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  1. Carla Bagnoli (2000). Blackburn Sulla Questione Normativa”. Iride 30: 8-14.
    Se è un difetto della ragione essere incapaci di adottare certi mezzi, allo stesso modo è un difetto della ragione essere incapaci di adottare certi fini, dicono i kantiani. Secondo Blackburn questa tesi non-strumentalista deve la sua apparente validità ad una fallacia modale. Dal condizionale «Se si adotta il fine X, è necessario adottare il mezzo Y», si deriva il conseguente «Si deve adottare il mezzo Y», ci si interroga sulla natura del modale che occorre nel conseguente, poi si ricostruisce (...)
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  2. William A. Banner (1956). The Case for Ethical Determinacy. Review of Metaphysics 9 (3):455 - 461.
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  3. Paul Boghossian, Does Philosophy Matter? -- It Would Appear So. A Reply to Fish.
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  4. Chung-Ying Cheng (2002). Integrating the Onto-Ethics of Virtues (East) and the Meta-Ethics of Rights (West). Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 1 (2):157-184.
  5. James Dreier (2010). When Do Goals Explain the Norms That Advance Them? In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press. 5--153.
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  6. Ronald Dworkin (2011). Diamonds in the Cosmic Sands. The Philosophers' Magazine 54 (54):22-31.
    “Even the statement ‘There are no such things as moral duties’ is a claim about moral duties. There is no neutral position. If I say, ‘Are there any such things as moral duties?’ and you say, ‘No’, you’re not being neutral. You’re making a decision. You’re deciding that rich people have no duty to help poor people. That’s what you’re saying.”.
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  7. Ben Fraser (2013). Moral Error Theories and Folk Metaethics. Philosophical Psychology (6):1-18.
    In this paper, I distinguish between two error theories of morality: one couched in terms of truth (ET1); the other in terms of justification (ET2). I then present two arguments: the Poisoned Presupposition Argument for ET1; and the Evolutionary Debunking Argument for ET2. I go on to show how assessing these arguments requires paying attention to empirical moral psychology, in particular, work on folk metaethics. After criticizing extant work, I suggest avenues for future research.
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  8. Christopher Freiman (2014). Goodness and Moral Twin Earth. Erkenntnis 79 (2):445-460.
    Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons’s “Moral Twin Earth” thought experiment allegedly undercuts virtually any form of naturalist moral realism. I argue that a neo-Aristotelian conception of moral properties defeats Moral Twin Earth. Developing themes in the work of Peter Geach, Philippa Foot, and Rosalind Hursthouse, I sketch an Aristotelian moral semantics that is unique in construing terms like ‘right’ and ‘good’ exclusively as attributive adjectives that denote relational properties. On this view, moral goodness is a relational property predicated of those (...)
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  9. Mark Greenberg, Does 'How Facts Make Law' Prove Too Much?
    This paper was presented at the American Philosophical Association's 2007 Berger Prize session. It is a reply to Ken Himma's comment on my paper, "How Facts Make Law," which was awarded the 2007 Berger Prize for the outstanding paper in philosophy of law published during 2004 and 2005. In his thoughtful and thought-provoking paper, Himma claims that the argument of "How Facts Make Law" must go wrong somewhere because, if successful, the argument shows too much with too little. In particular, (...)
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  10. Jonathan Haidt, Ideology and Intuition in Moral Education.
    We propose that social psychological findings on the intuitive bases of moral judgment have broad implications for moral education. The “five foundations theory of intuitive ethics” is applied to explain a longstanding rift in moral education as an ideological disagreement about which moral intuitions should be endorsed and cultivated. The Kohlbergian moral reasoning side has sought to limit the domain of moral education to Harm and Fairness-related moral concerns, whereas character education approaches have tried also to cultivate intuitions concerning the (...)
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  11. Jonathan Haidt (2005). Invisible Fences of the Moral Domain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):552-553.
    Crossing the border into the moral domain changes moral thinking in two ways: (1) the facts at hand become “anthropocentric” facts not easily open to revision, and (2) moral reasoning is often the servant of moral intuitions, making it difficult for people to challenge their own intuitions. Sunstein's argument is sound, but policy makers are likely to resist.
