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Moral Objectivity

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  1. Owen Anderson (2010). Moral Objectivity and Responsibility in Ethics: A Socratic Response to Hume's Legacy in the 20thcentury. Heythrop Journal 51 (2):178-191.
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  2. Carla Bagnoli (2004). Introduction. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):311-316.
    This volume collects articles in realism, anti-realism, and constructivism.
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  3. Carla Bagnoli (2001). Rawls on the Objectivity of Practical Reason. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):307-329.
    This article argues that Rawls’ history of ethics importantly contributes to the advancement of ethical theory, in that it correctly situates Kantian constructivism as an alternative to both sentimentalism and rational Intuitionism, and calls attention to the standards of objectivity in ethics. The author shows that by suggesting that both Intuitionist and Humean doctrines face the charge of heteronomy, Rawls appearsto adopt a Kantian conception of practical reason. Furthermore, Rawls follows Kant in assuming that ethical objectivity can be vindicated only (...)
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  4. Carla Bagnoli (2000). La Pretesa di Oggettività in Etica. In Gabriele Usberti (ed.), Modelli di oggettività. Bompiani.
    Sembra esserci almeno un punto di accordo tra i filosofi morali: i giudizi etici, così come li usiamo nelle nostre conversazioni quotidiane, condividono una certa aspirazione all’oggettività. Vi è invece un disaccordo piuttosto acerbo rispetto alla questione se questa aspirazione sia giustificata o non sia invece una mera pretesa. Il disaccordo filosofico riguarda, cioè, la questione se i giudizi etici debbano e possano aspirare all’oggettività. Ma ancor più fondamentale è il disaccordo rispetto ai criteri con cui valutare se questa aspirazione (...)
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  5. Robert Bass, Joyce as a Moral Anatomist.
    The cover illustration for Richard Joyce’s elegant and powerful recent work, The Evolution of Morality, is a reproduction of an oddly fascinating and disturbing sixteenth-century engraving, the Anatomia del corpo humano. One has to examine the image for a minute to realize that the standing human figure, stripped of skin, and with muscles, tendons and joints revealed, holds the anatomist’s knife in his left hand and that, with his right, he holds up the single piece of skin, from bearded face (...)
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  6. Matthew Chrisman (2005). Review of Shafer-Landau's Moral Realism. [REVIEW] Ethics 116 (1):250-255.
    G. E. Moore famously argued on the basis of semantic intuitions that moral properties are not reducible to natural properties, and therefore that moral predicates refer to nonnatural properties. This clearly represents a version of “moral realism,” but it is a testament to the strength of naturalist intuitions in contemporary philosophical debate that, insofar as one accepts Moore’s arguments, this is typically seen as a boon for antirealists rather than realists. For many philosophers worry that putative nonnatural properties would be (...)
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  7. John P. Dreher (1966). Moral Objectivity. Southern Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):137-148.
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  8. John J. Drummond (1995). Moral Objectivity: Husserl's Sentiments of the Understanding. Husserl Studies 12 (2).
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  9. Robert R. Ehman (1967). Moral Objectivity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (2):175-187.
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  10. Margaret Gilbert (1999). Critical Notice: Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Noûs 33 (2):295–303.
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  11. Margaret P. Gilbert, Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson's Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity.
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  12. Michael Glanzberg (2004). Discussion – Truth, Disquotation, and Expression: On McGinn's Theory of Truth. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 118 (3):413-423.
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  13. Geoffrey P. Goodwin & John M. Darley (2010). The Perceived Objectivity of Ethical Beliefs: Psychological Findings and Implications for Public Policy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):161-188.
    Ethical disputes arise over differences in the content of the ethical beliefs people hold on either side of an issue. One person may believe that it is wrong to have an abortion for financial reasons, whereas another may believe it to be permissible. But, the magnitude and difficulty of such disputes may also depend on other properties of the ethical beliefs in question—in particular, how objective they are perceived to be. As a psychological property of moral belief, objectivity is relatively (...)
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  14. Christopher W. Gowans (2004). A Priori Refutations of Disagreement Arguments Against Moral Objectivity: Why Experience Matters. Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (2).
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  15. Gordon Graham (1996). Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity by Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996, X+225pp. £40.00, £12.99. Philosophy 71 (278):622-.
