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  1. Maike Albertzart (2011). Missing the Target: Jonathan Dancy’s Conception of a Principled Ethics. Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (1):49-58.
  2. John Altmann, Meditations on Moral Philosophy.
    An extensive commentary on moral philosophy that is a renunciation of my previous two essays. This essay promotes the idea that the answer to an objective morality lies in examining moral problems through an epistemic lens.
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  3. Emad H. Atiq (2016). How to Be Impartial as a Subjectivist. Philosophical Studies 173 (3):757-779.
    The metaethical subjectivist claims that there is nothing more to a moral disagreement than a conflict in the desires of the parties involved. Recently, David Enoch has argued that metaethical subjectivism has unacceptable ethical implications. If the subjectivist is right about moral disagreement, then it follows, according to Enoch, that we cannot stand our ground in moral disagreements without violating the demands of impartiality. For being impartial, we’re told, involves being willing to compromise in conflicts that are merely due to (...)
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  4. Carla Bagnoli (2011). “Reason and Ethics”. In N. Vassallo & C. Amoretti (eds.), Reason and Reasons. Ontos-Verlag
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  5. Lars Bergström (1972). Meaning and Morals. In R. E. Olson & A. M. Paul (eds.), Contemporary Philosophy in Scandinavia. Johns Hopkins Press
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  6. Anthony Celano (2013). The Foundation of Moral Reasoning: The Development of the Doctrine of Universal Moral Principles in the Works of Thomas Aquinas and His Predecessors. Diametros 38:1-61.
    This article considers the development of the idea of universal moral principles in the work of Thomas Aquinas and his predecessors in the thirteenth century. Like other medieval authors who sought to place the principles of moral practice on a foundation more secure than on the choices of the good person, as described by Aristotle, Thomas chooses to introduce a measure of ethical certitude through the concept of the innate habit of synderesis. This idea, introduced by Jerome in his commentary (...)
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  7. Hugh Chandler, Aristippus & Others.
    This 'paper' was intended as the first chapter of a book. It sketches Aristippus'theory of ethics, and discusses various objections to it (Plato, Aristotle, etc.).
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  8. Ruth Chang (2002). Making Comparisons Count. Routledge.
    The central aim of this book is to answer two questions: Are alternatives for choice ever incomparable? and, In what ways can items be compared? The arguments offered suggest that alternatives for choice no matter how different are never incomparable, and that the ways in which items can be compared are richer and more varied than commonly supposed. This work is the first book length treatment of the topics of incomparability, value, and practical reason.
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  9. Max Charlesworth (2005). Don't Blame the 'Bio' — Blame the 'Ethics': Varieties of (Bio) Ethics and the Challenge of Pluralism. [REVIEW] Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 2 (1):10-17.
    We tend to think that the difficulties in bioethics spring from the novel and alarming issues that arise due to discoveries in the new biosciences and biotechnologies. But many of the crucial difficulties in bioethics arise from the assumptions we make about ethics. This paper offers a brief overview of bioethics, and relates ethical ‘principlism’ to ‘ethical fundamentalism’. It then reviews some alternative approaches that have emerged during the second phase of bioethics, and argues for a neo-Aristotelian approach. Misconceptions about (...)
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  10. Jonathan Dancy (2000). Intention and Permissibility, II. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):319–338.
    [T. M. Scanlon] It is clearly impermissible to kill one person because his organs can be used to save five others who are in need of transplants. It has seemed to many that the explanation for this lies in the fact that in such cases we would be intending the death of the person whom we killed, or failed to save. What makes these actions impermissible, however, is not the agent's intention but rather the fact that the benefit envisaged does (...)
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  11. John K. Davis (2012). Applying Principles to Cases and the Problem of Judgment. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (4):563 - 577.
    We sometimes decide what to do by applying moral principles to cases, but this is harder than it looks. Principles are more general than cases, and sometimes it is hard to tell whether and how a principle applies to a given case. Sometimes two conflicting principles seem to apply to the same case. To handle these problems, we use a kind of judgment to ascertain whether and how a principle applies to a given case, or which principle to follow when (...)
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  12. Susan Dwyer, How not to argue that morality isn't innate: Comments on Jesse Prinz's “is morality innate?”.
    We must admire the ambition of Prinz’s title question. But does he provide a convincing answer to it? Prinz’s own view of morality as “a byproduct – accidental or invented – of faculties that evolved for different purposes (1),” which appears to express a negative reply, does not receive much direct argument here. Rather, Prinz’s main aim is to try to show that the considerations he believes are typically presented by moral nativists are insufficient or inadequate to establish that morality (...)
