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  1. Zed Adams (2006). Moral Fictionalism by Kalderon, Mark. [REVIEW] Ethics 117 (1).
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  2. David Alm (2007). Non-Cognitivism and Validity. Theoria 73 (2):121-147.
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  3. David Alm (2000). Moral Conditionals, Noncognitivism, and Meaning. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):355-377.
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  4. Dorit Bar-On & Matthew Chrisman (2009). Ethical Neo-Expressivism. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 4. Oup Oxford. 132-65.
    A standard way to explain the connection between ethical claims and motivation is to say that these claims express motivational attitudes. Unless this connection is taken to be merely a matter of contingent psychological regularity, it may seem that there are only two options for understanding it. We can either treat ethical claims as expressing propositions that one cannot believe without being at least somewhat motivated (subjectivism), or we can treat ethical claims as nonpropositional and as having their semantic content (...)
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  5. Stephen J. Barker (2002). Troubles with Horgan and Timmons' Nondescriptivist Cognitivism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):235-255.
    Emotivist, or non-descriptivist metaethical theories hold that value-statements do not function by describing special value-facts, but are the mere expressions of naturalistically describable motivational states of (valuing) agents. Non-descriptivism has typically been combined with the claim that value-statements are non-cognitive: they are not the manifestations of genuine belief states. However, all the linguistic, logical and phenomenological evidence indicates that value-statements are cognitive. Non-descriptivism then has a problem. Horgan and Timmons propose to solve it by boldly combining a non-descriptivist thesis about (...)
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  6. Matthew S. Bedke (2012). The Ought-Is Gap: Trouble For Hybrid Semantics. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):657-670.
    When it comes to the meanings of normative expressions, descriptivist theories and expressivist theories have distinct explanatory virtues. Noting this, and with the hope of not compromising on explanatory resources, hybrid semantic theories refuse to choose. Here, I examine how well the strategy works for Moorean open questions and associated is-ought gaps. Though hybrid theorists typically rely on their expressivist resources for this explanandum, there is a type of open question that unadulterated expressivist theories can handle but hybrid theories cannot (...)
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  7. J. S. Biehl (2005). Ethical Instrumentalism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):353 - 369.
    The present essay offers a sketch of a philosophy of value, what I shall here refer to as ‘ethical instrumentalism.’ My primary aim is to say just what this view involves and what its commitments are. In the course of doing so, I find it necessary to distinguish this view from another with which it shares a common basis and which, in reference to its most influential proponent, I refer to as ‘Humeanism.’ A second, more general, aim is to make (...)
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  8. Gunnar Björnsson (forthcoming). Disagreement, Correctness, and the Evidence for Metaethical Absolutism. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford.
    Metaethical absolutism is the view that moral concepts have non-relative satisfaction conditions that are constant across judges and their particular beliefs, attitudes, and cultural embedding. If it is correct, there is an important sense in which parties of moral disputes are concerned to get the same things right, such that their disputes can be settled by the facts. If it is not correct, as various forms of relativism and non-cognitivism imply, such coordination of concerns will be limited. The most influential (...)
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  9. Gunnar Björnsson (2002). How Emotivism Survives Immoralists, Irrationality, and Depression. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):327-344.
    Argues that emotivism is compatible with cases where we seem to lack motivation to act according to our moral opinions.
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  10. Gunnar Björnsson & Tristram McPherson (2014). Moral Attitudes for Non-Cognitivists: Solving the Specification Problem. Mind 123 (489):1-38.
    Moral non-cognitivists hope to explain the nature of moral agreement and disagreement as agreement and disagreement in non-cognitive attitudes. In doing so, they take on the task of identifying the relevant attitudes, distinguishing the non-cognitive attitudes corresponding to judgements of moral wrongness, for example, from attitudes involved in aesthetic disapproval or the sports fan’s disapproval of her team’s performance. We begin this paper by showing that there is a simple recipe for generating apparent counterexamples to any informative specification of the (...)
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  11. Simon Blackburn, Conference Paper on Representation and Pragmatism.
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  12. Simon Blackburn (1998). Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):195-198.
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  13. Simon Blackburn (1998/2000). Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press.
    Simon Blackburn puts forward a compelling and original philosophy of human motivation and morality. Why do we behave as we do? Can we improve? Is our ethics at war with our passions, or is it an upshot of those passions? Blackburn seeks the answers to such questions in an exploration of the nature of moral emotions and the structures of human motivation. He develops a naturalistic ethics, which integrates our understanding of ethics with the rest of our understanding of the (...)
