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  1. Facundo M. Alonso (2016). A Dual Aspect Theory of Shared Intention. Journal of Social Ontology 2 (2):271–302.
    In this article I propose an original view of the nature of shared intention. In contrast to psychological views (Bratman, Searle, Tuomela) and normative views (Gilbert), I argue that both functional roles played by attitudes of individual participants and interpersonal obligations are factors of central and independent significance for explaining what shared intention is. It is widely agreed that shared intention (I) normally motivates participants to act, and (II) normally creates obligations between them. I argue that the view I propose (...)
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  2. Joel Anderson (2003). Autonomy and the Authority of Personal Commitments: From Internal Coherence to Social Normativity. Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):90 – 108.
    It has been argued - most prominently in Harry Frankfurt's recent work - that the normative authority of personal commitments derives not from their intrinsic worth but from the way in which one's will is invested in what one cares about. In this essay, I argue that even if this approach is construed broadly and supplemented in various ways, its intrasubjective character leaves it ill-prepared to explain the normative grip of commitments in cases of purported self-betrayal. As an alternative, I (...)
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  3. Carla Bagnoli (forthcoming). Constructivism and the Moral Problem. Philosophia.
    According to the standard objection, Kantian constructivism implicitly commits to value realism or fails to warrant objective validity of normative propositions. This paper argues that this objection gains some force from the special case of moral obligations. The case largely rests on the assumption that the moral domain is an eminent domain of special objects. But for constructivism there is no moral domain of objects prior to and independently of reasoning. The argument attempts to make some progress in the debate (...)
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  4. Carla Bagnoli (2016). Change in View: Sensitivity to Facts in Prospective Rationality. In G. Marchetti & S. Marchetti (eds.), The Contingency of Fact and the Objectivity of Values. Routledge 137-158.
    In this chapter, I offer a constructivist account of practical reasoning as both generative and transformative in response to calls from philosophers as diverse as Iris Murdoch and Gilbert Harman, who have urged the development of a more nuanced picture of reasoning that incorporates revisionary and revelatory changes in viewpoint. Within this context, I describe sensitivity to facts as a form of emotional engagement that is also partially constitutive of facts. I consider both the epistemological and ontological aspects of this (...)
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  5. Carla Bagnoli (2011). “Reason and Ethics”. In N. Vassallo & C. Amoretti (eds.), Reason and Reasons. Ontos-Verlag
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  6. Carla Bagnoli (2011). “Moral Perception and Knowledge by Principles”. In Jill Hernandez (ed.), New Intuitionism. Continuum 84.
  7. Carla Bagnoli (2009). “Practical Necessity: The Subjective Experience”. In W. Huemer & B. Centi (eds.), Value and Ontology. Ontos-Verlag
  8. Carla Bagnoli (2007). Respect and Membership in the Moral Community. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (2):113 - 128.
    Some philosophers object that Kant's respect cannot express mutual recognition because it is an attitude owed to persons in virtue of an abstract notion of autonomy and invite us to integrate the vocabulary of respect with other persons-concepts or to replace it with a social conception of recognition. This paper argues for a dialogical interpretation of respect as the key-mode of recognition of membership in the moral community. This interpretation highlights the relational and practical nature of respect, and accounts for (...)
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  9. Carla Bagnoli (2007). Deliberare, Comparare, Misurare. Ragion Pratica: Rivista semestrale 26:65-80.
    © Carla Bagnoli DELIBERARE, COMPARARE, MISURARE É opinione ampiamente condivisa che l’incommensurabilità e la commensurabilità sono ipotesi sulla natura del valore che pongono delle condizioni pesanti sulla deliberazione e sulla nostra capacità di compiere scelte ragionate. Pragmatisti e pluralisti si sono adoperati ad argomentare che la commensurabilità non è un requisito necessario alla scelta razionale. In questo articolo sosterrò che vi è un argomento ancora più radicale di quello pluralista e pragmatista secondo il quale la commensurabilità, così come l’incommensurabilità, non (...)
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  10. Carla Bagnoli (2007). The Authority of Reflection. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22 (1):43-52.
