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  1. Roman Altshuler (2009). Political Realism and Political Idealism: The Difference That Evil Makes. Public Reason 1 (2):73-87.
    According to a particular view of political realism, political expediency must always override moral considerations. Perhaps the strongest defense of such a theory is offered by Carl Schmitt in The Concept of the Political. A close examination of Schmitt’s main presuppositions can therefore help to shed light on the tenuous relation between politics and morality. Schmitt’s theory rests on two keystones. First, the political is seen as independent of and prior to morality. Second, genuine political theory depends on a view (...)
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  2. Andreas Anter (2010). Hermann Heller Und Max Weber : Normativität Und Wirklichkeit des Staates. In Marcus Llanque (ed.), Souveräne Demokratie Und Soziale Homogenität: Das Politische Denken Hermann Hellers. Nomos.
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  3. Matthew S. Bedke (2010). Might All Normativity Be Queer? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):41-58.
    Here I discuss the conceptual structure and core semantic commitments of reason-involving thought and discourse needed to underwrite the claim that ethical normativity is not uniquely queer. This deflates a primary source of ethical scepticism and it vindicates so-called partner in crime arguments. When it comes to queerness objections, all reason-implicating normative claims?including those concerning Humean reasons to pursue one's ends, and epistemic reasons to form true beliefs?stand or fall together.
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  4. L. V. Brettler (1975). Blumberg on Moral Criticism. Mind 84 (336):579-582.
    D. Blumbergi identifies three kinds of moral criticism: (i) of an individual for violating a moral practice in his society, (2) of a moral practice but not the individual who participates in it, and (3) of both an individual and the practice in accordance with which he acts ('practice- personal' criticism) (p. 348). According to Mr. Blumberg, successful derivation of a conclusive 'ought'-statement from statements about socially-created obligations would show how moral criticisms of type 1 are justified. Moral criticisms of (...)
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  5. Elizabeth Butterfield (2004). Sartre and Marcuse on the Relation Between Needs and Normativity: A Step Beyond Postmodernism in Moral Theory. Sartre Studies International 10 (2):28-46.
    In this article, I will investigate Sartre's claims regarding need as an element of the human condition, and I will compare them to the analysis of need found in the works of Marx and of Herbert Marcuse. These comparisons will raise important questions, such as: given the cultural diversity of experiences of need, is Sartre justified in speaking of needs common to all humans? Are these human needs to be considered permanent fixtures, or do they change historically? And, how might (...)
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  6. Mark J. Cherry (2009). The Normativity of the Natural : Can Philosophers Pull Morality Out of the Magic Hat of Human Nature? In , The Normativity of the Natural: Human Goods, Human Virtues, and Human Flourishing. Springer.
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  7. Bradford Cokelet (2007). Review of Normativity and the Will by R. Jay Wallace. [REVIEW] Ethics 117 (4):790-794.
  8. David Copp (1995). Morality, Normativity, and Society. Oxford University Press.
    Moral claims not only purport to be true, they also purport to guide our choices. This book presents a new theory of normative judgment, the "standard-based theory," which offers a schematic account of the truth conditions of normative propositions of all kinds, including moral propositions and propositions about reasons. The heart of Copp's approach to moral propositions is a theory of the circumstances under which corresponding moral standards qualify as justified, the "society-centered theory." He argues that because any society needs (...)
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  9. David Copp (1991). Normativity and the Very Idea of Moral Epistemology. Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1):189-210.
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  10. Josep Corbí (2004). Normativity, Moral Realism, and Unmasking Explanations. Theoria 19 (2):155-172.
    Moral Projectivism must be able to specify under what conditions a certain inner response counts as a moral response. I argue, however, that moral projectivists cannot coherently do so because they must assume that there are moral properties in the world in order to fix the content of our moral judgements. To show this, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism, which is, nowadays, the most promising version of moral projectivism. In this context, I call into question both (...)
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  11. Antonella Corradini (2003). On the Normativity of Human Nature: Some Epistemological Remarks. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 28 (2):239 – 254.
