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  1. Vuko Andrić (2010). David Gauthiers kontraktualistische Moralbegründung. Aufklärung Und Kritik 33:80-104.
    Dies ist eine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit David Gauthiers kontraktualistischer Moralbegründung.
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  2. Carla Bagnoli (2007). Deliberare, Comparare, Misurare. Ragion Pratica 26:65-80.
    © Carla Bagnoli DELIBERARE, COMPARARE, MISURARE É opinione ampiamente condivisa che l’incommensurabilità e la commensurabilità sono ipotesi sulla natura del valore che pongono delle condizioni pesanti sulla deliberazione e sulla nostra capacità di compiere scelte ragionate. Pragmatisti e pluralisti si sono adoperati ad argomentare che la commensurabilità non è un requisito necessario alla scelta razionale. In questo articolo sosterrò che vi è un argomento ancora più radicale di quello pluralista e pragmatista secondo il quale la commensurabilità, così come l’incommensurabilità, non (...)
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  3. Carla Bagnoli (2002). Moral Constructivism: A Phenomenological Argument. Topoi 21 (1-2):125-138.
  4. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Wide-Scope Requirements and the Ethics of Belief. In Jonathan Matheson & Rico Vitz (eds.), The Ethics of Belief.
    William Kingdon Clifford proposed a vigorous ethics of belief, according to which you are morally prohibited from believing something on insufficient evidence. Though Clifford offers numerous considerations in favor of his ethical theory, the conclusion he wants to draw turns out not to follow from any reasonable assumptions. In fact, I will argue, regardless of how you propose to understand the notion of evidence, it is implausible that we could have a moral obligation to refrain from believing something whenever we (...)
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  5. Ruth Chang (forthcoming). &Quot;commitment, Reasons, and the Will&Quot;. Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    This paper argues that there is a particular kind of ‘internal’ commitment typically made in the context of romantic love relationships that has striking meta-normative implications for how we understand the role of the will in practical normativity. Internal commitments cannot plausibly explain the reasons we have in committed relationships on the usual model – as triggering reasons that are already there, in the way that making a promise triggers a reason via a pre-existing norm of the form ‘If you (...)
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  6. Ruth Chang (2013). Grounding Practical Normativity: Going Hybrid. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 164 (1):163-187.
    In virtue of what is something a reason for action? That is, what makes a consideration a reason to act? This is a metaphysical or meta-normative question about the grounding of reasons for action. The answer to the grounding question has been traditionally given in ‘pure’, univocal terms. This paper argues that there is good reason to understand the ground of practical normativity as a hybrid of traditional ‘pure’ views. The paper 1) surveys the three leading ‘pure’ answers to the (...)
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  7. David Fagelson (2002). Justice As Integrity: Objectivity And Social Meaning In Legal Theory. Social And Legal Studies 11 (4):569-588.
  8. Jessy Giroux (2011). The Origin of Moral Norms: A Moderate Nativist Account. Dialogue 50 (02):281-306.
    In this paper, I distinguish between two families of theories which view moral norms as either “inputs” or “outputs.” I argue that the most plausible version of each model can ultimately be seen as the two sides of the same model, which I call Moderate Nativism. The difference between these two apparently antagonistic models is one of perspective rather than content: while the Input model explains how emotional dispositions constrain the historical evolution of moral norms, the Output model explains how (...)
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  9. Irwin Goldstein (2001). Book Review, Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die. [REVIEW] Philosophia 28 (1-4).
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  10. Clayton Littlejohn (2009). Critical Notice of Michael Zimmerman's, Living with Uncertainty. [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 50 (4):235–247.
  11. Chauncey Maher (2010). On Being and Holding Responsible. Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):129-140.
    In his Responsibility and the moral sentiments , Wallace develops the idea that we should think of what it is to be morally responsible for an act in terms of norms for holding someone responsible for that act. Smith has recently claimed that Wallace's approach and those like it are 'fundamentally misguided'. She says that such approaches make the mistake of incorporating conditions for 'actively blaming' others into the basic conditions for being responsible, when in fact the conditions for active (...)
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  12. Michael Moehler (2014). The Scope of Instrumental Morality. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):431-451.
    In The Order of Public Reason (2011a), Gerald Gaus rejects the instrumental approach to morality as a viable account of social morality. Gaus' rejection of the instrumental approach to morality, and his own moral theory, raise important foundational questions concerning the adequate scope of instrumental morality. In this article, I address some of these questions and I argue that Gaus' rejection of the instrumental approach to morality stems primarily from a common but inadequate application of this approach. The scope of (...)
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  13. Linda Radzik (2000). Incorrigible Norms: Foundationalist Theories of Normative Authority. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):633-649.
    What makes a norm a genuinely authoritative guide to action? For many theorists, the answer takes a foundationalist form, analogous to foundationalism in epistemology. They say that there is at least one norm that is justified in itself. On most versions, the norm is said to be incorrigibly authoritative. All other norms are justified in virtue of their connection with it. This essay argues that all such foundationalist theories of normative authority fail because they cannot give an account of the (...)
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  14. Andrew Reisner (forthcoming). John Broome. In Robert Audi (ed.), Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
  15. Andrew Reisner (2013). Book Review: The Domain of Reasons. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 122 (4):661-664.
    A review of John Skorupski's The Domain of Reasons.
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  16. David Sosa (2004). A Big, Good Thing: T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998). Noûs 38 (2):359–377.
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  17. Nicholas Southwood (2011). The Moral/Conventional Distinction. Mind 120 (479):761-802.
    Commonsense suggests that moral judgements and conventional normative judgements are importantly different in kind. Yet a compelling vindicating account of the moral/conventional distinction has proven persistently elusive. The distinction is typically explicated in terms of either formal properties (the Form View) or substantive properties (the Content View) of the principles that figure in the judgements. But the most promising versions of these views face serious difficulties. After reviewing the difficulties with the standard accounts, I propose a new way of explicating (...)
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  18. J. David Velleman (2013). Foundations for Moral Relativism. OpenBook Publishers.
    In Foundations for Moral Relativism, J. David Velleman shows that different communities can indeed be subject to incompatible moralities, because their local mores are rationally binding. At the same time, he explains why the mores of different communities, even when incompatible, are still variations on the same moral themes. The book thus maps out a universe of many moral worlds without, as Velleman puts it, "moral black holes”. The five self-standing chapters discuss such diverse topics as online avatars and virtual (...)
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