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Siblings:History/traditions: Moral Projectivism
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  1. J. S. Biehl (2005). Ethical Instrumentalism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):353 - 369.
    The present essay offers a sketch of a philosophy of value, what I shall here refer to as ‘ethical instrumentalism.’ My primary aim is to say just what this view involves and what its commitments are. In the course of doing so, I find it necessary to distinguish this view from another with which it shares a common basis and which, in reference to its most influential proponent, I refer to as ‘Humeanism.’ A second, more general, aim is to make (...)
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  2. Simon Blackburn, Conference Paper on Representation and Pragmatism.
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  3. Simon Blackburn (2010). The Steps From Doing to Saying. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1):1-13.
    In this paper I consider recent developments in neo-pragmatism, and in particular the degree of convergence between such approaches and those placing greater emphasis on truth and truth-makers. I urge that although a global pragmatism has its merits, it by no means closes the space for a more Wittgensteinian, finer-grained, approach to the diversity of functions served by modal, causal, moral, or other modes of thought.
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  4. Simon Blackburn (2005). Quasi-Realism No Fictionalism. In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. 322--338.
  5. M. H. Brighouse (1990). Blackburn's Projectivism — an Objection. Philosophical Studies 59 (2):225 - 233.
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  6. T. D. J. Chappell (1998). The Incompleat Projectivist: How to Be an Objectivist and an Attitudinist. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (190):50-66.
    What is at stake in the dispute between moral objectivism and subjectivism is how we are to give a rational grounding to ethical first principles or basic commitments. The search is for an explanation of what if anything makes any commitments good. Subjectivisms such as Blackburn's quasi‐realism can give any set of commitments no ‘rational grounding’ in this sense except in considerations about internal consistency. But this is inadequate. Internal consistency is not sufficient for ethical rationality, since a set of (...)
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  7. Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (2006). Sensibility Theory and Projectivism. In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. 186--218.
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  8. Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (2006). Sensibility Theory and Projectivism. In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. 186--218.
  9. James Dreier (1996). Book Review: The Moral Problem by Michael Smith. [REVIEW] Mind 105 (418):363-367.
  10. James Dreier (1996). Projectivism. In Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Macmillan.
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  11. Andy Egan (2010). Projectivism Without Error. In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. 68.
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  12. Richard Joyce (2009). Is Moral Projectivism Empirically Tractable? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):53 - 75.
    Different versions of moral projectivism are delineated: minimal, metaphysical, nihilistic, and noncognitivist. Minimal projectivism (the focus of this paper) is the conjunction of two subtheses: (1) that we experience morality as an objective aspect of the world and (2) that this experience has its origin in an affective attitude (e.g., an emotion) rather than in perceptual faculties. Both are empirical claims and must be tested as such. This paper does not offer ideas on any specific test procedures, but rather undertakes (...)
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  13. Simon Kirchin (2000). Quasi-Realism, Sensibility Theory, and Ethical Relativism. Inquiry 43 (4):413 – 427.
    This paper is a reply to Simon Blackburn's 'Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-realist Foundation?' Inquiry 42 (1999), pp. 213-28. Blackburn attempts to show how his version of non-cognitivism - quasi-realist projectivism - can evade the threat of ethical relativism, the thought that all ways of living are as ethically good as each other and every ethical judgment is as ethically true as any other. He further attempts to show that his position is superior in this respect (...)
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  14. Mark T. Nelson (2005). Loving Attention: A Realist, Projectivist Theory of Value. Religious Studies 41 (4):415-433.
    I try out a tentative hypothesis in speculative philosophy, by sketching a theory of value modelled on John Locke's theory of acquisition. I argue that this theory has all the advantages of Locke's theory of acquisition, but few of its disadvantages. Moreover, it allows us to reconcile two attractive, but apparently incompatible, ideas about value: the real-value idea (that animals, plants, artifacts, and landscapes really are valuable) and the subject-dependence idea (that things have value only in relation to experiencing subjects). (...)
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  15. Christopher Norris (2002). Realism, Projectivism and Response-Dependence: On the Limits of 'Best Judgement'. Philosophy and Social Criticism 28 (2):123-152.
    This essay offers a critical appraisal of some claims recently advanced by Crispin Wright and others in support of a response-dispositional (RD) approach to issues in epistemology, ethics, political theory, and philosophy of the social sciences. These claims take a lead from Plato's discussion of the status of moral value-judgements in the Euthyphro and from Locke's account of 'secondary qualities' such as colour, texture and taste. The idea is that a suitably specified description of best opinion (or optimal response) for (...)
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  16. A. W. Price (1986). Doubts About Projectivism. Philosophy 61 (236):215 - 228.
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  17. John Skorupski (2010). Sentimentalism: Its Scope and Limits. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):125 - 136.
    The subject of this paper is sentimentalism. In broad terms this is the view that value concepts, moral concepts, practical reasons—some or all of these—can be analysed in terms of feeling, sentiment or emotion. More specifically, the paper discusses the following theses: (i) there are reasons to feel (‘evaluative’ reasons) that are not reducible to practical or epistemic reasons (ii) value is analysable in terms of these reasons to feel. (iii) all practical reasons are in one way or another grounded (...)
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  18. Sergio Tenenbaum (2003). Quasi-Realism's Problem of Autonomous Effects. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):392–409.
    Simon Blackburn defends a 'quasi-realist' view intended to preserve much of what realists want to say about moral discourse. According to error theory, moral discourse is committed to indefensible metaphysical assumptions. Quasi-realism seems to preserve ontological frugality, attributing no mistaken commitments to our moral practices. In order to make good this claim, quasi-realism must show that (a) the seemingly realist features of the 'surface grammar' of moral discourse can be made compatible with projectivism; and (b) certain realist-sounding statements which we (...)
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  19. Alan Thomas, Minimalism and Quasi-Realism.
    Expressivism's problem in solving the Frege/Geach problem concerning unasserted contexts is evaluated in the light of Blackburn's own methodological commitment to assessing philosophical theories in terms of costs and benefits, notably quasi-realism's aim of minimising the ontological commitments of a broadly naturalistic worldview. The problem emerges when a competitor theory can explain the same phenomena at lower cost: the minimalist about truth has no problem with unasserted contexts whereas the quasi-realist/expressivist package does. However, this form of projectivism is supposed to (...)
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  20. Glenn Tiller (2000). Expressivism, Projectivism, and Santayana. Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (2):239-258.
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  21. Barry Ward (2002). Humeanism Without Humean Supervenience: A Projectivist Account of Laws and Possibilities. Philosophical Studies 107 (3):191-208.
    Acceptance of Humean Supervenience and thereductive Humean analyses that entail it leadsto a litany of inadequately explained conflictswith our intuitions regarding laws andpossibilities. However, the non-reductiveHumeanism developed here, on which law claimsare understood as normative rather than factstating, can accommodate those intuitions. Rational constraints on such norms provide aset of consistency relations that ground asemantics formulated in terms offactual-normative worlds, solving theFrege-Geach problem of construing unassertedcontexts. This set of factual-normative worldsincludes exactly the intuitive sets ofnomologically possible worlds associated witheach possible (...)
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  22. Nick Zangwill (1994). Moral Mind-Independence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2):205-219.
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