This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
72 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 72
  1. Joaquín Jareño Alarcón (2006). Value Pluralism and Valuable Pluralism. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:91-95.
    One of the most influential ideas in recent discussions in political philosophy and philosophy of values has been Isaiah Berlin's value pluralism. Given that different ways of living embody different applications of values, it is really difficult to talk about objectivity in the domain of morals. But if we reject the existence of criteria that allow us to judge among different moral proposals, we are led to recognize the prejudiced character of our convictions: their ethnocentric character. In my opinion, this (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Robin Attfield (2003). Biocentric Consequentialism, Pluralism, and 'The Minimax Implication': A Reply to Alan Carter. Utilitas 15 (01):76-.
    Alan Carter's recent review in Mind of my Ethics of the Global Environment combines praise of biocentric consequentialism (as presented there and in Value, Obligation and Meta-Ethics) with criticisms that it could advocate both minimal satisfaction of human needs and the extinction of for the sake of generating extra people; Carter also maintains that as a monistic theory it is predictably inadequate to cover the full range of ethical issues, since only a pluralistic theory has this capacity. In this reply, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Guy Axtell, Utilitarianism and Dewey's “Three Independent Factors in Morals”.
    The centennial of Dewey & Tuft’s Ethics (1908) provides a timely opportunity to reflect both on Dewey’s intellectual debt to utilitarian thought, and on his critique of it. In this paper I examine Dewey’s assessment of utilitarianism, but also his developing view of the good (ends; consequences), the right (rules; obligations) and the virtuous (approbations; standards) as “three independent factors in morals.” This doctrine (found most clearly in the 2nd edition of 1932) as I argue in the last sections, has (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Selim Berker (2007). Particular Reasons. Ethics 118 (1):109-139.
    Moral particularists argue that because reasons for action are irreducibly context-dependent, the traditional quest in ethics for true and exceptionless moral principles is hopelessly misguided. In making this claim, particularists assume a general framework according to which reasons are the ground floor normative units undergirding all other normative properties and relations. They then argue that there is no cashing out in finite terms either (i) when a given non-normative feature gives rise to a reason for or against action, or (ii) (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. R. Blackford (2009). Moral Pluralism Versus the Total View: Why Singer is Wrong About Radical Life Extension. Journal of Medical Ethics 35 (12):747-752.
    Peter Singer has argued that we should not proceed with a hypothetical life-extension drug, based on a scenario in which developing the drug would fail to achieve the greatest sum of happiness over time. However, this is the wrong test. If we ask, more simply, which policy would be more benevolent, we reach a different conclusion from Singer’s: even given his (admittedly questionable) scenario, development of the drug should go ahead. Singer’s rigorous utilitarian position pushes him in the direction of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Richard Boyd (1997). Frank H. Knight and Ethical Pluralism. Critical Review 11 (4):519-536.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Jeffrey Brand-ballard (2007). Why One Basic Principle? Utilitas 19 (2):220-242.
    Principle monists believe that our moral duties, such as fidelity and non-maleficence, can be justified in terms of one basic moral principle. Principle pluralists disagree, some suggesting that only an excessive taste for simplicity or a desire to mimic natural science could lead one to endorse monism. In Ideal Code, Real World (Oxford, 2000), Brad Hooker defends a monist theory, employing the method of reflective equilibrium to unify the moral duties under a version of rule consequentialism. Hooker's arguments have drawn (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Thom Brooks (ed.) (2011). New Waves in Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan.
    New Waves in Ethics brings together the leading future figures in ethics broadly construed, with essays ranging from meta-ethics and normative ethics to applied ethics and political philosophy. Topics include new work on experimental philosophy, feminism, and global justice, incorporating perspectives informed from historical and contemporary approaches alike. An ideal collection for anyone interested in the most important debates in ethics and political philosophy, as well as those with an interest in the latest significant contributions from the leading new generation (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Vittorio Bufacchi (2010). Beyond Unity in Plurality: Rethinking the Pluralist Legacy. Contemporary Political Theory 9 (4):458-476.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. J. Baird Callicott (1990). The Case Against Moral Pluralism. Environmental Ethics 12 (2):99-124.
    Despite Christopher Stone’s recent argument on behalf of moral pluralism, the principal architects of environmental ethics remain committed to moral monism. Moral pluralism fails to specify what to do when two or more of its theories indicate inconsistent practical imperatives. More deeply, ethical theories are embedded in moral philosophies and moral pluralism requires us to shift between mutually inconsistent metaphysics of morals, most of which are no Ionger tenable in light of postmodern science. A univocal moral philosophy-traceable to David Hume’s (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Eric M. Cave (2003). Marital Pluralism: Making Marriage Safer for Love. Journal of Social Philosophy 34 (3):331–347.
