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  1. Maike Albertzart (2013). Principle-Based Moral Judgement. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):339-354.
    It is widely acknowledged that moral principles are not sufficient to guide moral thought and action: they need to be supplemented by a capacity for judgement. However, why can we not rely on this capacity for moral judgement alone? Why do moral principles need to be supplemented, but are not supplanted, by judgement? So-called moral particularists argue that we can, and should, make moral decisions on a case-by-case basis without any principles. According to particularists, the person of moral judgement is (...)
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  2. Maike Albertzart (2011). Missing the Target: Jonathan Dancy’s Conception of a Principled Ethics. Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (1):49-58.
  3. David Alm (2004). Atomism About Value. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):312 – 331.
    Atomism is defined as the view that the moral value of any object is ultimately determined by simple features whose contribution to the value of an object is always the same, independently of context. A morally fundamental feature, in a given context, is defined as one whose contribution in that context is determined by no other value fact. Three theses are defended, which together entail atomism: (1) All objects have their moral value ultimately in virtue of morally fundamental features; (2) (...)
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  4. Daniel Andler, Context: The Case for a Principled Epistemic Particularism.
    The context-sensitivity of many cognitive processes is usually seen as an objective property which we should try to account for and to simulate in computational models. This rests on a mistaken view of inquiry as guided by principles alone. In ethics, exclusive reliance on principles is all but abandoned: the ability to deal with particular cases depends on something more. The same goes for the belief fixation processes involved in communication and other cognitive tasks. The paper defends a mixed model (...)
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  5. Norbert P. Anwander (2003). Book Review: Ulrik Kihlbom, Ethical Particularism. An Essay on Moral Reasons. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (4):451-453.
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  6. Robert L. Arrington (1994). Moral Reasons By Jonathan Dancy. Oxford Blackwell 1993 274 Pp. With Index. £35.00, £14.95 Paper. [REVIEW] Philosophy 69 (267):114-.
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  7. Robert L. Arrington (1994). DANCY, JOHNATHAN Moral Reasons. [REVIEW] Philosophy 69:114.
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  8. Bruce Aune (1986). Jonathan Dancy, Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 6 (8):371-373.
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  9. Bruce Aune (1986). Jonathan Dancy, Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 6:371-373.
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  10. Annette C. Baier (1995). Response to Dancy. Philosophical Books 36 (4):243-245.
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  11. David Bakhurst (2013). Moral Particularism: Ethical Not Metaphysical? In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking About Reasons: Themes From the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press 192.
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  12. David Bakhurst (2007). Pragmatism and Ethical Particularism. In C. J. Misak (ed.), New Pragmatists. Oxford University Press 122.
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  13. David Bakhurst (2005). Particularism and Moral Education. Philosophical Explorations 8 (3):265 – 279.
    Some opponents of ethical particularism complain that particularists cannot give a plausible account of moral education. After considering and rejecting a number of arguments to this conclusion, I focus on the following objection: Particularism, at least in Jonathan Dancy's version, has nothing to say about moral education because it lacks a substantial account of moral competence. By Dancy's own admission, particularists can tell us little more than that a competent agent 'gets things right case by case'. I respond by reflecting (...)
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  14. David Bakhurst (2000). Ethical Particularism in Context. In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral Particularism. Oxford University Press 157--77.
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  15. David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.) (2013). Thinking About Reasons: Themes From the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press.
    Thinking about Reasons collects fourteen new essays on ethics and the philosophy of action, inspired by the work of Jonathan Dancy—one of his generation's most influential moral philosophers.
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  16. John W. Bender (1995). General but Defeasible Reasons in Aesthetic Evaluation: The Particularist/Generalist Dispute. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 53 (4):379-392.
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  17. Anna Bergqvist (2010). Why Sibley is Not a Generalist After All. British Journal of Aesthetics 50 (1):1-14.
    In his influential paper, ‘General Criteria and Reasons in Aesthetics’, Frank Sibley outlines what is taken to be a generalist view (shared with Beardsley) such that there are general reasons for aesthetic judgement, and his account of the behaviour of such reasons, which differs from Beardsley's. In this paper my aim is to illuminate Sibley's position by employing a distinction that has arisen in meta-ethics in response to recent work by Jonathan Dancy in particular. Contemporary research involves two related yet (...)
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  18. Anna Bergqvist (2009). Semantic Particularism and Linguistic Competence. Logique Et Analyse 52 (208):343-361.
    In this paper I examine a contemporary debate about the general notion of linguistic rules and the place of context in determining meaning, which has arisen in the wake of a challenge that the conceptual framework of moral particularism has brought to the table. My aim is to show that particularism in the theory of meaning yields an attractive model of linguistic competence that stands as a genuine alternative to other use-oriented but still generalist accounts that allow room for context-sensitivity (...)
