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  1. Mitchell Aboulafia (2011). Through the Eyes of Mad Men: Simulation, Interaction, and Ethics. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PRAGMATISM AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY (2):133-147.
    Traditionally pragmatists have been favorably disposed to improving our understanding of agency and ethics through the use of empirical research. In the last two decades simulation theory has been championed in certain cognitive science circles as a way of explaining how we attribute mental states and predict human behavior. Drawing on research in psychology and neuroscience, Alvin I. Goldman and Robert M. Gordon have not only used simulation theory to discuss how we “mindread”, but have suggested that the theory has (...)
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  2. Erik Åkerlund (2010). Suárez's Ideas on Natural Law in the Light of His Philosophical Anthropology and Moral Psychology. In Virpi Mäkinen (ed.), The Nature of Rights: Moral and Political Aspects of Rights in Late Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy. The Philosophical Society of Finland.
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  3. Mark Alfano (forthcoming). Moral Psychology: An Introduction. Polity.
    This book provides a rich, systematic, and accessible introduction to moral psychology, aimed at undergraduate philosophy and psychology majors. There are eight chapters, in addition to a short introduction, prospective conclusion, and extensive bibliography. The recipe for each chapter will be: a) to introduce a philosophical topic (e.g., altruism, virtue, preferences, rules) and some prominent positions on it, without assuming prior acquaintance on the part of the reader b) to canvass and explain the relevance of a particular domain of empirical (...)
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  4. Mark Alicke (2008). Blaming Badly. Journal of Cognition and Culture 8:179-186.
    Moral philosophers, legal theorists, and psychologists who study moral judgment are remarkably agreed in prescribing how to blame people. A blameworthy act occurs when an actor intentionally, negligently or recklessly causes foreseen, or foreseeable, harmful consequences without any compelling mitigating or extenuating circumstances. This simple formulation conveniently forestalls intricacies about how to construe concepts such as will, causation, foresight, and mitigation, but putting that aside for the moment, it seems fair to say that blame “professionals” share compatible conceptions of how (...)
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  5. Kenneth D. Alpern (1997). What Do We Want Trust to Be? Business and Professional Ethics Journal 16 (1/2/3):29-45.
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  6. Judith Andre (2005). Disgust, Dignity, and a Public Intellectual. [REVIEW] Criminal Justice Ethics 24 (1):52-57.
    Martha Nussbaum’s Hiding from Humanity is eloquent and thought-provoking. I criticize some of her central arguments, particularly her construal of disgust and her exposition of shame. But I applaud the book as a whole. It is possible that richness and engagement are more important in the work of public intellectuals than is technical precision. If so, Nussbaum has fulfilled her role. It is more likely that both qualities are important, but difficult to combine. In that case, we can still thank (...)
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  7. Chrisoula Andreou (2007). Morality and Psychology. Philosophy Compass 2 (1):46–55.
    This article briefly discusses the connection between moral philosophy and moral psychology, and then explores three intriguing areas of inquiry that fall within the intersection of the two fields. The areas of inquiry considered focus on (1) debates concerning the nature of moral judgments and moral motivation; (2) debates concerning good and bad character traits and character-based explanations of actions; and (3) debates concerning the role of moral rules in guiding the morally wise agent.
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  8. Chrisoula Andreou (2006). Getting On in a Varied World. Social Theory and Practice 32 (1):61-73.
    The core argument in favor of the view that immorality is a natural defect for human beings, which has been developed by Foot, assumes that if justice and compassion have important functions in human survival and reproduction, then injustice and cruelty are natural defects in human beings. But this ignores possibilities and results that cannot reasonably be ignored. Multiple and mixed naturally sound types can and do occur in nature. Moreover, research in the life sciences suggests that at least some (...)
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  9. Steven Arkonovich (2012). Conflicts of Desire. Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (1):51-63.
    This paper is an attempt to come to a better understanding of desire through an examination of certain kinds of conflict of desire. Standard accounts of conflict of desire involve a two-part analysis. First, desires are held to conflict just in case the satisfaction of one precludes the satisfaction of the other; second, a desire is said to be satisfied just in case the propositional content of the desire is true. I argue that this account of conflict rests in an (...)
