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  1. Carla Bagnoli (2009). The Appeal of Kantian Intuitionism. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):152-158.
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  2. David Barnett (2002). Against a Posteriori Moral Naturalism. Philosophical Studies 107 (3):239 - 257.
    A posteriori Moral Naturalism posits a posteriorimoral/naturalistic identities. Versions of this view thatposit necessary identities purport to rely on theKripke/Putnam doctrine of scientific essentialism.Versions that posit only contingent identities requirethat moral terms are non-rigid designators. I argue thatmetaethics does not fall within the scope of scientificessentialism and that moral terms are not non-rigid designators.
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  3. Matthew Bedke (2014). A Menagerie of Duties? Normative Judgments Are Not Beliefs About Non-Natural Properties. American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (3):189-201.
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  4. Matthew S. Bedke (2012). Against Normative Naturalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):111 - 129.
    This paper considers normative naturalism, understood as the view that (i) normative sentences are descriptive of the way things are, and (ii) their truth/falsity does not require ontology beyond the ontology of the natural world. Assuming (i) for the sake of argument, I here show that (ii) is false not only as applied to ethics, but more generally as applied to practical and epistemic normativity across the board. The argument is a descendant of Moore's Open Question Argument and Hume's Is-Ought (...)
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  5. Gunnar Björnsson & Ragnar Francén Olinder (2016). Enoch's Defense of Robust Meta-Ethical Realism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (1):101–112.
    Taking Morality Seriously is David Enoch’s book-length defense of meta-ethical and meta-normative non-naturalist realism. After describing Enoch’s position and outlining the argumentative strategy of the book, we engage in a critical discussion of what we take to be particularly problematic central passages. We focus on Enoch’s two original positive arguments for non-naturalist realism, one argument building on first order moral implications of different meta-ethical positions, the other attending to the rational commitment to normative facts inherent in practical deliberation. We also (...)
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  6. Gunnar Björnsson & Ragnar Francén Olinder (2016). Enoch’s Defense of Robust Meta-Ethical Realism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (1):101-112.
    Taking Morality Seriously is David Enoch’s book-length defense of meta-ethical and meta-normative non-naturalist realism. After describing Enoch’s position and outlining the argumentative strategy of the book, we engage in a critical discussion of what we take to be particularly problematic central passages. We focus on Enoch’s two original positive arguments for non-naturalist realism, one argument building on first order moral implications of different meta-ethical positions, the other attending to the rational commitment to normative facts inherent in practical deliberation. We also (...)
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  7. David Owen Brink (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a systematic and constructive treatment of a number of traditional issues at the foundations of ethics. These issues concern the objectivity of ethics, the possibility and nature of moral knowledge, the relationship between the moral point of view and a scientific or naturalist world-view, the nature of moral value and obligation, and the role of morality in a person's rational lifeplan. In striking contrast to traditional and more recent work in the field, David Brink offers an integrated (...)
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  8. George R. Carlson (1994). Moral Realism and Wanton Cruelty. Philosophia 24 (1-2):49-56.
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  9. Richard Yetter Chappell, Why Care About Non-Natural Reasons?
    Are non-natural properties worth caring about? I consider two (related) objections to metaethical non-naturalism. According to the "intelligibility" objection, it would be positively unintelligible to care about non-natural properties that float free from the causal fabric of the cosmos. According to the "ethical idlers" objection, there is no compelling motivation to posit non-natural normative properties because the natural properties suffice to provide us with reasons. In both cases, I argue, the objection stems from misunderstanding the role that non-natural properties play (...)
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  10. Matthew Chrisman (2005). Review of Shafer-Landau's Moral Realism. [REVIEW] Ethics 116 (1):250-255.
    G. E. Moore famously argued on the basis of semantic intuitions that moral properties are not reducible to natural properties, and therefore that moral predicates refer to nonnatural properties. This clearly represents a version of “moral realism,” but it is a testament to the strength of naturalist intuitions in contemporary philosophical debate that, insofar as one accepts Moore’s arguments, this is typically seen as a boon for antirealists rather than realists. For many philosophers worry that putative nonnatural properties would be (...)
