This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Subcategories:
322 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 322
Material to categorize
  1. Paul Boghossian (2011). The Maze of Moral Relativism. The New York Times.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Susan Dwyer, How not to argue that morality isn't innate: Comments on Jesse Prinz's “is morality innate?”.
    We must admire the ambition of Prinz’s title question. But does he provide a convincing answer to it? Prinz’s own view of morality as “a byproduct – accidental or invented – of faculties that evolved for different purposes (1),” which appears to express a negative reply, does not receive much direct argument here. Rather, Prinz’s main aim is to try to show that the considerations he believes are typically presented by moral nativists are insufficient or inadequate to establish that morality (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Matti Eklund, Evaluative Language and Evaluative Reality.
  4. Matti Eklund (2012). Alternative Normative Concepts. Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):139-157.
Ideal Observer Theories
  1. Glen O. Allen (1970). From the "Naturalistic Fallacy" to the Ideal Observer Theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 30 (4):533-549.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Christopher J. Berry, Maria Pia Paganelli & Craig Smith (eds.) (2013). The Oxford Handbook of Adam Smith. Oxford University Press.
    Preface Introduction Christopher J. Berry: Adam Smith: Outline of Life, Times, and Legacy Part One: Adam Smith: Heritage and Contemporaries 1: Nicholas Phillipson: Adam Smith: A Biographer's Reflections 2: Leonidas Montes: Newtonianism and Adam Smith 3: Dennis C. Rasmussen: Adam Smith and Rousseau: Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment 4: Christopher J. Berry: Adam Smith and Early Modern Thought Part Two: Adam Smith on Language, Art and Culture 5: Catherine Labio: Adam Smith's Aesthetics 6: James Chandler: Adam Smith as Critic 7: Michael C. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Roman Bonzon (1999). Aesthetic Objectivity and the Ideal Observer Theory. British Journal of Aesthetics 39 (3):230-240.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Richard B. Brandt (1955). The Definition of an "Ideal Observer" Theory in Ethics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15 (3):407-413.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Alexander Broadie (2006). Sympathy and the Impartial Spectator. In Knud Haakonssen (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith. Cambridge University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Vivienne Brown & Samuel Fleischacker (eds.) (2010). The Philosophy of Adam Smith: Essays Commemorating the 250th Anniversary of the Theory of Moral Sentiments. Routledge.
    The Philosophy of Adam Smith contains essays by some of the most prominent philosophers and scholars working on Adam Smith today. It is a special issue of The Adam Smith Review, commemorating the 250th anniversary of Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments. Introduction Part 1: Moral phenomenology 1. The virtue of TMS 1759 D.D. Raphael 2. The Theory of Moral Sentiments and the inner life Emma Rothschild 3. The standpoint of morality in Adam Smith and Hegel Angelica Nuzzo Part 2: Sympathy (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Thomas Carson, Relativising the Ideal Observer Theory.
    Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Geoff Cockfield, Ann Firth & John Laurent (eds.) (2007). New Perspectives on Adam Smith's the Theory of Moral Sentiments. Edward Elgar.
    1. Introduction Geoff Cockfield, Ann Firth and John Laurent -/- 2. The Role of Thumos in Adam Smith’s System Lisa Hill -/- 3. Adam Smith’s Treatment of the Greeks in The Theory of Moral Sentiments: The Case of Aristotle Richard Temple-Smith -/- 4. Adam Smith, Religion and the Scottish Enlightenment Pete Clarke -/- 5. The ‘New View’ of Adam Smith and the Development of his Views Over Time James E. Alvey -/- 6. The Moon Before the Dawn: A Seventeenth-Century Precursor (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. James Dreier (1996). Book Review: The Moral Problem by Michael Smith. [REVIEW] Mind 105 (418):363-367.
  10. Roderick Firth (1952). Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12 (3):317-345.
    The moral philosophy of the first half of the twentieth century, at least in the English-speaking part of the world, has been largely devoted to problems of an ontological or epistemological nature. This concentration of effort by many acute analytical minds has not produced any general agreement with respect to the solution of these problems; it seems likely, on the contrary, that the wealth of proposed solutions, each making some claim to plausibility, has resulted in greater disagreement than ever before, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Samuel Fleischacker (2013). Adam Smith's Moral and Political Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  12. Scott Forschler (2012). From Supervenience to “Universal Law”: How Kantian Ethics Become Heteronomous. In Dietmar Heidemann (ed.), Kant and Contemporary Moral Philosophy. De Gruyter.
