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  1. Zed Adams (2014). Against Moral Intellectualism. Philosophical Investigations 37 (1):37-56.
    This paper argues that non-cognitivism about moral judgements is compatible with moral realism. In order to reveal the possibility, and plausibility, of this hitherto under-explored position in metaethics, it surveys a series of four increasingly fine-grained formulations of the distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. It argues that all but the last of these distinctions should be rejected, on the grounds that they lead advocates of non-cognitivism away from what initially motivated them to advocate non-cognitivism in the first place. One significant (...)
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  2. Carla Bagnoli (2000). Blackburn Sulla Questione Normativa”. Iride 30: 8-14.
    Se è un difetto della ragione essere incapaci di adottare certi mezzi, allo stesso modo è un difetto della ragione essere incapaci di adottare certi fini, dicono i kantiani. Secondo Blackburn questa tesi non-strumentalista deve la sua apparente validità ad una fallacia modale. Dal condizionale «Se si adotta il fine X, è necessario adottare il mezzo Y», si deriva il conseguente «Si deve adottare il mezzo Y», ci si interroga sulla natura del modale che occorre nel conseguente, poi si ricostruisce (...)
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  3. Anne Margaret Baxley (2012). The Problem of Obligation, the Finite Rational Will, and Kantian Value Realism. Inquiry 55 (6):567-583.
    Abstract Robert Stern's Understanding Moral Obligation is a remarkable achievement, representing an original reading of Kant's contribution to modern moral philosophy and the legacy he bequeathed to his later-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century successors in the German tradition. On Stern's interpretation, it was not the threat to autonomy posed by value realism, but the threat to autonomy posed by the obligatory nature of morality that led Kant to develop his critical moral theory grounded in the concept of the self-legislating moral agent. Accordingly, (...)
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  4. Chris Beckett (2007). The Reality Principle: Realism as an Ethical Obligation. Ethics and Social Welfare 1 (3):269-281.
    Although a ?realist? stance is sometimes contrasted with a ?principled? one, this article argues that realism is, of itself, an important ethical principle. Acknowledging the problems that exist in defining ?reality?, and the fact that the nature of reality is contested, the article nevertheless insists on an ?out there? reality. It asserts that the existence of this external reality is, in practice, generally accepted, and indeed must be accepted if we are to make the important distinction between truth and falsehood. (...)
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  5. Matthew S. Bedke, Ethics Makes Strange Bedfellows: Intuitions and Quasi-Realism.
    You know the story. You have a few intuitions. You propose a few theories that fit them. It’s a living. Of course, things are more complicated than this. We are sensitive to counterexamples raised by others and wish to accommodate or explain away an ever-wider base of intuitive starting points. And a great deal of the action occurs in rational reflection that can alter what is intuitive, and in theorizing that overturns formerly justified beliefs and moves us to new justified (...)
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  6. Jeff Behrends (2013). Meta‐Normative Realism, Evolution, and Our Reasons to Survive. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):486-502.
    In this article, I articulate and respond to an epistemological challenge to meta-normative realism. The challenge has it that, if realism about the normative is correct, and if evolutionary forces have significantly influenced our normative judgments, then it would be a remarkable coincidence if the content of the normative facts and our normative judgments were aligned. I criticize David Enoch's recent attempt to meet this challenge, but provide an alternative response that is structurally similar. I argue that if realism is (...)
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  7. Lars Bergström (2002). Putnam on the Fact-Value Dichotomy. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):117-129.
    In Reason, Truth and History and certain related writings, Hilary Putnam attacked the fact-value distinction. This paper criticizes his arguments and defends the distinction. Putnam claims that factual statements presuppose values, that “the empirical world depends upon our criteria of rational acceptability,” and that “we must have criteria of rational acceptability to even have an empirical world.” The present paper argues that these claims are mistaken.
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  8. Lars Bergström (1981). Outline for an Argument for Moral Realism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 12:215-225.
    Moral realism is defined here as the ontological view that there are moral facts. This is compared with traditional views in moral philosophy, such as naturalism, nonnaturalism, and noncognitivism. It is argued that we have no good reasons to avoid inconsistencies among our moral views unless (we believe that) moral realism is true. Various counter-arguments to this claim are criticized. Moreover, it is argued that, since we do not want to give up the practice of moral reasoning, we have a (...)
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  9. Gunnar Björnsson (2013). Contextualism in Ethics. In Hugh LaFolette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
    There are various ways in which context matters in ethics. Most clearly, the context in which an action is performed might determine whether the action is morally right: though it is often wrong not to keep a promise, it might be permissible in certain contexts. More radically, proponents of moral particularism (see particularism) have argued that a reason for an action in one context is not guaranteed to be a reason in a different context: whether it is a reason against (...)