  12. S. A. Chambers & A. Finlayson (2007). "Becoming Plural: The Political Thought of William E. Connolly" May 11-12, 2007: Hosted By: The Department of Politics and International Relations, Swansea University, United Kingdom. [REVIEW] Political Theory 35 (2):239-239.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Ruth Chang (2001). Review: Two Conceptions of Reasons for Action. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):447 - 453.
    On a ‘comparative’ conception of practical reasons, reasons are like ‘weights’ that can make an action more or less rational. Bernard Gert adopts instead a ‘toggle’ conception of practical reasons: something counts as a reason just in case it alone can make some or other otherwise irrational action rational. I suggest that Gert’s conception suffers from various defects, and that his motivation for adopting this conception – his central claim that actions can be rational without there being reasons for them (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Donald A. Crosby (1992). Civilization and its Dissents: Moral Pluralism and Political Order. Journal of Social Philosophy 23 (2):111-126.
  15. Mary Ann Gardell Cutter (1989). Moral Pluralism and the Use of Anencephalic Tissue and Organs. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 14 (1):89-95.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Dan Demetriou (forthcoming). What Should Realists Say About Honor Cultures? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-19.
    Richard Nisbett and Dov Cohen’s (1996) influential account of “cultures of honor” speculates that honor norms are a socially-adaptive deterrence strategy. This theory has been appealed to by multiple empirically-minded philosophers, and plays an important role in John Doris and Alexandra Plakias’ (2008) antirealist argument from disagreement. In this essay, I raise four objections to the Nisbett-Cohen deterrence thesis, and offer another theory of honor in its place that sees honor as an agonistic normative system regulating prestige competitions. Since my (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. William Edelglass (2006). Moral Pluralism, Skillful Means, and Environmental Ethics. Environmental Philosophy 3 (2):8-16.
    J. Baird Callicott claims that moral pluralism leads to relativism, skepticism, and the undermining of moral obligations. Buddhist ethics provides a counterexample to Callicott; it is a robust tradition of moral pluralism. Focusing on one of the most significant texts in Buddhist ethics, Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra, I show how it draws on a multiplicity of moral principles determined by context and skillful means (upāya kauśalya). In contrast to Callicott’s description of pluralism as detrimental to moral life, I suggest that South Asian (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (2004). Prankster's Ethics. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):45–52.
    Diversity is a good thing. Some of its value is instrumental. Having people around with diverse beliefs, or customs, or tastes, can expand our horizons and potentially raise to salience some potential true beliefs, useful customs or apt tastes. Even diversity of error can be useful. Seeing other people fall away from the true and the useful in distinctive ways can immunise us against similar errors. And there are a variety of pleasant interactions, not least philosophical exchange, that wouldn’t be (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Ralph D. Ellis (1992). Moral Pluralism Reconsidered: Is There an Intrinsic-Extrinsic Value Distintion? Philosophical Papers 21 (1):45-64.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. H. T. Engelhardt (2011). Confronting Moral Pluralism in Posttraditional Western Societies: Bioethics Critically Reassessed. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 36 (3):243-260.
    In the face of the moral pluralism that results from the death of God and the abandonment of a God's eye perspective in secular philosophy, bioethics arose in a context that renders it essentially incapable of giving answers to substantive moral questions, such as concerning the permissibility of abortion, human embryonic stem cell research, euthanasia, etc. Indeed, it is only when bioethics understands its own limitations and those of secular moral philosophy in general can it better appreciate those tasks that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. H. T. Engelhardt (2009). Moral Pluralism, the Crisis of Secular Bioethics, and the Divisive Character of Christian Bioethics: Taking the Culture Wars Seriously. Christian Bioethics 15 (3):234-253.
    Moral pluralism is a reality. It is grounded, in part, in the intractable pluralism of secular morality and bioethics. There is a wide gulf that separates secular bioethics from Christian bioethics. Christian bioethics, unlike secular bioethics, understand that morality is about coming into a relationship with God. Orthodox Christian bioethics, moreover, understands that the impersonal set of moral principles and goals in secular morality gives a distorted account of the moral life. Therefore, Traditional Christian bioethics is separated from bioethics by (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Jason Ferrell (2012). Isaiah Berlin as Essayist. Political Theory 40 (5):602 - 628.
    One of the largest contemporary debates in political theory revolves around the question of how pluralists can justify their political commitments. Isaiah Berlin, one of the first to face this problem, was a self-proclaimed liberal, whose political writings have led to controversy. In this essay, I take up the issue of how Berlin's use of the essay genre contributes to his defense of liberalism given his pluralist beliefs. I argue that while his reliance upon the essay generates particular interpretive problems, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Jason Ferrell (2009). Isaiah Berlin: Liberalism and Pluralism in Theory and Practice. Contemporary Political Theory 8 (3):295.