    This paper examines Moran’s argument for the special authority of the first-person, which revolves around the Self/Other asymmetry and grounds dichotomies such as the practical vs. theoretical, activity vs. passivity, and justificatory vs. explanatory reasons. These dichotomies qualify the self-reflective person as an agent, interested in justifying her actions from a deliberative stance. The Other is pictured as a spectator interested in explaining action from a theoretical stance. The self-reflective knower has authority over her own mental states, while the Spectator (...)
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  11. Carla Bagnoli (2007). L'autorita' Della Morale. Feltrinelli.
    Capitolo I Il rispetto e l'ideale morale 1.1. Angeli, bruti e agenti 1.2. Il rispetto dell'altro 1.3. Il rispetto di sé 1.4. Auto−riflessione e auto−legislazione 1.5. Autonomia e individualità 1.6. Il rispetto e l'attenzione 1.7. Il rispetto e l'amore.
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  12. Carla Bagnoli (2002). Moral Constructivism: A Phenomenological Argument. Topoi 21 (1-2):125-138.
  13. Christiane Bailey (2014). Le double sens de la communauté morale : la considérabilité morale et l’agentivité morale des autres animaux. Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 9 (3):31-67.
    Christiane Bailey | : Distinguant deux sens de « communauté morale », cet article soutient que certains animaux appartiennent à la communauté morale dans les deux sens : ils sont des patients moraux dignes de considération morale directe et équivalente, mais également des agents moraux au sens où ils sont capables de reconnaître, d’assumer et d’adresser aux autres des exigences minimales de bonne conduite et de savoir-vivre. Au moyen de la notion d’« attitudes réactives » développée par Peter F. Strawson, (...)
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  14. Erik Baldwin (2011). On Buddhist and Taoist Morality. Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 16 (2):99-110.
    Arthur Danto argues that all Eastern philosophies – except Confucianism – fail to accept necessary conditions on genuine morality: a robust notion of agency and that actions are praiseworthy only if performed voluntarily, in accordance with rules, and from motives based on the moral worth and well-being of others. But Danto’s arguments fail: Neo-Taoism and Mohism satisfy these allegedly necessary constraints and Taoism and Buddhism both posit moral reasons that fall outside the scope of Danto’s allegedly necessary conditions on genuine (...)
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  15. Seyla Benhabib (2013). Ethics Without Normativity and Politics Without Historicity On Judith Butler's Parting Ways. Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism. Constellations 20 (1):150-163.
  16. Lars Bergström (2002). Putnam on the Fact-Value Dichotomy. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):117-129.
    In Reason, Truth and History and certain related writings, Hilary Putnam attacked the fact-value distinction. This paper criticizes his arguments and defends the distinction. Putnam claims that factual statements presuppose values, that “the empirical world depends upon our criteria of rational acceptability,” and that “we must have criteria of rational acceptability to even have an empirical world.” The present paper argues that these claims are mistaken.
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  17. Thomas M. Besch (forthcoming). Schmidtz on Moral Recognition Rules: A Critique. Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy and Psychology.
    David Schmidtz’s reconstruction of morality advances Hart-type recognition rules for a “personal” and an “interpersonal” strand of morality. I argue that his view does not succeed for reasons owed both to the way in which Schmidtz construes of the task of reconstructing morality and the content of the moral recognition rules that he proposes. For Schmidtz, this task must be approached from a Hart-type “internal” perspective, but this leaves his reconstruction with an unresolved problem of parochiality. And he reconstructs morality (...)
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  18. J. S. Biehl (2008). The Insignificance of Choice. In David Chan (ed.), Moral Psychology Today: Essays on Value, Rational Choice, and the Will. Springer 110--75.
    For some time, philosophers have sought a more satisfactory understanding of the mysteries of morality through a close analysis of its assumed kinship with practical rationality, via the psychological capacity of choice. It is the view in the present paper that no such understanding is possible by these means. The significance of morality has nothing to do with choice.
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  19. Noell Birondo (2016). Virtue and Prejudice: Giving and Taking Reasons. The Monist 99 (2):212-223.
    The most long-standing criticism of virtue ethics in its traditional, eudaimonistic variety centers on its apparently foundational appeal to nature in order to provide a source of normativity. This paper argues that a failure to appreciate both the giving and taking of reasons in sustaining an ethical outlook can distort a proper understanding of the available options for this traditional version of virtue ethics. To insist only on giving reasons, without also taking (maybe even considering) the reasons provided by others, (...)
