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  1. Leslie Allan, A Defence of Emotivism.
    As a non-cognitivist analysis of moral language, Charles Stevenson's sophisticated emotivism is widely regarded by moral philosophers as a substantial improvement over its historical antecedent, radical emotivism. None the less, it has come in for its share of criticism. In this essay, Leslie Allan responds to the key philosophical objections to Stevenson's thesis, arguing that the criticisms levelled against his meta-ethical theory rest largely on a too hasty reading of his works.
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  2. Andrew Altman (1977). Prescriptivism and Naturalism in Contemporary Ethical Theory. Dissertation, Columbia University
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  3. Andrew Alwood (2016). Non-Descriptive Negation for Normative Sentences. Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):1-25.
    Frege-Geach worries about embedding and composition have plagued metaethical theories like emotivism, prescriptivism and expressivism. The sharpened point of such criticism has come to focus on whether negation and inconsistency have to be understood in descriptivist terms. Because they reject descriptivism, these theories must offer a non-standard account of the meanings of ethical and normative sentences as well as related semantic facts, such as why certain sentences are inconsistent with each other. This paper fills out such a solution to the (...)
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  4. Andrew Alwood (2010). Imperative Clauses and the Frege–Geach Problem. [REVIEW] Analysis 70 (1):105-117.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  5. Kurt Baier (1973). Reason and Experience. Noûs 7 (1):56-67.
    My two major theses are that (i) prescriptivism obscures certain parallels between practical and theoretical reasoning, Lends plausibility to the false view that practical reasoning is not empirically based, And misunderstands ordinary usage; (ii) the main difference between claims of theoretical and practical reasoning lies in the logical relation between the conclusions of such claims and what they license: beliefs and intuitions, Respectively.
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  6. Jonathan Bennett (1960). Moral Argument. Mind 69 (276):544-549.
    The thesis is advanced by R. M. Hare that a judgment on an action or state of affairs is a moral judgment only if the person who makes it accepts some universal moral principle which, together with some true statement about the non-moral characteristics of the situation originally judged, entails the original judgment.1 Instances of this thesis would take some such form as saying that someone who says ‘You ought not to have done what you did’ cannot be expressing a (...)
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  7. David Kent Carter (1982). Hare's Theory of Morals. Dissertation, Yale University
    R. M. Hare's two main contributions to contemporary ethical theory are his earlier analysis of the logic of moral discourse and his more recent account of moral argument. Of the two, it is the first which is both more fundamental and more viable, and the present study is a critical examination of it. Portions of that analysis, it is argued, are seriously defective and require to be recast, and two of particular importance are singled out for extended treatment. It is (...)
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  8. J. W. Roxbee Cox (1986). From Universal Prescriptivism to Utilitarianism. Philosophical Quarterly 36 (142):1-15.
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  9. John Cronquist (1972). Hare and Prescriptivism. Dissertation, Stanford University
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  10. Norman O. Dahl (1987). A Prognosis for Universal Prescriptivism. Philosophical Studies 51 (3):383 - 424.
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  11. Aleksandar Dobrijevic (2003). Towards an Adequate Ethical Theory. Filozofija I Društvo 22:65-114.
    The author re-examines Hare’s claim about universal prescriptivism as the most adequate ethical theory in the narrow sense. Validity of that standpoint is being verified in relation to some rival conceptions, and through the requirements which have to be satisfied in order that an ethical theory can be called adequate.
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  12. Alan Donagan (1965). Mr. Hare and the Conscientious Nazi. Philosophical Studies 16 (1-2):8 - 12.
    The article goes into hare's attempt to refute objections to his account of morality which seemingly allows for the nazis' judgment to exterminate the jews. The author suggests that hare's defense rests on his demonstrating that if the principles of universalizability and prescriptivism are granted and their implications imaginatively grasped, Then "nobody but a madman" could hold that all jews ought to be exterminated. He argues that this defense rests on sociological and biological absurdities. (staff).
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  13. Keith Dowling (1992). Hare's Route From Universal Prescriptivism to Utilitarianism. Philosophical Papers 21 (1):65-81.
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  14. James Dreier (1996). Book Review: The Moral Problem by Michael Smith. [REVIEW] Mind 105 (418):363-367.