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  10. Robert Audi (1997). Self-Deception Vs. Self-Caused Deception: A Comment on Professor Mele. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):104-104.
    Mele's study of philosophical and psychological theories of self-deception informatively links the conceptual and dynamic aspects of self-deception and explicates it without positing mutually inconsistent beliefs, such as those occurring in two-person deception. It is argued, however, that he does not do full justice to the dissociation characteristic of self-deception and does not sufficiently distinguish self-deception from self-caused deception.
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  11. Kent Bach (1997). Thinking and Believing in Self-Deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):105-105.
    Mele views self-deception as belief sustained by motivationally biased treatment of evidence. This view overlooks something essential, for it does not reckon with the fact that in self-deception the truth is dangerously close at hand and must be repeatedly suppressed. Self-deception is not so much a matter of what one positively believes as what one manages not to think.
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  12. Benjamin Bagley (forthcoming). Loving Someone in Particular. Ethics.
    People loved for their beauty and cheerfulness are not loved as irreplaceable, yet people loved for “what their souls are made of” are. Or so literary romance implies; leading philosophical accounts, however, deny the distinction, holding that reasons for love either do not exist or do not include the beloved’s distinguishing features. In this, I argue, they deny an essential species of love. To account for it while preserving the beloved’s irreplaceability, I defend a model of agency on which people (...)
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  13. Carla Bagnoli (2012). Self-Deception: A Constructivist Account. Humana.Mente 20:93-116.
    This paper takes a constitutivist approach to self-deception, and argues that this phenomenon should be evaluated under several dimensions of rationality. The constitutivist approach has the merit of explaining the selective nature of self-deception as well as its being subject to moral sanction. Self-deception is a pragmatic strategy for maintaining the stability of the self, hence continuous with other rational activities of self-constitution. However, its success is limited, and it costs are high: it protects the agent’s self by undermining the (...)
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  14. Carla Bagnoli (2011). The Exploration of Moral Life. In Iris Murdoch, philosopher. Oxford University Press.
    The most distinctive feature of Murdoch's philosophical project is her attempt to reclaim the exploration of moral life as a legitimate topic of philosophical investigation. In contrast to the predominant focus on action and decision, she argues that “what we require is a renewed sense of the difficulty and complexity of the moral life and the opacity of persons. We need more concepts in terms of which to picture the substance of our being” (AD 293).1 I shall argue that to (...)
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  15. Carla Bagnoli (2007). Phenomenology of the Aftermath: Ethical Theory and the Intelligibility of Moral Experience. In Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.), New Trends in Moral Psychology. Kluwer. 185-212.
  16. Carla Bagnoli (2007). The Authority of Reflection. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22 (1):43-52.
    This paper examines Moran’s argument for the special authority of the first-person, which revolves around the Self/Other asymmetry and grounds dichotomies such as the practical vs. theoretical, activity vs. passivity, and justificatory vs. explanatory reasons. These dichotomies qualify the self-reflective person as an agent, interested in justifying her actions from a deliberative stance. The Other is pictured as a spectator interested in explaining action from a theoretical stance. The self-reflective knower has authority over her own mental states, while the Spectator (...)
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  17. Gary Banham, Kantian Respect.
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  18. Konrad Banicki (2014). Positive Psychology on Character Strengths and Virtues. A Disquieting Suggestion. New Ideas in Psychology 33:21-34.
    The Values in Action (VIA) classification of character strengths and virtues has been recently proposed by two leading positive psychologists, Christopher Peterson and Martin Seligman as “the social science equivalent of virtue ethics.” The very possibility of developing this kind of an “equivalent,” however, is very doubtful in the light of the cogent criticism that has been leveled at modern moral theory by Alasdair MacIntyre as well as the well argued accusations that positive psychology, despite its official normative neutrality, is (...)
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  19. Konrad Banicki (2009). The Berlin Wisdom Paradigm: A Conceptual Analysis of a Psychological Approach to Wisdom. History and Philosophy of Psychology 11 (2):25-35.