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  11. Justin Clarke-Doane (forthcoming). What is the Benacerraf Problem? In Fabrice Pataut (ed.), New Perspectives on the Philosophy of Paul Benacerraf: Truth, Objects, Infinity.
    In "Mathematical Truth", Paul Benacerraf articulated an epistemological problem for mathematical realism. His formulation of the problem relied on a causal theory of knowledge which is now widely rejected. But it is generally agreed that Benacerraf was onto a genuine problem for mathematical realism nevertheless. Hartry Field describes it as the problem of explaining the reliability of our mathematical beliefs, realistically construed. In this paper, I argue that the Benacerraf Problem cannot be made out. There simply is no intelligible problem (...)
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  12. Brendan Cline (forthcoming). Against Deliberative Indispensability as an Independent Guide to What There Is. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    David Enoch has recently proposed that the deliberative indispensability of irreducibly normative facts suffices to support their inclusion in our ontology, even if they are not necessary for the explanation of any observable phenomena. He challenges dissenters to point to a relevant asymmetry between explanation and deliberation that shows why explanatory indispensability, but not deliberative indispensability, is a legitimate guide to ontology. In this paper, I aim to do just that. Given that an entity figures in the actual explanation of (...)
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  13. Cristian Constantinescu (2014). Moral Vagueness: A Dilemma for Non-Naturalism. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 9. Oxford University Press 152-185.
    In this paper I explore the implications of moral vagueness (viz., the vagueness of moral predicates) for non-naturalist metaethical theories like those recently championed by Shafer-Landau, Parfit, and others. I characterise non-naturalism in terms of its commitment to 7 theses: Cognitivism, Correspondence, Atomism, Objectivism, Supervenience, Non-reductivism, and Rationalism. I start by offering a number of reasons for thinking that moral predicates are vague in the same way in which ‘red’, ‘tall’, and ‘heap’ are said to be. I then argue that (...)
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  14. Christopher Cowie (2014). A New Explanatory Challenge for Nonnaturalists. Res Philosophica 91 (4):661-679.
    According to some contemporary nonnaturalists about normativity , normative facts exist in an ontologically non-committing sense. These nonnaturalists face an explanatory burden. They must explain their claim that normative facts exist in such a sense. I identify criteria for an adequate explanation, and extract five distinct candidate explanations from the writings of these authors . I assess each. None is both informative and recognizable as a version of contemporary nonnaturalism. In light of this, I assess the best options for proponents (...)
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  15. Stephen Finlay Terence Cuneo (2008). Teaching & Learning Guide For: Moral Realism and Moral Nonnaturalism. Philosophy Compass 3 (3):570–572.
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  16. Terence Cuneo (2013). Nonnaturalism, Ethical. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell
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  17. Terence Cuneo (2007). Recent Faces of Moral Nonnaturalism. Philosophy Compass 2 (6):850-879.
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  18. Terence Cuneo & Russ Shafer-Landau (2014). The Moral Fixed Points: New Directions for Moral Nonnaturalism. Philosophical Studies 171 (3):399-443.
    Our project in this essay is to showcase nonnaturalistic moral realism’s resources for responding to metaphysical and epistemological objections by taking the view in some new directions. The central thesis we will argue for is that there is a battery of substantive moral propositions that are also nonnaturalistic conceptual truths. We call these propositions the moral fixed points. We will argue that they must find a place in any system of moral norms that applies to beings like us, in worlds (...)
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  19. Rafael de Clercq (2002). Two Conceptions of Response-Dependence. Philosophical Studies 107 (2):159-177.
    The traditional conception of response-dependence isinadequate because it cannot account for all intuitivecases of response-dependence. In particular, it is unableto account for the response-dependence of (aesthetic, moral, epistemic ...) values. I therefore propose tosupplement the traditional conception with an alternativeone. My claim is that only a combination of the twoconceptions is able to account for all intuitivecases of response-dependence.
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  20. Tanya de Villiers-Botha (2014). How Not to Be a Metaethical Naturalist –Jesse Prinz on the Emotional Construction of Morals. South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):145-154.
