moral Non-Naturalism and a Defense of Constructivist Naturalism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 126 (2):269 - 283.
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  28. David Copp (2003). Why Naturalism? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2):179-200.
    My goal in this paper is to explain what ethical naturalism is, to locate the pivotal issue between naturalists and non-naturalists, and to motivate taking naturalism seriously. I do not aim to establish the truth of naturalism nor to answer the various familiar objections to it. But I do aim to motivate naturalism sufficiently that the attempt to deal with the objections will seem worthwhile. I propose that naturalism is best understood as the view that the moral properties are natural (...)
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  29. David Copp (2000). Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (Supplement):31-74.
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  30. David Copp (2000). Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth. Synthese 124 (1-2):113-137.
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  31. Paul Crissman (1928). Dewey's Theory of the Moral Good. The Monist 38 (4):592-619.
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  32. Mario de Caro & David Macarthur (eds.) (2010). Naturalism and Normativity. Columbia University Press.
  33. Tanya de Villiers-Botha (2014). How Not to Be a Metaethical Naturalist –Jesse Prinz on the Emotional Construction of Morals. South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):145-154.
    Jesse Prinz develops a naturalistic metaethical theory with which he purports to sidestep ‘Hume's law’ by demonstrating how, on his theory, in describing what our moral beliefs commit us to we can determine what our moral obligations are. I aim to show that Prinz does not deliver on his prescriptive promise – he does not bridge the is–ought gap in any meaningful way. Given that Prinz goes on to argue that (1) his moral psychology highlights fundamental shortcomings in ‘traditional’ normative (...)
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  34. John Dewey (1980). Theory of the Moral Life. Irvington Publishers.
    This book is a reprint of Part II of Dewey and Tufts 1938 version of the Ethics.
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  35. John Dewey (1943). Further as to Valuation as Judgment. Journal of Philosophy 40 (20):543-552.
    A Reply to a piece by Philip Blair Rice-- -/- I shall in my present attempt confine myself to two leading theses put forth by Mr. Rice. One of them is that there are certain events which are intrinsically of such a nature that they can be observed only "introspectively," or by a single person or self in whom they occur, such events being so "sequestered and idiosyncratic" as to be private and, psychologically, "subjective." The second proposition is that in (...)
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  36. John Dewey (1916). The Pragmatism of Peirce. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 13 (26):709-715.
    A classical Deweyan look at the philosophy of C.S. Peirce--written before the availability of the Harvard edition of Peirce's writings.
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  37. Janice Dowell, J. L. & David Sobel (forthcoming). Advice for Non-Analytical Naturalists. In Simon Kirchin (ed.), Reading Parfit. Routledge.
    We argue that Parfit's "Triviality Objection" against some naturalistic views of normativity is not compelling. We think that once one accepts, as one should, that identity statements can be informative in virtue of their pragmatics and not only in virtue of their semantics, Parfit's case against naturalism can be overcome.
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  38. Hans Fink (2006). Three Sorts of Naturalism. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):202–221.
    In "Two sorts of Naturalism" John McDowell is sketching his own sort of naturalism in ethics as an alternative to "bald naturalism". In this paper I distinguish materialist, idealist and absolute conceptions of nature and of naturalism in order to provide a framework for a clearer understanding of what McDowell’s own naturalism amounts to. I argue that nothing short of an absolute naturalism will do for a number of McDowell's own purposes, but that it is far from obvious that this (...)
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  39. Stephen Finlay (2010). Normativity, Necessity and Tense: A Recipe for Homebaked Normativity. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 5. Oxford University Press. 57-85.
    A reductive analysis of a concept decomposes it into more basic constituent parts. Metaethicists today are in almost unanimous agreement that normative language and concepts cannot be reductively analyzed into entirely nonnormative language and concepts. Basic normative concepts are widely thought to be primitive or elemental in our thought, and therefore to admit of no further (reductive) explanation. G. E. Moore inferred from the unanalyzability of normative concepts the metaphysical doctrine that basic normative properties and relations are irreducible to complexes (...)
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  40. Bronwyn Finnigan (forthcoming). Meta-Ethics for Madhyamaka: Investigating the Justificatory Grounds of Moral Judgments. Philosophy East and West.