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  13. Aaron Elliott (2014). Can Moral Principles Explain Supervenience? Res Philosophica 91 (4):629-659.
    The distribution of moral properties supervenes on the distribution of natural properties, and this provides a puzzle for non-naturalism: what could explain supervenience if moral properties are not natural properties? Enoch claims moral principles explain supervenience. But this solution is incomplete without an account of what moral principles and properties are, and what relation holds between them. This paper begins to develop such an account by exploring analogous issues for Realism about Laws of nature in philosophy of science. Appealing to (...)
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  14. Stephen Finlay (2010). What Ought Probably Means, and Why You Can't Detach It. Synthese 177 (1):67 - 89.
    Some intuitive normative principles raise vexing 'detaching problems' by their failure to license modus ponens. I examine three such principles (a self-reliance principle and two different instrumental principles) and recent stategies employed to resolve their detaching problems. I show that solving these problems necessitates postulating an indefinitely large number of senses for 'ought'. The semantics for 'ought' that is standard in linguistics offers a unifying strategy for solving these problems, but I argue that an alternative approach combining an end-relational theory (...)
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  15. Danny Frederick (2015). Pro-Tanto Obligations and Ceteris-Paribus Rules. Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (3):255-266.
    I summarize a conception of morality as containing a set of rules which hold ceteris paribus and which impose pro-tanto obligations. I explain two ways in which moral rules are ceteris-paribus, according to whether an exception is duty-voiding or duty-overriding. I defend the claim that moral rules are ceteris-paribus against two qualms suggested by Luke Robinson’s discussion of moral rules and against the worry that such rules are uninformative. I show that Robinson’s argument that moral rules cannot ground pro-tanto obligations (...)
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  16. Joseph S. Fulda (2013). Toward a Thick Libertarianism. Reason Papers 35 (1):193-196.
    Extends the conception of "libertarianism" from the narrow politico-legal sphere to the ethical sphere, by adding two ethical principles which are the logical extension of the politico-legal principle, distinguishing between modesty and humility and providing a definition of the latter, relating the ethical principles to this understanding of humility, and giving two additional (libertarian) grounds for the acceptance of the ethical principles.
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  17. Irwin Goldstein (1989). Pleasure and Pain: Unconditional Intrinsic Values. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (December):255-276.
    That all pleasure is good and all pain bad in itself is an eternally true ethical principle. The common claim that some pleasure is not good, or some pain not bad, is mistaken. Strict particularism (ethical decisions must be made case by case; there are no sound universal normative principles) and relativism (all good and bad are relative to society) are among the ethical theories we may refute through an appeal to pleasure and pain. Daniel Dennett, Philippa Foot, R M (...)
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  18. Chris Heathwood (2012). Could Morality Have a Source? Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (2):1-19.
    It is a common idea that morality, or moral truths, if there are any, must have some sort of source, or grounding. It has also been claimed that constructivist theories in metaethics have an advantage over realist theories in that the former but not the latter can provide such a grounding. This paper has two goals. First, it attempts to show that constructivism does not in fact provide a complete grounding for morality, and so is on a par (...)
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  19. Pamela Hieronymi (2011). Of Metaethics and Motivation: The Appeal of Contractualism. In R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar & Samuel Richard Freeman (eds.), Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon. Oxford University Press
    In 1982, when T. M. Scanlon published “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” he noted that, despite the widespread attention to Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, the appeal of contractualism as a moral theory had been under appreciated. In particular, the appeal of contractualism’s account of what he then called “moral motivation” had been under appreciated.1 It seems to me that, in the intervening quarter century, despite the widespread discussion of Scanlon’s work, the appeal of contractualism, in precisely this regard, has still been (...)
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  20. Brad Hooker (2012). Theory Vs Anti-Theory. In Ulrika Heuer Gerald Lang (ed.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Bernard Williams. Oxford University Press
    Bernard Williams influentially attacked ethical theory. This paper assesses arguments for the ‘anti-theory’ position in ethics, including mainly arguments put forward by Williams but also arguments put forward by others. The paper begins by discussing what is supposed to be theory in ethics and what ethical intuitions are taken to be by those involved in the theory versus anti-theory debate. Then the paper responds to the objections that ethical theory is mistaken to prize principles, mistaken to prize rationalism, mistaken to (...)
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  21. Andrew Jordan (2013). Reasons, Holism And Virtue Theory. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (251):248-268.