    In his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant’s desiderata for a supreme principle of practical reasoning and morality require that the subjective conditions under which some action is thought of as justified via some maxim be sufficient for judging the same action as justified by any agent in those conditions. This describes the kind of universalization conditions now known as moral supervenience. But when he specifies his “formula of universal law” (FUL) Kant replaces this condition with a quite different (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Richard Garner (1967). Beardsley, Firth and the Ideal Observer Theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27 (4):618-623.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Jonathan Harrison (1956). Some Comments on Professor Firth's Ideal Observer Theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 17 (2):256-262.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Noriaki Iwasa (2013). On Three Defenses of Sentimentalism. Prolegomena 12 (1):61-82.
    This essay shows that a moral sense or moral sentiments alone cannot identify appropriate morals. To this end, the essay analyzes three defenses of Francis Hutcheson's, David Hume's, and Adam Smith's moral sense theories against the relativism charge that a moral sense or moral sentiments vary across people, societies, cultures, or times. The first defense is the claim that there is a universal moral sense or universal moral sentiments. However, even if they exist, a moral sense or moral sentiments alone (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Antti Kauppinen (2013). Sentimentalism (International Encyclopedia of Ethics). In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwell.
    Sentimentalism comes in many varieties: explanatory sentimentalism, judgment sentimentalism, metaphysical sentimentalism, and epistemic sentimentalism. This encyclopedia entry gives an overview of the positions and main arguments pro and con.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Jason Kawall (2010). The Epistemic Demands of Environmental Virtue. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 23 (1-2):109-28.
    To lead an environmentally virtuous life requires information—about morality, environmental issues, the impacts of our actions and commitments, our options for alternatives, and so on. On the other hand, we are finite beings with limited time and resources. We cannot feasibly investigate all of our options, and all environmental issues (let alone moral issues, more broadly). In this paper I attempt to provide initial steps towards addressing the epistemic demands of environmental virtue. In the first half of the paper I (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Jason Kawall (2009). Virtue Theory, Ideal Observers, and the Supererogatory. Philosophical Studies 146 (2):179-96.
    I argue that recent virtue theories (including those of Hursthouse, Slote, and Swanton) face important initial difficulties in accommodating the supererogatory. In particular, I consider several potential characterizations of the supererogatory modeled upon these familiar virtue theories (and their accounts of rightness) and argue that they fail to provide an adequate account of supererogation. In the second half of the paper I sketch an alternative virtue-based characterization of supererogation, one that is grounded in the attitudes of virtuous ideal observers, and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Jason Kawall (2006). On the Moral Epistemology of Ideal Observer Theories. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (3):359 - 374.
    In this paper I attempt to defuse a set of epistemic worries commonly raised against ideal observer theories. The worries arise because of the omniscience often attributed to ideal observers -- how can we, as finite humans, ever have access to the moral judgements or reactions of omniscient beings? I argue that many of the same concerns arise with respect to other moral theories (and that these concerns do not in fact reveal genuine flaws in any of these theories), and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Jason Kawall (2004). Moral Response-Dependence, Ideal Observers, and the Motive of Duty: Responding to Zangwill. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 60 (3):357-369.
    Moral response-dependent metaethical theories characterize moral properties in terms of the reactions of certain classes of individuals. Nick Zangwill has argued that such theories are flawed: they are unable to accommodate the motive of duty. That is, they are unable to provide a suitable reason for anyone to perform morally right actions simply because they are morally right. I argue that Zangwill ignores significant differences between various approvals, and various individuals, and that moral response-dependent theories can accommodate the motive of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Jason Kawall (2002). Virtue Theory and Ideal Observers. Philosophical Studies 109 (3):197 - 222.
    Virtue theorists in ethics often embrace the following characterizationof right action: An action is right iff a virtuous agent would performthat action in like circumstances. Zagzebski offers a parallel virtue-basedaccount of epistemically justified belief. Such proposals are severely flawedbecause virtuous agents in adverse circumstances, or through lack ofknowledge can perform poorly. I propose an alternative virtue-based accountaccording to which an action is right (a belief is justified) for an agentin a given situation iff an unimpaired, fully-informed virtuous observerwould deem the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Andrew McGonigal (2005). Moral Facts and Suitably Informed Subjects: A Reply to Denham. Ratio 18 (1):82–92.