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  10. Simon Blackburn (2010). Truth, Beauty and Goodness. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press. 5--295.
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  11. Paul Boghossian, Does Philosophy Matter? -- It Would Appear So. A Reply to Fish.
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  12. Chung-Ying Cheng (2002). Integrating the Onto-Ethics of Virtues (East) and the Meta-Ethics of Rights (West). Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 1 (2):157-184.
  13. Patrick Clipsham (2013). In Defense of Anti‐Archimedean Moral Realism: A Response to Recent Critics. Metaphilosophy 44 (4):470-484.
    Ronald Dworkin famously argued that many putatively nonmoral metaethical theories can only be understood as being internal to the moral domain. If correct, this position, referred to as anti-archimedeanism, has profound implications for the methodology of metaethics. This is particularly true for skeptical metaethical theories. This article defends a version of anti-archimedeanism that is true to the spirit rather than the letter of Dworkin's original thesis from several recent objections. First, it addresses Kenneth Ehrenberg's recent attempt to demonstrate how certain (...)
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  14. Maeve Cooke (2012). Realism and Idealism: Was Habermas's Communicative Turn a Move in the Wrong Direction? Political Theory 40 (6):811 - 821.
  15. David Copp (2009). Realist-Expressivism and Conventional Implicature. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:167-202.
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  16. Robert Cowan (2013). Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2).
    In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in Ethical Intuitionism, whose core claim is that normal ethical agents can and do have non-inferentially justified first-order ethical beliefs. Although this is the standard formulation, there are two senses in which it is importantly incomplete. Firstly, ethical intuitionism claims that there are non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs, but there is a worrying lack of consensus in the ethical literature as to what non-inferentially justified belief is. Secondly, it has been overlooked (...)
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  17. A. E. Denham & S. Farelly-Jackson (1996). Kant and Contemporary Moral Philosophy. In Alan Montefiore & V. Muresan (eds.), Contemporary British Moral Philosophy. Editura Alternative.
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  18. Ulrich Diehl (1996). Sittliche Erkenntnis ohne objektive Werte? LOGOS 3 (2):134-167.
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  19. Tom Dougherty (2013). Vague Value. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1).
    You are morally permitted to save your friend at the expense of a few strangers, but not at the expense of very many. However, there seems no number of strangers that marks a precise upper bound here. Consequently, there are borderline cases of groups at the expense of which you are permitted to save your friend. This essay discusses the question of what explains ethical vagueness like this, arguing that there are interesting metaethical consequences of various explanations.
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  20. James Dreier (2010). 1. Wedgwood's Argument. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press. 5--153.
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  21. James Dreier (2010). When Do Goals Explain the Norms That Advance Them? In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press. 5--153.
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  22. Ronald Dworkin (2011). Diamonds in the Cosmic Sands. The Philosophers' Magazine 54 (54):22-31.
    “Even the statement ‘There are no such things as moral duties’ is a claim about moral duties. There is no neutral position. If I say, ‘Are there any such things as moral duties?’ and you say, ‘No’, you’re not being neutral. You’re making a decision. You’re deciding that rich people have no duty to help poor people. That’s what you’re saying.”.
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  23. David Enoch, Why I Am an Objectivist About Ethics (And Why You Are, Too).
    You may think that you're a moral relativist or subjectivist - many people today seem to. But I don't think you are. In fact, when we start doing metaethics - when we start, that is, thinking philosophically about our moral discourse and practice - thoughts about morality's objectivity become almost irresistible. Now, as is always the case in philosophy, that some thoughts seem irresistible is only the starting point for the discussion, and under argumentative pressure we may need to revise (...)
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  24. David Enoch (2007). An Outline of an Argument for Robust Metanormative Realism. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2 (2007):21-50.
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  25. Iskra Fileva (2008). The Neutrality of Rightness and the Indexicality of Goodness: Beyond Objectivity and Back Again. Ratio 21 (3):273-285.
    My purpose in the present paper is two-fold: to provide a theoretical framework for understanding the difference between rightness and virtue; and to systematically account for the role of objective rightness in an individual person's decision making. I argue that a decision to do something virtuous differs from a decision to do what's right not simply, as is often supposed, in being motivated differently but, rather, in being taken from a different point of view. My argument to that effect is (...)
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  26. William Fitzpatrick (2008). Robust Ethical Realism, Non-Naturalism, and Normativity. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:159-205.
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  27. Matthew Flannagan (2012). Is Ethical Naturalism More Plausible Than Supernaturalism? A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. Philo 15 (1):19-37.
