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Moral Phenomena

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  1. Elisa Aaltola (2007). The Moral Value of Animals. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 3:219-225.
    Altruism has often been thought to be the reason we treat animals with a certain moral respect. Animals are not moral agents who could reciprocally honour our well being, and because of this duties toward them are considered to be based on other-directed motivations. Altruism is a vague notion, and in the context of animals can be divided into at least three different alternatives. The first one equates altruism with benevolence or "kindness"; the second one argues altruism is based on (...)
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  2. Julia Tanner (2002). Value, Respect and Attachment (Book Review). [REVIEW] Philosophical Writings (21).
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Desert
  1. Linda F. Annis (1986). Merit Pay, Utilitarianism, and Desert. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 3 (1):33-41.
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  2. Gustaf Arrhenius (2003). Feldman's Desert-Adjusted Utilitarianism and Population Ethics. Utilitas 15 (02):225-.
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  3. Brenda M. Baker (1997). Improving Our Practice of Sentencing. Utilitas 9 (01):99-.
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  4. Kimberley Brownlee (2006). Serena Olsaretti (Ed.), Desert and Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Pp. Xi + 269. Utilitas 18 (04):449-.
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  5. Erik Carlson (1997). Consequentialism, Distribution and Desert. Utilitas 9 (03):307-.
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  6. Peter Celello (2009). Against Desert as a Forward-Looking Concept. Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (2):144-159.
    Fred Feldman and, more recently, David Schmidtz have challenged the standard view that a person's desert is based strictly on past and present facts about him. I argue that Feldman's attempt to overturn this 'received wisdom' about desert's temporal orientation is unsuccessful, since his examples do not establish that what a person deserves now can be based on what will occur in the future. In addition, his forward-looking account introduces an unnecessary asymmetry regarding desert's temporal orientation in different contexts. Schmidtz (...)
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  7. Anthony Ellis (1997). Punishment and the Principle of Fair Play. Utilitas 9 (01):81-.
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  8. Fred Feldman (1996). Responsibility as a Condition for Desert. Mind 105 (417):165-168.
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  9. Fred Feldman (1995). Desert: Reconsideration of Some Received Wisdom. Mind 104 (413):63-77.
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  10. Robert Johnson, Merit /.
    A few pages into the Groundwork Kant claims that only actions from duty have moral worth.ii Even though as an aside he also says that a dutiful action from sympathy or honor, though lacking in moral worth, "deserves praise and encouragement", it is tempting not to take him very seriously. One suspects that he regards this praise as only a poor and morally insignificant cousin of the esteem reserved for actions from duty. In the end, it seems hard to avoid (...)
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  11. Matt King, Moral Responsibility and Merit.
    In the contemporary moral responsibility debate, most theorists seem to be giving accounts of responsibility “in the desert-entailing sense”. This distinguishes it from causal or legal responsibility and draws it closer to our other moral concepts. Moral responsibility and desert are natural partners: morally responsible agents can be blameworthy and praiseworthy; they can deserve blame and praise. This convergence on responsibility “in the desert-entailing sense” is a welcome development, for it helps secure competing accounts as rival accounts, a status that (...)
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  12. Howard Simmons, Sher on Blame.
    My subject is the theory of blame recently propounded by George Sher in his book, In Praise of Blame. I argue that although Sher has succeeded in capturing a number of genuine features of the concept of blame, there is an important element that he has omitted, which is the fact that necessarily, when A blames B for something and expresses this to B, A will realise that B is likely to find this unpleasant. The inclusion of the latter element (...)
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  13. Howard Simmons (2010). Moral Desert: A Critique. University Press of America.
    This book argues that moral desert should be excluded as a consideration in normative and applied ethics, as it is likely that no-one ever morally deserves anything for their actions and, if they do, it is in most cases impossible to know what. I also explain how moral deliberation in relation to punishment, distributive justice and personal morality can proceed without appeals to moral desert.
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  14. Bradford Skow (forthcoming). How to Adjust Utility for Desert. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-23.
    Welfarism says that the value of a possible world is got by taking the numbers that measures each person's welfare level---how good that person's life is for them---and adding them up. But welfarism is false. Instead, the value of a possible world should also depend on how deserving the people in that world are. But how are we to use facts about welfare and about desert to compute the values of possible worlds? There appear to be too many ways to (...)