    The nature of moral facts, and their relationship to rationality, imagination and sentiment, have been central and pressing issues in recent moral philosophy. In this paper, I discuss and criticise a meta-ethical theory put forward by Alison Denham, which views moral facts as being constituted by the responses of ideal, empathetic agents. I argue that Denham’s account is radically unstable, in that she has given us an account of the nature of such agents which is inconsistent with an independently plausible (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Charles W. Mills (2005). "Ideal Theory" as Ideology. Hypatia 20 (3):165-184.
  24. James Otteson (2011). How High Does the Impartial Spectator Go? In Paul Oslington (ed.), Adam Smith as Theologian. Routledge.
  25. B. C. Postow (1978). Ethical Relativism and the Ideal Observer. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39 (1):120-121.
    I show that roderick firth's ideal observer theory contains a loophole which allows conflicting ethical statements to be true. To remedy this, I recommend that we add to the list of defining characteristics of an ideal observer, The requirement that he be unable to have obligation-Determining reactions toward acts which he knows to be incompatible.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. D. D. Raphael (2007/2009). The Impartial Spectator: Adam Smith's Moral Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    D. D. Raphael examines the moral philosophy of Adam Smith (1723-90), best known for his famous work on economics, The Wealth of Nations, and shows that his thought still has much to offer philosophers today. Raphael gives particular attention to Smith's original theory of conscience, with its emphasis on the role of 'sympathy' (shared feelings).
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Adam Smith (2002 (1759)). Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments (Ed. K. Haakonssen). Cambridge University Press.
    A new edition of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, an important text in the history of moral and political thought.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Adam Smith (1976). The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith: I: The Theory of Moral Sentiments (D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie (Eds.)). OUP Oxford.
    A scholarly edition of a work by Adam Smith. The edition presents an authoritative text, together with an introduction, commentary notes, and scholarly apparatus.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Charles Taliaferro (2007). Transcendence and Feminism: Response to Anderson's “Feminist Challenges to Conceptions of God”. Philosophia 35 (3-4):371-373.
    An argument that Pamela Sue Anderson’s critique of Irigaray commits her to a version of the Ideal Observer Theory, a theory Anderson rejects. This paper was delivered in the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Charles Taliaferro (1988). Relativising the Ideal Observer Theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (1):123-138.
    THIS PAPER IS A DEFENSE OF AN OBJECTIVIST VERSION OF\nRODERICK FIRTH'S IDEAL OBSERVER THEORY OF ETHICS. IT\nANALYZES AND CRITIQUES A POWERFUL, RELATIVIZED IDEAL\nOBSERVER THEORY ADVANCED BY THOMAS CARSON.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. David Zimmerman (2003). Why Richard Brandt Does Not Need Cognitive Psychotherapy, and Other Glad News About Idealized Preference Theories in Meta-Ethics. Journal of Value Inquiry 37 (3):373-394.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
Moral Constructivism
  1. Carla Bagnoli (forthcoming). “Respect and Obligation. The Scope of Kant’s Constructivism”,. In S. Bacin, C. la Rocca & M. Ruffing (eds.), Proceedings of the XI International Congress of the Kantian Society. De Gruyter.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Carla Bagnoli (2013). Constructivism About Practical Knowledge. In , Constructivism in Ethics. Cambridge University Press. 153-182.
    It is largely agreed that if constructivism contributes anything to meta-ethics it is by proposing that we understand ethical objectivity “in terms of a suitably constructed point of view that all can accept” (Rawls 1980/1999: 307). Constructivists defend this “practical” conception of objectivity in contrast to the realist or “ontological” conception of objectivity, understood as an accurate representation of an independent metaphysical order. Because of their objectivist but not realist commitments, Kantian constructivists place their theory “somewhere in the space between (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Carla Bagnoli (2012). “Kant’s Contribution to Moral Epistemology”. Paradigmi 1:69-79.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Carla Bagnoli (2012). Self-Deception: A Constructivist Account. Humana.Mente 20:93-116.