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  20. Gunnar Björnsson (2005). Christine Korsgaards moralfilosofi. Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 1:38–54.
    Critical introduction in Swedish of Christine Korsgaard's Sources of Normativity and Self-Constitution.
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  21. Michael E. Bratman (1998). Review of Korsgaard's The Sources of Normativity. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):699-709.
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  22. John Broome (1995). Skorupski on Agent-Neutrality. Utilitas 7 (2):315.
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  23. David K. Chan (ed.) (2008). Moral Psychology Today: Essays on Values, Rational Choice, and the Will. Springer Verlag.
    This book brings together in one volume some of the very latest developments in moral psychology that were presented at a major American conference in 2004. Moral psychology is a broad area at the intersection of moral philosophy and philosophy of mind and action. Essays in this collection deal with most of the central issues in moral psychology that are of interest to a large number of philosophers today, including important questions in normative ethical theory, meta-ethics, and applied ethics.
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  24. Ruth Chang (2014). Practical Reasons: The Problem of Gridlock. In Barry Dainton & Howard Robinson (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy. Continuum Publishing Corporation 474-499.
    The paper has two aims. The first is to propose a general framework for organizing some central questions about normative practical reasons in a way that separates importantly distinct issues that are often run together. Setting out this framework provides a snapshot of the leading types of view about practical reasons as well as a deeper understanding of what are widely regarded to be some of their most serious difficulties. The second is to use the proposed framework to uncover and (...)
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  25. Ruth Chang (2013). Commitment, Reasons, and the Will. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 8. Oxford University Press 74-113.
    This paper argues that there is a particular kind of ‘internal’ commitment typically made in the context of romantic love relationships that has striking meta-normative implications for how we understand the role of the will in practical normativity. Internal commitments cannot plausibly explain the reasons we have in committed relationships on the usual model – as triggering reasons that are already there, in the way that making a promise triggers a reason via a pre-existing norm of the form ‘If you (...)
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  26. Ruth Chang (2013). Grounding Practical Normativity: Going Hybrid. Philosophical Studies 164 (1):163-187.
    In virtue of what is something a reason for action? That is, what makes a consideration a reason to act? This is a metaphysical or meta-normative question about the grounding of reasons for action. The answer to the grounding question has been traditionally given in ‘pure’, univocal terms. This paper argues that there is good reason to understand the ground of practical normativity as a hybrid of traditional ‘pure’ views. The paper 1) surveys the three leading ‘pure’ answers to the (...)
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  27. Justin Clarke-Doane (forthcoming). Objectivity in Ethics and Mathematics. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
    How do axioms, or first principles, in ethics compare to those in mathematics? In this companion piece to G.C. Field's 1931 "On the Role of Definition in Ethics", I argue that there are similarities between the cases. However, these are premised on an assumption which can be questioned, and which highlights the peculiarity of normative inquiry.
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  28. Andrew Jason Cohen (2008). Existentialist Voluntarism as a Source of Normativity. Philosophical Papers 37 (1):89-129.
    I defend a neo-Kantian view wherein we are capable of being completely autonomous and impartial and argue that this ability can ground normativity. As this view includes an existentialist conception of the self, I defend radical choice, a primary component of that conception, against arguments many take to be definitive. I call the ability to use radical choice “existentialist voluntarism” and bring it into a current debate in normative philosophy, arguing that it allows that we can be distanced from all (...)
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  29. Bradford Cokelet (2008). Ideal Agency and the Possibility of Error. Ethics 118 (2):315-323.
    In “Practical Reason and the Possibility of Error," Douglas Lavin claims to have discovered a paradox deep in the heart of Christine Korsgaard’s neo-Kantian project. I argue that Lavin's criticism rests on a mistaken conception of ideal agency. In particular, he falsely assumes that since it is no accident that an ideal agent lives up to sound norms, it must have been impossible for her to deviate from them.
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  30. D. Copp (2009). Naturalizmmoralny i trzy stopnie normatywności. Etyka 42:51-83.