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  15. Roger Wertheimer (1983). Understanding Retribution. Criminal Justice Ethics 2 (2):19-38.
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  1. Lawrence Alexander (1984). Another Look at Moral Blackmail. Philosophy Research Archives 10:189-196.
    In this paper I describe cases of moral blackmail as cases where A is told by B that if A does not commit an otherwise immoral act, B will commit an immoral act of equal or greater gravity. I describe cases of moral dilemma as cases where A must commit an otherwise immoral act to avert a natural disaster of equal or greater gravity. I then argue that cases of moral blackmail are structurally identical to cases of moral dilemma in (...)
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  2. Carl Baker (2011). Expressivism and Moral Dilemmas: A Response to Marino. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (4):445-455.
    Simon Blackburn’s expressivist logic of attitudes aims to explain how we can use non-assertoric moral judgements in logically valid arguments. Patricia Marino has recently argued that Blackburn’s logic faces a dilemma: either it cannot account for the place of moral dilemmas in moral reasoning or, if it can, it makes an illicit distinction between two different kinds of moral dilemma. Her target is the logic’s definition of validity as satisfiability, according to which validity requires an avoidance of attitudinal inconsistency. Against (...)
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  3. Patricia Greenspan (1995). Practical Guilt: Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms. Oxford University Press.
    In its treatment of the role of emotion in ethics the argument of the book outlines a new way of packing motivational force into moral meaning that allows for a ...
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  4. Matthew Hanser (1999). Killing, Letting Die and Preventing People From Being Saved. Utilitas 11 (03):277-.
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  5. Carol Gibb Harding (1985/2010). Moral Dilemmas and Ethical Reasoning. Transaction Publishers.
    This book deals with moral dilemmas and the development of ethical reasoning in two senses.
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  6. D. W. Haslett (2011). Boulders and Trolleys. Utilitas 23 (03):268-287.
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  7. Bashshar Haydar (2010). The Consequences of Rejecting the Moral Relevance of the Doing–Allowing Distinction. Utilitas 22 (2):222-227.
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  8. Daniel Holbrook (1994). Lincoln Allison, Ecology and Utility: The Philosophical Dilemmas of Planetary Management, Leicester University Press, 1991, Pp. 185. Utilitas 6 (01):145-.
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  9. Thaddeus Metz (2001). Review of Heidi Hurd, Moral Combat. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 110 (3):434-436.
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  10. Alex Rajczi (2002). When Can One Requirement Override Another? Philosophical Studies 108 (3):309 - 326.
    I argue that any theory of moral obligation must be able toexplain two things: why we cannot be thrust into a moraldilemma through no fault of our own, and why we can get intoa moral dilemma through our own negligence. The most intuitivetheory of moral obligation cannot do so. However, I offer atheory of moral obligation that satisfies both of these criteria,one that is founded on the principle that if you are required todo something, then you would be blameworthy for (...)
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  11. Luke Robinson (forthcoming). A Dispositional Account of Conflicts of Obligation. Noûs.
    I address a question in moral metaphysics: How are conflicts between moral obligations possible? I begin by explaining why we cannot give a satisfactory answer to this question simply by positing that such conflicts are conflicts between rules, principles, or reasons. I then develop and defend the “Dispositional Account,” which posits that conflicts between moral obligations are conflicts between the manifestations of obligating dispositions (obligating powers, capacities, etc.), just as conflicts between physical forces are conflicts between the manifestations of (certain) (...)
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  12. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (1987). Moral Realisms and Moral Dilemmas. Journal of Philosophy 84 (5):263-276.
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  13. Peter Vallentyne, “Moral Dilemmas and Comparative Conceptions of Morality”, Southern Journal of Philosophy XXX.
    In recent years the problem of moral dilemmas has received the attention of a number of philosophers. Some authors[i] argue that moral dilemmas are not conceptually possible because they are ruled out by certain valid principles of deontic logic. Other authors[ii] insist that moral dilemmas are conceptually possible, and argue that therefore the principles of deontic logic that rule them out must be rejected.
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  14. Peter Vallentyne (1989). Two Types of Moral Dilemmas. Erkenntnis 30 (3):301 - 318.