    The main purpose of this article is to undertake a conceptual investigation of the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm: a psychological project initiated by Paul Baltes and intended to study the complex phenomenon of wisdom. Firstly, in order to provide a wider perspective for the subsequent analyses, a short historical sketch is given. Secondly, a meta-theoretical issue of the degree to which the subject matter of the Baltesian study can be identified with the traditional philosophical wisdom is addressed. The main result yielded (...)
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  20. Peter Brian Barry, Two Dogmas of Moral Psychology.
    I contend that there are two dogmas that are still popular among philosophers of action: that agents can only desire what they think is good and that they can only intentionally pursue what they think is good. I also argue that both dogmas are false. Broadly, I argue that our best theories of action can explain the possibility of intentionally pursuing what one thinks is not at all good, that we need to allow for the possibility of intentionally pursuing what (...)
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  21. Günter Becker (2011). Kohlberg Und Seine Kritiker: Die Aktualität von Kohlbergs Moralpsychologie. Vs.
    Das Buch bietet eine systematische Aufarbeitung der Forschung zum moralpsychologischen Ansatz von Lawrence Kohlberg und insbesondere seiner zahlreichen Kritiker.
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  22. Macalester Bell (2011). Globalist Attitudes and the Fittingness Objection. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):449-472.
    Some attitudes typically take whole persons as their objects. Shame, contempt, disgust and admiration have this feature, as do many tokens of love and hate. Objectors complain that these ‘globalist attitudes’ can never fit their targets and thus can never be all-things-considered appropriate. Those who dismiss all globalist attitudes in this way are misguided. The fittingness objection depends on an inaccurate view of the person-assessments at the heart of the globalist attitudes. Once we understand the nature of globalist attitudes and (...)
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  23. Michael Bergmann & Patrick Kain (eds.) (2014). Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution. Oxford University Press.
    Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief contains fourteen original essays by philosophers, theologians, and social scientists on challenges to moral and religious belief from disagreement and evolution. Three main questions are addressed: Can one reasonably maintain one's moral and religious beliefs in the face of interpersonal disagreement with intellectual peers? Does disagreement about morality between a religious belief source, such as a sacred text, and a non-religious belief source, such as a society's moral intuitions, make it irrational to continue trusting (...)
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  24. Jose Luis Bermudez (1997). Defending Intentionalist Accounts of Self-Deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):107-108.
    This commentary defends intentionalist accounts of self-deception against Mele by arguing that: (1) viewing self-deception on the model of other-deception is not as paradoxical as Mele makes out; (2) the paradoxes are not entailed by the view that self-deception is intentional; and (3) there are two problems for Mele's theory that only an intentionalist theory can solve.
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  25. Lorraine Besser-Jones (2008). Personal Integrity, Moraity, and Psychological Well-Being. Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (3):361-383.
    Most moral theories purport to make claims upon agents, yet often it is not clear why those claims are ones that can be justifiably demanded of agents. In this paper, I develop a justification of moral requirements that explains why it is that morality makes legitimate claims on agents. This justification is grounded in the idea that there is an essential connection between morality and psychological well-being. I go on to suggest how, using this justification as a springboard, we might (...)
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  26. Lorraine Besser-jones (2008). Social Psychology, Moral Character, and Moral Fallibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):310–332.
    In recent years, there has been considerable debate in the literature concerning the existence of moral character. One lesson we should take away from these debates is that the concept of character, and the role it plays in guiding our actions, is far more complex than most of us initially took it to be. Just as Gilbert Harman, for example, makes a serious mistake in insisting, plainly and simply, that ther is no such thing as character, defenders of character also (...)
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  27. Susanne Bobzien (2006). Moral Responsibility and Moral Development in Epicurus’ Philosophy. In B. Reis & S. Haffmans (eds.), The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics. CUP.
    ABSTRACT: 1. This paper argues that Epicurus had a notion of moral responsibility based on the agent’s causal responsibility, as opposed to the agent’s ability to act or choose otherwise; that Epicurus considered it a necessary condition for praising or blaming an agent for an action, that it was the agent and not something else that brought the action about. Thus, the central question of moral responsibility was whether the agent was the, or a, cause of the action, or whether (...)
