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  1. Leslie Allan, Is Morality Subjective?
    Subjectivists claim that the absence of a theological or metaphysical grounding to moral judgements renders them all as simply statements about our subjective wants and preferences. Leslie Allan argues that the subjectivists' case rests on a misunderstanding of the nature of moral objectivity. He presents the view that subjectivists mistakenly counterpoise the ideal of moral objectivity with the expression of individual preferences. Being objective in moral deliberation, Allan argues, should be regarded instead as the antithesis of parochial and biased reasoning. (...)
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  2. Leslie Allan, Is Morality Subjective? – A Reply to Critics.
    Leslie Allan defends his thesis that ethics is objective in the sense of requiring moral agents to offer impartial reasons for acting. Radical subjectivists have attacked this requirement for impartiality on a number of grounds. Some critics make the charge that Allan's thesis is simply a version of subjectivism in disguise. He responds by showing how a broadly naturalist view of ethics accommodates objective moral constraints. Allan also counters cases in which impartiality is purportedly not morally required and considers the (...)
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  3. Owen Anderson (2010). Moral Objectivity and Responsibility in Ethics: A Socratic Response to Hume's Legacy in the 20th Century. Heythrop Journal 51 (2):178-191.
  4. Jonny Anomaly (2013). Review of Derek Parfit, On What Matters. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (3):358-360.
  5. Carla Bagnoli (2004). Introduction. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):311-316.
    This volume collects articles in realism, anti-realism, and constructivism.
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  6. Carla Bagnoli (2001). Rawls on the Objectivity of Practical Reason. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):307-329.
    This article argues that Rawls’ history of ethics importantly contributes to the advancement of ethical theory, in that it correctly situates Kantian constructivism as an alternative to both sentimentalism and rational Intuitionism, and calls attention to the standards of objectivity in ethics. The author shows that by suggesting that both Intuitionist and Humean doctrines face the charge of heteronomy, Rawls appearsto adopt a Kantian conception of practical reason. Furthermore, Rawls follows Kant in assuming that ethical objectivity can be vindicated only (...)
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  7. Carla Bagnoli (2000). La Pretesa di Oggettività in Etica. In Gabriele Usberti (ed.), Modelli di oggettività. Bompiani
    Sembra esserci almeno un punto di accordo tra i filosofi morali: i giudizi etici, così come li usiamo nelle nostre conversazioni quotidiane, condividono una certa aspirazione all’oggettività. Vi è invece un disaccordo piuttosto acerbo rispetto alla questione se questa aspirazione sia giustificata o non sia invece una mera pretesa. Il disaccordo filosofico riguarda, cioè, la questione se i giudizi etici debbano e possano aspirare all’oggettività. Ma ancor più fondamentale è il disaccordo rispetto ai criteri con cui valutare se questa aspirazione (...)
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  8. Robert Bass, Joyce as a Moral Anatomist.
    The cover illustration for Richard Joyce’s elegant and powerful recent work, The Evolution of Morality, is a reproduction of an oddly fascinating and disturbing sixteenth-century engraving, the Anatomia del corpo humano. One has to examine the image for a minute to realize that the standing human figure, stripped of skin, and with muscles, tendons and joints revealed, holds the anatomist’s knife in his left hand and that, with his right, he holds up the single piece of skin, from bearded face (...)
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  9. Gunnar Björnsson (forthcoming). The Significance of Ethical Disagreement for Theories of Ethical Thought and Talk. In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge
    This chapter has two sections, each focusing on a distinct way in which ethical disagreement and variations in ethical judgment matter for theories of ethical thought and talk. In the first section, we look at how the variation poses problems for both cognitivist and non-cognitivist ways of specifying the nature of ethical judgments. In the second, we look at how disagreement phenomena have been taken to undermine cognitivist accounts, but also at how the seeming variation in cognitive and non-cognitive contents (...)
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  10. Gunnar Björnsson (2012). Do 'Objectivist' Features of Moral Discourse and Thinking Support Moral Objectivism? Journal of Ethics 16 (4):367-393.
    Many philosophers think that moral objectivism is supported by stable features of moral discourse and thinking. When engaged in moral reasoning and discourse, people behave ‘as if’ objectivism were correct, and the seemingly most straightforward way of making sense of this is to assume that objectivism is correct; this is how we think that such behavior is explained in paradigmatically objectivist domains. By comparison, relativist, error-theoretic or non-cognitivist accounts of this behavior seem contrived and ad hoc. After explaining why this (...)
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  11. Simon Blackburn (1998). Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):195-198.
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  12. Spencer Case (2015). Review of Terence Cuneo's Speech and Morality: On the Metaethical Implications of Speaking. [REVIEW] Tradition and Discovery 42 (1):59-62.