    In recent years the question of whether moral dilemmas are conceptually possible has received a fair amount of attention. In arguing for or against the conceptual possibility of moral dilemmas authors have been almost exclusively concerned with obligation dilemmas, i.e., situations in which more than one action is obligatory. Almost no one has been concerned with prohibition dilemmas, i.e., situations in which no feasible actions is permissible. I argue that the two types of dilemmas are distinct, and that a much (...)
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The Trolley Problem
  1. Michael J. Costa (1986). The Trolley Problem Revisited. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (4):437-449.
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  2. Ezio Di Nucci (forthcoming). Self-Sacrifice and the Trolley Problem. Philosophical Psychology.
    Judith Jarvis Thomson has recently proposed a new argument for the thesis that killing the one in the Trolley Problem is not permissible. Her argument relies on the introduction of a new scenario in which the bystander may also sacrifice herself to save the five. Thomson argues that those not willing to sacrifice themselves if they could may not kill the one to save the five. Bryce Huebner and Marc Hauser have recently put Thomson’s argument to the empirical test by (...)
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  3. Michael Gorr (1990). Thomson and the Trolley Problem. Philosophical Studies 59 (1):91 - 100.
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  4. Adam Kolber (2009). The Organ Conscription Trolley Problem. American Journal of Bioethics 9 (8):13-14.
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  5. Alessandro Lanteri, Chiara Chelini & Salvatore Rizzello (2008). An Experimental Investigation of Emotions and Reasoning in the Trolley Problem. Journal of Business Ethics 83 (4):789 - 804.
    Elaborating on the notions that humans possess different modalities of decision-making and that these are often influenced by moral considerations, we conducted an experimental investigation of the Trolley Problem. We presented the participants with two standard scenarios (‹lever’ and ‹stranger’) either in the usual or in reversed order. We observe that responses to the lever scenario, which result from (moral) reasoning, are affected by our manipulation; whereas responses to the stranger scenario, triggered by moral emotions, are unaffected. Furthermore, when asked (...)
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  6. Margery Bedford Naylor (1988). The Moral of the Trolley Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (4):711-722.
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  7. Michael Otsuka, Double-Effect, Triple-Effect, and the Trolley Problem.
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  8. Michael Otsuka (2008). Double Effect, Triple Effect and the Trolley Problem: Squaring the Circle in Looping Cases. Utilitas 20 (1):92-110.
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  9. Guido Pincione (2007). The Trolley Problem as a Problem for Libertarians. Utilitas 19 (4):407-429.
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  10. B. C. Postow (1989). Thomson and the Trolley Problem. Southern Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):529-537.
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  11. Alexander Rosenberg (1992). Contractarianism and the "Trolley" Problem. Journal of Social Philosophy 23 (3):88-104.
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  12. C. L. Sheng (1995). A Suggested Solution to the Trolley Problem. Journal of Social Philosophy 26 (1):203-217.
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  13. Alec D. Walen & David Wasserman, The Mechanics of Hohfeldian Rights, Featuring a Case Study of Judith Jarvis Thomson on the Trolley Problem.
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Moral Dilemmas, Misc
  1. Carla Bagnoli (2007). Phenomenology of the Aftermath: Ethical Theory and the Intelligibility of Moral Experience. In Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.), New Trends in Moral Psychology. Kluwer.
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  2. Dirk Baltzly (2000). Moral Dilemmas Are Not a Local Issue. Philosophy 75 (2):245-263.
    It is sometimes claimed that the Kantian Ought Implies Can principle (OIC) rules out the possibility of moral dilemmas. A certain understanding of OIC does rule out the possibility of moral dilemmas in the sense defined. However I doubt that this particular formulation of the OIC principle is one that fits well with the eudaimonist framework common to ancient Greek moral philosophy. In what follows, I explore the reasons why Aristotle would not accept the OIC principle in the form in (...)
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  3. Patricia S. Greenspan (1983). Moral Dilemmas and Guilt. Philosophical Studies 43 (1):117 - 125.
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  4. Guy Kahane, Katja Wiech, Nicholas Shackel, Miguel Farias, Julian Savulescu & Irene Tracey (forthcoming). The Neural Basis of Intuitive and Counterintuitive Moral Judgement. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience.