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  12. John Hawthorne (2002). Practical Realism? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):169-178.
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  13. Tim Henning (2011). Moral Realism and Two-Dimensional Semantics. Ethics 121 (4):717-748.
    Moral realists can, and should, allow that the truth-conditional content of moral judgments is in part attitudinal. I develop a two-dimensional semantics that embraces attitudinal content while preserving realist convictions about the independence of moral facts from our attitudes. Relative to worlds “considered as counterfactual,” moral terms rigidly track objective, response-independent properties. But relative to different ways the actual world turns out to be, they nonrigidly track whatever properties turn out to be the objects of our relevant attitudes. This theory (...)
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  14. John Hospers (1988). Subjective Reality. Critical Review 2 (1):51-64.
    THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE by Thomas Nagel New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. 244 pp., $19.95.
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  15. Frank Jackson (2008). The Argument From the Persistence of Moral Disagreement. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Iii. Oup Oxford.
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  16. Richard Joyce, Moral Anti-Realism.
    It might be expected that it would suffice for the entry for “moral anti-realism” to contain only some links to other entries in this encyclopedia. It could contain a link to “moral realism” and stipulate the negation of the view there described. Alternatively, it could have links to the entries “anti-realism” and “morality” and could stipulate the conjunction of the materials contained therein. The fact that neither of these approaches would be adequate—and, more strikingly, that following the two procedures would (...)
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  17. Richard Joyce, Response to Nichols and Katz.
    To reject a false theory on the basis of an unsound argument is, in my opinion, as much an intellectual sin as to embrace a false theory. Thus, although I am no fan of any particular form of moral rationalism—and, indeed, on occasion have gone out of my way to criticize it—when rationalism is assailed for faulty reasons I find myself in the curious position of leaping to its defense (which goes to show that in philosophy it isn’t the case (...)
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  18. Richard Joyce (2008). Morality, Schmorality. In Paul Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest. Oxford University Press.
    In his contribution to this volume, Paul Bloomfield analyzes and attempts to answer the question “Why is it bad to be bad?” I too will use this question as my point of departure; in particular I want to approach the matter from the perspective of a moral error theorist. This discussion will preface one of the principal topics of this paper: the relationship between morality and self-interest. Again, my main goal is to clarify what the moral error theorist might say (...)
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  19. M. Karmasin (2002). Towards a Meta Ethics of Culture – Halfway to a Theory of Metanorms. Journal of Business Ethics 39 (4):337 - 346.
    This article deals with cross-cultural ethics. It discusses the grid-group model and is ethical implications. We try to show how cross-cultural ethics remain possible under this paradigm of ethical relativism. We discuss the theory of discourse and apply it to intercultural communication. Finally we offer some rules for (an ethical) intercultural discourse, which also may be interpreted as metanorms for cross-cultural interaction.
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  20. Arto Laitinen, A Critique of Charles Taylor's Notions of “Moral Sources” and “Constitutive Goods”.
    In this paper I argue that moral realism does not, pace Charles Taylor, need “moral sources” or “constitutive goods”, and adding these concepts distorts the basic insights of what can be called “cultural” moral realism.1 Yet the ideas of “moral topography” or “moral space” as well as the idea of “ontological background pictures” are valid, if separated from those notions. What does Taylor mean by these notions?
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  21. Brian Leiter (2000). Nietzsche's Metaethics: Against the Privilege Readings. European Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):277–297.
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  22. James Lenman (2010). 1. How to Share a Flat. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press. 5--175.
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  23. Neil Levy (2011). Moore on Twin Earth. Erkenntnis 75 (1):137-146.
    In a series of articles, Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons have argued that Richard Boyd’s defence of moral realism, utilizing a causal theory of reference, fails. Horgan and Timmons construct a twin Earth-style thought experiment which, they claim, generates intuitions inconsistent with the realist account. In their thought experiment, the use of (allegedly) moral terms at a world is causally regulated by some property distinct from that regulating their use here on Earth; nevertheless, Horgan and Timmons claim, it is intuitive (...)
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  24. JeeLoo Liu (2012). Moral Reason, Moral Sentiments and the Realization of Altruism: A Motivational Theory of Altruism. Asian Philosophy 22 (2):93-119.
