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  1. Joel Anderson (2003). Autonomy and the Authority of Personal Commitments: From Internal Coherence to Social Normativity. Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):90 – 108.
    It has been argued - most prominently in Harry Frankfurt's recent work - that the normative authority of personal commitments derives not from their intrinsic worth but from the way in which one's will is invested in what one cares about. In this essay, I argue that even if this approach is construed broadly and supplemented in various ways, its intrasubjective character leaves it ill-prepared to explain the normative grip of commitments in cases of purported self-betrayal. As an alternative, I (...)
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  2. Carla Bagnoli (2011). “Moral Perception and Knowledge by Principles”. In Jill Hernandez (ed.), New Intuitionism. Continuum. 84.
  3. Carla Bagnoli (2011). “Reason and Ethics”. In N. Vassallo & C. Amoretti (eds.), Reason and Reasons. Ontos-Verlag.
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  4. Carla Bagnoli (2009). “Practical Necessity: The Subjective Experience”. In W. Huemer & B. Centi (eds.), Value and Ontology. Ontos-Verlag.
  5. Carla Bagnoli (2007). Deliberare, Comparare, Misurare. Ragion Pratica 26:65-80.
    © Carla Bagnoli DELIBERARE, COMPARARE, MISURARE É opinione ampiamente condivisa che l’incommensurabilità e la commensurabilità sono ipotesi sulla natura del valore che pongono delle condizioni pesanti sulla deliberazione e sulla nostra capacità di compiere scelte ragionate. Pragmatisti e pluralisti si sono adoperati ad argomentare che la commensurabilità non è un requisito necessario alla scelta razionale. In questo articolo sosterrò che vi è un argomento ancora più radicale di quello pluralista e pragmatista secondo il quale la commensurabilità, così come l’incommensurabilità, non (...)
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  6. Carla Bagnoli (2007). The Authority of Reflection. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22 (1):43-52.
    This paper examines Moran’s argument for the special authority of the first-person, which revolves around the Self/Other asymmetry and grounds dichotomies such as the practical vs. theoretical, activity vs. passivity, and justificatory vs. explanatory reasons. These dichotomies qualify the self-reflective person as an agent, interested in justifying her actions from a deliberative stance. The Other is pictured as a spectator interested in explaining action from a theoretical stance. The self-reflective knower has authority over her own mental states, while the Spectator (...)
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  7. Carla Bagnoli (2007). L'autorita' Della Morale. Feltrinelli.
    Capitolo I Il rispetto e l'ideale morale 1.1. Angeli, bruti e agenti 1.2. Il rispetto dell'altro 1.3. Il rispetto di sé 1.4. Auto−riflessione e auto−legislazione 1.5. Autonomia e individualità 1.6. Il rispetto e l'attenzione 1.7. Il rispetto e l'amore..
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  8. Carla Bagnoli (2007). Respect and Membership in the Moral Community. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (2):113 - 128.
    Some philosophers object that Kant's respect cannot express mutual recognition because it is an attitude owed to persons in virtue of an abstract notion of autonomy and invite us to integrate the vocabulary of respect with other persons-concepts or to replace it with a social conception of recognition. This paper argues for a dialogical interpretation of respect as the key-mode of recognition of membership in the moral community. This interpretation highlights the relational and practical nature of respect, and accounts for (...)
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  9. Carla Bagnoli (2002). Moral Constructivism: A Phenomenological Argument. Topoi 21 (1-2):125-138.
  10. Erik Baldwin (2011). On Buddhist and Taoist Morality. Forum Philosophicum 16 (2):99-110.
    Arthur Danto argues that all Eastern philosophies – except Confucianism – fail to accept necessary conditions on genuine morality: a robust notion of agency and that actions are praiseworthy only if performed voluntarily, in accordance with rules, and from motives based on the moral worth and well-being of others. But Danto’s arguments fail: Neo-Taoism and Mohism satisfy these allegedly necessary constraints and Taoism and Buddhism both posit moral reasons that fall outside the scope of Danto’s allegedly necessary conditions on genuine (...)