  13. Marc Champagne (2011). What About Suicide Bombers? A Terse Response to a Terse Objection. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 11 (2):233–236.
    Stressing that the pronoun "I" picks out one and only one person in the world (i.e., me), I argue against Hunt (and other like-minded Rand commentators) that the supposed "hard case" of destructive people who do not care for their own lives poses no special difficulty for rational egoism. I conclude that the proper response to a terse objection like "What about suicide bombers?" is the equally terse assertion "But I don't want to get blown up.".
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  14. Matthew Chrisman (2005). Review of Shafer-Landau's Moral Realism. [REVIEW] Ethics 116 (1):250-255.
    G. E. Moore famously argued on the basis of semantic intuitions that moral properties are not reducible to natural properties, and therefore that moral predicates refer to nonnatural properties. This clearly represents a version of “moral realism,” but it is a testament to the strength of naturalist intuitions in contemporary philosophical debate that, insofar as one accepts Moore’s arguments, this is typically seen as a boon for antirealists rather than realists. For many philosophers worry that putative nonnatural properties would be (...)
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  15. Maudemarie Clark & David Dudrick (2007). Nietzsche and Moral Objectivity : The Development of Nietzsche's Metaethics. In Brian Leiter & Neil Sinhababu (eds.), Nietzsche and Morality. Oxford University Press 192--226.
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  16. Florian Cova & Jérôme Ravat (2008). Sens commun et objectivisme moral : Objectivisme "global" ou objectivisme "local" ? Une introduction par l'exemple à la philosophie expérimentale. Klesis 9:180-202.
    Dans cet article, nous proposons de montrer expérimentalement que le "sens commun" n'est en matière moral ni complètement objectiviste ni complètement relativiste, mais qu'un même individu peut être tantôt objectiviste tantôt relativiste. De même, nous montrons que les jugements de goût portant sur le prédicat "dégoûtant" ne sont pas toujours relativiste mais peuvent varier selon le contexte entre objectivisme et relativisme.
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  17. Sem de Maagt (forthcoming). Reflective Equilibrium and Moral Objectivity. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Ever since the introduction of reflective equilibrium in ethics, it has been argued that reflective equilibrium either leads to moral relativism, or that it turns out to be a form of intuitionism in disguise. Despite these criticisms, reflective equilibrium remains the most dominant method of moral justification in ethics. In this paper, I therefore critically examine the most recent attempts to defend the method of reflective equilibrium against these objections. Defenders of reflective equilibrium typically respond to the objections by saying (...)
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  18. John P. Dreher (1966). Moral Objectivity. Southern Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):137-148.
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  19. John J. Drummond (1995). Moral Objectivity: Husserl's Sentiments of the Understanding. [REVIEW] Husserl Studies 12 (2):165-183.
    This paper explores two perspectives in Husserl's recently published writings on ethics and axiology in order to sketch anew a phenomenological account of practical reason. The paper aims a) to show that a phenomenological account of moral intentionality i) transcends the disputes between intellectualist-emotivist and intellectualist-voluntarist disputes and ii) points toward a position in which practical reason has an emotive content or, conversely, the emotions have a cognitive content, and the paper aims b) to show that a phenomenological ethics identifies (...)
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  20. Robert R. Ehman (1967). Moral Objectivity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (2):175-187.
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  21. Catherine Elgin (1996). The Relativity of Fact and the Objectivity of Value. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 6 (1):4-15.
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  22. Anthony Ellis (1986). Reviewed Work: Objectivity and Cultural Divergence by S. C. Brown. [REVIEW] Philosophy 61 (236):274-276.
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  23. Margaret Gilbert (1999). Critical Notice: Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Noûs 33 (2):295–303.
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  24. Margaret P. Gilbert, Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson's Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity.
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  25. Michael Glanzberg (2004). Discussion – Truth, Disquotation, and Expression: On McGinn's Theory of Truth. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 118 (3):413-423.
    In Logical Properties, Colin McGinn offers a new theory of truth, which he describes as “thick disquotationalism.” In keeping with wider theme of the book, truth emerges as conceptually primitive. Echoing Moore, it is simple and unanalyzable. Though truth cannot be analyzed, in the sense of giving a conceptual decomposition, McGinn argues that truth can be defined. A non-circular statement of its application conditions can be given. This makes truth a singularly remarkable property. Indeed, by McGinn’s lights, it is the (...)
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  26. Geoffrey P. Goodwin & John M. Darley (2010). The Perceived Objectivity of Ethical Beliefs: Psychological Findings and Implications for Public Policy. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):161-188.
