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  1. Vuko Andrić (2010). David Gauthiers kontraktualistische Moralbegründung. Aufklärung Und Kritik 33:80-104.
    This paper offers a critique of David Gauthier’s contractarian moral theory. I point out morally counter-intuitive implications of Gauthier’s theory – for example, with respect to societies with slavery or concerning the protection of animals – as well as theoretically unattractive features, such as the overly optimistic assumption of translucent agents. However, contractarian moral theories can be improved by correcting the theoretically unattractive features. Moreover, though some morally counter-intuitive implications cannot be avoided, whether we should accept these implications ultimately depends (...)
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  2. Carla Bagnoli (2007). Deliberare, Comparare, Misurare. Ragion Pratica: Rivista semestrale 26:65-80.
    © Carla Bagnoli DELIBERARE, COMPARARE, MISURARE É opinione ampiamente condivisa che l’incommensurabilità e la commensurabilità sono ipotesi sulla natura del valore che pongono delle condizioni pesanti sulla deliberazione e sulla nostra capacità di compiere scelte ragionate. Pragmatisti e pluralisti si sono adoperati ad argomentare che la commensurabilità non è un requisito necessario alla scelta razionale. In questo articolo sosterrò che vi è un argomento ancora più radicale di quello pluralista e pragmatista secondo il quale la commensurabilità, così come l’incommensurabilità, non (...)
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  3. Carla Bagnoli (2002). Moral Constructivism: A Phenomenological Argument. Topoi 21 (1-2):125-138.
  4. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Wide-Scope Requirements and the Ethics of Belief. In Jonathan Matheson & Rico Vitz (eds.), The Ethics of Belief.
    William Kingdon Clifford proposed a vigorous ethics of belief, according to which you are morally prohibited from believing something on insufficient evidence. Though Clifford offers numerous considerations in favor of his ethical theory, the conclusion he wants to draw turns out not to follow from any reasonable assumptions. In fact, I will argue, regardless of how you propose to understand the notion of evidence, it is implausible that we could have a moral obligation to refrain from believing something whenever we (...)
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  5. Eva Buddeberg & Achim Vesper (eds.) (2013). Moral und Sanktion: Eine Kontroverse über die Autorität moralischer Normen. Campus.
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  6. Ruth Chang (2013). Grounding Practical Normativity: Going Hybrid. Philosophical Studies 164 (1):163-187.
    In virtue of what is something a reason for action? That is, what makes a consideration a reason to act? This is a metaphysical or meta-normative question about the grounding of reasons for action. The answer to the grounding question has been traditionally given in ‘pure’, univocal terms. This paper argues that there is good reason to understand the ground of practical normativity as a hybrid of traditional ‘pure’ views. The paper 1) surveys the three leading ‘pure’ answers to the (...)
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  7. Ruth Chang (2013). Commitment, Reasons, and the Will. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 8. Oxford University Press 74-113.
    This paper argues that there is a particular kind of ‘internal’ commitment typically made in the context of romantic love relationships that has striking meta-normative implications for how we understand the role of the will in practical normativity. Internal commitments cannot plausibly explain the reasons we have in committed relationships on the usual model – as triggering reasons that are already there, in the way that making a promise triggers a reason via a pre-existing norm of the form ‘If you (...)
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  8. Patrick Daly (2014). Common Sense and the Common Morality in Theory and Practice. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 35 (3):187-203.
    The unfinished nature of Beauchamp and Childress’s account of the common morality after 34 years and seven editions raises questions about what is lacking, specifically in the way they carry out their project, more generally in the presuppositions of the classical liberal tradition on which they rely. Their wide-ranging review of ethical theories has not provided a method by which to move beyond a hypothetical approach to justification or, on a practical level regarding values conflict, beyond a questionable appeal to (...)
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  9. Jonathan Dancy & Daniel Muñoz (2014). Not Knowing Everything That Matters. The Philosophers' Magazine (66):94-99.
    We know what to say about the agent who knowingly does the wrong thing. But what of the wrongdoer who doesn't know everything that matters? Some of the usual criticisms may apply, if some of the usual mistakes were made. Other usual criticisms will miss the mark. One task for moral theory is to explain this variety of censures and failures. Derek Parfit proposes that we define for each criticism a sense of 'wrong', and that each new sense be defined (...)
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  10. David G. Dick (2009). Ethics and the Possibility of Failure: Getting It Right About Getting It Wrong. Dissertation, University of Michigan
    Entire moral philosophies have been rejected for ruling out the possibility of failure. This “fallibility constraint” (also sometimes called the “error constraint”) cannot be justified by appealing either to Wittgensteinian considerations about rules or to the moral importance of alternate possibilities. I propose instead that support for such a constraint in ethics can be found in the Strawsonian reactive attitudes. I then use the constraint to reveal hidden weaknesses in contemporary contstitutivist strategies to ground moral normativity such as Christine Korsgaard’s, (...)