    This is a Polish translation of my essay, "Moral Naturalism and Three Grades of Normativity." This essay is published in English in my 2007 book, "Morality in a Natural World" (Cambridge University Press).
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  31. Jonathan Dancy & Daniel Muñoz (2014). Not Knowing Everything That Matters. The Philosophers' Magazine (66):94-99.
    We know what to say about the agent who knowingly does the wrong thing. But what of the wrongdoer who doesn't know everything that matters? Some of the usual criticisms may apply, if some of the usual mistakes were made. Other usual criticisms will miss the mark. One task for moral theory is to explain this variety of censures and failures. Derek Parfit proposes that we define for each criticism a sense of 'wrong', and that each new sense be defined (...)
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  32. Florian Demont-Biaggi (2013). John Mikhail on Moral Intuitions. Kairos 7.
    John Mikhail's moral psychology is an interestin contribution to philosophical debates surrounding the nature of normativity and moral and legal judgement. The paper focuses on Mikhail's metaethical assumptions and how they are combined with the Chomskian framework of his moral theory. Particularly the computational processes which are supposed to generate oughts will be scrutinised. It is then argued that--apart from three other issues--Mikhail does not provide a satisfactory answer to the is-ought problem.
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  33. David G. Dick (2009). Ethics and the Possibility of Failure: Getting It Right About Getting It Wrong. Dissertation, University of Michigan
    Entire moral philosophies have been rejected for ruling out the possibility of failure. This “fallibility constraint” (also sometimes called the “error constraint”) cannot be justified by appealing either to Wittgensteinian considerations about rules or to the moral importance of alternate possibilities. I propose instead that support for such a constraint in ethics can be found in the Strawsonian reactive attitudes. I then use the constraint to reveal hidden weaknesses in contemporary contstitutivist strategies to ground moral normativity such as Christine Korsgaard’s, (...)
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  34. Joshua DiPaolo & Jeff Behrends (2015). Reason to Promotion Inferences. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy:1-10.
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  35. Dale Dorsey (2012). Weak Anti-Rationalism and the Demands of Morality†. Noûs 46 (1):1-23.
    The demandingness of act consequentialism is well-known and has received much sophisticated treatment.1 Few have been content to defend AC’s demands. Much of the response has been to jettison AC in favor of a similar, though significantly less demanding view.2 The popularity of this response is easy to understand. Excessive demandingness appears to be a strong mark against any moral theory. And if excessive demandingness is a worry of this kind, AC’s goose appears cooked: attempts to show that AC is (...)
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  36. Heather Dyke (ed.) (2003). Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Ethics seeks answers to questions about the moral status of human actions and human lives. What should I do, and what should I not do? What sort of life should I lead? Actions and lives are temporal things. Actions are performed at certain times, are informed by past events and have consequences for the future. Lives have temporal extension, and are experienced from a sequence of temporal perspectives. Thus, one would think that answers to ethical questions should take account some (...)
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  37. Daan Evers (2015). Allan Gibbard Meaning and Normativity. Oxford University Press, 2012. Xiv + 310 Pp. Isbn 9780199646074. [REVIEW] Theoria 81 (1):82-86.
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  38. Daan Evers (2015). Street on Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons. Synthese 192 (11):3663-3676.
    Sharon Street argues that realism about epistemic normativity is false. Realists believe there are truths about epistemic reasons that hold independently of the agent’s attitudes. Street argues by dilemma. Either the realist accepts a certain account of the nature of belief, or she does not. If she does, then she cannot consistently accept realism. If she does not, then she has no scientifically credible explanation of the fact that our epistemic behaviours or beliefs about epistemic reasons align with independent normative (...)
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  39. Alejandro Farieta (2015). Aproximaciones éticas al problema del free rider: consecuencialismo, deontología y ética de la virtud. Discusiones Filosóficas 16 (27):147-161.
    In contemporary ethics, the free rider problem occurs when in a group of people who work for a common aim, someone takes advantage of the collective work and makes a comparatively lower effort than the rest of the group, receiving the same benefits. The problem consists in avoiding this behavior that, intuitively, is considered undesirable. This essay presents an analysis of the problem from three different perspectives in moral education: consequentialism, deontologic proceduralism and virtue ethics. I show the weaknesses of (...)