    Neuroimaging studies on moral decision-making have thus far largely focused on differences between moral judgments with opposing utilitarian (well-being maximizing) and deontological (duty-based) content. However, these studies have investigated moral dilemmas involving extreme situations, and did not control for two distinct dimensions of moral judgment: whether or not it is intuitive (immediately compelling to most people) and whether it is utilitarian or deontological in content. By contrasting dilemmas where utilitarian judgments are counterintuitive with dilemmas in which they are intuitive, we (...)
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  5. Antti Kauppinen, The Self-Enforcing Lottery.
    There are many conceivable circumstances in which some people have to be sacrificed in order to give others a chance to survive. The fair and rational method of selection is a lottery with equal chances. But why should losers comply, when they have nothing to lose in a war of all against all? A novel solution to this Compliance Problem is proposed. The lottery must be made self-enforcing by making the lots themselves the means of enforcement of the outcome. This (...)
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  6. Patricia Marino (2001). Moral Dilemmas, Collective Responsibility, and Moral Progress. Philosophical Studies 104 (2):203 - 225.
    Ruth Marcus has offered an account of moral dilemmas in which the presence of dilemmas acts as a motivating force, pushing us to try to minimize predicaments of moral conflict. In this paper, I defend a Marcus-style account of dilemmas against two objections: first, that if dilemmas are real, we are forced to blame those who have done their best, and second, that in some cases, even a stripped down version of blame seems inappropriate. My account highlights the importance of (...)
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  7. John R. Welch (2007). Vagueness and Inductive Molding. Synthese 154 (1):147 - 172.
    Vagueness is epistemic, according to some. Vagueness is ontological, according to others. This article deploys what I take to be a compromise position. Predicates are coined in specific contexts for specific purposes, but these limited practices do not automatically fix the extensions of predicates over the domain of all objects. The linguistic community using the predicate has rarely considered, much less decided, all questions that might arise about the predicate’s extension. To this extent, the ontological view is correct. But a (...)
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Moral Luck
  1. John P. Anderson (1997). Sophie's Choice. Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):439-450.
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  2. Nafsika Athanassoulis (2005). Common-Sense Virtue Ethics and Moral Luck. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (3):265 - 276.
    Moral luck poses a problem for out conception of responsibility because it highlights a tension between morality and lack of control. Michael Slote’s common-sense virtue ethics claims to avoid this problem. However there are a number of objections to this claim. Firstly, it is not clear that Slote fully appreciates the problem posed by moral luck. Secondly, Slote’s move from the moral to the ethical is problematic. Thirdly it is not clear why we should want to abandon judgements of moral (...)
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  3. Nathan Ballantyne (forthcoming). Luck and Interests. Synthese.
    Recent work on the nature of luck widely endorses the thesis that an event is good or bad luck for an individual only if it is significant for that individual. In this paper, I explore this thesis, showing that it raises questions about interests, well-being, and the philosophical uses of luck. In Sect. 1, I examine several accounts of significance, due to Pritchard (2005), Coffman (2007), and Rescher (1995). Then in Sect. 2 I consider what some theorists want to ‘do’ (...)
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  4. Thomas Bittner (2008). Punishment for Criminal Attempts: A Legal Perspective on the Problem of Moral Luck. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (1):pp. 51-83.
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  5. E. J. Bond (1983). Moral Luck By Bernard Williams Cambridge University Press, 1981, Xiii + 173 Pp., £16.50. Philosophy 58 (226):544-.
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  6. Luc Bovens (1998). Moral Luck, Photojournalism, and Pornography. Journal of Value Inquiry 32 (2):205-217.
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  7. Peter Breiner (1989). Democratic Autonomy, Political Ethics, and Moral Luck. Political Theory 17 (4):550-574.
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  8. Berit Brogaard (2003). Epistemological Contextualism and the Problem of Moral Luck. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):351–370.
    We have a strong intuition that a person’s moral standing should not be affected by luck, but the fact is that we do blame a morally unfortunate person more than her fortunate counterpart. This is the problem of moral luck. I argue that the problem arises because account is not taken of the fact that the extension of the term ‘blame’ is contextually determined. Loosely speaking, the more likely an act is to have an undesirable consequence, the more its agent (...)
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  9. Brynmor Browne (1992). A Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168):345-356.
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  10. Claudia Card (1998). Stoicism, Evil, and the Possibility of Morality. Metaphilosophy 29 (4):245-253.