    In many of his addresses and debates, William Lane Craig has defended a Divine Command Theory of moral obligation (DCT). In a recent article and subsequent monograph, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has criticized Craig’s position.1 Armstrong contended that a DCT is subject to several devastating objections and further contended that even if theism is true a particular form of ethical naturalism is a more plausible account of the nature of moral obligations than a DCT is. This paper critiques Armstrong’s argument. I will (...)
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  28. Ben Fraser (2013). Moral Error Theories and Folk Metaethics. Philosophical Psychology:1-18.
    In this paper, I distinguish between two error theories of morality: one couched in terms of truth (ET1); the other in terms of justification (ET2). I then present two arguments: the Poisoned Presupposition Argument for ET1; and the Evolutionary Debunking Argument for ET2. I go on to show how assessing these arguments requires paying attention to empirical moral psychology, in particular, work on folk metaethics. After criticizing extant work, I suggest avenues for future research.
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  29. Christopher Freiman (2014). Goodness and Moral Twin Earth. Erkenntnis 79 (2):445-460.
    Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons’s “Moral Twin Earth” thought experiment allegedly undercuts virtually any form of naturalist moral realism. I argue that a neo-Aristotelian conception of moral properties defeats Moral Twin Earth. Developing themes in the work of Peter Geach, Philippa Foot, and Rosalind Hursthouse, I sketch an Aristotelian moral semantics that is unique in construing terms like ‘right’ and ‘good’ exclusively as attributive adjectives that denote relational properties. On this view, moral goodness is a relational property predicated of those (...)
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  30. Joshua Gert (2010). Fitting-Attitudes, Secondary Qualities, and Values. Philosophical Topics 38 (1):87-105.
    Response-dispositional accounts of value defend a biconditional in which the possession of an evaluative property is said to covary with the disposition to cause a certain response. In contrast, a fitting-attitude account of the same property would claim that it is such as to merit or make fitting that same response. This paper argues that even for secondary qualities, response-dispositional accounts are inadequate; we need to import a normative notion such as appropriateness even into accounts of such descriptive properties as (...)
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  31. Joshua Gert (2007). Cognitivism, Expressivism, and Agreement in Response. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Ii. Clarendon Press.
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  32. Mark Greenberg, Does 'How Facts Make Law' Prove Too Much?
    This paper was presented at the American Philosophical Association's 2007 Berger Prize session. It is a reply to Ken Himma's comment on my paper, "How Facts Make Law," which was awarded the 2007 Berger Prize for the outstanding paper in philosophy of law published during 2004 and 2005. In his thoughtful and thought-provoking paper, Himma claims that the argument of "How Facts Make Law" must go wrong somewhere because, if successful, the argument shows too much with too little. In particular, (...)
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  33. Jonathan Haidt, Ideology and Intuition in Moral Education.
    We propose that social psychological findings on the intuitive bases of moral judgment have broad implications for moral education. The “five foundations theory of intuitive ethics” is applied to explain a longstanding rift in moral education as an ideological disagreement about which moral intuitions should be endorsed and cultivated. The Kohlbergian moral reasoning side has sought to limit the domain of moral education to Harm and Fairness-related moral concerns, whereas character education approaches have tried also to cultivate intuitions concerning the (...)
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  34. Jonathan Haidt (2005). Invisible Fences of the Moral Domain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):552-553.
    Crossing the border into the moral domain changes moral thinking in two ways: (1) the facts at hand become “anthropocentric” facts not easily open to revision, and (2) moral reasoning is often the servant of moral intuitions, making it difficult for people to challenge their own intuitions. Sunstein's argument is sound, but policy makers are likely to resist.
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  35. John Hawthorne (2002). Practical Realism? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):169-178.
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  36. Tim Henning (2011). Moral Realism and Two-Dimensional Semantics. Ethics 121 (4):717-748.
    Moral realists can, and should, allow that the truth-conditional content of moral judgments is in part attitudinal. I develop a two-dimensional semantics that embraces attitudinal content while preserving realist convictions about the independence of moral facts from our attitudes. Relative to worlds “considered as counterfactual,” moral terms rigidly track objective, response-independent properties. But relative to different ways the actual world turns out to be, they nonrigidly track whatever properties turn out to be the objects of our relevant attitudes. This theory (...)
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  37. John Hospers (1988). Subjective Reality. Critical Review 2 (1):51-64.
    THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE by Thomas Nagel New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. 244 pp., $19.95.
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  38. Frank Jackson (2008). The Argument From the Persistence of Moral Disagreement. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Iii. Oup Oxford.
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  39. Richard Joyce, Moral Anti-Realism.