    Ethical disputes arise over differences in the content of the ethical beliefs people hold on either side of an issue. One person may believe that it is wrong to have an abortion for financial reasons, whereas another may believe it to be permissible. But, the magnitude and difficulty of such disputes may also depend on other properties of the ethical beliefs in question—in particular, how objective they are perceived to be. As a psychological property of moral belief, objectivity is relatively (...)
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  27. Christopher W. Gowans (2004). A Priori Refutations of Disagreement Arguments Against Moral Objectivity: Why Experience Matters. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (2):141-157.
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  28. Gordon Graham (1996). Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity by Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996, X+225pp. £40.00, £12.99. [REVIEW] Philosophy 71 (278):622-.
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  29. Germain G. Grisez (1960). Moral Objectivity and the Cold War. Ethics 70 (4):291-305.
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  30. Delfín Ignacio Grueso (2012). Teoría Crítica, Justicia y Metafilosofía: La Validación de la Filosofía Política En Nancy Fraser y Axel Honneth / Critical Theory, Justice and Metaphilosophy: Validation of Political Philosophy in Fraser and Honneth [Spanish]. Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 16:69-98.
    SPANISH: ¿Puede un filósofo, sin más, tomar el lado de las víctimas, cuando se trata de situaciones de justicia e injusticia? ¿Puede carecer de un punto de vista objetivo acerca de lo que es moralmente bueno o malo? Si el filósofo sostiene que lo que las víctimas demandan, en lugar de redistribución, es reconocimiento, ¿debe proveer una convincente teoría de lo que es el reconocimiento y del modo como él juega un papel en las situaciones de justicia e injusticia? Este (...)
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  31. Gilbert Harman (1996). Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Blackwell.
    Do moral questions have objective answers? In this great debate, Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, and moral scepticism.
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  32. Joseph P. R. Hester (1975). Subjective Commitment and the Problem of Moral Objectivity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (4):534-539.
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  33. Joh Erich Heyde (1926). Grundfragen zum Problem der objektiven Werte. Kant-Studien 31 (1-3):46-52.
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  34. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2008). What Does Moral Phenomenology Tell Us About Moral Objectivity? Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):267-300.
    Moral phenomenology is concerned with the elements of one's moral experiences that are generally available to introspection. Some philosophers argue that one's moral experiences, such as experiencing oneself as being morally obligated to perform some action on some occasion, contain elements that (1) are available to introspection and (2) carry ontological objectivist purportargument from phenomenological introspection.neutrality thesisthe phenomenological data regarding one's moral experiences that is available to introspection is neutral with respect to the issue of whether such experiences carry ontological (...)
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  35. Christina Lafont (2004). Moral Objectivity and Reasonable Agreement: Can Realism Be Reconciled with Kantian Constructivism? Ratio Juris 17 (1):27-51.
    In this paper I analyze the tension between realism and antirealism at the basis of Kantian constructivism. This tension generates a conflictive account of the source of the validity of social norms. On the one hand, the claim to moral objectivity characteristic of Kantian moral theories makes the validity of norms depend on realist assumptions concerning the existence of shared fundamental interests among all rational human beings. I illustrate this claim through a comparison of the approaches of Rawls, Habermas and (...)
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  36. Hallvard Lillehammer (2011). Constructivism and the Error Theory. In Christian Miller (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum
    This paper presents a comparative evaluation of constructivist and error theoretic accounts of moral claims. It is argued that constructivism has distinct advantages over error theory.
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  37. T. Foster Lindley (1954). Mr. Walhout's "Objectivity and Value". Journal of Philosophy 51 (6):190-192.
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  38. Christian Miller (2009). Divine Will Theory: Desires or Intentions? In Jonathan Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press
    Due largely to the work of Mark Murphy and Philip Quinn, divine will theory has emerged as a legitimate alternative to divine command theory in recent years. As an initial characterization, divine will theory is a view of deontological properties according to which, for instance, an agent S‟s obligation to perform action A in circumstances C is grounded in God‟s will that S A in C. Characterized this abstractly, divine will theory does not specify which kind of mental state is (...)
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  39. Richard W. Miller (1997). Three Versions of Objectivity: Moral, Aesthetic and Scientific. In Jerrold Levinson (ed.), Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. Cambridge University Press
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  40. Micah Newman (2015). A Realist Sexual Ethics. Ratio 28 (2):223-240.
    A very liberal sexual ethics now holds sway in Western culture, such that mutual consent alone is widely seen as morally legitimizing almost any sexual activity between adults. It is further commonly assumed by both philosophers and nonphilosophers that arguing for some alternative to liberal sexual ethics requires appeal to ethical commands specific to some religious tradition or other. The purpose of this paper is to challenge that assumption by suggesting some purely naturalistic and independently-plausible premises that can be used (...)