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  28. James Bohman (2010). Ethics as Moral Inquiry: Dewey and the Moral Psychology of Social Reform. In Molly Cochran (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Dewey. Cambridge University Press.
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  29. Nicolas Bommarito (2013). Modesty as a Virtue of Attention. Philosophical Review 122 (1):93-117.
    The contemporary discussion of modesty has focused on whether or not modest people are accurate about their own good qualities. This essay argues that this way of framing the debate is unhelpful and offers examples to show that neither ignorance nor accuracy about the good qualities related to oneself is necessary for modesty. It then offers an attention-based account, claiming that what is necessary for modesty is to direct one’s attention in certain ways. By analyzing modesty in this way, we (...)
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  30. Robert F. Bornstein (1997). Varieties of Self-Deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):108-109.
    Mele's analysis of self-deception is persuasive but it might also be useful to consider the varieties of self-deception that occur in real-world settings. Instances of self-deception can be classified along three dimensions: implicit versus explicit, motivated versus process-based, and public versus private. All three types of self-deception have implications for the scientific research enterprise.
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  31. Johan Brännmark (2009). The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology – by Christine M. Korsgaard. [REVIEW] Theoria 75 (4):358-361.
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  32. Jan Bransen (2005). Competences. Philosophical Explorations 8 (3):209 – 215.
  33. Shoshana Brassfield (2012). Never Let the Passions Be Your Guide: Descartes and the Role of the Passions. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (3):459-477.
    Commentators commonly assume that Descartes regards it as a function of the passions to inform us or teach us which things are beneficial and which are harmful. As a result, they tend to infer that Descartes regards the passions as an appropriate guide to what is beneficial or harmful. In this paper I argue that this conception of the role of the passions in Descartes is mistaken. First, in spite of a number of texts appearing to show the contrary, I (...)
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  34. Jack Williams Brehm (1966). A Theory of Psychological Reactance. New York, Academic Press.
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  35. Jason Brennan (2008). What If Kant Had Had a Cognitive Theory of the Emotions? In Valerio Hrsg v. Rohden, Ricardo Terra & Guido Almeida (eds.), Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Walter de Gruyter. 1--219.
    Emotional cognitivists, such as the Stoics and Aristotle, hold that emotions have cognitive content, whereas noncognitivists, like Plato and Kant, believe the emotions to be nonrational bodily movements. I ask, taking Martha Nussbaum's account of cognitivism, what if Kant had become convinced of a cognitive theory of the emotions, what changes would this require in his moral philosophy. Surprisingly, since this represents a radical shift in his psychology, it changes almost nothing. I show that Kant's account of continence, virtue, the (...)
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  36. Thomas C. Brickhouse (2010). Socratic Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press.
    Machine generated contents note: Introduction; Acknowledgements; 1. Apology of Socratic studies; 2. Motivational intellectualism; 3. The 'prudential paradox'; 4. Wrongdoing and damage to the soul; 5. Educating the appetites and passions; 6. Virtue intellectualism; 7. Socrates and his intellectual heirs: Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics; Appendix: Is Plato's Gorgias consistent with the other early or Socratic dialogues?; Bibliography of works cited; Index of passages; General index.
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  37. Arthur Brickman (1980). A Critique of the Laws of Moral Psychology in Rawls' a Theory of Justice. World Futures 16 (3):281-300.
    (1980). A critique of the laws of moral psychology in Rawls’ a theory of justice. World Futures: Vol. 16, Nationalism in an Interdependent World II, pp. 281-300.
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  38. David O. Brink & Dana K. Nelkin (2013). Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility. Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 1:284-313.
    This essay explores a conception of responsibility at work in moral and criminal responsibility. Our conception draws on work in the compatibilist tradition that focuses on the choices of agents who are reasons-responsive and work in criminal jurisprudence that understands responsibility in terms of the choices of agents who have capacities for practical reason and whose situation affords them the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. Our conception brings together the dimensions of normative competence and situational control, and we factor normative (...)
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  39. Berit Brogaard (2010). Stupid People Deserve What They Get: The Effects of Personality Assessment on Judgments of Intentional Action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):332-334.