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  11. David Fagelson (2002). Justice As Integrity: Objectivity And Social Meaning In Legal Theory. Social and Legal Studies 11 (4):569-588.
  12. Jacek Filek (2013). Nauczanie filozofii, wykłady/teaching philosophy, lecturing. Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 3 (1):161-175.
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  13. Jessy Giroux (2011). The Origin of Moral Norms: A Moderate Nativist Account. Dialogue 50 (02):281-306.
    In this paper, I distinguish between two families of theories which view moral norms as either “inputs” or “outputs.” I argue that the most plausible version of each model can ultimately be seen as the two sides of the same model, which I call Moderate Nativism. The difference between these two apparently antagonistic models is one of perspective rather than content: while the Input model explains how emotional dispositions constrain the historical evolution of moral norms, the Output model explains how (...)
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  14. Irwin Goldstein (2001). Book Review, Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die. [REVIEW] Philosophia 28 (1-4).
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  15. Moti Gorin (2014). Do Manipulators Always Threaten Rationality? American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1).
  16. Robert Welsh Jordan (2002). 'Nicolai Hartmann: Proper Ethics is Atheistic (Dordrecht; Boston; London, 2002), Pp. 175-96'. In John J. Drummond Lester Embree (ed.), Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philosophy. A Handbook. Kluwer Academic Publishers
    Hartmann's axiology is intuitionist like that of Max Scheler and acknowledges ,like Scheler's a hierarchy of ideal values. The two also agree that the primary intuitive consciousness of axiotic traits is emotional. Values themselves are ideal entities entailing laws regarding what ought to be and what ought to be done. The requirements about what ought to be are more likely to come into prominence or exigence for the emotional sense of what is of value when real, temporal things are not (...)
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  17. Y. Levy (2015). Explaining Norms, by Geoffrey Brennan, Lina Eriksson, Robert E. Goodin, and Nicholas Southwood. Mind 124 (494):612-616.
  18. Clayton Littlejohn (2009). Critical Notice of Michael Zimmerman's, Living with Uncertainty. [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 50 (4):235–247.
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  19. Piotr Machura (2013). Moral Norms, Moral Ideals and Supererogation. Folia Philosophica 29.
    The aim of the paper is to investigate the relations between the basic moral categories, namely those of norms, ideals and supererogation. The subject of discussion is, firstly, the ways that these categories are understood; secondly, the possible approaches towards moral acting that appear due to their use; and thirdly, their relationship within the moral system. However, what is of a special importance here is the relationship between the categories of norms and ideals (or in a wider aspect — laudable (...)
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  20. Chauncey Maher (2010). On Being and Holding Responsible. Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):129-140.
    In his Responsibility and the moral sentiments , Wallace develops the idea that we should think of what it is to be morally responsible for an act in terms of norms for holding someone responsible for that act. Smith has recently claimed that Wallace's approach and those like it are 'fundamentally misguided'. She says that such approaches make the mistake of incorporating conditions for 'actively blaming' others into the basic conditions for being responsible, when in fact the conditions for active (...)
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  21. Paul McNamara (2011). Praise, Blame, Obligation, and DWE: Toward a Framework for the Classical Conception of Supererogation and Kin. Journal of Applied Logic 9:153–170.
    Continuing prior work by the author, a simple classical system for personal obligation is integrated with a fairly rich system for aretaic (agent-evaluative) appraisal. I then explore various relationships between definable aretaic statuses such as praiseworthiness and blameworthiness and deontic statuses such as obligatoriness and impermissibility. I focus on partitions of the normative statuses generated ("normative positions" but without explicit representation of agency). In addition to being able to model and explore fundamental questions in ethical theory about the connection between (...)
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  22. Michel Meliopoulos (2015). Does Morality Have a Point? Ethical Perspectives 22 (1):151-195.
    Proceeding from the assumption that moral discourse is best conceived of as a practice in the technical sense specified by John Rawls, this article discusses whether it is possible, adequate or even necessary to take up a legislative perspective on the constitutive rules of the said practice. There seem to be two principal legislative manoeuvres with respect to practices, namely rendering the practice under consideration compatible with a practice that is more important and evaluating the constitutive rules of the practice (...)
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  23. Michael Moehler (2014). The Scope of Instrumental Morality. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):431-451.
    In The Order of Public Reason (2011a), Gerald Gaus rejects the instrumental approach to morality as a viable account of social morality. Gaus' rejection of the instrumental approach to morality, and his own moral theory, raise important foundational questions concerning the adequate scope of instrumental morality. In this article, I address some of these questions and I argue that Gaus' rejection of the instrumental approach to morality stems primarily from a common but inadequate application of this approach. The scope of (...)
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  24. Daniel Nica (2013). Etica fara principii? Generalism si particularism in filosofia morala. Eikon Publishing House.