    This paper examines the role played by the concept of human nature in ethical theory. The focus is on the epistemological problems that arise from application of this notion to the foundation of ethics. From this viewpoint, two theories, the neoscholastic and the neoclassical ones, are expounded, analyzed and compared. The aim is to highlight their opposite ways of relating the "ought-to-be" (of norms) to the "is" (of human nature). The conclusion is drawn that an adequate solution of the dispute (...)
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  12. Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (2006). Anthropocentric Constraints on Human Value. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1:99-126.
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  13. Stephen Darwall (2003). Moore, Normativity, and Intrinsic Value. Ethics 113 (3):468-489.
    Principia Ethica set the agenda for analytical metaethics. Moore’s unrelenting focus on fundamentals both brought metaethics into view as a potentially separate area of philosophical inquiry and provided a model of the analytical techniques necessary to pursue it.1 Moore acknowledged that he wasn’t the first to insist on a basic irreducible core of all ethical concepts. Although he seems not to have appreciated the roots of this thought in eighteenth-century intuitionists like Clarke, Balguy, and Price, not to mention sentimentalists like (...)
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  14. James Dreier (2002). The Expressivist Circle: Invoking Norms in the Explanation of Normative Judgment. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):136–143.
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  15. James Dreier (1994). Perspectives on the Normativity of Ethics. [REVIEW] Noûs 28 (4):514 - 525.
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  16. David Enoch (2011). Shmagency Revisited. In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan.
    1. The Shmagency Challenge to Constitutivism In metaethics – and indeed, meta-normativity – constitutivism is a family of views that hope to ground normativity in norms, or standards, or motives, or aims that are constitutive of action and agency. And mostly because of the influential work of Christine Korsgaard and David Velleman (and, some would say, because of the also-influential work of Kant and Aristotle), constitutivism seems to be gaining grounds in the current literature. The promises of constitutivism are significant. (...)
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  17. David Enoch (2006). Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come From What is Constitutive of Action. Philosophical Review 115 (2):169-198.
    There is a fairly widespread—and very infl uential—hope among philosophers interested in the status of normativity that the solution to our metaethical and, more generally, metanormative problems will emerge from the philosophy of action. In this essay, I will argue that these hopes are groundless. I will focus on the metanormative hope, but—as will become clear—showing that the solution to our metanormative problems will not come from what is constitutive of action will also devastate the hope of gaining significant insight (...)
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  18. David Enoch (2001). Noncognitivism, Normativity and Belief: A Reply to Jackson. Ratio 14 (2):185–190.
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  19. Stephen Finlay (2011). Errors Upon Errors: A Reply to Joyce. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):535 - 547.
    In his response to my paper ?The Error in the Error Theory? criticizing his and J. L. Mackie's moral error theory, Richard Joyce finds my treatment of his position inaccurate and my interpretation of morality implausible. In this reply I clarify my objection, showing that it retains its force against their error theory, and I clarify my interpretation of morality, showing that Joyce's objections miss their mark.
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  20. Stephen Finlay (2010). Normativity, Necessity and Tense: A Recipe for Homebaked Normativity. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 5. Oxford University Press. 57-85.
    A reductive analysis of a concept decomposes it into more basic constituent parts. Metaethicists today are in almost unanimous agreement that normative language and concepts cannot be reductively analyzed into entirely nonnormative language and concepts. Basic normative concepts are widely thought to be primitive or elemental in our thought, and therefore to admit of no further (reductive) explanation. G. E. Moore inferred from the unanalyzability of normative concepts the metaphysical doctrine that basic normative properties and relations are irreducible to complexes (...)
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  21. P. Fristedt (2011). Normativity and Interpretation: Korsgaard's Deontology and the Hermeneutic Conception of the Subject. Philosophy and Social Criticism 37 (5):533-550.
    In this article, I ask whether Korsgaard’s ethics can be reconciled with a hermeneutic understanding of the human subject. Hermeneutics, inspired by Nietzsche, has traditionally been skeptical about the notion that moral principles have authority over us. But Korsgaard’s account of normativity as grounded in self-consciousness and its reflective distance from beliefs and desires is strikingly similar to Gadamer’s description of human beings as distant and ‘free’ from their environment. The question hermeneutics poses to deontology is how a finite subject (...)