    Some particularists have argued that even virtue properties can exhibit a form of holism or context variance, e.g. sometimes an act is worse for being kind, say. But, on a common conception of virtuous acts, one derived from Aristotle, claims of virtue holism will be shown to be false. I argue, perhaps surprisingly, that on this conception the virtuousness of an act is not a reason to do it, and hence this conception of virtuous acts presents no challenge to particularist (...)
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  22. Marko Jurjako (2010). From Reasons to Norms. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):292-296.
    This is a review of Torbjorn Tannsjo's book: "From Reasons to Norms".
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  23. Guy Kahane (2013). The Armchair and the Trolley: An Argument for Experimental Ethics. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):421-445.
    Ethical theory often starts with our intuitions about particular cases and tries to uncover the principles that are implicit in them; work on the ‘trolley problem’ is a paradigmatic example of this approach. But ethicists are no longer the only ones chasing trolleys. In recent years, psychologists and neuroscientists have also turned to study our moral intuitions and what underlies them. The relation between these two inquiries, which investigate similar examples and intuitions, and sometimes produce parallel results, is puzzling. Does (...)
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  24. Mark Lance & Margaret Little (2007). Where the Laws Are. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2:149-171.
  25. Uri D. Leibowitz (2009). Moral Advice and Moral Theory. Philosophical Studies 146 (3):349 - 359.
    Monists, pluralists, and particularists disagree about the structure of the best explanation of the rightness (wrongness) of actions. In this paper I argue that the availability of good moral advice gives us reason to prefer particularist theories and pluralist theories to monist theories. First, I identify two distinct roles of moral theorizing—explaining the rightness (wrongness) of actions, and providing moral advice—and I explain how these two roles are related. Next, I explain what monists, pluralists, and particularists disagree about. Finally, I (...)
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  26. B. Andrew Lustig (1993). Perseverations on a Critical Theme. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 18 (5):491-502.
    In response to my earlier critique of recent attempts to rebut principlism as an ethical approach, Green, Gert, and Clouser (GG&C) have in turn offered their own critique of my appraisal. This essay identifies eight major criticisms GG&C raise in their response and offers a rejoinder to each. Among them, three are especially important: (1) that the label of ‘deductivism’ fails to capture GG&C's ethical method and should be replaced by ‘descriptivism’; (2) that pluralistic accounts, including principlism, fail to offer (...)
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  27. Piotr Machura (2013). Moral Norms, Moral Ideals and Supererogation. Folia Philosophica 29.
    The aim of the paper is to investigate the relations between the basic moral categories, namely those of norms, ideals and supererogation. The subject of discussion is, firstly, the ways that these categories are understood; secondly, the possible approaches towards moral acting that appear due to their use; and thirdly, their relationship within the moral system. However, what is of a special importance here is the relationship between the categories of norms and ideals (or in a wider aspect (...)
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  28. Duncan MacIntosh (1990). Ideal Moral Codes. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):389-408.
    Ideal rule utilitarianism says that a moral code C is correct if its acceptance maximizes utility; and that right action is compliance with C. But what if we cannot accept C? Rawls and L. Whitt suggest that C is correct if accepting C maximizes among codes we can accept; and that right action is compliance with C. But what if merely reinforcing a code we can't accept would maximize? G. Trianosky suggests that C is correct if reinforcing it maximizes; and (...)
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  29. Colin Marshall (forthcoming). Schopenhauer and Non-Cognitivist Moral Realism. Journal of the History of Philosophy.
    Schopenhauer has been consistently ignored by contemporary metaethics, and almost no commentators on his work address the question of whether his metaethics is realist or anti-realist. I argue, however, that Schopenhauer’s views provide a powerful and novel challenge to the widely-held metaethical view that cognitivism about moral judgments is a necessary condition for moral realism. I begin by discussing how the phrase “moral realism” has been intended to characterize the family of anti-skeptical views that goes back at least to Plato. (...)
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  30. Thaddeus Metz (2014). Just the Beginning for Ubuntu: Reply to Matolino and Kwindingwi. South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):65-72.
    In an article titled ‘The end of ubuntu’ recently published in this journal, Bernard Matolino and Wenceslaus Kwindingwi argue that contemporary conditions in (South) Africa are such that there is no justification for appealing to an ethic associated with talk of ‘ubuntu’. They argue that political elites who invoke ubuntu do so in ways that serve nefarious functions, such as unreasonably narrowing discourse about how best to live, while the moral ideals of ubuntu are appropriate only for a bygone, pre-modern (...)