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  14. Olle Blomberg (2007). Disentangling the Thick Concept Argument. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):63-78.
    Critics argue that non-cognitivism cannot adequately account for the existence and nature of some thick moral concepts. They use the existence of thick concepts as a lever in an argument against non-cognitivism, here called the Thick Concept Argument (TCA). While TCA is frequently invoked, it is unfortunately rarely articulated. In this paper, TCA is first reconstructed on the basis of John McDowell’s formulation of the argument (from 1981), and then evaluated in the light of several possible non-cognitivist responses. In general, (...)
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  15. Michael Blome-Tillmann (2009). Non-Cognitivism and the Grammar of Morality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):279-309.
    This paper investigates the linguistic basis for moral non-cognitivism, the view that sentences containing moral predicates do not have truth conditions. It offers a new argument against this view by pointing out that the view is incompatible with our best empirical theories about the grammatical encoding of illocutionary force potentials. Given that my arguments are based on very general assumptions about the relations between the grammar of natural languages and a sentence's illocutionary function, my arguments are broader in scope than (...)
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  16. Walter Brand (1993). Hume's Theory of Moral Judgment. Hume Studies 19 (2):324-326.
  17. Ronald J. Broach (1997). A Noncognitivist Reading of Quine's Ethics. Dialectica 51 (2):119–134.
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  18. Mark Bryant Budolfson (2011). Non-Cognitivism and Rational Inference. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):243 - 259.
    Non-cognitivism might seem to offer a plausible account of evaluative judgments, at least on the assumption that there is a satisfactory solution to the Frege-Geach problem. However, Cian Dorr has argued that non-cognitivism remains implausible even assuming that the Frege-Geach problem can be solved, on the grounds that non-cognitivism still has to classify some paradigmatically rational inferences as irrational. Dorr's argument is ingenious and at first glance seems decisive. However, in this paper I will show that Dorr's argument equivocates between (...)
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  19. Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson (2009). Expressivism and Moral Certitude. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):202-215.
    Michael Smith has recently argued that non-cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucial structural features of moral belief, and in particular that non-cognitivists have trouble accounting for subjects' certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge have independently constructed 'ecumenical' versions of non-cognitivism, intended to block this objection. We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non-cognitivism, a hybrid view which incorporates both non-cognitivist and cognitivist elements, fails to meet Smith's challenge, it is unlikely that (...)
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  20. Matthew Chrisman (2008). A Dilemma for Moral Fictionalism. Philosophical Books 49 (1):4-13.
    This article is a critical study of Mark Kalderon's excellent book *Moral Fictionalism*.
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  21. Matthew Chrisman (2005). Review of Alan Gibbard's Thinking How to Live. [REVIEW] Ethics 115 (2):406-412.
    I imagine that people will complain that the account of normative concepts defended in Gibbard’s new book makes the metaethical waters even muddier because it blurs the line between cognitivism and noncognitivism and between realism and antirealism. However, these labels are philosophic tools, and in the wake of Gibbard’s new book, one might rightly conclude that there are new and better philosophical tools emerging on the metaethical scene. The uptake of views about practical reasoning—as exhibited by planning—into debates about the (...)
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  22. Christine Clavien (2012). Kitcher’s Revolutionary Reasoning Inversion in Ethics. Analyse and Kritk 34 (1):117-128.
    This paper examines three specific issues raised by The Ethical Project. First, I discuss the varieties of altruism and spell out the differences between the definitions proposed by Kitcher and the ways altruism is usually conceived in biology, philosophy, psychology, and economics literature. Second, with the example of Kitcher’s account, I take a critical look at evolutionary stories of the emergence of human ethical practices. Third, I point to the revolutionary implications of the Darwinian methodology when it is thoughtfully applied (...)
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  23. Robert C. Coburn (1991). A Defense of Ethical Noncognitivism. Philosophical Studies 62 (1):67 - 80.
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  24. Rachel Cohon (1997). Is Hume a Noncognitivist in the Motivation Argument? Philosophical Studies 85 (2-3):251-266.
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  25. David Copp (2006). Review: Ethics and the A Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics. [REVIEW] Mind 115 (458):476-481.
  26. Adam M. Croom (2010). Thick Concepts, Non-Cognitivism, and Wittgenstein's Rule Following Considerations. South African Journal of Philosophy 29:286-309.
