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  1. Maike Albertzart (2013). Principle-Based Moral Judgement. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):339-354.
    It is widely acknowledged that moral principles are not sufficient to guide moral thought and action: they need to be supplemented by a capacity for judgement. However, why can we not rely on this capacity for moral judgement alone? Why do moral principles need to be supplemented, but are not supplanted, by judgement? So-called moral particularists argue that we can, and should, make moral decisions on a case-by-case basis without any principles. According to particularists, the person of moral judgement is (...)
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  2. Maike Albertzart (2011). Missing the Target: Jonathan Dancy’s Conception of a Principled Ethics. Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (1):49-58.
  3. David Alm (2004). Atomism About Value. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):312 – 331.
    Atomism is defined as the view that the moral value of any object is ultimately determined by simple features whose contribution to the value of an object is always the same, independently of context. A morally fundamental feature, in a given context, is defined as one whose contribution in that context is determined by no other value fact. Three theses are defended, which together entail atomism: (1) All objects have their moral value ultimately in virtue of morally fundamental features; (2) (...)
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  4. Norbert P. Anwander (2003). Book Review: Ulrik Kihlbom, Ethical Particularism. An Essay on Moral Reasons. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (4):451-453.
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  5. David Bakhurst (2013). Moral Particularism: Ethical Not Metaphysical? In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking About Reasons: Themes From the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press. 192.
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  6. David Bakhurst (2007). Pragmatism and Ethical Particularism. In C. J. Misak (ed.), New Pragmatists. Oxford University Press. 122.
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  7. David Bakhurst (2005). Particularism and Moral Education. Philosophical Explorations 8 (3):265 – 279.
    Some opponents of ethical particularism complain that particularists cannot give a plausible account of moral education. After considering and rejecting a number of arguments to this conclusion, I focus on the following objection: Particularism, at least in Jonathan Dancy's version, has nothing to say about moral education because it lacks a substantial account of moral competence. By Dancy's own admission, particularists can tell us little more than that a competent agent 'gets things right case by case'. I respond by reflecting (...)
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  8. David Bakhurst (2000). Ethical Particularism in Context. In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral Particularism. Oxford University Press. 157--77.
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  9. Anna Bergqvist (2010). Why Sibley is Not a Generalist After All. British Journal of Aesthetics 50 (1):1-14.
    In his influential paper, ‘General Criteria and Reasons in Aesthetics’, Frank Sibley outlines what is taken to be a generalist view (shared with Beardsley) such that there are general reasons for aesthetic judgement, and his account of the behaviour of such reasons, which differs from Beardsley's. In this paper my aim is to illuminate Sibley's position by employing a distinction that has arisen in meta-ethics in response to recent work by Jonathan Dancy in particular. Contemporary research involves two related yet (...)
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  10. Anna Bergqvist (2009). Semantic Particularism and Linguistic Competence. Logique Et Analyse 52 (208):343-361.
    In this paper I examine a contemporary debate about the general notion of linguistic rules and the place of context in determining meaning, which has arisen in the wake of a challenge that the conceptual framework of moral particularism has brought to the table. My aim is to show that particularism in the theory of meaning yields an attractive model of linguistic competence that stands as a genuine alternative to other use-oriented but still generalist accounts that allow room for context-sensitivity (...)
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  11. Selim Berker (2007). Particular Reasons. Ethics 118 (1):109-139.
    Moral particularists argue that because reasons for action are irreducibly context-dependent, the traditional quest in ethics for true and exceptionless moral principles is hopelessly misguided. In making this claim, particularists assume a general framework according to which reasons are the ground floor normative units undergirding all other normative properties and relations. They then argue that there is no cashing out in finite terms either (i) when a given non-normative feature gives rise to a reason for or against action, or (ii) (...)
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  12. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Wide-Scope Requirements and the Ethics of Belief. In Jonathan Matheson & Rico Vitz (eds.), The Ethics of Belief.
    William Kingdon Clifford proposed a vigorous ethics of belief, according to which you are morally prohibited from believing something on insufficient evidence. Though Clifford offers numerous considerations in favor of his ethical theory, the conclusion he wants to draw turns out not to follow from any reasonable assumptions. In fact, I will argue, regardless of how you propose to understand the notion of evidence, it is implausible that we could have a moral obligation to refrain from believing something whenever we (...)