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  22. Christopher W. Gowans (1991). Moral Relevance and Moral Conflict, by James D. Wallace. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (2):478-481.
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  23. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2009). What Does the Frame Problem Tell Us About Moral Normativity? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):25 - 51.
    Within cognitive science, mental processing is often construed as computation over mental representations—i.e., as the manipulation and transformation of mental representations in accordance with rules of the kind expressible in the form of a computer program. This foundational approach has encountered a long-standing, persistently recalcitrant, problem often called the frame problem; it is sometimes called the relevance problem. In this paper we describe the frame problem and certain of its apparent morals concerning human cognition, and we argue that these morals (...)
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  24. Paul Katsafanas (forthcoming). The Problem of Normative Authority in Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche. In Tom Bailey & João Constâncio (eds.), Nietzsche and Kantian Ethics.
    Kant and Hegel share a common foundational idea: they believe that the authority of normative claims can be justified only by showing that these norms are self-imposed or autonomous. Yet they develop this idea in strikingly different ways: Kant argues that we can derive specific normative claims from the formal idea of autonomy, whereas Hegel contends that we use the idea of freedom not to derive, but to assess, the specific normative claims ensconced in our social institutions and practices. Exploring (...)
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  25. Paul Katsafanas (2013). Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism. Oxford University Press.
    Constitutivism is the view that we can derive substantive normative conclusions from an account of the nature of action. Agency and the Foundations of Ethics explains the constitutivist strategy and argues that the attractions of this view are considerable: constitutivism promises to resolve longstanding philosophical puzzles about the metaphysics, epistemology, and practical grip of normative claims. Yet constitutivism faces a challenge: it must employ a conception of action that is minimal enough to be independently plausible, but substantial enough to yield (...)
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  26. Jason Kawall (2005). Moral Realism and Arbitrariness. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):109-129.
    In this paper I argue (i) that choosing to abide by realist moral norms would be as arbitrary as choosing to abide by the mere preferences of a God (a difficulty akin to the Euthyphro dilemma raised for divine command theorists); in both cases we would lack reason to prefer these standards to alternative codes of conduct. I further develop this general line of thought by arguing in particular (ii) that we would lack any noncircular justification to concern ourselves with (...)
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  27. Michelle Mason (2006). Aretaic Appraisal and Practical Reason. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (4):629-656.
    When we criticize someone for being unjust, deceitful, or imprudent -- or commend him as just, truthful, or wise -- what is the content of our evaluation? On one way of thinking, evaluating agents in terms that employ aretaic concepts evaluates how they regulate their actions (and judgment-sensitive attitudes) in light of the reasons that bear on them. On this virtue-centered view of practical reasons appraisal, evaluations of agents in terms of ethical virtues (and vices) are, 'inter alia', evaluations of (...)
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  28. Michelle Mason (1999). Knud Ejler Logstrup, The Ethical Demand:The Ethical Demand. [REVIEW] Ethics 109 (2):446-448.
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  29. Francesco Orsi (2013). What's Wrong with Moorean Buck-Passing? Philosophical Studies 164 (3):727-746.
    In this paper I discuss and try to remove some major stumbling blocks for a Moorean buck-passing account of reasons in terms of value (MBP): There is a pro tanto reason to favour X if and only if X is intrinsically good, or X is instrumentally good, or favouring X is intrinsically good, or favouring X is instrumentally good. I suggest that MBP can embrace and explain the buck-passing intuition behind the far more popular buck-passing account of value, and has (...)
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  30. Derek Parfit (2006). Normativity. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1:325-80.
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  31. Michael Philips (1987). Moralism and the Good. Philosophical Studies 52 (1):131 - 139.
    It is often held that moral considerations take precedence over considerations of other kinds in determining what we ought to do. I contend that this claim is ambiguous and argue that objections to each interpretation of it can be met only by rejecting the other. One surprising consequence of my argument is that no deontic moral theory can effectively guide action unless it is conjoined with a theory of the good. Another interesting consequence is that the deontologists' favorite objection to (...)