    Non-cognitivists claim that thick concepts can be disentangled into distinct descriptive and evaluative components and that since thick concepts have descriptive shape they can be mastered independently of evaluation. In Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following, John McDowell uses Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations to show that such a non-cognitivist view is untenable. In this paper I do several things. I describe the non-cognitivist position in its various forms and explain its driving motivations. I then explain McDowell’s argument against non-cognitivism and the Wittgensteinian considerations upon (...)
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  27. Charles B. Cross (2008). Nonbelief and the Desire-as-Belief Thesis. Acta Analytica 23 (2):115-124.
    I show the incompatibility of two theses: (a) to desire the truth of p amounts to believing a certain proposition about the value of p’s truth; (b) one cannot be said to desire the truth of p if one believes that p is true. Thesis (a), the Desire-As-Belief Thesis, has received much attention since the late 1980s. Thesis (b) is an epistemic variant of Socrates’ remark in the Symposium that one cannot desire what one already has. It turns out that (...)
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  28. Edmund Dain (2012). Projection and Pretence in Ethics. Philosophical Papers 41 (2):181 - 208.
    Abstract Suppose one is persuaded of the merits of noncognitivism in ethics but not those of expressivism: in such a case, a form of moral fictionalism, combining a descriptivist account of moral sentences with a noncognitivist account of the attitudes involved in their acceptance or rejection, might seem an attractive alternative. This paper argues against the use of moral fictionalism as a strategy for defending noncognitivism in ethics. It argues, first, that the view is implausible as it stands and, second, (...)
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  29. John Divers & Alexander Miller (1994). Why Expressivists About Value Should Not Love Minimalism About Truth. Analysis 54 (1):12 - 19.
  30. Cian Dorr (2002). Non-Cognitivism and Wishful Thinking. Noûs 36 (1):97–103.
    Even if non-cognitivists about some subject-matter can meet Geach’s challenge to explain how there can be valid implications involving sentences which express non-cognitive attitudes, they face a further problem. I argue that a non-cognitivist cannot explain how, given a valid argument whose conclusion expresses a belief and at least one of whose premises expresses a non-cognitive attitude, it could be reasonable to infer the conclusion from the premises.
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  31. James Dreier (2004). Lockean and Logical Truth Conditions. Analysis 64 (1):84–91.
    1. In ‘A problem for expressivism’ Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit argue ‘that expressivists do not have a persuasive story to tell about how ethical sentences can express attitudes without reporting them and, in particular, without being true or false’ (1998: 240). Briefly: expressivists say that ethical sentences serve to express non-cognitive attitudes, but that these sentences do not report non-cognitive attitudes. The view that ethical sentences do report non-cognitive attitudes is not Expressivism (and not non-cognitivism), but rather a version (...)
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  32. James Dreier (1996). Accepting Agent Centred Norms: A Problem for Non-Cognitivists and a Suggestion for Solving It. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (3):409–422.
    Non-cognitivists claim to be able to represent normative judgment, and especially moral judgment, as an expression of a non-cognitive attitude. There is some reason to worry whether their treatment can incorporate agent centred theories, including much of common sense morality. In this paper I investigate the prospects for a non-cognitivist explanation of what is going on when we subscribe to agent centred theories or norms. The first section frames the issue by focusing on a particularly simple and clear agent centred (...)
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  33. James Dreier (1996). Book Review: The Moral Problem by Michael Smith. [REVIEW] Mind 105 (418):363-367.
  34. Matti Eklund (2009). The Frege–Geach Problem and Kalderon's Moral Fictionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):705-712.
    Mark Eli Kalderon has argued for a fictionalist variant of non-cognitivism. On his view, what the Frege–Geach problem shows is that standard non-cognitivism proceeds uncritically from claims about use to claims about meaning; if non-cognitivism's claims were solely about use it would be on safe ground as far as the Frege–Geach problem is concerned. I argue that Kalderon's diagnosis is mistaken: the problem concerns the non-cognitivist's account of the use of moral sentences too.
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  35. David Enoch (2003). How Noncognitivists Can Avoid Wishful Thinking. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):527-545.
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  36. David Enoch (2001). Noncognitivism, Normativity and Belief: A Reply to Jackson. Ratio 14 (2):185–190.
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  37. Daan Evers (2011). Review of Mark Schroeder - Noncognitivism in Ethics. [REVIEW] Disputatio 4 (31):295-203.