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  13. Curtis Brown, Moral Truths and Moral Principles.
    In recent years, a number of moral philosophers have held both that there are particular moral truths, and also that there are no general moral principles which explain these particular moral truths--either because there simply are no moral principles, or because moral principles are themselves explained by or derived from particular moral truths rather than vice versa. Often this combination of doctrines is held by philosophers interested in reviving an Aristotelean approach..
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  14. Bruno Celano (2012). True Exceptions : Defeasibility and Particularism. In Jordi Ferrer Beltrán & Giovanni Battista Ratti (eds.), The Logic of Legal Requirements: Essays on Defeasibility. Oxford University Press. 268--287.
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  15. David Copp (ed.) (2005). Particularism and Antitheory. Oxford University Press.
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  16. David Copp (1994). Review of Moral Reasons. [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 35 (3):197-199.
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  17. Roger Crisp (2007). Ethics Without Reasons? Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):40-49.
    This paper is a discussion of Jonathan Dancy's book Ethics Without Principles (2004). Holism about reasons is distinguished into a weak version, which allows for invariant reasons, and a strong, which doesn't. Four problems with Dancy's arguments for strong holism are identified. (1) A plausible particularism based on it will be close to generalism. (2) Dancy rests his case on common-sense morality, without justifying it. (3) His examples are of non-ultimate reasons. (4) There are certain universal principles it is hard (...)
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  18. Roger Crisp (2000). Particularizing Particularism. In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral Particularism. Oxford University Press. 23--47.
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  19. G. Cullity, Particularism and Presumptive Reasons.
    Weak particularism about reasons is the view that the normative valency of some descriptive considerations varies, while others have an invariant normative valency. A defence of this view needs to respond to arguments that a consideration cannot count in favour of any action unless it counts in favour of every action. But it cannot resort to a global holism about reasons, if it claims that there are some examples of invariant valency. This paper argues for weak particularism, and presents a (...)
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  20. Garrett Cullity (2002). Particularism and Moral Theory: Particularism and Presumptive Reasons: Garrett Cullity. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):169–190.
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  21. Garrett Cullity & Richard Holton (2002). Particularism and Moral Theory. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76:169 - 209.
    [Garrett Cullity] Weak particularism about reasons is the view that the normative valency of some descriptive considerations varies, while others have an invariant normative valency. A defence of this view needs to respond to arguments that a consideration cannot count in favour of any action unless it counts in favour of every action. But it cannot resort to a global holism about reasons, if it claims that there are some examples of invariant valency. This paper argues for weak particularism, and (...)
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  22. Jonathan Dancy (2009). Moral Particularism. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University.
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  23. Jonathan Dancy (2007). Defending the Right. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):85-98.
    In this paper I consider what might be my best response to various difficulties and challenges that emerged at a conference held at the University of Kent in December 2004, the contributions to which are given in the same volume. I comment on Crisp's distinction between ultimate and non-ultimate reasons, and reply to McKeever and Ridge on default reasons, and to Norman on the idea of a reason for action. I don't here consider what other particularists might want to say; (...)
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  24. Jonathan Dancy (2006). What Do Reasons Do? In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press. 95-113.
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  25. Jonathan Dancy (2004). Ethics Without Principles. Oxford University Press.
    In this much-anticipated book, Jonathan Dancy offers the only available full-scale treatment of particularism in ethics, a view with which he has been associated for twenty years. Dancy now presents particularism as the view that the possibility of moral thought and judgement does not in any way depend on an adequate supply of principles. He grounds this claim on a form of reasons-holism, holding that what is a reason in one case need not be any reason in another, and maintaining (...)
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  26. Jonathan Dancy (2000). The Particularist's Progress. In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral Particularism. Clarendon Press.
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  27. Jonathan Dancy (1999). On The Logical And Moral Adequacy Of Particularism. Theoria 65 (2-3):144-155.
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  28. Jonathan Dancy (1999). Defending Particularism. Metaphilosophy 30 (1&2):25-32.
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  29. Jonathan Dancy (1999). Can a Particularist Learn the Difference Between Right and Wrong? The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1:59-72.
    This paper is an attempt to answer the charge that extreme moral particularism is unable to explain the possibility of moral concepts and our ability to acquire them. This charge is based on the claim that we acquire moral concepts from experience of instances, and that the sorts of similarities that there must be between the instances are ones that only a generalist can countenance. I argue that this inference is unsound.