  24. James W. Fossett, Alicia R. Ouellette, Sean Philpott, David Magnus & Glenn McGee (2007). Federalism and Bioethics: States and Moral Pluralism. Hastings Center Report 37 (6):24-35.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Jeffrey Friedman (2008). Pluralism or Relativism? Critical Review 11 (4):469-479.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Zhenrong Gan (2008). The Politically Pluralistic Conception of Human Rights. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 11:33-39.
    This paper is a sketch of the politically pluralistic conception of human rights. The conception will be illustrated by a basic characteristic of human rights under the constraint of the fact in the political. It is pluralistic because it is compatible with different moral values and cultures with qualification. It is also political because it considers political actions in practice and it does not follow from any moral doctrine which may be more generally or intrinsically related to human rights. I (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Gerald F. Gaus (1999). Reasonable Pluralism and the Domain of the Political: How the Weaknesses of John Rawls's Political Liberalism Can Be Overcome by a Justificatory Liberalism. Inquiry 42 (2):259 – 284.
    Under free institutions the exercise of human reason leads to a plurality of reasonable, yet irreconcilable doctrines. Rawls's political liberalism is intended as a response to this fundamental feature of modern democratic life. Justifying coercive political power by appeal to any one (or sample) of these doctrines is, Rawls believes, oppressive and illiberal. If we are to achieve unity without oppression, he tells us, we must all affirm a public political conception that is supported by these diverse reasonable doctrines. The (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Berys Gaut (1999). Rag-Bags, Disputes and Moral Pluralism. Utilitas 11 (01):37-.
    Moral pluralism of the kind associated with W. D. Ross is the doctrine that there is a plurality of moral principles, which in their application to particular cases can conflict, and that there is no further principle to determine which of these principles takes priority in cases of conflict. Two objections are commonly advanced against this kind of pluralism: that it proposes a rag-bag of moral principles lacking a unifying basis; and that it offers no way to adjudicate moral disputes (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Berys Gaut (1993). Moral Pluralism. Philosophical Papers 22 (1):17-40.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Sara Goering (2003). Choosing Our Friends: Moral Partiality and the Value of Diversity. Journal of Social Philosophy 34 (3):400–413.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Alison Hills (2003). The Significance of the Dualism of Practical Reason. Utilitas 15 (03):315-.
    Sidgwick argued that utilitarianism and egoism were in conflict, that neither theory was better justified than the other, and concluded that there was a and all that remained to him was . The dualism argument introduced by Sidgwick is an extremely powerful sceptical argument that no theory of ethics is rationally required: it cannot be shown that a moral sceptic or an egoist ought to accept the moral theory, otherwise she is unreasonable. I explain two ways in which the significance (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. John Horton (1993). Moral Conflict and Political Commitment. Utilitas 5 (01):109-.
  33. Kung-chʻüan Hsiao (1927). Political Pluralism. New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc..
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Ana Iltis (2003). Understanding Moral Obligation in the Face of Moral Pluralism. Journal of Value Inquiry 37 (4):471-479.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Leonard Kahn (2011). Conflict, Regret, and Modern Moral Philosophy. In Thom Brooks (ed.), New Waves in Ethics.
    I begin this paper by discussing the difference between outweighing and canceling in conflicts of normativity. I then introduce a thought experiment that I call Crash Drive,and I use it to explain the nature of a certain kind of moral conflict as well as the appropriate emotional response – regret – on the part of the primary agent in this case. Having done this, I turn to a line of criticism opened by Bernard Williams and recently expanded by Jonathan Dancy (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Timothy Lord (2009). R.G. Collingwood's Response to Oxbridge Meta-Ethics : Hierarchical Moral Pluralism. In James Connelly & Stamatoula Panagakou (eds.), Anglo-American Idealism: Thinkers and Ideas / [Edited by] James Connelly and Stamatoula Panagakou. Peter Lang.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Alasdair MacIntyre (1999). Moral Pluralism Without Moral Relativism. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1:1-8.
    When we deny the truth of someone else’s moral beliefs and give our grounds for so doing, we make or imply judgments about the inadequacy of their reasons for belief and about the causes of their belief. And we presuppose a difference between them and us in both respects. In so doing we provide matter for a shared philosophical inquiry about the relevant types of reason and cause. It is a mark of rational disagreement on matters of serious moral import (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Henry Meyer Magid (1941). English Political Pluralism. New York, Columbia University Press.
