Related categories
Subcategories:
2279 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 2279
Material to categorize
  1. Bruce Aune (1997). Jocelyne Couture and Kai Nielsen, Eds., On the Relevance of Metaethics: New Essays on Metaethics Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 17 (4):246-249.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Carla Bagnoli (2000). Blackburn Sulla Questione Normativa”. Iride 30: 8-14.
    Se è un difetto della ragione essere incapaci di adottare certi mezzi, allo stesso modo è un difetto della ragione essere incapaci di adottare certi fini, dicono i kantiani. Secondo Blackburn questa tesi non-strumentalista deve la sua apparente validità ad una fallacia modale. Dal condizionale «Se si adotta il fine X, è necessario adottare il mezzo Y», si deriva il conseguente «Si deve adottare il mezzo Y», ci si interroga sulla natura del modale che occorre nel conseguente, poi si ricostruisce (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. William A. Banner (1956). The Case for Ethical Determinacy. Review of Metaphysics 9 (3):455 - 461.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Richard Bett (1989). Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Ed., Essays on Moral Realism Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 9 (6):252-254.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Richard Bett (1989). Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Ed., Essays on Moral Realism. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 9:252-254.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Paul Boghossian, Does Philosophy Matter? -- It Would Appear So. A Reply to Fish.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Sofia Bonicalzi, Leonardo Caffo & Mattia Sorgon (eds.) (2014). Naturalism and Constructivism in Metaethics. Cambridge Scholars.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. John Bowlin (2004). Virtue and Moral Realism. Nova Et Vetera 2.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Charlotte Brown (1992). Moral Sense Theorists. In Lawrence C. Becker & Charlotte B. Becker (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Ethics. Garland Publishing Inc. 2--862.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser (1998). Relativism and Normative Nonrealism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 54:115-137.
    Normative nonrealism denies, first, that some things are good or bad independently of facts about the attitudes of moral agents and, second, that attitude-independent moral facts determine what is rational. This implies that facts about what is rational are logically prior to what is moral. Nonrealism commonly assumes (a) that moral realism is false or unjustifiable, (b) that there is a conceptual connection between morality and rationality and (c) that the particular theory of rationality is the correct account of rationality. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Chung-Ying Cheng (2002). Integrating the Onto-Ethics of Virtues (East) and the Meta-Ethics of Rights (West). Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 1 (2):157-184.
  12. Ruth B. Cochran (1990). Some Problems with Loyality: The Metaethics of Commitment. Dialectics and Humanism 17 (3):201-210.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Brian Collins (2013). A Unique Metaphysical Problem for Moral Realism. Southwest Philosophy Review 29 (1):257-265.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. John J. Compton (1992). The Natural and the Normative. Review of Metaphysics 46 (2):406-408.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Hugh Mercer Curtler (1964). Subjectivism, Objectivism and Certain Tendencies in Current British and American Ethical Theory. Dissertation, Northwestern University
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Kevin M. DeLapp (2011). Metaethics. In James Fieser & Bradley Dowden (eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Jude P. Dougherty (2003). Robinson, Daniel N. Praise and Blame: Moral Realism and Its Application. Review of Metaphysics 56 (4):899-901.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. James Dreier (2010). When Do Goals Explain the Norms That Advance Them? In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press. 5--153.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Author A. C. Ewing (2010). Mind Association Subjectivism and Naturalism in Ethics. Mind 53 (210):120-141.
    This article is a discussion of the relationships of objectivity of value with subjectivist and naturalist ethics. the author considers and clarifies both the subjectivist and the naturalist views of ethics and how they assert judgments in relation to the objectivity of ethical values, and the role of intuition in terms of achievement of agreement that affirms the objectivity of ethical values. (staff).
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. David Faraci (2012). David Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (2):259-267.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Geoffrey Harrison Ferrari & Krister Bykvist, Explaining Right and Wrong.
    When an act is right or wrong, there may be an explanation why. Different moral theories recognize different moral facts and offer different explanations of them, but they offer no account of moral explanation itself. What, then, is its nature? This thesis seeks a systematic account of moral explanation within a framework of moral realism. In Chapter 1, I develop a pluralist theory of explanation. I argue that there is a prima facie distinctive normative mode of explanation that is essential (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Knud Haakonssen (1990). Natural Law and Moral Realism: The Scottish Synthesis. In M. A. Stewart (ed.), Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment. Oxford University Press. 61.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. John V. Hagopian (1965). Moral Realism. Hibbert Journal 63 (49):77.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. R. M. Hare (1998). A Moral Argument. In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical Theory 1: The Question of Objectivity. Oup Oxford.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. John Hawthorne (2002). Practical Realism? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):169-178.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Tim Henning (2011). Moral Realism and Two-Dimensional Semantics. Ethics 121 (4):717-748.