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  11. J. S. Biehl (2008). The Insignificance of Choice. In David Chan (ed.), Moral Psychology Today: Essays on Value, Rational Choice, and the Will. Springer. 110--75.
    For some time, philosophers have sought a more satisfactory understanding of the mysteries of morality through a close analysis of its assumed kinship with practical rationality, via the psychological capacity of choice. It is the view in the present paper that no such understanding is possible by these means. The significance of morality has nothing to do with choice.
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  12. Michael E. Bratman (1998). Review of Korsgaard's The Sources of Normativity. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):699-709.
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  13. John Broome (1995). Skorupski on Agent-Neutrality. Utilitas 7 (02):315-.
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  14. David K. Chan (ed.) (2008). Moral Psychology Today: Essays on Values, Rational Choice, and the Will. Springer Verlag.
    This volume is an edited collection of original papers on the theme of Values, Rational Choice, and the Will.
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  15. Ruth Chang (forthcoming). &Quot;practical Reasons: The Problem of Gridlock&Quot;. In Barry Dainton & Howard Robinson (eds.), Companion to Analytic Philosophy. Continuum Press.
    The paper has two aims. The first is to propose a general framework for organizing some central questions about normative practical reasons in a way that separates importantly distinct issues that are often run together. Setting out this framework provides a snapshot of the leading types of view about practical reasons as well as a deeper understanding of what are widely regarded to be some of their most serious difficulties. The second is to use the proposed framework to uncover and (...)
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  16. Ruth Chang (forthcoming). &Quot;commitment, Reasons, and the Will&Quot;. Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    This paper argues that there is a particular kind of ‘internal’ commitment typically made in the context of romantic love relationships that has striking meta-normative implications for how we understand the role of the will in practical normativity. Internal commitments cannot plausibly explain the reasons we have in committed relationships on the usual model – as triggering reasons that are already there, in the way that making a promise triggers a reason via a pre-existing norm of the form ‘If you (...)
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  17. Ruth Chang (2013). Grounding Practical Normativity: Going Hybrid. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 164 (1):163-187.
    In virtue of what is something a reason for action? That is, what makes a consideration a reason to act? This is a metaphysical or meta-normative question about the grounding of reasons for action. The answer to the grounding question has been traditionally given in ‘pure’, univocal terms. This paper argues that there is good reason to understand the ground of practical normativity as a hybrid of traditional ‘pure’ views. The paper 1) surveys the three leading ‘pure’ answers to the (...)
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  18. Andrew Jason Cohen (2008). Existentialist Voluntarism as a Source of Normativity. Philosophical Papers 37 (1):89-129.
    I defend a neo-Kantian view wherein we are capable of being completely autonomous and impartial and argue that this ability can ground normativity. As this view includes an existentialist conception of the self, I defend radical choice, a primary component of that conception, against arguments many take to be definitive. I call the ability to use radical choice “existentialist voluntarism” and bring it into a current debate in normative philosophy, arguing that it allows that we can be distanced from all (...)
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  19. Bradford Cokelet (2008). Ideal Agency and the Possibility of Error. Ethics 118 (2):315-323.
    Lavin’s conclusion—that strong imperativalism and constitutivism are incompatible—spells trouble for contemporary Kantians who, like Korsgaard, hope to combine these two doctrines. I aim to offer them some solace by showing that Lavin’s criticism rests on a mistaken conception of ideal rational agency.
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  20. Dale Dorsey (2012). Weak Anti-Rationalism and the Demands of Morality†. Noûs 46 (1):1-23.
    The demandingness of act consequentialism (AC) is well-known and has received much sophisticated treatment.1 Few have been content to defend AC’s demands. Much of the response has been to jettison AC in favor of a similar, though significantly less demanding view.2 The popularity of this response is easy to understand. Excessive demandingness appears to be a strong mark against any moral theory. And if excessive demandingness is a worry of this kind, AC’s goose appears cooked: attempts to show that AC (...)