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  41. Charles Pigden (1984). Review of Sabina Lovibond:Realism and Imagination in Ethics. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):313-315.
    A critique of a kind of 'moral realism' that is in fact a rather thinly disguised version of global historicist idealism. If you don't like the idea that facts are hard and values are soft, you can pump up the values to make them as hard as the facts or soften down the facts to make them as soggy as the values. Lovibond prefers the latter strategy. After some critical remarks about Lovibond's book (including its implicit authoritarianism) I conclude with (...)
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  42. Thomas Pölzler (2016). Further Problems with Projectivism. South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):92-102.
    From David Hume onwards, many philosophers have argued that moral thinking is characterized by a tendency to “project” our own mental states onto the world. This metaphor of projection may be understood as involving two empirical claims: the claim that humans experience morality as a realm of objective facts (the experiential hypothesis), and the claim that this moral experience is immediately caused by affective attitudes (the causal hypothesis). Elsewhere I argued in detail against one form of the experiential hypothesis. My (...)
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  43. Thomas Pölzler (2015). Climate Change Inaction and Moral Nihilism. Ethics, Policy and Environment 18 (2):202-214.
    The effects of anthropogenic climate change may be devastating. Nevertheless, most people do not seem to be seriously concerned. We consume as much as we always did, drive as much as we always did, eat as much meat as we always did. What can we do to overcome this collective apathy? In order to be able to develop effective measures, we must first get clear about the causes of climate change inaction. In this paper I ask whether moral nihilism is (...)
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  44. Thomas Pölzler (2015). Moral Disagreement, Anti-Realism, and the Worry About Overgeneralization. In Christian Kanzian, Josef Mitterer & Katharina Neges (eds.), Contributions to the 38th International Wittgenstein Symposium. 245-247.
    According to the classical argument from moral disagreement, the existence of widespread or persistent moral disagreement is best explained by, and thus inductively supports the view that there are no objective moral facts. One of the most common charges against this argument is that it “overgeneralizes”: it implausibly forces its proponents to deny the existence of objective facts about certain matters of physics, history, philosophy, etc. as well (companions in guilt), or even about its own conclusion or its own soundness (...)
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  45. Thomas Pölzler, How Does Moral Nihilism Affect Our Taking Action Against Climate Change? Proceedings of the 13. International Conference of ISSEI.
    The effects of anthropogenic climate change will be devastating. Nevertheless, most people do not seem to be seriously concerned. We consume as much as we always did, drive as much as we always did, eat as much meat as we always did. What can we do to overcome this collective apathy? In order to be able to develop effective measures, we must first get clear about the causes of climate change inaction. In this paper I ask whether moral nihilism (the (...)
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  46. Madhu Suri Prakash & Mark Weinstein (1982). After Virtue: A Quest for Moral Objectivity. Educational Theory 32 (1):35-44.
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  47. Peter Railton (1998). Moral Explanation and Moral Objectivity. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):175-182.
    What is the real issue at stake in discussions of "moral explanation"? There isn't one; there are many. The standing of purported moral properties and problems about our epistemic or semantic access to them are of concern both from within and without moral practice. An account of their potential contribution to explaining our values, beliefs, conduct, practices, etc. can help in these respects. By examining some claims made about moral explanation in Judith Thompson's and Gilbert Harman's Moral Relativism and Moral (...)
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  48. William Rehg (1999). Intractable Conflicts and Moral Objectivity: A Dialogical, Problem-Based Approach. Inquiry 42 (2):229 – 257.
    According to the standard version of discourse ethics (e.g. as formulated by Apel, Habermas, and others), the objectivity of moral norms resides in their intersubjective acceptability under idealized conditions of discourse. These accounts have been criticized for not taking sufficient account of contextual particularities and the realities of actual discourse. This essay addresses such objections by proposing a more realistic, contextualist 'principle of real moral discourse' (RMD). RMD is derived from a more comprehensive concept of objectivity that links intersubjective objectivity (...)
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  49. Bastian Reichardt (2014). Asserting Moral Sentences. SATS 15 (1):1-19.
    During the last century of meta-ethical debates, moral realism was much criticized for its ontological assumptions. These assumptions arise from the semantic intuition that lies at the heart of realist theories – namely, the intuition that language represents states of affairs. This makes moral realism hardly compatible with a naturalist world view and gives rise to consider ontologically more economic approaches. Moral constructivists can explain objectivity in ethics without inheriting the realist’s ontological burden. Nevertheless, constructivists tend to ignore the semantic (...)
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  50. Nicholas Rescher (2008). Moral Objectivity. Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):393-409.
    The aim of this essay is to set out an argument for moral objectivity. A brief sketch of the considerations at issue should help make it possible to keep sight of the forest amid the profusion of trees.
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