    Jesse Prinz develops a naturalistic metaethical theory with which he purports to sidestep ‘Hume's law’ by demonstrating how, on his theory, in describing what our moral beliefs commit us to we can determine what our moral obligations are. I aim to show that Prinz does not deliver on his prescriptive promise – he does not bridge the is–ought gap in any meaningful way. Given that Prinz goes on to argue that (1) his moral psychology highlights fundamental shortcomings in ‘traditional’ normative (...)
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  21. Michael J. Deem (2016). Dehorning the Darwinian Dilemma for Normative Realism. Biology and Philosophy:1-20.
    Normative realists tend to consider evolutionary debunking arguments as posing epistemological challenges to their view. By understanding Sharon Street’s ‘Darwinian dilemma’ argument in this way, they have overlooked and left unanswered her unique scientific challenge to normative realism. This paper counters Street’s scientific challenge and shows that normative realism is compatible with an evolutionary view of human evaluative judgment. After presenting several problems that her adaptive link account of evaluative judgments faces, I outline and defend an evolutionary byproduct perspective on (...)
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  22. Raphael Demos (1945). Moral Value as Irreducible, Objective, and Cognizable. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 6 (2):163-194.
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  23. James Dreier (1992). The Supervenience Argument Against Moral Realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):13-38.
    In 1971, Simon Blackburn worked out an argument against moral realism appealing to the supervenience of the moral realm on the natural realm.1 He has since revised the argument, in part to take account of objections,2 but the basic structure remains intact. While commentators3 seem to agree that the argument is not successful, they have not agreed upon what goes wrong. I believe this is because no attempt has been made to see what happens when Blackburn's argument is addressed to (...)
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  24. Antoine C. Dussault (2010). Le rôle de la science dans l'écocentrisme humien de Callicott. Revue Phares 10:103-123.
  25. Matti Eklund (2012). Alternative Normative Concepts. Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):139-157.
  26. Aaron Elliott (2014). Can Moral Principles Explain Supervenience? Res Philosophica 91 (4):629-659.
    The distribution of moral properties supervenes on the distribution of natural properties, and this provides a puzzle for non-naturalism: what could explain supervenience if moral properties are not natural properties? Enoch claims moral principles explain supervenience. But this solution is incomplete without an account of what moral principles and properties are, and what relation holds between them. This paper begins to develop such an account by exploring analogous issues for Realism about Laws of nature in philosophy of science. Appealing to (...)
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  27. Daan Evers, Relativism and the Metaphysics of Value.
    I argue that relativists about evaluative language face some of the same objections as non-naturalists in ethics. If these objections have force, there is reason to doubt the existence of relative evaluative states of affairs. In they do not exist, then relativism leads to an error theory. This is unattractive, as the position was specifically designed to preserve the truth of many evaluative claims.
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  28. Daan Evers (2016). Jonas Olson's Evidence for Moral Error Theory. Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):403-418.
    Jonas Olson defends a moral error theory in (2014). I will first argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral nonnaturalism in his own opinion. I will then argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral contextualism either (although the latter is not a matter of his own opinion).
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  29. Daan Evers (2015). Street on Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons. Synthese 192 (11):3663-3676.
    Sharon Street argues that realism about epistemic normativity is false. Realists believe there are truths about epistemic reasons that hold independently of the agent’s attitudes. Street argues by dilemma. Either the realist accepts a certain account of the nature of belief, or she does not. If she does, then she cannot consistently accept realism. If she does not, then she has no scientifically credible explanation of the fact that our epistemic behaviours or beliefs about epistemic reasons align with independent normative (...)
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  30. Daan Evers & Bart Streumer (2016). Are the Moral Fixed Points Conceptual Truths? Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy:1-9.
    Terence Cuneo and Russ Shafer-Landau have recently proposed a new version of moral nonnaturalism, according to which there are nonnatural moral concepts and truths but no nonnatural moral facts. This view entails that moral error theorists are conceptually deficient. We explain why moral error theorists are not conceptually deficient. We then argue that this explanation reveals what is wrong with Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s view.