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  21. Heather Dyke (ed.) (2003). Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Ethics seeks answers to questions about the moral status of human actions and human lives. What should I do, and what should I not do? What sort of life should I lead? Actions and lives are temporal things. Actions are performed at certain times, are informed by past events and have consequences for the future. Lives have temporal extension, and are experienced from a sequence of temporal perspectives. Thus, one would think that answers to ethical questions should take account some (...)
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  22. William J. FitzPatrick (2005). The Practical Turn in Ethical Theory: Korsgaard's Constructivism, Realism, and the Nature of Normativity. Ethics 115 (4):651-691.
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  23. William J. FitzPatrick (2004). Reasons, Value, and Particular Agents: Normative Relevance Without Motivational Internalism. Mind 113 (450):285-318.
    While differing widely in other respects, both neo-Humean and neo-Kantian approaches to normativity embrace an internalist thesis linking reasons for acting to potential motivation. This thesis pushes in different directions depending on the underlying view of the powers of practical reason, but either way it sets the stage for an attack on realist attempts to ground reasons directly in facts about value. How can reasons that are not somehow grounded in motivational features of the agent nonetheless count as reasons for (...)
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  24. Danny Frederick, Theoretical and Practical Reason: A Critical Rationalist View.
    If the task of theoretical reason is to discover truth or reasons for belief, then theoretical reason is impossible. Attempts to circumvent this by appeal to probabilities are self-defeating. If the task of practical reason is to discover what we ought to do or what actions are desirable or valuable, then practical reason is impossible. Appeal to the subjective ought is self-defeating and often gives either a wrong answer or a self-contradictory one. I argue that the task of theoretical reason (...)
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  25. Dwight Furrow (2005). Ethics: Key Concepts in Philosophy. Continuum.
    This book is the ideal introduction to ethics.
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  26. Logan Paul Gage (2013). Darwin Knows Best: Can Evolution Support the Classical Liberal Vision of the Family? In Stephen Dilley (ed.), Darwinian Evolution and Classical Liberalism: Theories in Tension. Lexington Books. 135-156.
    In a time when conservatives believe that the traditional family is under increasing fire, some think an appeal to Darwinian science may be the answer. I argue that these conservatives are wrong to maintain that Darwinian theory can serve as the intellectual foundation for the traditional conception of the family. Contra Larry Arnhart and James Q. Wilson, a Darwinian philosophy of nature simply lacks the stability the traditional family requires; it cannot support the traditional conception of human nature and the (...)
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  27. Pablo Gilabert (2005). A Substantivist Construal of Discourse Ethics. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (3):405 – 437.
    This paper presents a substantivist construal of discourse ethics, which claims that we should see our engagement in public deliberation as expressing and elaborating a substantive commitment to basic moral ideas of solidarity, equality, and freedom. This view is different from Habermas's standard formalist defence of discourse ethics, which attempts to derive the principle of discursive moral justification from primarily non-moral presuppositions of rational argumentation as such. After explicating the difference between the substantivist and the formalist construal, I (...)
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  28. Pablo Gilabert (2005). The Substantive Dimension of Deliberative Practical Rationality. Philosophy and Social Criticism 31 (2):185-210.
    The aim of this paper is to propose a model for understanding the relation between substance and procedure in discourse ethics and deliberative democracy capable of answering the common charge that they involve an ‘empty formalism’. The expressive-elaboration model introduced here answers this concern by arguing that the deliberative practical rationality presupposed by discourse ethics and deliberative democracy involves the creation of a practical medium in which certain general basic ideas of solidarity, equality and freedom are expressed and elaborated in (...)
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  29. Pablo Gilabert (2005). Two Sets of Concerns About Heath's Pragmatic Theory of Convergence. Dialogue 44 (2):383-390.
