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  1. Francisco Ayala (2010). What the Biological Sciences Can and Cannot Contribute to Ethics. In Francisco José Ayala & Robert Arp (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Biology. Wiley-Blackwell Pub.
    The question whether ethical behavior is biologically determined may refer either to the capacity for ethics (i.e., the proclivity to judge human actions as either right or wrong), or to the moral norms accepted by human beings for guiding their actions. I herein propose: (1) that the capacity for ethics is a necessary attribute of human nature; and (2) that moral norms are products of cultural evolution, not of biological evolution. Humans exhibit ethical behavior by nature because their biological makeup (...)
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  2. Susan Babbitt (2000). Moral Naturalism and the Normative Question. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (Supplement):139-173.
    (2000). Moral Naturalism and the Normative Question. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 30, Supplementary Volume 26: Moral Epistemology Naturalized, pp. 139-173.
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  3. Carla Bagnoli (2009). Review of Christine M. Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (6).
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  4. Arthur James Balfour (1894). Naturalism and Ethics. International Journal of Ethics 4 (4):415-429.
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  5. David Barnett (2002). Against a Posteriori Moral Naturalism. Philosophical Studies 107 (3):239 - 257.
    A posteriori Moral Naturalism posits a posteriorimoral/naturalistic identities. Versions of this view thatposit necessary identities purport to rely on theKripke/Putnam doctrine of scientific essentialism.Versions that posit only contingent identities requirethat moral terms are non-rigid designators. I argue thatmetaethics does not fall within the scope of scientificessentialism and that moral terms are not non-rigid designators.
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  6. Michael Baurmann (2012). The Golden Age of the Campfire: Should We Take Our Ancestors Seriously? Analyse & Kritik 34 (1):39-50.
    In his book The Ethical Project Philip Kitcher presents an ‘analytical history’ of the development of human ethical practice. According to this history the first ethical norms were launched in the ancient world of the hunters and gatherers and their initial function was to remedy altruism failures. Kitcher wants to show that the emergence of ethical norms can in this case and in general be explained without referring to supernatural causes or philosophical revelation. Furthermore, he claims that the first manifestation (...)
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  7. Matthew S. Bedke (2012). Against Normative Naturalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):111 - 129.
    This paper considers normative naturalism, understood as the view that (i) normative sentences are descriptive of the way things are, and (ii) their truth/falsity does not require ontology beyond the ontology of the natural world. Assuming (i) for the sake of argument, I here show that (ii) is false not only as applied to ethics, but more generally as applied to practical and epistemic normativity across the board. The argument is a descendant of Moore's Open Question Argument and (...)
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  8. C. Bicchieri, E. Xiao & R. Muldoon (2011). Trustworthiness is a Social Norm, but Trusting is Not. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (2):170-187.
    Previous literature has demonstrated the important role that trust plays in developing and maintaining well-functioning societies. However, if we are to learn how to increase levels of trust in society, we must first understand why people choose to trust others. One potential answer to this is that people view trust as normative: there is a social norm for trusting that imposes punishment for noncompliance. To test this, we report data from a survey with salient rewards to elicit people’s attitudes regarding (...)
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  9. Noell Birondo (2016). Virtue and Prejudice: Giving and Taking Reasons. The Monist 99 (2):212-223.
    The most long-standing criticism of virtue ethics in its traditional, eudaimonistic variety centers on its apparently foundational appeal to nature in order to provide a source of normativity. This paper argues that a failure to appreciate both the giving and taking of reasons in sustaining an ethical outlook can distort a proper understanding of the available options for this traditional version of virtue ethics. To insist only on giving reasons, without also taking (maybe even considering) the reasons provided by others, (...)
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  10. Simon Blackburn (1998/2000). Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press.
    Simon Blackburn puts forward a compelling original philosophy of human motivation and morality. Why do we behave as we do? Can we improve? Is our ethics at war with our passions, or is it an upshot of those passions? Blackburn seeks the answers to such questions in an exploration of the nature of moral emotions and the structures of human motivation. His theory is naturalistic: it integrates our understanding of ethics with the rest of our understanding of the world we (...)