    Martha Nussbaum's work has been characterized by a sustained critique of Stoic ethics, insofar as that ethics denies the validity and importance of our valuing things that elude our control. This essay explores the idea that the very possibility of morality, understood as social or interpersonal ethics, presupposes that we do value such things. If my argument is right, Stoic ethics is unable to recognize the validity of morality (so understood) but can at most acknowledge duties to oneself. A further (...)
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  11. E. J. Coffman (2011). How (Not) to Attack the Luck Argument. Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):157-166.
    The Luck Argument is among the most influential objections to the main brand of libertarianism about metaphysical freedom and moral responsibility. In his work, Alfred Mele [2006. Free will and luck . Oxford: Oxford University Press] develops - and then attempts to defeat - the literature's most promising version of the Luck Argument. After explaining Mele's version of the Luck Argument, I present two objections to his novel reply to the argument. I argue for the following two claims: (1) Mele's (...)
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  12. David W. Concepcion (2002). Moral Luck, Control, and the Bases of Desert. Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4).
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  13. Margaret Urban Coyne (1985). Moral Luck? Journal of Value Inquiry 19 (4).
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  14. R. Crisp (1993). Moral Luck in Medical Ethics and Practical Politics. Journal of Medical Ethics 19 (4):242-243.
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  15. Darren Domsky (2005). Tossing the Rotten Thing Out: Eliminating Bad Reasons Not to Solve the Problem of Moral Luck. Philosophy 80 (4):531-541.
    Solving the problem of moral luck—the problem of dealing with conflicting intuitions about whether moral blameworthiness varies with luck in cases of negligence—is like repairing a dented fender in front of two kinds of critic. The one keeps telling you that there is no dent, and the other sees the dent but keeps warning you that repairing it will do more harm than good. It is time to straighten things out. As I argue elsewhere, the solution to the problem of (...)
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  16. David Enoch (2010). Cognitive Biases and Moral Luck. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (3):372-386.
    Some of the recent philosophical literature on moral luck attempts to make headway in the moral-luck debate by employing the resources of empirical psychology, in effect arguing that some of the intuitive judgments relevant to the moral-luck debate are best explained - and so presumably explained away - as the output of well-documented cognitive biases. We argue that such attempts are empirically problematic, and furthermore that even if they were not, it is still not at all clear what philosophical significance (...)
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  17. David Enoch (2010). Moral Luck and the Law. Philosophy Compass 5 (1):42-54.
    Is there a difference in moral blameworthiness between a murderer and an attempted murderer? Should there be a legal difference between them? These questions are particular instances of the question of moral luck and legal luck (respectively). In this paper, I survey and explain the main argumentative moves within the general philosophical discussion of moral luck. I then discuss legal luck, and the different ways in which this discussion may be related to that of moral luck.
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  18. David Enoch & Andrei Marmor (2007). The Case Against Moral Luck. Law and Philosophy 26 (4):405-436.
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  19. Christopher Evan Franklin (2011). Farewell to the Luck (and Mind) Argument. Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.
    In this paper I seek to defend libertarianism about free will and moral responsibility against two well-known arguments: the luck argument and the Mind argument. Both of these arguments purport to show that indeterminism is incompatible with the degree of control necessary for free will and moral responsibility. I begin the discussion by elaborating these arguments, clarifying important features of my preferred version of libertarianism—features that will be central to an adequate response to the arguments—and showing why a strategy of (...)
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  20. Anca Gheaus (2009). How Much of What Matters Can We Redistribute? Love, Justice, and Luck. Hypatia 24 (4):68-90.
    By meeting needs for individualized love and relatedness, the care we receive deeply shapes our social and economic chances and therefore represents a form of luck. Hence, distributive justice requires a fair distribution of care in society. I look at different ways of ensuring this and argue that full redistribution of care is beyond our reach. I conclude that a strong individual morality informed by an ethics of care is a necessary complement of well-designed institutions.
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  21. John Greco (1995). A Second Paradox Concerning Responsibility and Luck. Metaphilosophy 26 (1-2):81-96.
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  22. Ishtiyaque Haji (2003). Alternative Possibilities, Luck, and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 7 (3):253-275.