    Moral realists can, and should, allow that the truth-conditional content of moral judgments is in part attitudinal. I develop a two-dimensional semantics that embraces attitudinal content while preserving realist convictions about the independence of moral facts from our attitudes. Relative to worlds “considered as counterfactual,” moral terms rigidly track objective, response-independent properties. But relative to different ways the actual world turns out to be, they nonrigidly track whatever properties turn out to be the objects of our relevant attitudes. This theory (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons (1996). From Moral Realism to Moral Relativism in One Easy Step. Critica 28 (83):3-39.
    In recent years, defenses of moral realism have embraced what we call new wave moral semantics', which construes the semantic workings of moral terms like good' and right' as akin to the semantic workings of natural-kind terms in science and also takes inspiration from functionalist themes in the philosophy of mind. This sort of semantic view which we find in the metaethical views of David Brink, Richard Boyd, Peter Railton, is the crucial semantical underpinning of a naturalistic brand of moral (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. John Hospers (1988). Subjective Reality. Critical Review 2 (1):51-64.
    THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE by Thomas Nagel New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. 244 pp., $19.95.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Frank Jackson (2008). The Argument From the Persistence of Moral Disagreement. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oup Oxford.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Nathaniel Jezzi, Constructivism in Metaethics.
    Recent defenders of metaethical constructivism (like Christine Korsgaard, Sharon Street, Aaron James, and Carla Bagnoli) argue that this view can be shown to represent a new, free-standing alternative to familiar approaches in metaethics. If they are correct, traditional discussions in metaethics have overlooked an important position, one that is supposed to adequately explain the nature of our ethical thinking and practice while avoiding the kinds of objections that traditional views struggle with. However, what form constructivism should take and whether constructivists (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Richard Joyce, Moral Anti-Realism.
    It might be expected that it would suffice for the entry for “moral anti-realism” to contain only some links to other entries in this encyclopedia. It could contain a link to “moral realism” and stipulate the negation of the view there described. Alternatively, it could have links to the entries “anti-realism” and “morality” and could stipulate the conjunction of the materials contained therein. The fact that neither of these approaches would be adequate—and, more strikingly, that following the two procedures would (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Richard Joyce, Response to Nichols and Katz.
    To reject a false theory on the basis of an unsound argument is, in my opinion, as much an intellectual sin as to embrace a false theory. Thus, although I am no fan of any particular form of moral rationalism—and, indeed, on occasion have gone out of my way to criticize it—when rationalism is assailed for faulty reasons I find myself in the curious position of leaping to its defense (which goes to show that in philosophy it isn’t the case (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Richard Joyce (2008). Morality, Schmorality. In Paul Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest. Oxford University Press.
    In his contribution to this volume, Paul Bloomfield analyzes and attempts to answer the question “Why is it bad to be bad?” I too will use this question as my point of departure; in particular I want to approach the matter from the perspective of a moral error theorist. This discussion will preface one of the principal topics of this paper: the relationship between morality and self-interest. Again, my main goal is to clarify what the moral error theorist might say (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Božidar Kante (2008). Aesthetic Qualities as Iterated Response-Dependent. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 1:129-136.
    There is widespread view among numerous aestheticians that aesthetic and value properties are response-dependent. According to some philosophers the dependence has a rich and multilayered structure: value qualities (e.g. beauty) depend on our response to aesthetic properties (e.g. harmonious), which in turn depend on our response to a pattern of primary and secondary qualities (shapes and colors). Secondary qualities are themselves response-dependent. The basic dependence relation is thus iterated. The resulting structure is one of iterated response-dependence. The integral part of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. M. Karmasin (2002). Towards a Meta Ethics of Culture – Halfway to a Theory of Metanorms. Journal of Business Ethics 39 (4):337 - 346.
    This article deals with cross-cultural ethics. It discusses the grid-group model and is ethical implications. We try to show how cross-cultural ethics remain possible under this paradigm of ethical relativism. We discuss the theory of discourse and apply it to intercultural communication. Finally we offer some rules for (an ethical) intercultural discourse, which also may be interpreted as metanorms for cross-cultural interaction.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Marc Krellenstein, A Modern Nihilism.
    Reviews the best currently supported answers to a number of the hardest questions -- questions such as why there is something rather than nothing, or whether there are objective moral truths – and discusses them from a psychological point of view. These answers suggest an overall perspective that could be labeled a modern nihilism. This position respects the psychological reality of our beliefs and pleasures but suggests we have no satisfactory answers to most of these questions, and may never have (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Arto Laitinen, A Critique of Charles Taylor's Notions of “Moral Sources” and “Constitutive Goods”.
    In this paper I argue that moral realism does not, pace Charles Taylor, need “moral sources” or “constitutive goods”, and adding these concepts distorts the basic insights of what can be called “cultural” moral realism.1 Yet the ideas of “moral topography” or “moral space” as well as the idea of “ontological background pictures” are valid, if separated from those notions. What does Taylor mean by these notions?
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Justin Lawson, Quantum Mechanics and Ethical Antirealism: A Counter-Analogy to Boyd.