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  11. Simon Blackburn & Nicholas L. Sturgeon (1991). Just Causes. Philosophical Studies 61 (1-2):3-42.
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  12. Richard Boyd (2003). Finite Beings, Finite Goods: The Semantics, Metaphysics and Ethics of Naturalist Consequentialism, Part I. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):505–553.
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  13. Richard Boyd (2003). Finite Beings, Finite Goods: The Semantics, Metaphysics and Ethics of Naturalist Consequentialism, Part II. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):24–47.
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  14. Richard Boyd (1988). How to Be a Moral Realist. In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press 181-228.
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  15. David Brax, Hedonic Naturalism.
    Published (in Swedish) in the journal Filosofisk tidskrift as "Hedonistisk naturalism", 2011/3.
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  16. David Brax (2009). Hedonism as the Explanation of Value. Dissertation, Lund University
    This thesis defends a hedonistic theory of value consisting of two main components. Part 1 offers a theory of pleasure. Pleasures are experiences distinguished by a distinct phenomenological quality. This quality is attitudinal in nature: it is the feeling of liking. The pleasure experience is also an object of this attitude: when feeling pleasure, we like what we feel, and part of how it feels is how this liking feels: Pleasures are Internally Liked Experiences. Pleasure plays a central role in (...)
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  17. David O. Brink (2007). „The Autonomy of Ethics “. In Michael Martin (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Atheism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 149--65.
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  18. David O. Brink (2001). Realism, Naturalism, and Moral Semantics. Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):154.
    The prospects for moral realism and ethical naturalism have been important parts of recent debates within metaethics. As a first approximation, moral realism is the claim that there are facts or truths about moral matters that are objective in the sense that they obtain independently of the moral beliefs or attitudes of appraisers. Ethical naturalism is the claim that moral properties of people, actions, and institutions are natural, rather than occult or supernatural, features of the world. Though these metaethical debates (...)
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  19. David O. Brink (1986). Externalist Moral Realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):23-41.
    SOME THINK THAT MORAL REALISTS CANNOT RECOGNIZE THE PRACTICAL OR ACTION-GUIDING CHARACTER OF MORALITY AND SO REJECT MORAL REALISM. THIS FORM OF ANTI-REALISM DEPENDS UPON AN INTERNALIST MORAL PSYCHOLOGY. BUT AN EXTERNALIST MORAL PSYCHOLOGY IS MORE PLAUSIBLE AND ALLOWS THE REALIST A SENSIBLE EXPLANATION OF THE ACTION-GUIDING CHARACTER OF MORALITY. CONSIDERATION OF THE PRACTICAL CHARACTER OF MORALITY, THEREFORE, DOES NOT UNDERMINE AND, INDEED, SUPPORTS MORAL REALISM.
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  20. David Owen Brink (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a systematic and constructive treatment of a number of traditional issues at the foundations of ethics. These issues concern the objectivity of ethics, the possibility and nature of moral knowledge, the relationship between the moral point of view and a scientific or naturalist world-view, the nature of moral value and obligation, and the role of morality in a person's rational lifeplan. In striking contrast to traditional and more recent work in the field, David Brink offers an (...)
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  21. Mark J. Cherry (ed.) (2009). The Normativity of the Natural: Human Goods, Human Virtues, and Human Flourishing. Springer.
    Perhaps nature is simply a challenge to be addressed, overcome, and set aside.This volume is a critical exploration of natural law theory.
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  22. Mark J. Cherry (2009). The Normativity of the Natural : Can Philosophers Pull Morality Out of the Magic Hat of Human Nature? In The Normativity of the Natural: Human Goods, Human Virtues, and Human Flourishing. Springer
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  23. Ryo Chonabayashi, A Defence of Metaphysical Ethical Naturalism.