    This paper begins with Thomas Nagel's (1970) investigation of the possibility of altruism to further examine how to motivate altruism. When the pursuit of the gratification of one's own desires generally has an immediate causal efficacy, how can one also be motivated to care for others and to act towards the well-being of others? A successful motivational theory of altruism must explain how altruism is possible under all these motivational interferences. The paper will begin with an exposition of Nagel's proposal, (...)
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  25. Dan López de Sa (2006). Values Vs Secondary Qualities. Teorema 25:197-210.
    McDowell, responding to Mackie’s argument from queerness, defended realism about values by analogy to secondary qualities. A certain tension between two interpretations of McDowell’s response is highlighted. According to one, realism about values would indeed be vindicated, but at the cost of failing to provide an appropriate response to Mackie’s argument; whereas according to the other, McDowell does provide an adequate response, but evaluative realism is jeopardized.
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  26. Diego E. Machuca (2011). Moderate Ethical Realism in Sextus' Against the Ethicists? In D. E. Machuca (ed.), New Essays on Ancient Pyrrhonism. Brill.
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  27. Alasdair MacIntyre (1999). Moral Pluralism Without Moral Relativism. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1:1-8.
    When we deny the truth of someone else’s moral beliefs and give our grounds for so doing, we make or imply judgments about the inadequacy of their reasons for belief and about the causes of their belief. And we presuppose a difference between them and us in both respects. In so doing we provide matter for a shared philosophical inquiry about the relevant types of reason and cause. It is a mark of rational disagreement on matters of serious moral import (...)
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  28. Brad Majors (2003). Moral Explanation and the Special Sciences. Philosophical Studies 113 (2):121 - 152.
    Discussion of moral explanation has reached animpasse, with proponents of contemporaryethical naturalism upholding the explanatoryintegrity of moral facts and properties, andopponents – including both anti-realists andnon-naturalistic realists – insisting thatsuch robustly explanatory pretensions as moraltheory has be explained away. I propose thatthe key to solving the problem lies in thequestion whether instances of moral propertiesare causally efficacious. It is argued that,given the truth of contemporary ethicalnaturalism, moral properties are causallyefficacious if the properties of the specialsciences are. Certain objections are rebuttedinvolving (...)
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  29. Sarin Marchetti (2010). William James on Truth and Invention in Morality. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 2 (2):127-161.
    In what follows I shall investigate how the notions of truth and invention inform our moral life. In particular, I will show how this idea has been explored by William James in his seminal essay The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life (MPML), by far his most clear-cut piece of moral philosophy. I will claim that the dialectics of the essay cannot be apprehended independently from the understanding of the moral psychology and epistemology James elaborates in his writings on pragmatism (...)
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  30. Sarah McGrath (2010). Moral Realism Without Convergence. Philosophical Topics 38 (2):59-90.
    It is sometimes claimed that if moral realism is true, then rational and informed individuals would not disagree about morality. According to this line of thought, the moral realist is committed to an extremely substantive convergence thesis, one that might very well turn out to be false. Although this idea has been accepted by prominent moral realists as well as by antirealists, I argue that we have no reason to think that it is true, and that the only convergence claims (...)
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  31. David McNaughton (1988). Moral Vision: An Introduction to Ethics. B. Blackwell.
    This book introduces the reader to ethics by examining a current and important debate. During the last fifty years the orthodox position in ethics has been a broadly non-cognitivist one: since there are no moral facts, moral remarks are best understood, not as attempting to describe the world, but as having some other function - such as expressing the attitudes or preferences of the speaker. In recent years this position has been increasingly challenged by moral realists who maintain that there (...)
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  32. Sibel Oktar (2008). Is Moore a Metaphysical Ethicist? Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:317-323.
    “Naturalistic fallacy” is generally associated with Moore’s charge against the naturalists. But for Moore, metaphysical ethics, including those of Kant is as guilty as naturalistic ethics in committing the naturalistic fallacy. Here, the fallacy is identifying “good” with anything metaphysical. Moore appreciates that ‘metaphysical’ propositions provide us with a chance to talk about objects that are not natural. And he thinks that metaphysical ethicists’ do not recognise that these objects do not exist at all, rather they think if the object (...)