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  31. Hans Fink (2006). Three Sorts of Naturalism. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):202–221.
    In "Two sorts of Naturalism" John McDowell is sketching his own sort of naturalism in ethics as an alternative to "bald naturalism". In this paper I distinguish materialist, idealist and absolute conceptions of nature and of naturalism in order to provide a framework for a clearer understanding of what McDowell’s own naturalism amounts to. I argue that nothing short of an absolute naturalism will do for a number of McDowell's own purposes, but that it is far from obvious that this (...)
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  32. Stephen Finlay (2007). Four Faces of Moral Realism. Philosophy Compass 2 (6):820-849.
    This essay explains for a general philosophical audience the central issues and strategies in the contemporary moral realism debate. It critically surveys the contribution of some recent scholarship, representing expressivist and pragmatist nondescriptivism, subjectivist and nonsubjectivist naturalism, nonnaturalism and error theory. Four different faces of ‘ moral realism ’ are distinguished: semantic, ontological, metaphysical, and normative. The debate is presented as taking shape under dialectical pressure from the demands of capturing the moral appearances and reconciling morality with our understanding of (...)
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  33. Stephen Finlay & Terence Cuneo (2008). Teaching & Learning Guide For: Moral Realism and Moral Nonnaturalism. Philosophy Compass 3 (3):570-572.
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  34. Andrew Fisher & Simon Kirchin (eds.) (2006). Arguing About Metaethics. Routledge.
    _Arguing about Metaethics_ collects together some of the most exciting contemporary work in metaethics in one handy volume. In it, many of the most influential philosophers in the field discuss key questions in metaethics: Do moral properties exist? If they do, how do they fit into the world as science conceives it? If they don’t exist, then how should we understand moral thought and language? What is the relation between moral judgement and motivation? As well as these questions, this volume (...)
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  35. Gregor Flock, Solving the Is-Ought Problem [Paper Currently Removed Due to Blind Review].
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  36. Andrew T. Forcehimes, Putting Reasons First: A Defense of Normative Non-Naturalism.
    Against non-analytic naturalism and quietist realism, I defend a robust form of non-naturalism. The argument proceeds as follows: In the face of extensional underdetermination, quietist realism cannot non-question-beggingly respond to alternative accounts that offer formally identical but substantively different interpretations of what reasons are. They face what we might call the reasons appropriation problem. In light of this problem, quietists ought to abandon their view in favor of robust realism. By permitting substantive metaphysical claims we can then argue, based on (...)
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  37. Philippe Gagnon (2009). À Propos D’Un Texte de Miguel Espinoza Sur le Déterminisme Et la Liberté. Eikasia. Revista de Filosofía 27 (August):281-289.
    This critical notice was occasioned by reading M. Espinoza, "Freedom in a Causally Determined World," Actas de las XIII Jornadas sobre Filosofía y Metodología Actual de la Ciencia, Jornadas sobre Libertad y Determinismo: Ciencias Sociales y Ciencias de la Naturaleza, Universidad de A Coruña, March 2008.
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  38. Nathan Hanna (2010). Cosmic Coincidence and Intuitive Non-Naturalism. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
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  39. Gerald K. Harrison (2013). The Moral Supervenience Thesis is Not a Conceptual Truth. Analysis 73 (1):62-68.
    Virtually everyone takes the moral supervenience thesis to be a basic conceptual truth about morality. As a result, if a metaethical theory has difficulties respecting or adequately explaining the supervenience relationship it is deemed to be in big trouble. However, the moral supervenience thesis is a not a conceptual truth (though it may be true) and as such it is not a problem if a metaethical theory cannot respect or explain it.
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  40. Chris Heathwood (2015). Irreducibly Normative Properties. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 10:216–244.
    Metaethical non-naturalists maintain that normative or evaluative properties cannot be reduced to, or otherwise explained in terms of, natural properties. They thus have difficulty explaining what these irreducibly normative properties are supposed to be, other than by saying what they are not. I offer a partial, positive characterization of irreducible normativity in naturalistic terms. At a first pass, it is this: that to attribute a normative property to something is necessarily to commend or condemn that thing, due to the nature (...)