    It might be expected that it would suffice for the entry for “moral anti-realism” to contain only some links to other entries in this encyclopedia. It could contain a link to “moral realism” and stipulate the negation of the view there described. Alternatively, it could have links to the entries “anti-realism” and “morality” and could stipulate the conjunction of the materials contained therein. The fact that neither of these approaches would be adequate—and, more strikingly, that following the two procedures would (...)
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  40. Richard Joyce, Response to Nichols and Katz.
    To reject a false theory on the basis of an unsound argument is, in my opinion, as much an intellectual sin as to embrace a false theory. Thus, although I am no fan of any particular form of moral rationalism—and, indeed, on occasion have gone out of my way to criticize it—when rationalism is assailed for faulty reasons I find myself in the curious position of leaping to its defense (which goes to show that in philosophy it isn’t the case (...)
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  41. Richard Joyce (2008). Morality, Schmorality. In Paul Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest. Oxford University Press.
    In his contribution to this volume, Paul Bloomfield analyzes and attempts to answer the question “Why is it bad to be bad?” I too will use this question as my point of departure; in particular I want to approach the matter from the perspective of a moral error theorist. This discussion will preface one of the principal topics of this paper: the relationship between morality and self-interest. Again, my main goal is to clarify what the moral error theorist might say (...)
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  42. M. Karmasin (2002). Towards a Meta Ethics of Culture – Halfway to a Theory of Metanorms. Journal of Business Ethics 39 (4):337 - 346.
    This article deals with cross-cultural ethics. It discusses the grid-group model and is ethical implications. We try to show how cross-cultural ethics remain possible under this paradigm of ethical relativism. We discuss the theory of discourse and apply it to intercultural communication. Finally we offer some rules for (an ethical) intercultural discourse, which also may be interpreted as metanorms for cross-cultural interaction.
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  43. Arto Laitinen, A Critique of Charles Taylor's Notions of “Moral Sources” and “Constitutive Goods”.
    In this paper I argue that moral realism does not, pace Charles Taylor, need “moral sources” or “constitutive goods”, and adding these concepts distorts the basic insights of what can be called “cultural” moral realism.1 Yet the ideas of “moral topography” or “moral space” as well as the idea of “ontological background pictures” are valid, if separated from those notions. What does Taylor mean by these notions?
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  44. Brian Leiter (2000). Nietzsche's Metaethics: Against the Privilege Readings. European Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):277–297.
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  45. James Lenman (2010). 1. How to Share a Flat. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press. 5--175.
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  46. Neil Levy (2011). Moore on Twin Earth. Erkenntnis 75 (1):137-146.
    In a series of articles, Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons have argued that Richard Boyd’s defence of moral realism, utilizing a causal theory of reference, fails. Horgan and Timmons construct a twin Earth-style thought experiment which, they claim, generates intuitions inconsistent with the realist account. In their thought experiment, the use of (allegedly) moral terms at a world is causally regulated by some property distinct from that regulating their use here on Earth; nevertheless, Horgan and Timmons claim, it is intuitive (...)
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  47. JeeLoo Liu (2012). Moral Reason, Moral Sentiments and the Realization of Altruism: A Motivational Theory of Altruism. Asian Philosophy 22 (2):93-119.
    This paper begins with Thomas Nagel's (1970) investigation of the possibility of altruism to further examine how to motivate altruism. When the pursuit of the gratification of one's own desires generally has an immediate causal efficacy, how can one also be motivated to care for others and to act towards the well-being of others? A successful motivational theory of altruism must explain how altruism is possible under all these motivational interferences. The paper will begin with an exposition of Nagel's proposal, (...)
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  48. Dan López de Sa (2006). Values Vs Secondary Qualities. Teorema 25:197-210.
    McDowell, responding to Mackie’s argument from queerness, defended realism about values by analogy to secondary qualities. A certain tension between two interpretations of McDowell’s response is highlighted. According to one, realism about values would indeed be vindicated, but at the cost of failing to provide an appropriate response to Mackie’s argument; whereas according to the other, McDowell does provide an adequate response, but evaluative realism is jeopardized.
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  49. Diego E. Machuca (2011). Moderate Ethical Realism in Sextus' Against the Ethicists? In , New Essays on Ancient Pyrrhonism. Brill.
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  50. Alasdair MacIntyre (1999). Moral Pluralism Without Moral Relativism. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1:1-8.
    When we deny the truth of someone else’s moral beliefs and give our grounds for so doing, we make or imply judgments about the inadequacy of their reasons for belief and about the causes of their belief. And we presuppose a difference between them and us in both respects. In so doing we provide matter for a shared philosophical inquiry about the relevant types of reason and cause. It is a mark of rational disagreement on matters of serious moral import (...)
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