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  30. Jonathan Dancy (1993). Moral Reasons. Blackwell.
    This book attempts to place a realist view of ethics (the claim that there are facts of the matter in ethics as elsewhere) within a broader context. It starts with a discussion of why we should mind about the difference between right and wrong, asks what account we should give of our ability to learn from our moral experience, and looks in some detail at the different sorts of ways in which moral reasons can combine to show us what we (...)
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  31. Jonathan Dancy (1983). Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties. Mind 92 (368):530-547.
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  32. Omar Edward Moad (2007). Reasons, Resultance and Moral Particularism. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):112–116.
    According to Jonathan Dancy's moral particularism, the way in which a given moral reason functions as a reason for or against an action can vary from case to case. Dancy also asserts that reasons are resultance bases. But a reason why something ought to be done is that in virtue of which it is something that ought to be done. If the function of a reason can vary, then resultance bases cannot be reasons. Perhaps the particularist might conceive a reason (...)
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  33. Douglas Farland (1999). Let's Get Real About Moral Particularism. Theoria 46 (93):116-133.
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  34. Guy Fletcher (2010). Brown and Moore's Value Invariabilism Vs Dancy's Variabilism. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):162-168.
    Campbell Brown has recently argued that G.E. Moore's intrinsic value holism is superior to Jonathan Dancy's. I show that the advantage which Brown claims for Moore's view over Dancy's is illusory, and that Dancy's view may be superior.
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  35. Jennifer Flynn (2010). Recent Work: Moral Particularism. Analysis 70 (1):140-148.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  36. Lauren Freeman (2010). Metontology , Moral Particularism, and the “Art of Existing:” A Dialogue Between Heidegger, Aristotle, and Bernard Williams. [REVIEW] Continental Philosophy Review 43 (4):545-568.
    An important shift occurs in Martin Heidegger’s thinking one year after the publication of Being and Time , in the Appendix to the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic . The shift is from his project of fundamental ontology—which provides an existential analysis of human existence on an ontological level—to metontology . Metontology is a neologism that refers to the ontic sphere of human experience and to the regional ontologies that were excluded from Being and Time. It is within metontology, Heidegger states, (...)
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  37. Joshua Gert (2008). Putting Particularism in its Place. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):312-324.
    Abstract: The point of this paper is to undermine the support that particularism in the domain of epistemic reasons might seem to give to particularism in the domain of practical reasons. In the epistemic domain, there are two related notions: truth and the rationality of belief. Epistemic reasons are related to the rationality of belief, and not directly to truth. In the domain of practical reasons, however, the role of truth is taken by the notion of objective rationality. Practical reasons (...)
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  38. Alan Gewirth (1988). Ethical Universalism and Particularism. Journal of Philosophy 85 (6):283-302.
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  39. Andrew Gleeson (2007). Moral Particularism Reconfigured. Philosophical Investigations 30 (4):363–380.
    The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com.
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  40. Irwin Goldstein (2003). Malicious Pleasure Evaluated: Is Pleasure an Unconditional Good? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):24–31.
    Pleasure is one of the strongest candidates for an occurrence that might be good, in some respect, unconditionally. Malicious pleasure is one of the most often cited alleged counter-examples to pleasure’s being an unconditional good. Correctly evaluating malicious pleasure is more complex than people realize. I defend pleasure’s unconditionally good status from critics of malicious pleasure.
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  41. Irwin Goldstein (1989). Pleasure and Pain: Unconditional Intrinsic Values. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (December):255-276.
    That all pleasure is good and all pain bad in itself is an eternally true ethical principle. The common claim that some pleasure is not good, or some pain not bad, is mistaken. Strict particularism (ethical decisions must be made case by case; there are no sound universal normative principles) and relativism (all good and bad are relative to society) are among the ethical theories we may refute through an appeal to pleasure and pain. Daniel Dennett, Philippa Foot, R M (...)
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  42. Marcello Guarini (2010). Particularism, Analogy, and Moral Cognition. Minds and Machines 20 (3):385-422.
    ‘Particularism’ and ‘generalism’ refer to families of positions in the philosophy of moral reasoning, with the former playing down the importance of principles, rules or standards, and the latter stressing their importance. Part of the debate has taken an empirical turn, and this turn has implications for AI research and the philosophy of cognitive modeling. In this paper, Jonathan Dancy’s approach to particularism (arguably one of the best known and most radical approaches) is questioned both on logical and empirical grounds. (...)