  15. John Eriksson (2009). Homage to Hare: Ecumenism and the Frege‐Geach Problem. Ethics 120 (1):8-35.
    The Frege‐Geach problem is probably the most serious worry for the prospects of any kind of metaethical expressivism. In a recent article, Ridge suggests that a new version of expressivism, a view he calls ecumenical expressivism, can avoid the Frege‐Geach problem.1 In contrast to pure expressivism, ecumenical expressivism is the view that moral utterances function to express not only desire‐like states of mind but also beliefs with propositional content. Whereas pure expressivists’ solutions to the Frege‐Geach problem usually have rested on (...)
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  16. Fred Feldman (1984). Hare's Proof. Philosophical Studies 45 (2):269 - 283.
  17. Robert Alvin Foreman (1974). A Critique of Prescriptivism. Dissertation, Syracuse University
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  18. P. T. Geach (1965). Assertion. Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.
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  19. Harry J. Gensler (1984). How Incomplete is Prescriptivism? Mind 93 (369):103-107.
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  20. Harry J. Gensler (1976). The Prescriptivism Incompleteness Theorem. Mind 85 (340):589-596.
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  21. Margaret Gilbert (1972). The Abilities of Prescriptivism. Analysis 32 (4):141 - 144.
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  22. Kenneth Edwin Goodpaster (1973). Prescriptivism and Neo-Naturalism in Ethical Theory. Dissertation, University of Michigan
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  23. Christopher W. Gowans (1989). Moral Dilemmas and Prescriptivism. American Philosophical Quarterly 26 (3):187 - 197.
    The purpose of this paper is to establish that, For an important class of moral judgments, The claim that there are moral dilemmas is false. The judgments are the judgments an agent committed to morality makes as the conclusion of deliberation about what, All things considered, He or she morally ought to do in some situation. The argument is that these judgments are prescriptive, In the sense of implying an intention to act, And that it is implausible to think there (...)
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  24. David Haight (1971). Naturalism, Prescriptivism, and Their Reconciliation. Journal of Value Inquiry 5 (3):212-218.
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  25. John E. Hare (2006). Prescriptive Realism. Philosophia Reformata 71 (1):14-30.
    In my book God’s Call1 I gave an historical account of the debate within twentieth century analytic philosophy between moral realism and expressivism. Moral realism is the view that moral properties like goodness or cruelty exist independently of our making judgements that things have such properties. Such judgements are, on this theory, objectively true when the things referred to have the specified properties and objectively false when they do not. Expressivism is the view that when a person makes a moral (...)
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  26. George William Harris (1981). Moral Judgment and the Moral Point of View. Dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin
    In recent years, metaethicists have debated the pros and cons of the following five claims regarding the essential features of moral as opposed to nonmoral judgments: Moral judgments are universalizable; Moral judgments are prescriptive; Moral judgments take normative priority over nonmoral evaluative judgments; Moral judgments are essentially connected with a substantive normative concern; Moral judgments can legitimately be said to be objective, intersubjectively valid, or true. The thesis of the dissertation is that on adequate interpretations of , , , and (...)
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  27. Hans-Ulrich Hoche (1995). Universal Prescriptivism Revised Or: The Analyticity of the Golden Rule. Revista Filosófica de Coimbra 4 (8):337-364.
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  28. Gerard J. Hughes & J. S. (1973). Prescriptivism in Theory and in Practice: The Moral Philosophy of R. M. Hare. Heythrop Journal 14 (2):136–146.
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  29. Thomas Hurka (1982). The Speech Act Fallacy Fallacy. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):509-526.
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  30. John Ibberson (1986). The Language of Decision: An Essay in Prescriptivist Ethical Theory. Humanities Press International.
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  31. John Ibberson (1979). A Doubt About Universal Prescriptivism. Analysis 39 (3):153 - 158.
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  32. Jack Winfield Jensen (1975). Prescriptivism, Descriptivism and the Purpose of Morality. Dissertation, Boston University Graduate School
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  33. Helen Kalokerinou (1988). Logic and Morality: The Ambiguities of Universal Prescriptivism. Dissertation, University of Exeter (United Kingdom)
    Available from UMI in association with The British Library. ;The present thesis is concerned with examining critically Hare's moral philosophy and with assessing its position in the contemporary British moral thought. I argue that his moral theory not only is not as coherent as it might have first appeared to be but also when appreciated as a whole is not susceptible to the kind of interpretation it usually is. Certain internal inconsistencies of his moral account have been at various times (...)
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  34. Young Jin Kim (1980). Prescriptivism and Neo-Naturalism: Hare, Foot and Warnock. Dissertation, State University of New York at Binghamton
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  35. William Lyons (1972). Is Hare's Prescriptivism Morally Neutral? Ethics 82 (3):259-261.