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  32. Jesse Prinz (2009). The Normativity Challenge: Cultural Psychology Provides the Real Threat to Virtue Ethics. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 13 (2-3):117 - 144.
    Situationists argue that virtue ethics is empirically untenable, since traditional virtue ethicists postulate broad, efficacious character traits, and social psychology suggests that such traits do not exist. I argue that prominent philosophical replies to this challenge do not succeed. But cross-cultural research gives reason to postulate character traits, and this undermines the situationist critique. There is, however, another empirical challenge to virtue ethics that is harder to escape. Character traits are culturally informed, as are our ideals of what traits are (...)
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  33. Peter Railton (2006). Normative Guidance. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 1. Oxford University Press. 3-34.
    I’ve been told that there are two principal approaches to drawing figures from life. One begins by tracing an outline of the figure to be drawn, locating its edges and key features on an imagined grid, and then using perspective to fill in depth. The other approach proceeds from the ‘center of mass’ of the subject, seeking to build up the image by supplying contour lines, the intersections of which convey depth—as if the representation were being created in relief. The (...)
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  34. Andrew Reisner (forthcoming). Normative Conflicts and the Structure of Normativity. In Iwao Hirose & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: A Festschrift for John Broome.
    This paper considers the relation between the sources of normativity, reasons, and normative conflicts. It argues that common views about how normative reasons relate to their sources have important consequences for how we can understand putative normative conflicts.
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  35. Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.) (2007). Oxford Studies in Metaethics Vol. 2. Oxford University Press.
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  36. Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.) (2006). Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 3. Oxford University Press.
    The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves ...
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  37. William Hosmer Smith (2012). The Phenomenology of Moral Normativity. Routledge.
    The topic of this book is a fundamental philosophical question: why should I be moral? Philosophers have long been concerned with the legitimacy of morality's claim on us, especially with morality's ostensible aim to motivate certain actions of all persons unconditionally. While the problem of moral normativity - that is, the justification of the binding force of moral claims - has received extensive treatment analytic moral theory, little attention has been paid to the potential contribution that phenomenology might make to (...)
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  38. Daniel Star (2010). Review of Terence Cuneo, The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism (OUP, 2007). [REVIEW] Mind 119 (473):210-215.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  39. Richard Swinburne (1976). Reply to Wallace's 'on Making Actions Morally Wrong'. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6:551 - 552.
    IN MY PAPER "DUTY AND THE WILL OF GOD," I CLAIM THAT IF THERE IS A GOD, HE CAN MAKE SOME ACTIONS RIGHT OR WRONG BY HIS WILL, WHILE OTHER ACTIONS DERIVE THEIR RIGHTNESS OR WRONGNESS FROM FACTORS QUITE OTHER THAN HIS WILL. IN HIS PAPER, WALLACE DENIES THAT IT IS COHERENT TO SUPPOSE THAT AN AGENT CAN MAKE ACTIONS RIGHT OR WRONG, AND HE CLAIMS THAT MY ACCOUNT OF RELIGIOUS MORALITY IS NOT A TRADITIONAL ONE. IN THIS PAPER, I (...)
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  40. Judith Jarvis Thomson (2008). Normativity. Open Court.
    Goodness -- Goodness properties -- Expressivism -- Betterness relations -- Virtue/kind properties -- Correctness properties (acts) -- Correctness properties (mental states) -- Reasons-for (mental states) -- Reasons-for (acts) -- On some views about "ought" : relativism, dilemmas, means-ends -- On some views about "ought" : belief, outcomes, epistemic ought -- Directives -- Addendum 1: "Red" and "good" -- Addendum 2: Correctness -- Addendum 3: Reasons -- Addendum 4: Reasoning.
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  41. Valerie Tiberius (2002). Maintaining Conviction and the Humean Account of Normativity. Topoi 21 (1-2):165-173.