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  43. Edward Harcourt (2007). Crisp's ‘Ethics Without Reasons?’: A Note on Invariance. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):50-54.
    Crisp is right to detect a clash between Dancy's leading formulation of holism about reasons and the phenomenon of invariance. Replying to Crisp on behalf of the particularist, I suggest a better formulation of holism modelled on a standard treatment in the philosophy of language of context-sensitive expressions. Key Words: context-sensitivity • Crisp • Dancy • holism • invariance • particularism.
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  44. Gilbert Harman (2005). Moral Particularism and Transduction. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):44–55.
    Can someone be reasonable or justified in accepting a specific moral judgment not based on the prior acceptance of a general exceptioness moral principle, where acceptance of a general principle might be tacit or implicit and might not be expressible in language? This issue is an instance of a wider issue about direct or transductive inference. Developments in statistical learning theory show that such an inference can be more effective than alternative methods using inductive generalization and so can be reasonable. (...)
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  45. Manuel Hernández-Iglesias (2006). Generalism Without Foundations. Acta Analytica 21 (2):71-86.
    This paper is a defence of a holistic version of the generalist view of moral reasoning based on prima facie principles. In Section 1 I summarise Dancy’s arguments for particularism. Then I argue that particularism goes against strong intuitions regarding reasoning in general (Section 2), fails to account for the asymmetry of reasons (Section 3) and to make sense of compunction and moral imbecility (Section 4). I conclude (Section 5) that a holistic generalism is the right view of moral reasoning. (...)
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  46. Richard Holton (2002). Principles and Particularisms. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 67 (1):191-209.
    Should particularists about ethics claim that moral principles are never true? Or should they rather claim that any finite set of principles will not be sufficient to capture ethics? This paper explores and defends the possibility of embracing the second of these claims whilst rejecting the first, a position termed principled particularism. The main argument that particularists present for their position - the argument that holds that any moral conclusion can be superceded by further considerations - is quite compatible with (...)
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  47. Brad Hooker (2012). Theory Vs Anti-Theory. In Ulrika Heuer Gerald Lang (ed.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Bernard Williams. Oxford University Press.
    Bernard Williams influentially attacked ethical theory. This paper assesses arguments for the ‘anti-theory’ position in ethics, including mainly arguments put forward by Williams but also arguments put forward by others. The paper begins by discussing what is supposed to be theory in ethics and what ethical intuitions are taken to be by those involved in the theory versus anti-theory debate. Then the paper responds to the objections that ethical theory is mistaken to prize principles, mistaken to prize rationalism, mistaken to (...)
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  48. Brad Hooker (2008). Moral Particularism and the Real World. In Mark Norris Lance, Matjaž Potrč & Vojko Strahovnik (eds.), Challenging Moral Particularism. Routledge. 12--30.
    The term ‘moral particularism’ has been used to refer to different doctrines. The main body of this paper begins by identifying the most important doctrines associated with the term, at least as the term is used by Jonathan Dancy, on whose work I will focus. I then discuss whether holism in the theory of reasons supports moral particularism, and I call into question the thesis that particular judgements have epistemological priority over general principles. Dancy’s recent book Ethics without Principles (Dancy (...)
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  49. Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.) (2000). Moral Particularism. Oxford University Press.
    A timely and penetrating investigation, this book seeks to transform moral philosophy. In the face of continuing disagreement about which general moral principles are correct, there has been a resurgence of interest in the idea that correct moral judgements can be only about particular cases. This view--moral particularism--forecasts a revolution in ordinary moral practice that has until now consisted largely of appeals to general moral principles. Moral particularism also opposes the primary aim of most contemporary normative moral theory that attempts (...)
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  50. John Horty (2007). Reasons as Defaults. Philosophers' Imprint 7 (3):1-28.
    The goal of this paper is to frame a theory of reasons--what they are, how they support actions or conclusions--using the tools of default logic. After sketching the basic account of reasons as provided by defaults, I show how it can be elaborated to deal with two more complicated issues: first, situations in which the priority relation among defaults, and so reasons as well, is itself established through default reasoning; second, the treatment of undercutting defeat and exclusionary reasons. Finally, and (...)
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