    I first question whether genuinealternatives are necessary for moralresponsibility by assessing the assumption thataccessibility to such alternatives is vital tohaving the kind of control required forresponsibility. I next suggest that theavailability of genuine alternatives courtsproblems of responsibility-subverting luck foran important class of libertarian theories. Isummarize one such problem and respond torecent replies it has elicited. I then proposethat if this ``luck objection'''' against theidentified class of libertarian theories ispersuasive, a similar objection appears toafflict compatibilist theories as well.Finally, I show that (...)
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  23. David Sanford Horner (forthcoming). Moral Luck and Computer Ethics: Gauguin in Cyberspace. Ethics and Information Technology.
    I argue that the problem of ‘moral luck’ is an unjustly neglected topic within Computer Ethics. This is unfortunate given that the very nature of computer technology, its ‘logical malleability’, leads to ever greater levels of complexity, unreliability and uncertainty. The ever widening contexts of application in turn lead to greater scope for the operation of chance and the phenomenon of moral luck. Moral luck bears down most heavily on notions of professional responsibility, the identification and attribution of responsibility. It (...)
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  24. S. L. Hurley (2003). Justice, Luck, and Knowledge. Harvard University Press.
    S. L. Hurley's ambitious work brings these two areas of lively debate into overdue contact with each other.
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  25. Vassilios N. Kazakidis & Rachel F. C. Haliburton (1998). The Mining Engineer, Moral Luck, and Professional Accountability. Science and Engineering Ethics 4 (4):437-456.
    The professional mining engineer has a number of different duties. He must: produce engineering designs, meet the production requirements set by the mining operation he works for, ensure efficient cooperation between the different departments in a mine, and he is responsible for mine planning. Also, and very importantly, he is responsible for meeting high safety standards and ensuring that his mine is as injury and fatality free as possible. However, it is unfortunately the case that accidents do occur in mines, (...)
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  26. Matthew King (2008). The Glass Shatters and Ducks Turn Into Rabbits: Bad Faith and Moral Luck. Dialogue 47 (3-4):583-.
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  27. Andrew Latus, Moral Luck. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  28. Brian Leftow (2005). No Best World: Moral Luck. Religious Studies 41 (2):165-181.
    William Rowe and others argue that if ours is a possible world than which there is a better, it follows that God does not exist. If this is correct, then if there is no best possible world, it is not so much as possible that God exist. I reject the key premise of Rowe's argument. The key to seeing that it is false, I suggest, is seeing that God is subject to something fairly called moral luck. In this first part (...)
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  29. Alex Long (2007). Lucan and Moral Luck. The Classical Quarterly 57 (01):183-.
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  30. Alasdair MacIntyre (1983). The Magic in the Pronoun "My":Moral Luck. Bernard Williams. Ethics 94 (1):113-.
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  31. Christine Mckinnon (2007). Morality, Moral Luck and Responsibility: Fortune's Web - By Nafsika Athanassoulis. Philosophical Books 48 (1):88-90.
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  32. Carolyn McLeod & Julie Ponesse (2008). Infertility and Moral Luck: The Politics of Women Blaming Themselves for Infertility. International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 1 (1):126 - 144.
    Infertility can be an agonizing experience, especially for women. And, much of the agony has to do with luck: with how unlucky one is in being infertile, and in how much luck is involved in determining whether one can weather the storm of infertility and perhaps have a child in the end. We argue that bad luck associated with being infertile is often bad moral luck for women. The infertile woman often blames herself or is blamed by others for what (...)
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  33. Gregory Mellema (1997). Moral Luck and Collectives. Journal of Social Philosophy 28 (3):144-152.
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  34. Christopher Michaelson (2008). Moral Luck and Business Ethics. Journal of Business Ethics 83 (4):773 - 787.
    Moral luck – which seems to appear when circumstances beyond a person’s control influence our moral attributions of praise and blame – is troubling in that modern moral theory has supposed morality to be immune to luck. In business, moral luck commonly influences our moral judgments, many of which have economic consequences that cannot be reversed. The possibility that the chance intervention of luck could influence the way in which we assign moral accountability in business ethics is unsettling. This paper (...)
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  35. A. W. Moore (1990). A Kantian View of Moral Luck. Philosophy 65 (253):297 - 321.
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  36. Dana K. Nelkin, Moral Luck.