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  19. Selim Berker (2007). Particular Reasons. Ethics 118 (1):109-139.
    Moral particularists argue that because reasons for action are irreducibly context-dependent, the traditional quest in ethics for true and exceptionless moral principles is hopelessly misguided. In making this claim, particularists assume a general framework according to which reasons are the ground floor normative units undergirding all other normative properties and relations. They then argue that there is no cashing out in finite terms either (i) when a given non-normative feature gives rise to a reason for or against action, or (ii) (...)
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  20. Thomas Rawson Birks (1873). First Principles of Moral Science, Lectures.
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  21. Piotr Boltuc (1998). Morality and Propinquity: A General Structure of Moral Particularism. Dissertation, Bowling Green State University
    Special moral reasons, such as partiality toward one's family and friends, have inherent moral value. I accept this claim on the basis of an intuitionistic justification provided by Robert Pargetter. Since different agents may have a different balance of moral reasons, they may face inter-personal moral dilemmas---situations in which two different agents have incompatible moral reasons, all things considered. In extreme situations, solutions of inter-personal moral dilemmas may require resorting to non-moral competitive measures . ;My dissertation is about the structure (...)
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  22. Johan Brännmark (1999). Rules and Exceptions. Theoria 65 (2-3):127-143.
    Over the last decades the traditional emphasis on moral rules, or principles, has been attacked by particularists like Jonathan Dancy. I argue that particularists are correct in rejecting traditional attempts at moral codification, but that it is still possible to have a rule-oriented approach to morality if we distinguish between different ways in which features can be morally relevant. I suggest that there are first a limited number of features that can serve as basic moral reasons for action, and then (...)
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  23. John Bricke (1988). Jonathan Dancy, Berkeley: An Introduction. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 8:89-92.
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  24. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Wide-Scope Requirements and the Ethics of Belief. In Jonathan Matheson & Rico Vitz (eds.), The Ethics of Belief.
    William Kingdon Clifford proposed a vigorous ethics of belief, according to which you are morally prohibited from believing something on insufficient evidence. Though Clifford offers numerous considerations in favor of his ethical theory, the conclusion he wants to draw turns out not to follow from any reasonable assumptions. In fact, I will argue, regardless of how you propose to understand the notion of evidence, it is implausible that we could have a moral obligation to refrain from believing something whenever we (...)
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  25. Campbell Brown (2007). Two Kinds of Holism About Values. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):456–463.
    I compare two kinds of holism about values: G.E. Moore's 'organic unities', and Jonathan Dancy's 'value holism'. I propose a simple formal model for representing evaluations of parts and wholes. I then define two conditions, additivism and invariabilism, which together imply a third, atomism. Since atomism is absurd, we must reject one of the former two conditions. This is where Moore and Dancy part company: whereas Moore rejects additivism, Dancy rejects invariabilism. I argue that Moore's view is more plausible. Invariabilism (...)
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  26. Curtis Brown, Moral Truths and Moral Principles.
    In recent years, a number of moral philosophers have held both that there are particular moral truths, and also that there are no general moral principles which explain these particular moral truths--either because there simply are no moral principles, or because moral principles are themselves explained by or derived from particular moral truths rather than vice versa. Often this combination of doctrines is held by philosophers interested in reviving an Aristotelean approach..
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  27. Faviola Rivera Castro (2000). Moral Principles and Agrement. Critica 32 (94):43-88.
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  28. Bruno Celano (2012). True Exceptions : Defeasibility and Particularism. In Jordi Ferrer Beltrán & Giovanni Battista Ratti (eds.), The Logic of Legal Requirements: Essays on Defeasibility. Oxford University Press 268--287.
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  29. Mar Cello Guarim (2011). Computational Neural Modeling and the Philosophy of Ethics Reflections on the Particularism-Generalism Debate. In M. Anderson S. Anderson (ed.), Machine Ethics. Cambridge Univ. Press
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  30. T. Chan (2002). Jonathan Dancy, Practical Reality. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (1):106-109.
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  31. Timothy Chappell (2005). Review of Jonathan Dancy, Ethics Without Principles. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (7).
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  32. Oliver Conolly & Bashshar Haydar (2005). Irreversible Generalism: A Reply to Dickie. British Journal of Aesthetics 45 (3):289-295.
    Irreversible generalism, the view that reasons given for the evaluation of art are general and do not admit of exceptions, is defended from the criticisms levelled against it by George Dickie in ‘Reading Sibley’. The authors' view that Frank Sibley adhered to a form of reversible generalism, the view that reasons given for the evaluation of art are general but can sometimes become reasons to disvalue artworks, according to which there a criterion for distinguishing valenced from neutral aesthetic properties, is (...)
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  33. Oliver Conolly & Bashshar Haydar (2003). Aesthetic Principles. British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (2):114-125.