    This dissertation is a defence of metaphysical ethical naturalism according to which there is a moral reality which is part of the natural world. The implication of this view is that moral properties, such as moral goodness, justice, compassion and so forth are part of the natural world, and inquiries concerning these moral entities are conducted in similar empirical ways of reasoning to that in which scientific inquiries are conducted. I defend metaphysical ethical naturalism by a variety of explanationist argument (...)
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  24. Christine Clavien (2012). Kitcher’s Revolutionary Reasoning Inversion in Ethics. Analyse & Kritik 34 (1):117-128.
    This paper examines three specific issues raised by The Ethical Project. First, I discuss the varieties of altruism and spell out the differences between the definitions proposed by Kitcher and the ways altruism is usually conceived in biology, philosophy, psychology, and economics literature. Second, with the example of Kitcher’s account, I take a critical look at evolutionary stories of the emergence of human ethical practices. Third, I point to the revolutionary implications of the Darwinian methodology when it is thoughtfully applied (...)
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  25. Brendan Cline (2015). Moral Explanations, Thick and Thin. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 9 (2):1-20.
    Cornell realists maintain that irreducible moral properties have earned a place in our ontology in virtue of the indispensable role they play in a variety of explanations. These explanations can be divided into two groups: those that employ thin ethical concepts and those that employ thick ethical concepts. Recent work on thick concepts suggests that they are not inherently evaluative in their meaning. If correct, this creates problems for the moral explanations of Cornell realists, since the most (...)
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  26. Cristian Constantinescu (2014). Moral Vagueness: A Dilemma for Non-Naturalism. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 9. Oxford University Press 152-185.
    In this paper I explore the implications of moral vagueness (viz., the vagueness of moral predicates) for non-naturalist metaethical theories like those recently championed by Shafer-Landau, Parfit, and others. I characterise non-naturalism in terms of its commitment to 7 theses: Cognitivism, Correspondence, Atomism, Objectivism, Supervenience, Non-reductivism, and Rationalism. I start by offering a number of reasons for thinking that moral predicates are vague in the same way in which ‘red’, ‘tall’, and ‘heap’ are said to be. I then argue that (...)
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  27. David Copp (2013). Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism: Naturalized Epistemology and the First-Person Perspective. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (sup1):30-74.
    (2000). Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism: Naturalized Epistemology and the First-Person Perspective. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 30, Supplementary Volume 26: Moral Epistemology Naturalized, pp. 30-74.
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  28. David Copp (2012). Varieties of Moral Naturalism. Filosofia Unisinos 13 (2 - suppl.).
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  29. David Copp (2007). Morality in a Natural World: Selected Essays in Metaethics. Cambridge University Press.
    The central philosophical challenge of metaethics is to account for the normativity of moral judgment without abandoning or seriously compromising moral realism. In Morality in a Natural World, David Copp defends a version of naturalistic moral realism that can accommodate the normativity of morality. Moral naturalism is often thought to face special metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic problems as well as the difficulty in accounting for normativity. In the ten essays included in this volume, Copp defends solutions to these problems. Three (...)
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  30. David Copp (2005). A Skeptical Challenge to Moral Non-Naturalism and a Defense of Constructivist Naturalism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 126 (2):269 - 283.
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  31. David Copp (2003). Why Naturalism? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2):179-200.
    My goal in this paper is to explain what ethical naturalism is, to locate the pivotal issue between naturalists and non-naturalists, and to motivate taking naturalism seriously. I do not aim to establish the truth of naturalism nor to answer the various familiar objections to it. But I do aim to motivate naturalism sufficiently that the attempt to deal with the objections will seem worthwhile. I propose that naturalism is best understood as the view that the moral properties are natural (...)
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  32. David Copp (2000). Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (Supplement):31-74.
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  33. David Copp (2000). Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth. Synthese 124 (1-2):113-137.