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  31. Richard W. Miller (1992). Moral Differences: Truth, Justice, and Conscience in a World of Conflict. Princeton University Press.
    In a wide-ranging inquiry Richard W. Miller provides new resources for coping with the most troubling types of moral conflict: disagreements in moral conviction, conflicting interests, and the tension between conscience and desires. Drawing on most fields in philosophy and the social sciences, including his previous work in the philosophy of science, he presents an account of our access to moral truth, and, within this framework, develops a theory of justice and an assessment of the role of morality in rational (...)
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  32. Howard Nye (2015). Directly Plausible Principles. In Christopher Daly (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods. Palgrave MacMillan 610-636.
    In this chapter I defend a methodological view about how we should conduct substantive ethical inquiries in the fields of normative and practical ethics. I maintain that the direct plausibility and implausibility of general ethical principles – once fully clarified and understood – should be foundational in our substantive ethical reasoning. I argue that, in order to expose our ethical intuitions about particular cases to maximal critical scrutiny, we must determine whether they can be justified by directly plausible principles. To (...)
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  33. Hugo Marcos Ortiz (2014). La consideración moral del suicidio en el pensamiento de M. F. Sciacca. Studium, Filosofía y Teología 34.
    For Michele Federico Sciacca, suicide should not be considered according to an immanent ethical order, comprising moral questions from the perspective of virtues owned by human beings as social subject. Instead, considered from the perspective of a 'moral intelligence' opened to Being as such, the suicidal act expresses a misrepresentation of what it is to be a human being according to its ontological structure, resulting in the absurd attempt of self-fulfilment inducing his own ontological ruin.
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  34. Norbert Paulo (2015). Casuistry as Common Law Morality. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 36 (6):373-389.
    This article elaborates on the relation between ethical casuistry and common law reasoning. Despite the frequent talk of casuistry as common law morality, remarks on this issue largely remain at the purely metaphorical level. The article outlines and scrutinizes Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin’s version of casuistry and its basic elements. Drawing lessons for casuistry from common law reasoning, it is argued that one generally has to be faithful to ethical paradigms. There are, however, limitations for the binding force of (...)
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  35. Robert Pippin (2007). Can There Be 'Unprincipled Virtue'? Comments on Nomy Arpaly. Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):291 – 301.
    In her book, Unprincipled Virtue, Nomy Arpaly is suspicious of reflective endorsement or deliberative rationality views of agency, those which tie the possibility of responsibility and moral blame to the conscious exercise of deliberation and reflection, and which require as a condition of blame- or praise- worthiness an agent's explicit commitment to ethical principles. I am in sympathy with her attack on standard autonomy theories, but argue that she confuses the phenomenon of unknowing and unreflective responsiveness to the right-making features (...)
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  36. Ryan Preston-Roedder (2014). A Better World. Philosophical Studies 168 (3):629-644.
    A number of moral philosophers have endorsed instances of the following curious argument: it would be better if a certain moral theory were true; therefore, we have reason to believe that the theory is true. In other words, the mere truth of the theory—quite apart from the results of our believing it or acting in accord with it—would make for a better world than the truth of its rivals, and this fact provides evidence of the theory’s truth. This form of (...)
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  37. Erich Rast (2016). Harming Yourself and Others: A Note on the Asymmetry of Agency in Action Evaluations. Polish Journal of Philosophy, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (2014) (2):65-74.
    Principles are investigated that allow one to establish a preference ordering between possible actions based on the question of whether the acting agent himself or other agents will benefit or be harmed by the consequences of an action. It is shown that a combination of utility maximization, an altruist principle, and weak negative utilitarianism yields an ordering that seems to be intuitively appealing, although it does not necessarily reflect common everyday evaluations of actions.
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  38. Denis Robinson (2010). Reflections on Moral Disagreement, Relativism, and Skepticism About Rules. Philosophical Topics 38 (2):131-156.
    Part I of this paper discusses some uses of arguments from radical moral disagreement — in particular, as directed against absolutist cognitivism — and surveys some semantic issues thus made salient. It may be argued that parties to such a disagreement cannot be using the relevant moral claims with exactly the same absolutist cognitive content. That challenges the absolutist element of absolutist cognitivism, which, combined with the intractable nature of radical moral disagreement, in turn challenges the viability (...)
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  39. Luke Robinson (2011). Moral Principles As Moral Dispositions. Philosophical Studies 156 (2):289-309.