    We give reasons for our judgements of works of art. (2) Reasons are inherently general, and hence dependent on principles. (3) There are no principles of aesthetic evaluation. Each of these three propositions seems plausible, yet one of them must be false. Illusionism denies (1). Particularism denies (2). Generalism denies (3). We argue that illusionism depends on an unacceptable account of the use of critical language. Particularism cannot account for the connection between reasons and verdicts in criticism. Generalism comes in (...)
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  34. David Copp (ed.) (2005). Particularism and Antitheory. Oxford University Press.
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  35. David Copp (1994). Review of Moral Reasons. [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 35 (3):197-199.
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  36. Roger Crisp (2007). Ethics Without Reasons? Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):40-49.
    This paper is a discussion of Jonathan Dancy's book Ethics Without Principles (2004). Holism about reasons is distinguished into a weak version, which allows for invariant reasons, and a strong, which doesn't. Four problems with Dancy's arguments for strong holism are identified. (1) A plausible particularism based on it will be close to generalism. (2) Dancy rests his case on common-sense morality, without justifying it. (3) His examples are of non-ultimate reasons. (4) There are certain universal principles it is hard (...)
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  37. Roger Crisp (2000). Particularizing Particularism. In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral Particularism. Oxford University Press 23--47.
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  38. A. M. Crofts (1960). Moral Philosophy its General Principles. Dominican Publications.
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  39. M. B. Crowe (1961). Principles of Moral Philosophy. Philosophical Studies 11 (2):320-321.
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  40. G. Cullity, Particularism and Presumptive Reasons.
    Weak particularism about reasons is the view that the normative valency of some descriptive considerations varies, while others have an invariant normative valency. A defence of this view needs to respond to arguments that a consideration cannot count in favour of any action unless it counts in favour of every action. But it cannot resort to a global holism about reasons, if it claims that there are some examples of invariant valency. This paper argues for weak particularism, and presents a (...)
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  41. Garrett Cullity (2002). Particularism and Moral Theory: Particularism and Presumptive Reasons: Garrett Cullity. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):169–190.
    Weak particularism about reasons is the view that the normative valency of some descriptive considerations varies, while others have an invariant normative valency. A defence of this view needs to respond to arguments that a consideration cannot count in favour of any action unless it counts in favour of every action. But it cannot resort to a global holism about reasons, if it claims that there are some examples of invariant valency. This paper argues for weak particularism, and presents a (...)
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  42. Garrett Cullity & Richard Holton (2002). Particularism and Moral Theory. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76:169 - 209.
    [Garrett Cullity] Weak particularism about reasons is the view that the normative valency of some descriptive considerations varies, while others have an invariant normative valency. A defence of this view needs to respond to arguments that a consideration cannot count in favour of any action unless it counts in favour of every action. But it cannot resort to a global holism about reasons, if it claims that there are some examples of invariant valency. This paper argues for weak particularism, and (...)
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  43. Jonathan Dancy (2009). Moral Particularism. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University
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  44. Jonathan Dancy (2007). Defending the Right. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):85-98.
    In this paper I consider what might be my best response to various difficulties and challenges that emerged at a conference held at the University of Kent in December 2004, the contributions to which are given in the same volume. I comment on Crisp's distinction between ultimate and non-ultimate reasons, and reply to McKeever and Ridge on default reasons, and to Norman on the idea of a reason for action. I don't here consider what other particularists might want to say; (...)
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  45. Jonathan Dancy (2006). What Do Reasons Do? In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Southern Journal of Philosophy. Oxford University Press 95-113.
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  46. Jonathan Dancy (2005). The Particularist's Progress. In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer 325--347.
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  47. Jonathan Dancy (2004). Ethics Without Principles. Oxford University Press.
    In this much-anticipated book, Jonathan Dancy offers the only available full-scale treatment of particularism in ethics, a view with which he has been associated for twenty years. Dancy now presents particularism as the view that the possibility of moral thought and judgement does not in any way depend on an adequate supply of principles. He grounds this claim on a form of reasons-holism, holding that what is a reason in one case need not be any reason in another, and maintaining (...)
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  48. Jonathan Dancy (2000). The Particularist's Progress. In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral Particularism. Clarendon Press
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  49. Jonathan Dancy (1999). Can a Particularist Learn the Difference Between Right and Wrong? The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1:59-72.
    This paper is an attempt to answer the charge that extreme moral particularism is unable to explain the possibility of moral concepts and our ability to acquire them. This charge is based on the claim that we acquire moral concepts from experience of instances, and that the sorts of similarities that there must be between the instances are ones that only a generalist can countenance. I argue that this inference is unsound.
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  50. Jonathan Dancy (1999). Defending Particularism. Metaphilosophy 30 (1&2):25-32.
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