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  41. Chris Heathwood (2009). Moral and Epistemic Open-Question Arguments. Philosophical Books 50 (2):83-98.
    An important and widely-endorsed argument for moral realism is based on alleged parallels between that doctrine and epistemic realism -- roughly the view that there are genuine epistemic facts, facts such as that it is reasonable to believe that astrology is false. I argue for an important disanalogy between moral and epistemic facts. Epistemic facts, but not moral facts, are plausibly identifiable with mere descriptive facts about the world. This is because, whereas the much-discussed moral open-question argument is compelling, the (...)
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  42. Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons (1991). New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:447-465.
    There have been times in the history of ethical theory, especially in this century, when moral realism was down, but it was never out. The appeal of this doctrine for many moral philosophers is apparently so strong that there are always supporters in its corner who seek to resuscitate the view. The attraction is obvious: moral realism purports to provide a precious philosophical good, viz., objectivity and all that this involves, including right answers to moral questions, and the possibility of (...)
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  43. Michael Huemer (2009). Apology of a Modest Intuitionist. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):222-236.
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  44. Gerald Hull, Tracking the Moral Truth: Debunking Street’s Darwinian Dilemma.
    Sharon Street’s 2006 article “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value” challenges the epistemological pretensions of the moral realist, of the nonnaturalist in particular. Given that “Evolutionary forces have played a tremendous role in shaping the content of human evaluative attitudes” – why should one suppose such attitudes and concomitant beliefs would track an independent moral reality? Especially since, on a nonnaturalist view, moral truth is causally inert. I abstract a logical skeleton of Street’s argument and, with its aid, (...)
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  45. Stephen Ingram (2015). I Can't Relax! You're Driving Me Quasi! Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3).
    Robust Realists think that there are irreducible, non-natural, and mind-independent moral properties. Quasi -Realists and Relaxed Realists think the same, but interpret these commitments differently. Robust Realists interpret them as metaphysical commitments, to be defended by metaphysical argument. Quasi -Realists and Relaxed Realists say that they can only be interpreted as moral commitments. These theories thus pose a serious threat to Robust Realism, for they apparently undermine the very possibility of articulating the robust metaphysical commitments of this theory. I clarify (...)
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  46. Stephen Ingram (2015). The Moral Fixed Points: Reply to Cuneo and Shafer-Landau. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy:1-5.
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  47. Robert Welsh Jordan (2002). 'Nicolai Hartmann: Proper Ethics is Atheistic (Dordrecht; Boston; London, 2002), Pp. 175-96'. In John J. Drummond Lester Embree (ed.), Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philosophy. A Handbook. Kluwer Academic Publishers
    Hartmann's axiology is intuitionist like that of Max Scheler and acknowledges ,like Scheler's a hierarchy of ideal values. The two also agree that the primary intuitive consciousness of axiotic traits is emotional. Values themselves are ideal entities entailing laws regarding what ought to be and what ought to be done. The requirements about what ought to be are more likely to come into prominence or exigence for the emotional sense of what is of value when real, temporal things are not (...)
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  48. Robert Welsh Jordan (1992). (Edmund Husserl's) Vorlesungen Ueber Ethik Und Wertlehre 1908?1914. [REVIEW] Husserl Studies 8 (3):221-232.
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  49. Guy Kahane (2013). Must Metaethical Realism Make a Semantic Claim? Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (2):148-178.
    Mackie drew attention to the distinct semantic and metaphysical claims made by metaethical realists, arguing that although our evaluative discourse is cognitive and objective, there are no objective evaluative facts. This distinction, however, also opens up a reverse possibility: that our evaluative discourse is antirealist, yet objective values do exist. I suggest that this seemingly farfetched possibility merits serious attention; realism seems committed to its intelligibility, and, despite appearances, it isn‘t incoherent, ineffable, inherently implausible or impossible to defend. I argue (...)
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  50. Erin Kelly (2004). Against Naturalism in Ethics. In Mario De Caro & David Macarthur (eds.), Naturalism in Question. Harvard University Press 259--274.
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