“Projectivism” means different things to different philosophers. Even restricting our attention to moral projectivism merely identifies our subject matter while leaving the nature of the projectivist component of the thesis indeterminate. The objectives of this paper are to home in on and clarify one central thesis that seems deserving of the name “moral projectivism,” and to call attention to the fact that it is an empirical hypothesis and thus must be tested as such. I should at the outset immediately quell (...) any expectations that in this paper I will design, develop, or even suggest any experimental methods. The preliminary task of identifying and clarifying a target hypothesis is sufficiently complicated to fill the paper, and I lack the space to propose any specific empirical procedures. If what follows serves to reorient thinking about moral projectivism in an empirical direction, if it encourages people to reflect on ways by which it might be properly tested, then I will be satisfied with the contribution. (shrink)