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  33. Felix E. Oppenheim (1998). The Subjectivity of Moral Judgements: A Defence. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 1 (4):42-61.
    After criticizing some recent writings typical of the different forms of ethical objectivism, that is, intuitionism, naturalism (including the ideal observation theory and supervenience), and rationalism, I gave my reasons for siding with ethical subjectivism. I hope to demonstrate that this alternative meta?ethical theory does not consider moral judgements meaningless nor arbitrary, and that it is compatible with empiricism in science and with serious moral commitment. Objectivists, on the other hand, tend to take a parochial view of ethics, identifying morality (...)
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  34. Eleonora Orlando (2001). Abduction, Realism and Ethics. Theoria 16 (2):331-352.
    In this paper, I am concerned with the possibility of applying an abductive strategy in founding ethical realism. First, I criticize Harman’s position, according to which abduction, though useful for founding scientific realism, does not serve to found ethical realism. Secondly, I examine Sturgeon’s critique, according to which distinctively moral facts do constitute the best explanations of the moral evidence. Finally,I conclude that Sturgeon is right in as far as the ontological status of moral properties is concerned but his answer (...)
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  35. Uwe Peters & King'S. College London, Evolution, Moral Justification, and Moral Realism.
    Does evolutionary theory have the potential to undermine morality? In his book The Evolution of Morality, Richard Joyce (2006) argues for a positive answer. He contends that an evolutionary account of morality would undermine moral judgements and lend support to moral scepticism. I offer a critique of Joyce’s argument. As it turns out, his case can be read in two different ways. It could be construed as an argument to establish a general scepticism about the justification of moral judgements. Or (...)
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  36. Philip Pettit (2006). On Thinking How to Live: A Cognitivist View. [REVIEW] Mind 115 (460):1083 - 1105.
    Allan Gibbard’s strategy in his new book is to begin by describing a psychology of thinking and planning that certain agents might instantiate, then to argue that this psychology involves an ‘expressivism’ about thought that bears on what to do, and, finally, to try to show that ascribing that same psychology to human beings would explain the way we deploy various concepts in practical and normative deliberation. The idea is to construct an imaginary normative psychology, purportedly conforming to expressivist specifications, (...)
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  37. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2008). Reason, Morality, and Hume's "Active Principles" : Comments on Rachel Cohon's Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication. Hume Studies 34 (2):267-276.
    Rachel Cohon's Hume is a moral sensing theorist, who holds both that moral qualities are mind-dependent and that there is such a thing as moral knowledge. He is an anti-rationalist about motivation, arguing that reason alone does not motivate, but allows that both beliefs and passions are motivating. And he is both a descriptive and a normative moral theorist who, despite having resources for putting checks on our sentimentally-based moral evaluations, does end up with a kind of a relativistic account (...)
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  38. Simon Robertson (2011). A Nietzschean Critique of Obligation-Centred Moral Theory. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (4):563 - 591.
    The focal objection of Nietzsche's critique of morality is that morality is disvaluable because antagonistic to the highest forms of human excellence. Recent advances in Nietzsche commentary have done much to unpack this objection - an objection which, at first blush, shares certain affinities with worries developed by a number of more recent morality critics. Some, though, have sought to disassociate Nietzsche from these more recent critics, claiming that his critique is directed mainly against moralized culture and that it cannot (...)
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  39. Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco (2012). Social and Justified Legal Normativity: Unlocking the Mystery of the Relationship. Ratio Juris 25 (3):409-433.
    Can Hart's non-cognitivism be reconciled with his rejection of the predictive and sanction-based explanations of law? This paper analyses Hart's notion of the internal point of view and focuses on the notion of acceptance of a rule along the lines of a non-cognitivist understanding of intentional actions. It is argued that a non-cognitivist analysis of acceptance of rules is incomplete and parasitic on a more basic or primary model of acceptance that does not involve mental states. This basic or primary (...)
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  40. Steven Ross (2001). Two Problems of Moral Objectivity. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):49-62.
    Two distinct problems of objectivity in moral theory are that of reference and truth and that of justification. These questions are often run together. However, it is possible to discuss the two questions separately. A defense is offered of moral ascriptions and moral properties, in opposition to the proposals of Mackie and Harman. But the thin or minimal defense of moral ascriptions leaves the second problem of objectivity unaddressed. Further argumentation leads to a proposal that claims limited moral objectivity.