    Review of Mark Schroeder's book Noncognitivism in Ethics.
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  38. W. Fenske (1997). Non-Cognitivism: A New Defense. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 31 (3):301-309.
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  39. Wayne Fenske (2001). Empirically Minded Non-Cognitivism: As Serious as It Needs to Be. Dialogue 40 (03):613-.
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  40. Wayne Fenske (2000). The Advantage of an Empirically Minded Conception of Non-Cognitivism. Dialogue 39 (03):513-.
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  41. Stephen Finlay (2014). The Pragmatics of Normative Disagreement. In Guy Fletcher & Michael Ridge (eds.), Having It Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics. Oxford University Press. 124-148.
    Relational theories of normative language allegedly face special problems in accounting for the extent of disagreement, but this is everybody’s problem because normative sentences are relativized to different information in contexts of deliberation and advice. This paper argues that a relational theory provides a pragmatic solution that accounts for some disagreements as involving inconsistent preferences rather than beliefs. This is shown to be superior to the semantic solution offered by expressivists like Allan Gibbard, as it accounts for a wider range (...)
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  42. Bronwyn Finnigan (forthcoming). Meta-Ethics for Madhyamaka: Investigating the Justificatory Grounds of Moral Judgments. Philosophy East and West.
    This paper investigates whether the metaphysical commitments of Madhyamaka Buddhism afford a satisfactory justificatory ground for moral judgments. Finnigan and Tanaka (2011a) argue that they do not. Their argument has since been challenged by Tillemans (2010-11), who alleges that both Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas can readily justify moral judgments by respective appeal to the doctrine of the two truths. This paper shall contest this claim with respect to Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka. It shall provide several arguments to show that Prāsaṅgika cannot satisfactorily (...)
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  43. Eugen Fischer (2008). Wittgenstein's 'Non-Cognitivism' – Explained and Vindicated. Synthese 162 (1):53 - 84.
    The later Wittgenstein advanced a revolutionary but puzzling conception of how philosophy ought to be practised: Philosophical problems are not to be coped with by establishing substantive claims or devising explanations or theories. Instead, philosophical questions ought to be treated ‘like an illness’. Even though this ‘non-cognitivism’ about philosophy has become a focus of debate, the specifically ‘therapeutic’ aims and ‘non-theoretical’ methods constitutive of it remain ill understood. They are motivated by Wittgenstein’s view that the problems he addresses result from (...)
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  44. Richard Garner (2007). Abolishing Morality. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):499 - 513.
    Moral anti-realism comes in two forms – noncognitivism and the error theory. The noncognitivist says that when we make moral judgments we aren’t even trying to state moral facts. The error theorist says that when we make moral judgments we are making statements about what is objectively good, bad, right, or wrong but, since there are no moral facts, our moral judgments are uniformly false. This development of moral anti-realism was first seriously defended by John Mackie. In this paper I (...)
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  45. P. T. Geach (1960). Ascriptivism. Philosophical Review 69 (2):221-225.
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  46. Allan Gibbard (2006). Moral Feelings and Moral Concepts. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1:195-215.
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  47. Allan Gibbard (1985). Moral Judgment and the Acceptance of Norms. Ethics 96 (1):5-21.
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  48. Allan Gibbard (1983). A Noncognitivistic Analysis of Rationality in Action. Social Theory and Practice 9 (2/3):199-221.
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  49. Ryan J. Hay (2013). Hybrid Expressivism and the Analogy Between Pejoratives and Moral Language. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):450-474.
    : In recent literature supporting a hybrid view between metaethical cognitivism and noncognitivist expressivism, much has been made of an analogy between moral terms and pejoratives. The analogy is based on the plausible idea that pejorative slurs are used to express both a descriptive belief and a negative attitude. The analogy looks promising insofar as it encourages the kinds of features we should want from a hybrid expressivist view for moral language. But the analogy between moral terms and pejorative slurs (...)
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  50. Graham Hubbs & Douglas Lind (eds.) (2014). Pragmatism, Law, and Language. Routledge.
    This volume puts leading pragmatists in the philosophy of language, including Robert Brandom, in contact with scholars concerned with what pragmatism has come to mean for the law. Each contribution uses the resources of pragmatism to tackle fundamental problems in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of law, and social and political philosophy. In many chapters, the version of pragmatism deployed proves a fruitful approach to its subject matter; in others, shortcomings of the specific brand of pragmatism are revealed. The (...)
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