  30. Chris Heathwood, Irreducibly Normative Properties.
    Metaethical non-naturalists maintain that normative or evaluative properties cannot be reduced to, or otherwise explained in terms of, natural properties. They thus have difficulty explaining what these irreducibly normative properties are supposed to be, other than by saying what they are not (e.g., they are not identical to any natural property, they are not causally efficacious, they are not empirically observable, etc.). I offer a partial, positive characterization of irreducibly normative properties in naturalistic terms. At a first pass, it is (...)
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  31. Ulrike Heuer (2012). Thick Concepts and Internal Reasons. In Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang (eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams. Oxford University Press, Usa. 219.
  32. Ulrike Heuer (2006). Explaining Reasons: Where Does the Buck Stop? Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (3):1-25.
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  33. Pamela Hieronymi (2011). Of Metaethics and Motivation: The Appeal of Contractualism. In R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar & Samuel Richard Freeman (eds.), Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon. Oxford University Press.
    In 1982, when T. M. Scanlon published “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” he noted that, despite the widespread attention to Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, the appeal of contractualism as a moral theory had been under appreciated. In particular, the appeal of contractualism’s account of what he then called “moral motivation” had been under appreciated.1 It seems to me that, in the intervening quarter century, despite the widespread discussion of Scanlon’s work, the appeal of contractualism, in precisely this regard, has still been (...)
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  34. Daniel Kelly, Social Norms & Independent Normativity: Moving Beyond the Moral/Conventional Distinction.
    A venerable tradition in philosophy sees significance in the fact that, from a subjective viewpoint, some rules seem to impress themselves upon us with a distinctive kind of authority or normative force: one feels their pull and is drawn to act in accordance with such rules unconditionally, and violations strike one as egregious. Though the first person experience of it can be mystifying, I believe this phenomenology is just one aspect of the operation of a psychological system crucial to morality. (...)
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  35. Uriah Kriegel (2013). Justifying Desires. Metaphilosophy 44 (3):335-349.
    According to an influential conception of reasons for action, the presence of a desire or some other conative state in the agent is a necessary condition for the agent’s havinga reason for action. This is sometimes known as internalism . In this paper I present a case for the considerably stronger thesis, which I call hyper-internalism , that the presence of a desire is a sufficient condition for the agent’s having a ( prima facie )reason for action.
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  36. Hallvard Lillehammer (2013). The Companions in Guilt Strategy. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics.
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  37. Azevedo Marco Antonio (2013). Commands and Claims. In Bartosz Wojciechowski, Karolina M. Cern & Piotr W. Juchacz (eds.), DIA-LOGOS, VOL 15: Legal Rules, Moral Norms and Democratic Principles. Peter Lang.
    Notwithstanding the widely accepted view that rights establish normative constraints on authority’s powers, command is still a core notion in modern philosophical jurisprudence. Nevertheless, if Herbert Hart is correct in his analysis on the deficiencies of the traditional command theories, a command is binding only if there is a right of being obeyed implying authority. My main objective in this paper is to make explicit the semantical and normative relations between rights and commands. In the first part, after some remarks (...)
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  38. Stephen Mathis (2000). Korsgaard, Normativity, and the Publicity of Reasons. Southwest Philosophy Review 17 (1):77-83.
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  39. Mark McBride (2013). Kearns and Star on Reasons as Evidence. Analytic Philosophy 54 (2):229-236.
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  40. Stephen K. McLeod (2013). Absolute Biological Needs. Bioethics 27 (4):n/a-n/a.
    Absolute needs (as against instrumental needs) are independent of the ends, goals and purposes of personal agents. Against the view that the only needs are instrumental needs, David Wiggins and Garrett Thomson have defended absolute needs on the grounds that the verb ‘need’ has instrumental and absolute senses. While remaining neutral about it, this article does not adopt that approach. Instead, it suggests that there are absolute biological needs. The absolute nature of these needs is defended by appeal to: their (...)
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  41. Javier Muguerza (2004). Ethics and Perplexity: Toward a Critique of Dialogical Reason. Rodopi.