    Knobe argues that people’s judgments of the moral status of a side-effect of action influence their assessment of whether the side-effect is intentional. We tested this hypothesis using vignettes akin to Knobe’s but involving economically or eudaimonistically (wellness-related) negative side-effects. Our results show that it is people’s sense of what agents deserve and not the moral status of side-effects that drives intuition.
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  40. Donald W. Bruckner (2011). Colburn on Covert Influences. Utilitas 23 (04):451-457.
    In , Ben Colburn claims that preferences formed through covert influences are defective. I show that Colburn's argument fails to establish that anything is wrong with preferences formed in this manner.
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  41. Cheshire Calhoun (2006). Peggy DesAutels and Margaret Urban Walker. Moral Psychology: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory. [REVIEW] Hypatia 21 (3):214-217.
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  42. H. G. Callaway (1999). Intelligence, Community and Cartesian Doubt. Humanism Today 13:31-48.
    This paper attempts some integration of two perspectives on questions about rationality and irrationality: the classical conception of irrationality as sophism and themes from the romantic revolt against Enlightenment reason. However, since talk of "reason" and "the irrational" often invites rigid dualities of reason and its opposites (such as feeling, intuition, faith, or tradition), the paper turns to "intelligence" in place of "reason," thinking of human intelligence as something less abstract, less purely theoretical, and more firmly rooted in practice, including (...)
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  43. Jeremy I. M. Carpendale, Stuart Hammond & Charlie Lewis (2010). The Social Origin and Moral Nature of Human Thinking. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):334.
    Knobe's laudable conclusion that we make sense of our social world based on moral considerations requires a development account of human thought and a theoretical framework. We outline a view that such a moral framework must be rooted in social interaction.
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  44. Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.) (2005). The Innate Mind. Oxford University Press.
    This is the first volume of a projected three-volume set on the subject of innateness. The extent to which the mind is innate is one of the central questions in the human sciences, with important implications for many surrounding debates. By bringing together the top nativist scholars in philosophy, psychology, and allied disciplines these volumes provide a comprehensive assessment of nativist thought and a definitive reference point for future nativist inquiry. The Innate Mind: Structure and Content, concerns the fundamental architecture (...)
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  45. Alisa L. Carse (2005). The Moral Contours of Empathy. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (1-2):169 - 195.
    Morally contoured empathy is a form of reasonable partiality essential to the healthy care of dependents. It is critical as an epistemic aid in determining proper moral responsiveness; it is also, within certain richly normative roles and relationships, itself a crucial constitutive mode of moral connection. Yet the achievement of empathy is no easy feat. Patterns of incuriosity imperil connection, impeding empathic engagement; inappropriate empathic engagement, on the other hand, can result in self-effacement. Impartial moral principles and constraints (...)
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  46. Marcia Cavell (1998). Book Review:The Sources of Moral Agency: Essays in Moral Psychology and Freudian Theory. John Deigh. [REVIEW] Ethics 108 (3):633-.
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  47. Clare Chambers, All Must Have Prizes.
    Liberals like choice.1 Human flourishing, they believe, is to some degree dependent on individuals’ ability to choose their ends and actions. However, liberals sometimes fail to note that this principle does not always work in reverse: it does not follow that an individual acting according to her own choices will flourish, or that she will necessarily have the freedom and autonomy which are crucial to flourishing. In this paper, I shall show that even outcomes which result from the choices of (...)
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  48. David K. Chan (2010). A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics, and Responsibility. MIT Press.
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  49. Richard Yetter Chappell & Helen Yetter-Chappell, Virtue and Salience.
    This paper explores two ways that evaluations of an agent’s character as virtuous or vicious are properly influenced by what the agent finds salient or attention-grabbing. First, we argue that ignoring salient needs reveals a greater deficit of benevolent motivation in the agent, and hence renders them more blameworthy. We use this fact to help explain our ordinary intuition that failing to give to famine relief (for example) is in some sense less bad than failing to help a drowning child (...)
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  50. Vere Chappell (1990). Locke's Moral Psychology. Journal of Philosophy 87 (10):524-525.
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