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  42. Peter Vallentyne (1989). Two Types of Moral Dilemmas. Erkenntnis 30 (3):301 - 318.
    In recent years the question of whether moral dilemmas are conceptually possible has received a fair amount of attention. In arguing for or against the conceptual possibility of moral dilemmas authors have been almost exclusively concerned with obligation dilemmas, i.e., situations in which more than one action is obligatory. Almost no one has been concerned with prohibition dilemmas, i.e., situations in which no feasible actions is permissible. I argue that the two types of dilemmas are distinct, and that a much (...)
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  43. Pekka Väyrynen (2013). Grounding and Normative Explanation. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):155-178.
    This paper concerns non-causal normative explanations such as ‘This act is wrong because/in virtue of__’ (where the blank is often filled out in non-normative terms, such as ‘it causes pain’). The familiar intuition that normative facts aren't brute or ungrounded but anchored in non-normative facts seems to be in tension with the equally familiar idea that no normative fact can be fully explained in purely non-normative terms. I ask whether the tension could be resolved by treating the explanatory relation in (...)
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  44. Eric Vogelstein (2011). Morality, Reasons, and Sentiments. Philosophical Studies 155 (3):421-432.
    Morality is commonly thought to be normative in a robust and important way. This is commonly cashed out in terms of normative reasons. It is also commonly thought that morality is necessarily and universally normative, i.e., that moral reasons are reasons for any possible moral agent. Taking these commonplaces for granted, I argue for a novel view of moral normativity. I challenge the standard view that moral reasons are reasons to act. I suggest that moral reasons are reasons for having (...)
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  45. Margaret Urban Walker (2000). Naturalizing, Normativity, and Using What 'We' Know in Ethics. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (Supplement):75-101.
    (2000). Naturalizing, Normativity, and Using What “We” Know in Ethics. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 30, Supplementary Volume 26: Moral Epistemology Naturalized, pp. 75-101.
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  46. Ralph Wedgwood (2007). The Nature of Normativity. Oxford University Press.
    This is a book about normativity -- where the central normative terms are words like 'ought' and 'should' and their equivalents in other languages. It has three parts: The first part is about the semantics of normative discourse: what it means to talk about what ought to be the case. The second part is about the metaphysics of normative properties and relations: what is the nature of those properties and relations (if any) whose pattern of instantiation makes propositions about what (...)
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  47. Ralph Wedgwood (2005). Railton on Normativity. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 126 (3):463-479.
    This is a critical discussion of Part III of Peter Railton's recent book Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays Toward a Morality of Consequence (Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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  48. Leo Zaibert & Barry Smith (2007). The Varieties of Normativity: An Essay on Social Ontology. In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts: Essays on John Searle’s Social Ontology. Springer.
    For much of the first fifty years of its existence, analytic philosophy shunned discussions of normativity and ethics. Ethical statements were considered as pseudo-propositions, or as expressions of pro- or con-attitudes of minor theoretical significance. Nowadays, in contrast, prominent analytic philosophers pay close attention to normative problems. Here we focus our attention on the work of Searle, at the same time drawing out an important connection between Searle’s work and that of two other seminal figures in this development: H.L.A. Hart (...)
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  49. Christopher Zurn (2000). Anthropology and Normativity: A Critique of Axel Honneth's 'Formal Conception of Ethical Life'. Philosophy and Social Criticism 26 (1):115-124.
    Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammer of Social Conflicts (reviewed by Christopher Zurn).
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  50. Radosław Zyzik (2011). Normativity and Moral Psychology : The Social Intuitionist Model and a World Without Normative Moral Rules? In Jerzy Stelmach & Bartosz Brożek (eds.), The Normativity of Law. Copernicus Center Press.
    The paper pores over the recent conceptions of normative judgement developed against the background of advances in psychology and neuroscience. It begins by analyzing what normative claim of morality and law consists of before presenting and criticizing the Social Intuitionist Model of normative judgement developed by Jonathan Haidt. The model poses serious challenges for well-established normative concepts, and the concept of normativity as objective reason for action in particular. A question is asked of what the relationship between philosophical conceptions and (...)
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