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  40. Jacek Filek (2013). Nauczanie filozofii, wykłady/teaching philosophy, lecturing. Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 3 (1):161-175.
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  41. William J. FitzPatrick (2005). The Practical Turn in Ethical Theory: Korsgaard's Constructivism, Realism, and the Nature of Normativity. Ethics 115 (4):651-691.
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  42. William J. FitzPatrick (2004). Reasons, Value, and Particular Agents: Normative Relevance Without Motivational Internalism. Mind 113 (450):285-318.
    While differing widely in other respects, both neo-Humean and neo-Kantian approaches to normativity embrace an internalist thesis linking reasons for acting to potential motivation. This thesis pushes in different directions depending on the underlying view of the powers of practical reason, but either way it sets the stage for an attack on realist attempts to ground reasons directly in facts about value. How can reasons that are not somehow grounded in motivational features of the agent nonetheless count as reasons for (...)
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  43. Danny Frederick, Theoretical and Practical Reason: A Critical Rationalist View.
    If the task of theoretical reason is to discover truth, or reasons for belief, then theoretical reason is impossible. Attempts to circumvent that by appeal to probabilities are self-defeating. If the task of practical reason is to discover what we ought to do or what actions are desirable or valuable, then practical reason is impossible. Appeals to the subjective ought or to subjective probabilities are self-defeating. Adapting Karl Popper, I argue that the task of theoretical reason is to obtain theories (...)
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  44. Fabian Freyenhagen (2013). Adorno's Practical Philosophy: Living Less Wrongly. Cambridge University Press.
    Adorno notoriously asserted that there is no 'right' life in our current social world. This assertion has contributed to the widespread perception that his philosophy has no practical import or coherent ethics, and he is often accused of being too negative. Fabian Freyenhagen reconstructs and defends Adorno's practical philosophy in response to these charges. He argues that Adorno's deep pessimism about the contemporary social world is coupled with a strong optimism about human potential, and that this optimism explains his negative (...)
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  45. Dwight Furrow (2005). Ethics: Key Concepts in Philosophy. Continuum.
    This book is the ideal introduction to ethics.
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  46. Logan Paul Gage (2013). Darwin Knows Best: Can Evolution Support the Classical Liberal Vision of the Family? In Stephen Dilley (ed.), Darwinian Evolution and Classical Liberalism: Theories in Tension. Lexington Books 135-156.
    In a time when conservatives believe that the traditional family is under increasing fire, some think an appeal to Darwinian science may be the answer. I argue that these conservatives are wrong to maintain that Darwinian theory can serve as the intellectual foundation for the traditional conception of the family. Contra Larry Arnhart and James Q. Wilson, a Darwinian philosophy of nature simply lacks the stability the traditional family requires; it cannot support the traditional conception of human nature and the (...)
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  47. Pablo Gilabert (2005). A Substantivist Construal of Discourse Ethics. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (3):405 – 437.
    This paper presents a substantivist construal of discourse ethics, which claims that we should see our engagement in public deliberation as expressing and elaborating a substantive commitment to basic moral ideas of solidarity, equality, and freedom. This view is different from Habermas's standard formalist defence of discourse ethics, which attempts to derive the principle of discursive moral justification from primarily non-moral presuppositions of rational argumentation as such. After explicating the difference between the substantivist and the formalist construal, I defend the (...)
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  48. Pablo Gilabert (2005). The Substantive Dimension of Deliberative Practical Rationality. Philosophy and Social Criticism 31 (2):185-210.
    The aim of this paper is to propose a model for understanding the relation between substance and procedure in discourse ethics and deliberative democracy capable of answering the common charge that they involve an ‘empty formalism’. The expressive-elaboration model introduced here answers this concern by arguing that the deliberative practical rationality presupposed by discourse ethics and deliberative democracy involves the creation of a practical medium in which certain general basic ideas of solidarity, equality and freedom are expressed and elaborated in (...)
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  49. Pablo Gilabert (2005). Two Sets of Concerns About Heath's Pragmatic Theory of Convergence. Dialogue 44 (2):383-390.
  50. Triantafyllos Gkouvas, The Practicality of Pure Reason.
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