    This paper takes a constitutivist approach to self-deception, and argues that this phenomenon should be evaluated under several dimensions of rationality. The constitutivist approach has the merit of explaining the selective nature of self-deception as well as its being subject to moral sanction. Self-deception is a pragmatic strategy for maintaining the stability of the self, hence continuous with other rational activities of self-constitution. However, its success is limited, and it costs are high: it protects the agent’s self by undermining the (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Carla Bagnoli, Constructivism in Metaethics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Constructivism in ethics is the view that insofar as there are normative truths, for example, truths about what we ought to do, they are in some sense determined by an idealized process of rational deliberation, choice, or agreement. As a “first-order moral account”--an account of which moral principles are correct--constructivism is the view that the moral principles we ought to accept or follow are the ones that agents would agree to or endorse were they to engage in a hypothetical or (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Carla Bagnoli (2009). Review of Charles Larmore The Autonomy of Morality. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 118 (4):536-540.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Carla Bagnoli (2002). Moral Constructivism: A Phenomenological Argument. Topoi 21 (1-2):125-138.
  8. Carla Bagnoli (2001). Rawls on the Objectivity of Practical Reason. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):307-329.
    This article argues that Rawls’ history of ethics importantly contributes to the advancement of ethical theory, in that it correctly situates Kantian constructivism as an alternative to both sentimentalism and rational Intuitionism, and calls attention to the standards of objectivity in ethics. The author shows that by suggesting that both Intuitionist and Humean doctrines face the charge of heteronomy, Rawls appearsto adopt a Kantian conception of practical reason. Furthermore, Rawls follows Kant in assuming that ethical objectivity can be vindicated only (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Melissa Barry (2013). Constructivist Practical Reasoning and Objectivity. In David Archard, Monique Deveaux, Neil Manson & Daniel Weinstock (eds.), Reading Onora O'Neill. Routledge. 17-36.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Selim Berker (forthcoming). Does Evolutionary Psychology Show That Normativity Is Mind-Dependent? In Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (eds.), Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Essays on the New Science of Ethics.
    Suppose we grant that evolutionary forces have had a profound effect on the contours of our normative judgments and intuitions. Can we conclude anything from this about the correct metaethical theory? I argue that, for the most part, we cannot. Focusing my attention on Sharon Street’s justly famous argument that the evolutionary origins of our normative judgments and intuitions cause insuperable epistemological difficulties for a metaethical view she calls "normative realism," I argue that there are two largely independent lines of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Thomas M. Besch, Reflections on the Foundations of Human Rights.
    Is there an approach to human rights that justifies rights-allocating moral-political principles as principles that are equally acceptable by everyone to whom they apply, while grounding them in categorical, reasonably non-rejectable foundations? The paper examines Rainer Forst’s constructivist attempt to provide such an approach. I argue that his view, far from providing an alternative to “ethical” approaches, depends for its own reasonableness on a reasonably contestable conception of the good, namely, the good of constitutive discursive standing. This suggests a way (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Thomas M. Besch (2011). Kantian Constructivism, the Issue of Scope, and Perfectionism: O'Neill on Ethical Standing. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):1-20.
    Kantian constructivists accord a constitutive, justificatory role to the issue of scope: they typically claim that first-order practical thought depends for its authority on being suitably acceptable within the right scope, or by all relevant others, and some Kantian constructivists, notably Onora O'Neill, hold that our views of the nature and criteria of practical reasoning also depend for their authority on being suitably acceptable within the right scope. The paper considers whether O'Neill-type Kantian constructivism can coherently accord this key role (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Thomas M. Besch (2008). Constructing Practical Reason: O'Neill on the Grounds of Kantian Constructivism. Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (1):55-76.
    The paper addresses O'Neill's view that her version of Kant's Categorical Imperative, namely, the requirement of followability (RF), marks the supreme principle of reason; it takes issue with her claim that RF commits us to Kantian constructivism in practical philosophy. The paper distinguishes between two readings of RF: on a weak reading, RF ranges over all (practical) reasoning but does not commit to constructivism, and on a strong version RF commits to constructivism but fails to meet its own test, and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Thomas M. Besch (2004). On Practical Constructivism and Reasonableness. Dissertation, University of Oxford
    The dissertation defends that the often-assumed link between constructivism and universalism builds on non-constructivist, perfectionist grounds. To this end, I argue that an exemplary form of universalist constructivism – i.e., O’Neill’s Kantian constructivism – can defend its universalist commitments against an influential particularist form of constructivism – i.e., political liberalism as advanced by Rawls, Macedo, and Larmore – only if it invokes a perfectionist view of the good. (En route, I show why political liberalism is a form of particularism and (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Charles P. Bigger (1981). Kant's Constructivism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):279-291.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 322