  34. Paul Crissman (1928). Dewey's Theory of the Moral Good. The Monist 38 (4):592-619.
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  35. Mario de Caro & David Macarthur (eds.) (2010). Naturalism and Normativity. Columbia University Press.
    Naturalism and Normativity engages with both sides of this debate. Essays explore philosophical options for understanding normativity in the space between scientific naturalism and Platonic supernaturalism.
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  36. Tanya de Villiers-Botha (2014). How Not to Be a Metaethical Naturalist –Jesse Prinz on the Emotional Construction of Morals. South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):145-154.
    Jesse Prinz develops a naturalistic metaethical theory with which he purports to sidestep ‘Hume's law’ by demonstrating how, on his theory, in describing what our moral beliefs commit us to we can determine what our moral obligations are. I aim to show that Prinz does not deliver on his prescriptive promise – he does not bridge the is–ought gap in any meaningful way. Given that Prinz goes on to argue that (1) his moral psychology highlights fundamental shortcomings in ‘traditional’ normative (...)
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  37. Caleb Dewey, Naturalism Favours Utilitarianism.
    Ever since the founding of utilitarianism, philosophers have noted that naturalists (among others) have a particular affinity towards utilitarianism. In 1999, Jon Mendle explored whether naturalism actually implied utilitarianism and found that it did not. However, implication is not the only way for naturalism to favour utilitarianism. In this essay, I define utilitarianism in terms of practical reason, which I call ``the utilitarian backstory''. This backstory demonstrates that naturalism creates conditions in which rationality subsumes utilitarianism, making non-utilitarian ethics irrational. In (...)
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  38. John Dewey (1980). Theory of the Moral Life. Irvington Publishers.
    This book is a reprint of Part II of Dewey and Tufts 1938 version of the Ethics.
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  39. John Dewey (1943). Further as to Valuation as Judgment. Journal of Philosophy 40 (20):543-552.
    A Reply to a piece by Philip Blair Rice-- -/- I shall in my present attempt confine myself to two leading theses put forth by Mr. Rice. One of them is that there are certain events which are intrinsically of such a nature that they can be observed only "introspectively," or by a single person or self in whom they occur, such events being so "sequestered and idiosyncratic" as to be private and, psychologically, "subjective." The second proposition is that in (...)
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  40. John Dewey (1916). The Pragmatism of Peirce. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 13 (26):709-715.
    A classical Deweyan look at the philosophy of C.S. Peirce--written before the availability of the Harvard edition of Peirce's writings.
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  41. Janice Dowell, J. L. & David Sobel (forthcoming). Advice for Non-Analytical Naturalists. In Simon Kirchin (ed.), Reading Parfit. Routledge
    We argue that Parfit's "Triviality Objection" against some naturalistic views of normativity is not compelling. We think that once one accepts, as one should, that identity statements can be informative in virtue of their pragmatics and not only in virtue of their semantics, Parfit's case against naturalism can be overcome.
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  42. Andrzej Elzanowski (2010). Prawdziwie darwinowska etyka. Lectiones Et Acroases Philosophicae 3:13-57.
    True Darwinian Ethics -/- Darwin’s model for the evolution of morality as presented in Descent of Man (1871) is shown to comprise three major stages that are here referred to as empathic premorality, tribal morality, and universalizing morality. Empathy, the key component of Darwin’s “social instincts” that started moral evolution, is here recognized as the principal cognitive device that conveys epistemic credibility to moral agency. The two constitutive elements of the tribal morality are conscience that Darwin conceived of as a (...)
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  43. Andrzej Elzanowski (2010). The Ethical Significance of Evolution. In Soniewicka Stelmach (ed.), Stelmach, J., Soniewicka M., Załuski W. (red.) Legal Philosophy and the Challenges of Biosciences (Studies in the Philosophy of Law 4). Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego 65-76.