    Introduction.--Figgis: the significance of the real personality of groups.--Cole: a pluralistic theory of guild socialism.--Laski: individualistic pluralism.--Conclusion.--Bibliography (p. 93-[96]).
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Jukka Mäkinen & Arno Kourula (2012). Pluralism in Political Corporate Social Responsibility. Business Ethics Quarterly 22 (4):649-678.
    Within corporate social responsibility (CSR), the exploration of the political role of firms (political CSR) has recently experienced a revival. We review three key periods of political CSR literature—classic, instrumental, and new political CSR—and use the Rawlsian conceptualization of division of moral labor within political systems to describe each period’s background political theories. The three main arguments of the paper are as follows. First, classic CSR literature was more pluralistic in terms of background political theories than many later texts. Second, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Gregor McLennan (2008). Progressive Pluralism? Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 11 (1):89-105.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. David Mcnaughton (1999). E. F. Paul, F. D. Miller Jr and J. Paul (Eds.), Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, Pp. 301. [REVIEW] Utilitas 11 (02):251-.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Michael Moehler (2012). A Hobbesian Derivation of the Principle of Universalization. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):83-107.
    In this article, I derive a weak version of Kant's categorical imperative within an informal game-theoretic framework. More specifically, I argue that Hobbesian agents would choose what I call the weak principle of universalization, if they had to decide on a rule of conflict resolution in an idealized but empirically defensible hypothetical decision situation. The discussion clarifies (i) the rationality requirements imposed on agents, (ii) the empirical conditions assumed to warrant the conclusion, and (iii) the political institutions that are necessary (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Thomas Nagel (1979). The Fragmentation of Value. In , Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Shane O'Neill (1997). Impartiality in Context: Grounding Justice in a Pluralist World. State University of New York Press.
    Assesses critically the work of Rawls, Walzer, and Habermas and presents a theory of justice that responds to two senses of pluralism.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. G. Pennings (2002). Reproductive Tourism as Moral Pluralism in Motion. Journal of Medical Ethics 28 (6):337-341.
    Reproductive tourism is the travelling by candidate service recipients from one institution, jurisdiction, or country where treatment is not available to another institution, jurisdiction, or country where they can obtain the kind of medically assisted reproduction they desire. The more widespread this phenomenon, the louder the call for international measures to stop these movements. Three possible solutions are discussed: internal moral pluralism, coerced conformity, and international harmonisation. The position is defended that allowing reproductive tourism is a form of tolerance that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. B. C. Postow (2007). Toward Honest Ethical Pluralism. Philosophical Studies 132 (2):191 - 210.
    I give the label “ethical pluralism” to the meta-ethical view that competing moral views are valid. I assume that validity is conferred on a moral view by its satisfying the relevant meta-ethical criteria in a maximally satisfactory way. If the relevant meta-ethical criteria are based on something roughly like the wide reflective equilibrium model, then ethical pluralism is likely to be correct. Traditional moral views do not grant exemptions from their own binding rules or principles to agents – should any (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Shane Ralston (2009). Deweyan Democracy and Pluralism. Social Philosophy Today 25:223-240.
    What Talisse refers to as his “pluralist objection” states that Deweyan democracy, or John Dewey’s theory of democracy as contemporary Dewey scholars understand it, resembles a thick account, that is, a theory establishing a set of prior restraints on the values that can count as legitimate within a democratic community, and thus is incompatible with pluralism, at least insofar as contemporary political theorists define that term. In this paper, I argue that by undermining the pluralist objection, a reunion of Deweyan (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Luke Robinson (2014). Obligating Reasons, Moral Laws, and Moral Dispositions. Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (1):1-34.
  49. Luke Robinson (2013). A Dispositional Account of Conflicts of Obligation. Noûs 47 (2):203-228.
    I address a question in moral metaphysics: How are conflicts between moral obligations possible? I begin by explaining why we cannot give a satisfactory answer to this question simply by positing that such conflicts are conflicts between rules, principles, or reasons. I then develop and defend the “Dispositional Account,” which posits that conflicts between moral obligations are conflicts between the manifestations of obligating dispositions (obligating powers, capacities, etc.), just as conflicts between physical forces are conflicts between the manifestations of (certain) (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Luke Robinson (2012). Exploring Alternatives to the Simple Model: Is There an Atomistic Option? In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol. 2. Oxford University Press.
    The simple model maintains that morally relevant factors combine in a simple, additive way, like weights on a scale. Although intuitive and familiar, this model entails that certain plausible views about particular cases and how morally relevant factors combine and interact therein are false. Shelly Kagan suggests that we could accommodate the relevant views and interactions by rejecting either of two assumptions the simple model makes: that the moral status of an act is determined by the sum of the contributions (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 72