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  41. William A. Rottschaefer (1999). Moral Learning and Moral Realism: How Empirical Psychology Illuminates Issues in Moral Ontology. Behavior and Philosophy 27 (1):19 - 49.
    Although scientific naturalistic philosophers have been concerned with the role of scientific psychology in illuminating problems in moral psychology, they have paid less attention to the contributions that it might make to issues of moral ontology. In this paper, I illustrate how findings in moral developmental psychology illuminate and advance the discussion of a long-standing issue in moral ontology, that of moral realism. To do this, I examine Gilbert Harman and Nicholas Sturgeon's discussion of that issue. I contend that their (...)
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  42. Michael Rubin (2008). Sound Intuitions on Moral Twin Earth. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):307 - 327.
    A number of philosophers defend naturalistic moral realism by appeal to an externalist semantics for moral predicates. The application of semantic externalism to moral predicates has been attacked by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons in a series of papers that make use of their “Moral Twin Earth” thought experiment. In response, several defenders of naturalistic moral realism have claimed that the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment is misleading and yields distorted and inaccurate semantic intuitions. If they are right, the intuitions (...)
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  43. Stefan Sencerz (1995). Personal Goodness and Moral Facts. Journal of Philosophical Research 20:481-498.
    Peter Railton argues that normative realism is justified because the non-moral goodness of an individual has explanatory uses. After having equated moral rightness with a kind of impersonal social rationality, he argues that rightness, so defined, helps to explain various social phenomena. If he is right, then moral realism would be justified, too. Railton’s argument fails, however, on both counts. Several crucial steps in his reasoning are unsupported and are likely to be false. The explanations he proposes may be dismissed (...)
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  44. Alex Silk (2012). Review of Shafer-Landau, Russ, (Ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 6. [REVIEW] Ethics 122 (3):622-627.
  45. Matthew Silverstein (2012). Inescapability and Normativity. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (3).
    When we make ethical claims, we invoke a kind of objective authority. A familiar worry about our ethical practices is that this invocation of authority involves a mistake. This worry was perhaps best captured by John Mackie, who argued that the fabric of the world contains nothing so queer as objective authority and thus that all our ethical claims are false. Kantians such as Christine Korsgaard and David Velleman offer accounts of the objectivity of ethics that do without the controversial (...)
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  46. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (1987). Moral Realisms and Moral Dilemmas. Journal of Philosophy 84 (5):263-276.
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  47. Deborah C. Smith (2001). Moral Realism, Skepticism and Anti-Realism: A Critical Analysis of the Criteria for Moral Realism. Disputatio 11:1 - 10.
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  48. Jordan Howard Sobel (2001). Blackburn's Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):361 - 383.
    Moral properties would supervene upon non-moral properties and be conceptually autonomous. That, according to Simon Blackburn, would make them if not impossible at least mysterious, and evidence for them best explained by theorists who say they are not real. In fact moral properties would not challenge in ways Blackburn has contended. There is, however, something new that can be gathered from his arguments. What would the supervenience of moral properties and their conceptual autonomy from at least total non-moral properties entail (...)
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  49. Tamler Sommers, The Intellectually Modest Criminal.
    Michael Smith’s The Moral Problem gives an admirably straightforward condition for moral rightness: an act is morally right in circumstance C only if under conditions of full rationality we would all want to perform that act. I will assume that this condition, if met, would make acts objectively right and therefore vindicate a robust form of metaethical realism. There remains the question, however, of whether this condition can be met. Smith considers several arguments that it cannot, and this paper will (...)
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  50. Jorn Sonderholm (2008). Why Supervenience is a Problem for Brink's Version of Moral Realism. Journal of Philosophical Research 33:203-213.
    The aim of this paper is to show that David Brink’s influential version of moral realism cannot give a convincing explanation of moral supervenience. Section twocontains an outline and discussion of Brink’s view of moral properties. Section three explicates Brink’s notions of strong and weak supervenience. In sections four and five, Brink’s explanation of moral supervenience is discussed. It is argued that his functionalist view of moral properties means that the explanation of moral supervenience that he explicitly offers is not (...)
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