    Javier Muguerza’s Ethics and Perplexity makes a highly original contribution to the debate over dialogical reason. The work opens with a letter that establishes a parallel between Ethics and Perplexity and Maimonides’s classic Guide of the Perplexed. It concludes with an interview that repeatedly strikes sparks on Spanish philosophy’s emergence from its “long quarantine,” as Muguerza puts it. These informal pieces—witty, informative, conversational—orbit the nucleus of the work: a formidable critique of dialogical reason. The result is a volume by turns (...)
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  42. Linda Radzik (2002). A Coherentist Theory of Normative Authority. Journal of Ethics 6 (1):21-42.
    What makes an ``ought'''' claim authoritative? What makes aparticular norm genuinely reason-giving for an agent? This paper arguesthat normative authority can best be accounted for in terms of thejustification of norms. The main obstacle to such a theory, however, isa regress problem. The worry is that every attempt to offer ajustification for an ``ought'''' claim must appeal to another ``ought''''claim, ad infinitum. The paper argues that vicious regress canbe avoided in practical reasoning in the same way coherentists avoid theproblem in (...)
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  43. Linda Radzik (2000). Incorrigible Norms: Foundationalist Theories of Normative Authority. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):633-649.
    What makes a norm a genuinely authoritative guide to action? For many theorists, the answer takes a foundationalist form, analogous to foundationalism in epistemology. They say that there is at least one norm that is justified in itself. On most versions, the norm is said to be incorrigibly authoritative. All other norms are justified in virtue of their connection with it. This essay argues that all such foundationalist theories of normative authority fail because they cannot give an account of the (...)
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  44. Linda Radzik (1999). A Normative Regress Problem. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1):35-47.
    The article argues that theorists who try to justify 'ought'-claims, i.e., who try to show that a standard of behavior has normative authority, will run into a regress problem. The problem is similar in structure to the familiar regress in the justification of belief. The point of the paper is not skeptical. Rather, the aim is to help theorists better understand the challenges associated with formulating a theory of normative authority.
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  45. Joseph Raz (2010). Reason, Reasons and Normativity. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 5. Oup Oxford.
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  46. Andrew Reisner (forthcoming). John Broome. In Robert Audi (ed.), Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
  47. Richard Rowland (2013). Moral Error Theory and the Argument From Epistemic Reasons. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (1):1-24.
    In this paper I defend what I call the argument from epistemic reasons against the moral error theory. I argue that the moral error theory entails that there are no epistemic reasons for belief and that this is bad news for the moral error theory since, if there are no epistemic reasons for belief, no one knows anything. If no one knows anything, then no one knows that there is thought when they are thinking, and no one knows that they (...)
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  48. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2009). Normative Reasons and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Dichotomy. Philosophia 37 (2):227-243.
    The distinction between the agent-relative and the agent-neutral plays a prominent role in recent attempts to taxonomize normative theories. Its importance extends to most areas in practical philosophy, though. Despite its popularity, the distinction remains difficult to get a good grip on. In part this has to do with the fact that there is no consensus concerning the sort of objects to which we should apply the distinction. Thomas Nagel distinguishes between agent-neutral and agent-relative values, reasons, and principles; Derek Parfit (...)
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  49. G. F. Schueler (2013). Review of Joshua Gert: Normative Bedrock: Resopnse-Dependence, Rationality, and Reasons. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2013 (05.24).
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  50. Attila Tanyi (2012). The Case for Authority. In S. Schleidgen (ed.), Should we always act morally? Essays on Overridingness. Tectum.
    The paper deals with a charge that is often made against consequentialist moral theories: that they are unacceptably demanding. This is called the Overdemandingness Objection. The paper first distinguishes three interpretations of the Objection as based on the three dimensions of moral demands: scope, content, and authority. It is then argued that neither the scope, nor the content-based understanding of the Objection is viable. Constraining the scope of consequentialism is neither helpful, nor justified, hence the pervasiveness of consequentialism cannot be (...)
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