    DARWIN’s (1859, 1871) discoveries have profound ethical implications that continue to be misrepresented and/or ignored. In contrast to socialdarwinistic misuses of his theory, Darwin was a great humanitarian who paved the way for an integrated scientific and ethical world view. As an ethical doctrine, socialdarwinism is long dead ever since its defeat by E. G. Moore although the socialdarwinistic thought is a hard-die in the biological community. The accusations of sociobiology for being socialdarwinistic are unfounded and stem from the moralistic (...)
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  44. Steven Fesmire (2003). John Dewey and Moral Imagination: Pragmatism in Ethics. Indiana University Press.
    While examining the important role of imagination in making moral judgments, John Dewey and Moral Imagination focuses new attention on the relationship between American pragmatism and ethics. Steven Fesmire takes up threads of Dewey's thought that have been largely unexplored and elaborates pragmatism's distinctive contribution to understandings of moral experience, inquiry, and judgment. Building on two Deweyan notions—that moral character, belief, and reasoning are part of a social and historical context and that moral deliberation is an imaginative, dramatic rehearsal (...)
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  45. Hans Fink (2006). Three Sorts of Naturalism. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):202–221.
    In "Two sorts of Naturalism" John McDowell is sketching his own sort of naturalism in ethics as an alternative to "bald naturalism". In this paper I distinguish materialist, idealist and absolute conceptions of nature and of naturalism in order to provide a framework for a clearer understanding of what McDowell’s own naturalism amounts to. I argue that nothing short of an absolute naturalism will do for a number of McDowell's own purposes, but that it is far from obvious that this (...)
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  46. Hans Fink (1970). Moralbegrundelse Og Logik. Et Indlæg i diskussionen om den naturalistiske fejlslutning. Gyldendal.
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  47. Stephen Finlay (2010). Normativity, Necessity and Tense: A Recipe for Homebaked Normativity. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 5. Oxford University Press 57-85.
    Normative concepts have a special taste, which many consider to be proof that they cannot be reductively analyzed into entirely nonnormative components. This paper demonstrates that at least some intuitively normative concepts can be reductively analyzed. I focus on so-called ‘hypothetical imperatives’ or ‘anankastic conditionals’, and show that the availability of normative readings of conditionals is determined by features of grammar, specifically features of tense. Properly interpreted, these grammatical features suggest that these deontic modals are analyzable in terms of conditional (...)
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  48. Bronwyn Finnigan (2015). Madhyamaka Buddhist Meta-Ethics: Investigating the Justificatory Grounds of Moral Judgments. Philosophy East and West 65 (3):765-785.
    This paper investigates whether the metaphysical commitments of Madhyamaka Buddhism afford a satisfactory justificatory ground for moral judgments. Finnigan and Tanaka (2011a) argue that they do not. Their argument has since been challenged by Tillemans (2010-11), who alleges that both Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas can readily justify moral judgments by respective appeal to the doctrine of the two truths. This paper shall contest this claim with respect to Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka. It shall provide several arguments to show that Prāsaṅgika cannot satisfactorily (...)
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  49. Philippa Foot (2001). Natural Goodness. Oxford University Press.
    Philippa Foot has for many years been one of the most distinctive and influential thinkers in moral philosophy. Long dissatisfied with the moral theories of her contemporaries, she has gradually evolved a theory of her own that is radically opposed not only to emotivism and prescriptivism but also to the whole subjectivist, anti-naturalist movement deriving from David Hume. Dissatisfied with both Kantian and utilitarian ethics, she claims to have isolated a special form of evaluation that predicates goodness and defect only (...)
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  50. Andrew T. Forcehimes, Putting Reasons First: A Defense of Normative Non-Naturalism.
    Against non-analytic naturalism and quietist realism, I defend a robust form of non-naturalism. The argument proceeds as follows: In the face of extensional underdetermination, quietist realism cannot non-question-beggingly respond to alternative accounts that offer formally identical but substantively different interpretations of what reasons are. They face what we might call the reasons appropriation problem. In light of this problem, quietists ought to abandon their view in favor of robust realism. By permitting substantive metaphysical claims we can then argue, based on (...)
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