    What are moral principles? In particular, what are moral principles of the sort that (if they exist) ground moral obligations or—at the very least—particular moral truths? I argue that we can fruitfully conceive of such principles as real, irreducibly dispositional properties of individual persons (agents and patients) that are responsible for and thereby explain the moral properties of (e.g.) agents and actions. Such moral dispositions (or moral powers) are apt to be the (...)
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  40. Luke Robinson (2008). Moral Principles Are Not Moral Laws. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2 (3):1-22.
    What are moral principles? The assumption underlying much of the generalism–particularism debate in ethics is that they are (or would be) moral laws: generalizations or some special class thereof, such as explanatory or counterfactual-supporting generalizations. I argue that this law conception of moral principles is mistaken. For moral principles do at least three things that moral laws cannot do, at least not in their own right: explain certain phenomena, provide particular kinds of support for counterfactuals, and ground moral necessities, “necessary (...)
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  41. Luke Robinson (2006). Moral Holism, Moral Generalism, and Moral Dispositionalism. Mind 115 (458):331-360.
    Moral principles play important roles in diverse areas of moral thought, practice, and theory. Many who think of themselves as ‘moral generalists’ believe that moral principles can play these roles—that they are capable of doing so. Moral generalism maintains that moral principles can and do play these roles because true moral principles are statements of general moral fact (i.e. statements of facts about the moral attributes of kinds of actions, kinds of (...)
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  42. Miriam Ronzoni & Laura Valentini (2008). On the Meta-Ethical Status of Constructivism: Reflections on G.A. Cohen's `Facts and Principles'. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 7 (4):403-422.
    The Queen's College, Oxford, UK In his article `Facts and Principles', G.A. Cohen attempts to refute constructivist approaches to justification by showing that, contrary to what their proponents claim, fundamental normative principles are fact- in sensitive. We argue that Cohen's `fact-insensitivity thesis' does not provide a successful refutation of constructivism because it pertains to an area of meta-ethics which differs from the one tackled by constructivists. While Cohen's thesis concerns the logical structure of normative principles, constructivists ask how normative principles (...)
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  43. Enzo Rossi (forthcoming). Facts, Principles, and Politics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-16.
    Should our factual understanding of the world influence our normative theorising about it? G.A. Cohen has argued that our ultimate normative principles should not be constrained by facts. David Estlund and others have defended subsets of that claim. In this paper I dispute those positions by arguing that, in order to resist the conclusion that ultimate normative principles rest on facts about possibility or conceivability, one has to embrace an unsatisfactory account of how principles generate normative political judgments. So political (...)
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  44. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (1999). Particularism and Principles. Theoria 65 (2-3):114-126.
  45. Jens Saugstad (2002). Respekt Og Menneskeverd. Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 37 (3):189-204.
  46. Heidi Savage, The Inevitability of Death: Going From an Is to an Ought.
    Since Hume, many ethicists have assumed that inferring normative claims from descriptive claims is fallacious. Some classic examples that illustrate this fact are those in which everyone commits some act, but we do not therefore conclude that it is the right thing to do. Everyone may jump off a bridge, asserts your mother, but that does not entail that you should. However, not all such claims illustrate this. In fact, some of them illustrate precisely the opposite claim. For example, consider (...)
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  47. T. M. Scanlon (2000). Intention and Permissibility, I. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):301–317.
    [T. M. Scanlon] It is clearly impermissible to kill one person because his organs can be used to save five others who are in need of transplants. It has seemed to many that the explanation for this lies in the fact that in such cases we would be intending the death of the person whom we killed, or failed to save. What makes these actions impermissible, however, is not the agent's intention but rather the fact that the benefit envisaged does (...)
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  48. Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.) (2006). Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 3. Oxford University Press.
    The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves ...
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  49. Desh Raj Sirswal (2014). Proceedings of the Second Online Session of SPPIS HaryanaEdit. Dissertation, CPPIS
    Second Online Session -/- on the theme -/- Development of Philosophy in India -/- 24th June, 2014 -/- positive -/- Table of Content -/- Preface to the Second Session -/- Spirituality Some Philosophical trends : PROF. D.N.TIWARI -/- ROLE OF YOGA AND NATUROPATHY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN IDEAL LIFE STYLE: PROF. SOHAN RAJ TATER -/- THE DEVELOPMENT OF EARLY MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY: DR MERINA ISLAM -/- THE RELEVANCE OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: DR. K.VICTOR BABU -/- Public Service Values (...)
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  50. Holly M. Smith (2011). The Prospective View of Obligation. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
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