    Moral luck occurs when an agent can be correctly treated as an object of moral judgment despite the fact that a significant aspect of what she is assessed for depends on factors beyond her control. Bernard Williams writes, “when I first introduced the expression moral luck , I expected to suggest an oxymoron” (Williams 1993, 251). Indeed, immunity from luck has been thought by many to be part of the very essence of morality. And yet, as Williams (1981) and Thomas (...)
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  37. Anita R. Noguera (2000). Mad, Sad or Bad. Moral Luck and Michael Stone. Nursing Philosophy 1 (2):158-168.
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  38. A. T. Nuyen (2008). Moral Luck, Role-Based Ethics and the Punishment of Attempts. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (1):59-69.
    In most countries, failed criminal attempts are punished less severely than those that succeed. Many philosophers, including myself, have argued that differential punishment can be justified. However, in a recent paper, Hanna raises objections to defenses of differential punishment, claiming that such policy goes against our “desert intuitions” and also cannot be justified on utilitarian grounds. I argue in this paper that Hanna’s desert-based and utilitarian objections can be undermined. Further, they are valid only within moral theories that take the (...)
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  39. Michael Otsuka (2009). Moral Luck: Optional, Not Brute. Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):373-388.
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  40. Joseph Raz, Responsibility & the Negligence Standard.
    The paper has dual aim: to analyse the structure of negligence, and to use it to offer an explanation of responsibility (for actions, omissions, consequences) in terms of the relations which must exist between the action (omission, etc.) and the agents powers of rational agency if the agent is responsible for the action. The discussion involves reflections on the relations between the law and the morality of negligence, the difference between negligence and strict liability, the role of excuses and the (...)
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  41. Joseph Raz, Agency and Luck.
    Advancing an account of responsibility which is based on the functioning of our rational capacities, the paper revisits some central aspects of the moral luck puzzle. It proposes a new variant of Williams’ agent-regret, but concludes that its scope does not coincide with cases of moral luck. It then distinguishes different ways in which the factors beyond our control feature in our engagement with the world which show how the guidance principle (we are responsible for actions guided by our rational (...)
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  42. Brian Rosebury (2009). Reply to Silcox on Moral Luck. Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (1):109-113.
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  43. Brian Rosebury (1995). Moral Responsibility and "Moral Luck". Philosophical Review 104 (4):499-524.
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  44. Sergi Rosell, On an Attempt to Undermine Reason-Responsive Compatibilism by Appealing to Moral Luck. Reply to Gerald K. Harrison.
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  45. Edward Royzman & Rahul Kumar (2004). Is Consequential Luck Morally Inconsequential? Empirical Psychology and the Reassessment of Moral Luck. Ratio 17 (3):329–344.
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  46. Paul Russell (1999). Smith on Moral Sentiment and Moral Luck. History of Philosophy Quarterly 16 (1):37 - 58.
    Such is the effect of the good or bad consequences of actions upon the sentiments both of the person who performs them, and of others; and thus, Fortune, which governs the world, has some influence where we should be least willing to allow her any, and directs in some measure the sentiments of mankind, with regard to the character and conduct both of themselves and others.
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  47. Zena Ryder (2001). Moral Luck and Moral Insurance. Dialogue 40 (04):791-.
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  48. Anders Schinkel (2009). The Problem of Moral Luck: An Argument Against its Epistemic Reduction. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (3):267 - 277.
    Whom I call ‘epistemic reductionists’ in this article are critics of the notion of ‘moral luck’ that maintain that all supposed cases of moral luck are illusory; they are in fact cases of what I describe as a special form of epistemic luck, the only difference lying in what we get to know about someone, rather than in what (s)he deserves in terms of praise or blame. I argue that epistemic reductionists are mistaken. They implausibly separate judgements of character from (...)
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  49. Re'em Segev (2008). Responsibility and Moral Luck: Comments on Benjamin Zipursky, 'Two Dimensions of Responsibility in Crime, Tort, and Moral Luck'. Theoretical Inquiries in Law Forum 9 (1):39-46.
    The essence of the moral luck question is whether the responsibility of persons is determined only in light of actions that are within their control or also in light of factors, such as the consequences of their actions, which are beyond their control. Most people seem to have contrasting intuitions regarding this question. On the one hand, there is a common intuition that the responsibility of persons should be judged only in light of what is within their control. On the (...)
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