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  16. Germain G. Grisez (1960). Moral Objectivity and the Cold War. Ethics 70 (4):291-305.
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  17. Gilbert Harman (1996). Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Blackwell.
    Do moral questions have objective answers? In this great debate, Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, and moral scepticism.
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  18. Joseph P. R. Hester (1975). Subjective Commitment and the Problem of Moral Objectivity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (4):534-539.
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  19. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2008). What Does Moral Phenomenology Tell Us About Moral Objectivity? Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):267-300.
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  20. Christina Lafont (2004). Moral Objectivity and Reasonable Agreement: Can Realism Be Reconciled with Kantian Constructivism? Ratio Juris 17 (1):27-51.
    In this paper I analyze the tension between realism and antirealism at the basis of Kantian constructivism. This tension generates a conflictive account of the source of the validity of social norms. On the one hand, the claim to moral objectivity characteristic of Kantian moral theories makes the validity of norms depend on realist assumptions concerning the existence of shared fundamental interests among all rational human beings. I illustrate this claim through a comparison of the approaches of Rawls, Habermas and (...)
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  21. Christian Miller (2009). Divine Will Theory: Desires or Intentions? In Jonathan Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press.
    Due largely to the work of Mark Murphy and Philip Quinn, divine will theory has emerged as a legitimate alternative to divine command theory in recent years. As an initial characterization, divine will theory is a view of deontological properties according to which, for instance, an agent S‟s obligation to perform action A in circumstances C is grounded in God‟s will that S A in C. Characterized this abstractly, divine will theory does not specify which kind of mental state is (...)
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  22. Madhu Suri Prakash & Mark Weinstein (1982). After Virtue: A Quest for Moral Objectivity. Educational Theory 32 (1):35-44.
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  23. William Rehg (1999). Intractable Conflicts and Moral Objectivity: A Dialogical, Problem-Based Approach. Inquiry 42 (2):229 – 257.
    According to the standard version of discourse ethics (e.g. as formulated by Apel, Habermas, and others), the objectivity of moral norms resides in their intersubjective acceptability under idealized conditions of discourse. These accounts have been criticized for not taking sufficient account of contextual particularities and the realities of actual discourse. This essay addresses such objections by proposing a more realistic, contextualist 'principle of real moral discourse' (RMD). RMD is derived from a more comprehensive concept of objectivity that links intersubjective objectivity (...)
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  24. Nicholas Rescher (2008). Moral Objectivity. Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):393-409.
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  25. Charles Sayward (1988). System Relativism. Ratio 1 (2):163-175.
    The fundamental thought of moral relativism is set out as follows: moral criteria, derived from overall moral points of view, are used to derive particular moral judgments. Thus such a judgment might be correct relative to one overall moral point of view and incorrect relative to another. The evaluation of an overall moral point of view does not involve the application of moral criteria. Rather, the evaluation of a morality takes us outside the province of morality. The result of sharpening (...)
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  26. Stephen D. Schwarz (1997). Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. International Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1):113-115.
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  27. David Sidorsky (2001). Incomplete Routes to Moral Objectivity: Four Variants of Naturalism. Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (02):177-.
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  28. Jennifer Tannoch-Bland (1997). From Aperspectival Objectivity to Strong Objectivity: The Quest for Moral Objectivity. Hypatia 12 (1):155 - 178.
    Sandra Harding is working on the reconstruction of scientific objectivity. Lorraine Daston argues that objectivity is a concept that has historically evolved. Her account of the development of "aperspectival objectivity" provides an opportunity to see Harding's "strong objectivity" project as a stage in this evolution, to locate it in the history of migration of ideals from moral philosophy to natural science, and to support Harding's desire to retain something of the ontological significance of objectivity.
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  29. Huntington Terrell (1965). Moral Objectivity and Moral Freedom. Ethics 75 (2):117-127.
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  30. Eric Wiland (2000). Advice and Moral Objectivity. Philosophical Papers 29 (1):1-19.
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  31. Cynthia Willett (2008). False Consciousness and Moral Objectivity in Kansas. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 22 (4):pp. 290-299.
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  32. Darryl F. Wright (2008). Evaluative Concepts and Objective Values: Rand on Moral Objectivity. Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):149-181.
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  33. John Zeis (1992). Theism and Moral Objectivity. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 66 (4):429-445.
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