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  36. J. C. Mackenzie (1968). Prescriptivism and Rational Behaviour. Philosophical Quarterly 18 (73):310-319.
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  37. C. D. MacNiven (1964). Hare's Universal Prescriptivism. Dialogue 3 (2):191-198.
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  38. Geoffrey Madell (1965). Hare's Prescriptivism. Analysis 26 (2):37 - 41.
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  39. H. J. McCloskey (1979). Universalized Prescriptivism and Utilitarianism: Hare's Attempted Forced Marriage. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 13 (1):63-76.
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  40. James W. McGray (1990). Universal Prescriptivism and Practical Skepticism. Philosophical Papers 19 (1):37-51.
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  41. James W. McGray (1986). From Universal Prescriptivism to Utilitarianism. Philosophy Research Archives 12 (142):79-86.
    This paper is a critique of R.M. Hare’s argument that rational universal prescriptions are equivalent to utilitarian judgments. The problem with Hare’s argument is his restrictive model of rationality. He succeeds in proving that awareness of certain facts is essential to making a fully rational universal prescription. But he fails to prove that other facts, such as the ultimate separateness of persons, are irrelevant. Once such facts are taken seriously, the utilitarian implication is invalidated.
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  42. Denise Meyerson (1979). Against Prescriptivism in Ethics. Philosophical Papers 8 (2):72-74.
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  43. Valentin Muresan (2012). Trei teorii etice. Kant, Mill, Hare. Editura Universitatii Din Bucuresti.
    This coursebook contains three extensive essays dedicated to presenting, in an relative accesible form, the essential concepts and specific theoretical views of Kant, Mill and RM Hare regarding the philosophical principles of our moral evaluations. Although intended mainly as a tool for teaching basic classical ethical strategies - Kant's deontologism, Mill's normative utilitarianism and Hare's universal prescriptivism - to students, this book is also a very useful instrument for all those who need to get a comprehensive first view over these (...)
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  44. Mark T. Nelson (1996). The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Moral Argument. Religious Studies 32 (1):15-26.
    The Clarke/Rowe version of the Cosmological Argument is sound only if the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is true, but many philosophers, including Rowe, think that there is not adequate evidence for the principle of sufficient reason. I argue that there may be indirect evidence for PSR on the grounds that if we do not accept it, we lose our best justification for an important principle of metaethics, namely, the Principle of Universalizability. To show this, I argue that all the (...)
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  45. Nathan Nobis (2012). R.M. Hare’s Irrationalist “Rationalism”. Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (1):205-214.
  46. Nathan Nobis (2011). R.M. Hare’s Irrationalist “Rationalism”: A Critic of Universal Prescriptivism. Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (1):205-214.
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  47. Ingmar Persson (1983). Hare on Universal Prescriptivism and Utilitarianism. Analysis 43 (1):43 - 49.
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  48. Charles Pigden (2010). Snare's Puzzle/Hume's Purpose: Non-Cognitivism and What Hume Was Really Up to with No-Ought-From-Is. In Pigden (ed.), Hume on Is and Ought. Palgrave Macmillan
    Frank Snare had a puzzle. Noncognitivism implies No-Ought-From-Is but No- Ought-From-Is does not imply non-cognitivism. How then can we derive non-cognitivism from No-Ought-From-Is? Via an abductive argument. If we combine non-cognitivism with the conservativeness of logic (the idea that in a valid argument the conclusion is contained in the premises), this implies No-Ought-From-Is. Hence if No-Ought-From-Is is true, we can arrive at non-cognitivism via an inference to the best explanation. With prescriptivism we can make this argument more precise. I develop (...)
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  49. Charles R. Pigden (1990). Ought-Implies-Can: Erasmus Luther and R.M. Hare. Sophia 29 (1):2-30.
    l. There is an antinomy in Hare's thought between Ought-Implies-Can and No-Indicatives-from-Imperatives. It cannot be resolved by drawing a distinction between implication and entailment. 2. Luther resolved this antinomy in the l6th century, but to understand his solution, we need to understand his problem. He thought the necessity of Divine foreknowledge removed contingency from human acts, thus making it impossible for sinners to do otherwise than sin. 3. Erasmus objected (on behalf of Free Will) that this violates Ought-Implies-Can which he (...)
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  50. A. W. Price (1988). Book Review:The Language of Decision: An Essay in Prescriptivist Ethical Theory. John Ibberson. [REVIEW] Ethics 98 (4):841-.
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