    This paper investigates whether the metaphysical commitments of Madhyamaka Buddhism afford a satisfactory justificatory ground for moral judgments. Finnigan and Tanaka (2011a) argue that they do not. Their argument has since been challenged by Tillemans (2010-11), who alleges that both Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas can readily justify moral judgments by respective appeal to the doctrine of the two truths. This paper shall contest this claim with respect to Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka. It shall provide several arguments to show that Prāsaṅgika cannot satisfactorily (...)
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  41. Philippa Foot (2001). Natural Goodness. Oxford University Press.
    Philippa Foot has for many years been one of the most distinctive and influential thinkers in moral philosophy. Long dissatisfied with the moral theories of her contemporaries, she has gradually evolved a theory of her own that is radically opposed not only to emotivism and prescriptivism but also to the whole subjectivist, anti-naturalist movement deriving from David Hume. Dissatisfied with both Kantian and utilitarian ethics, she claims to have isolated a special form of evaluation that predicates goodness and defect only (...)
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  42. Joshua Gert (2011). Naturalistic Metaethics at Half Price. In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  43. Jessy Giroux (2011). The Origin of Moral Norms: A Moderate Nativist Account. Dialogue 50 (02):281-306.
    In this paper, I distinguish between two families of theories which view moral norms as either “inputs” or “outputs.” I argue that the most plausible version of each model can ultimately be seen as the two sides of the same model, which I call Moderate Nativism. The difference between these two apparently antagonistic models is one of perspective rather than content: while the Input model explains how emotional dispositions constrain the historical evolution of moral norms, the Output model explains how (...)
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  44. John Hacker-Wright (2009). Human Nature, Personhood, and Ethical Naturalism. Philosophy 84 (3):413-427.
    John McDowell has argued that for human needs to matter in practical deliberation, we must have already acquired the full range of character traits that are imparted by an ethical upbringing. Since our upbringings can diverge considerably, his argument makes trouble for any Aristotelian ethical naturalism that wants to support a single set of moral virtues. I argue here that there is a story to be told about the normal course of human life according to which it is no coincidence (...)
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  45. John Hacker-Wright (2009). What is Natural About Foot's Ethical Naturalism? Ratio 22 (3):308-321.
    Philippa Foot's Natural Goodness is in the midst of a cool reception. It appears that this is due to the fact that Foot's naturalism draws on a picture of the biological world at odds with the view embraced by most scientists and philosophers. Foot's readers commonly assume that the account of the biological world that she must want to adhere to, and that she nevertheless mistakenly departs from, is the account offered by contemporary neo-Darwinian biological sciences. But as is evident (...)
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  46. Gilbert Harman (1986). Moral Explanations of Natural Facts-Can Moral Claims Be Tested Against Moral Reality? Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):57-68.
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  47. Gerald K. Harrison (2013). The Moral Supervenience Thesis is Not a Conceptual Truth. Analysis 73 (1):62-68.
    Virtually everyone takes the moral supervenience thesis to be a basic conceptual truth about morality. As a result, if a metaethical theory has difficulties respecting or adequately explaining the supervenience relationship it is deemed to be in big trouble. However, the moral supervenience thesis is a not a conceptual truth (though it may be true) and as such it is not a problem if a metaethical theory cannot respect or explain it.
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  48. Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons (1991). New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:447-465.
    There have been times in the history of ethical theory, especially in this century, when moral realism was down, but it was never out. The appeal of this doctrine for many moral philosophers is apparently so strong that there are always supporters in its corner who seek to resuscitate the view. The attraction is obvious: moral realism purports to provide a precious philosophical good, viz., objectivity and all that this involves, including right answers to (most) moral questions, and the possibility (...)
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  49. Michael Huemer, Critique of "the Objectivist Ethics&Quot;.
    The following responds to "The Objectivist Ethics" by Ayn Rand. I assume the reader is familiar with it. I begin with a general overview of what is wrong with it. I follow this with a set of more detailed comments, which make a paragraph-by-paragraph examination of her statements in the essay. The latter also elaborates further some of the points made in the overview.
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  50. Michael Huemer (2000). Naturalism and the Problem of Moral Knowledge. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):575-597.
    Ethical naturalists interpret moral knowledge as analogous to scientific knowledge and not dependent on intuition. For their account to succeed, moral truths must explain observable phenomena, and these explanations (i) must be better than any explanations framed in non-moral terms, (ii) must not rely on ad hoc posits about the causal powers of moral properties, and (iii) must not presuppose the existence of an independent means of awareness of moral truths. No moral explanations satisfy these criteria.
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