    Cum arată un om moral? Este acesta un om care se află în posesia unor principii ferme și știe cum să le aplice? Sau este un om care, neavând nevoie de reguli morale, reușește de fiecare dată să ia decizia corectă? Poate fi moralitatea codificată într-un set de principii universale? Sau viața morală este mult prea complexă pentru a fi guvernată de reguli stricte? Dar dacă moralitatea nu constă în aplicarea unor standarde generale, ci în capacitatea de a lua decizii (...)
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  25. Linda Radzik (2000). Incorrigible Norms: Foundationalist Theories of Normative Authority. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):633-649.
    What makes a norm a genuinely authoritative guide to action? For many theorists, the answer takes a foundationalist form, analogous to foundationalism in epistemology. They say that there is at least one norm that is justified in itself. On most versions, the norm is said to be incorrigibly authoritative. All other norms are justified in virtue of their connection with it. This essay argues that all such foundationalist theories of normative authority fail because they cannot give an account of the (...)
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  26. Andrew Reisner (2015). John Broome. In Robert Audi (ed.), Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press
    A short encyclopaedia entry on John Broome.
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  27. Andrew Reisner (2013). Book Review: The Domain of Reasons. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 122 (4):661-664.
    A review of John Skorupski's The Domain of Reasons.
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  28. David Robichaud (2012). La confiance et le rapport aux normes : le problème de la méfiance face à la différence. Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 7 (1):234-252.
    Nous proposons dans ce texte une hypothèse explicative de la méfiance plus grande observée entre des individus différents les uns des autres sur un aspect identitaire jugé pertinent par ceux-ci. Nous débutons par présenter une esquisse de définition de la confiance et nous plaçons les normes de rationalité et de moralité au centre de cette définition. Nous faisons confiance à autrui pour qu’il respecte certaines normes explicites ou implicites. Cette définition nous permet d’éviter deux écueils : celui de considérer qu’il (...)
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  29. Laura Schlingloff & Richard Moore (forthcoming). Do Chimpanzees Conform to Cultural Norms? In Kristin Andrews Jacob Beck (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds. Routledge
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  30. David Sosa (2004). A Big, Good Thing: T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998). Noûs 38 (2):359–377.
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  31. Nicholas Southwood (2011). The Moral/Conventional Distinction. Mind 120 (479):761-802.
    Commonsense suggests that moral judgements and conventional normative judgements are importantly different in kind. Yet a compelling vindicating account of the moral/conventional distinction has proven persistently elusive. The distinction is typically explicated in terms of either formal properties (the Form View) or substantive properties (the Content View) of the principles that figure in the judgements. But the most promising versions of these views face serious difficulties. After reviewing the difficulties with the standard accounts, I propose a new way of explicating (...)
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  32. Marcel van Ackeren & Michael Kühler (eds.) (2015). The Limits of Moral Obligation: Moral Demandingness and Ought Implies Can. Routledge.
    This volume responds to the growing interest in finding explanations for why moral claims may lose their validity based on what they ask of their addressees. Two main ideas relate to that question: the moral demandingness objection and the principle "ought implies can." Though both of these ideas can be understood to provide an answer to the same question, they have usually been discussed separately in the philosophical literature. The aim of this collection is to provide a focused and comprehensive (...)
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  33. Mark van Roojen (2013). Scanlon's Promising Proposal and the Righ Kind of Reasons to Believe. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 3. 59-78.
    T. M. Scanlon suggests that the binding nature of promises itself plays a role in allowing a promisee rationally to expect follow through even while that binding nature itself depends on the promisee’s rational expectation of follow through. Kolodny and Wallace object that this makes the account viciously circular. The chapter defends Scanlon’s theory from this objection. It argues that the basic complaint is a form of wrong kinds of reason objection. The thought is that the promisee’s reason to expect (...)
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  34. J. David Velleman (2013). Foundations for Moral Relativism. OpenBook Publishers.
    In Foundations for Moral Relativism, J. David Velleman shows that different communities can indeed be subject to incompatible moralities, because their local mores are rationally binding. At the same time, he explains why the mores of different communities, even when incompatible, are still variations on the same moral themes. The book thus maps out a universe of many moral worlds without, as Velleman puts it, "moral black holes”. The five self-standing chapters discuss such diverse topics as online avatars and virtual (...)
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  35. Achim Vesper (2012). Buchkritik: Normativität – eine Schimäre? Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 60 (5):825-829.
    Marco Iorio: Regel und Grund. Eine philosophische Abhandlung. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 2011, 332 S.
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  36. Paul Weirich (2008). Utility Maximization Generalized. Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (2):282-299.
    Theories of rationality advance principles that differ in topic, scope, and assumptions. A typical version of the principle of utility maximization formulates a standard rather than a procedure for decisions, evaluates decisions comprehensively, and relies on idealizations. I generalize the principle by removing some idealizations and making adjustments for their absence. The generalizations accommodate agents who have incomplete probability and utility assignments and are imperfectly rational. They also accommodate decision problems with unstable comparisons of options.
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