    In his paper How to Be a Moral Realist Boyd attempts to show how cases of ethical indeterminacy can be accounted for from an ethical realist’s standpoint. Boyd describes cases of extensional vagueness in the life-sciences which arise from knowable and definite underlying structures and draws an analogy to ethics to argue his case. This paper argues that an equally compelling analogy can be drawn between another type of scientific indeterminacy – that in quantum mechanics – and the related ethical (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Brian Leiter (2000). Nietzsche's Metaethics: Against the Privilege Readings. European Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):277–297.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. James Lenman (2010). 1. How to Share a Flat. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press. 5--175.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Neil Levy (2011). Moore on Twin Earth. Erkenntnis 75 (1):137-146.
    In a series of articles, Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons have argued that Richard Boyd’s defence of moral realism, utilizing a causal theory of reference, fails. Horgan and Timmons construct a twin Earth-style thought experiment which, they claim, generates intuitions inconsistent with the realist account. In their thought experiment, the use of (allegedly) moral terms at a world is causally regulated by some property distinct from that regulating their use here on Earth; nevertheless, Horgan and Timmons claim, it is intuitive (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Mark Linville (2009). The Moral Argument. In William Lane Craig & J. P. Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Blackwell Pub. 391--448.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. JeeLoo Liu (2012). Moral Reason, Moral Sentiments and the Realization of Altruism: A Motivational Theory of Altruism. Asian Philosophy 22 (2):93-119.
    This paper begins with Thomas Nagel's (1970) investigation of the possibility of altruism to further examine how to motivate altruism. When the pursuit of the gratification of one's own desires generally has an immediate causal efficacy, how can one also be motivated to care for others and to act towards the well-being of others? A successful motivational theory of altruism must explain how altruism is possible under all these motivational interferences. The paper will begin with an exposition of Nagel's proposal, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Dan López de Sa (2006). Values Vs Secondary Qualities. Teorema 25:197-210.
    McDowell, responding to Mackie’s argument from queerness, defended realism about values by analogy to secondary qualities. A certain tension between two interpretations of McDowell’s response is highlighted. According to one, realism about values would indeed be vindicated, but at the cost of failing to provide an appropriate response to Mackie’s argument; whereas according to the other, McDowell does provide an adequate response, but evaluative realism is jeopardized.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Diego E. Machuca (2011). Moderate Ethical Realism in Sextus' Against the Ethicists? In D. E. Machuca (ed.), New Essays on Ancient Pyrrhonism. Brill.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Alasdair MacIntyre (1999). Moral Pluralism Without Moral Relativism. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1:1-8.
    When we deny the truth of someone else’s moral beliefs and give our grounds for so doing, we make or imply judgments about the inadequacy of their reasons for belief and about the causes of their belief. And we presuppose a difference between them and us in both respects. In so doing we provide matter for a shared philosophical inquiry about the relevant types of reason and cause. It is a mark of rational disagreement on matters of serious moral import (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Brad Majors (2003). Moral Explanation and the Special Sciences. Philosophical Studies 113 (2):121 - 152.
    Discussion of moral explanation has reached animpasse, with proponents of contemporaryethical naturalism upholding the explanatoryintegrity of moral facts and properties, andopponents – including both anti-realists andnon-naturalistic realists – insisting thatsuch robustly explanatory pretensions as moraltheory has be explained away. I propose thatthe key to solving the problem lies in thequestion whether instances of moral propertiesare causally efficacious. It is argued that,given the truth of contemporary ethicalnaturalism, moral properties are causallyefficacious if the properties of the specialsciences are. Certain objections are rebuttedinvolving (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Sarin Marchetti (2010). William James on Truth and Invention in Morality. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 2 (2):127-161.
    In what follows I shall investigate how the notions of truth and invention inform our moral life. In particular, I will show how this idea has been explored by William James in his seminal essay The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life (MPML), by far his most clear-cut piece of moral philosophy. I will claim that the dialectics of the essay cannot be apprehended independently from the understanding of the moral psychology and epistemology James elaborates in his writings on pragmatism (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Sarah McGrath (2010). Moral Realism Without Convergence. Philosophical Topics 38 (2):59-90.
    It is sometimes claimed that if moral realism is true, then rational and informed individuals would not disagree about morality. According to this line of thought, the moral realist is committed to an extremely substantive convergence thesis, one that might very well turn out to be false. Although this idea has been accepted by prominent moral realists as well as by antirealists, I argue that we have no reason to think that it is true, and that the only convergence claims (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. David McNaughton (1988). Moral Vision: An Introduction to Ethics. B. Blackwell.
    This book introduces the reader to ethics by examining a current and important debate. During the last fifty years the orthodox position in ethics has been a broadly non-cognitivist one: since there are no moral facts, moral remarks are best understood, not as attempting to describe the world, but as having some other function - such as expressing the attitudes or preferences of the speaker. In recent years this position has been increasingly challenged by moral realists who maintain that there (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 2279