Related categories
Siblings:
100 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 100
  1. Zed Adams (2006). Ethics Without Ontology. [REVIEW] Ethics 116 (2).
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Agustin Arrieta & Agustin Vicente (2013). El pluralismo moral de David Hume. Critica 45 (134):17-42.
    In this paper, we argue for an objectivist pluralist interpretation of Hume’s moral philosophy. We begin by approaching the pluralist/relativist distinction in aesthetics. Then we move to ethics, and present some reasons which justify considering Hume a normative pluralist, and, in particular, an objectivist pluralist. Our argument will make use of Hume’s idea that there are foru sources of value, and of his notion of artificial lives/moralities.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Thomas Bennigson (1996). Irresolvable Disagreement and the Case Against Moral Realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (4):411-437.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Rufus Black (2000). Christian Moral Realism: Natural Law, Narrative, Virtue, and the Gospel. Oxford University Press.
    This book describes the shape of a Christian ethic that arises from a conversation between contemporary accounts of natural law theory, and virtue ethics. The ethic that emerges from this conversation seeks to resolve the tensions in Christian ethics between creation and eschatology, narrative and natural law, and objectivity and relativity. Black moves from this analytic foundation to conclude that worship lies at the heart of a theologically grounded ethic whose central concern is the flourishing of the whole human person (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Simon Blackburn (1971). Moral Realism. In John Casey (ed.), Morality and Moral Reasoning. Methuen.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Anthony Robert Booth (2006). Can There Be Epistemic Reasons for Action? Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):133-144.
    In this paper I consider whether there can be such things as epistemic reasons for action. I consider three arguments to the contrary and argue that none are successful, being either somewhat question-begging or too strong by ruling out what most epistemologists think is a necessary feature of epistemic justification, namely the epistemic basing relation. I end by suggesting a "non-cognitivist" model of epistemic reasons that makes room for there being epistemic reasons for action and suggest that this model may (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. David O. Brink (1984). Moral Realism and the Sceptical Arguments From Disagreement and Queerness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):111 – 125.
  8. Peter Carruthers & Scott M. James (2008). Evolution and the Possibility of Moral Realism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):237-244.
    A commentary on Richard Joyce's The Evolution of Morality.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Marc Champagne (2011). Axiomatizing Umwelt Normativity. Sign Systems Studies 39 (11):9-59.
    Prompted by the thesis that an organism’s umwelt possesses not just a descriptive dimension, but a normative one as well, some have sought to annex semiotics with ethics. Yet the pronouncements made in this vein have consisted mainly in rehearsing accepted moral intuitions, and have failed to concretely further our knowledge of why or how a creature comes to order objects in its environment in accordance with axiological charges of value or disvalue. For want of a more explicit account, theorists (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Justin Clarke-Doane, Moral Realism and Mathematical Realism.
    Ethics and mathematics are normally treated independently in philosophical discussions. When comparisons are drawn between problems in the two areas, those comparisons tend to be highly local, concerning just one or two issues. Nevertheless, certain metaethicists have made bold claims to the effect that moral realism is on “no worse footing” than mathematical realism -- i.e. that one cannot reasonably reject moral realism without also rejecting mathematical realism. -/- In the absence of any remotely systematic survey of the relevant arguments, (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Justin Clarke-Doane (2014). Moral Epistemology: The Mathematics Analogy. Noûs 48 (2):238-255.
    There is a long tradition comparing moral knowledge to mathematical knowledge. In this paper, I discuss apparent similarities and differences between knowledge in the two areas, realistically conceived. I argue that many of these are only apparent, while others are less philosophically significant than might be thought. The picture that emerges is surprising. There are definitely differences between epistemological arguments in the two areas. However, these differences, if anything, increase the plausibility of moral realism as compared to mathematical realism. It (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. John Collier & Michael Stingl (2013). Evolutionary Moral Realism. Biological Theory 7 (3):218-226.
    Evolutionary moral realism is the view that there are moral values with roots in evolution that are both specifically moral and exist independently of human belief systems. In beginning to sketch the outlines of such a view, we examine moral goods like fairness and empathetic caring as valuable and real aspects of the environments of species that are intelligent and social, or at least developing along an evolutionary trajectory that could lead to a level of intelligence that would enable individual (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Terence Cuneo (2008). Moral Realism, QuasiRealism, and Skepticism. In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press. 176.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Terence Cuneo (2007). The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism. Oxford University Press.
    Moral realism of a paradigmatic sort -- Defending the parallel -- The parity premise -- Epistemic nihilism -- Epistemic expressivism : traditional views -- Epistemic expressivism : nontraditional views -- Epistemic reductionism -- Three objections to the core argument.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Terence Cuneo (2006). Moral Facts as Configuring Causes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):141–162.
    The overarching aim of this essay is to argue that moral realists should be "causalists" or claim that moral facts of certain kinds are causally efficacious. To this end, I engage in two tasks. The first is to develop an account of the sense in which moral facts of certain kinds are causally efficacious. After having sketched the concept of what I call a "configuring" cause, I contend that the exercise of the moral virtues is plausibly viewed as a configuring (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Terence Cuneo (2002). Reconciling Realism with Humeanism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):465 – 486.
    The central purpose of this essay is to consider some of the more prominent reasons why realists have rejected the Humean theory of motivation. I shall argue that these reasons are not persuasive, and that there is nothing about being a moral realist that should make us suspicious of Humeanism.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Terence Cuneo & Russ Shafer-Landau (2014). The Moral Fixed Points: New Directions for Moral Nonnaturalism. Philosophical Studies:1-45.
    Our project in this essay is to showcase nonnaturalistic moral realism’s resources for responding to metaphysical and epistemological objections by taking the view in some new directions. The central thesis we will argue for is that there is a battery of substantive moral propositions that are also nonnaturalistic conceptual truths. We call these propositions the moral fixed points. We will argue that they must find a place in any system of moral norms that applies to beings like us, in worlds (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Rafael de Clercq (2002). Two Conceptions of Response-Dependence. Philosophical Studies 107 (2):159-177.
    The traditional conception of response-dependence isinadequate because it cannot account for all intuitivecases of response-dependence. In particular, it is unableto account for the response-dependence of (aesthetic, moral, epistemic ...) values. I therefore propose tosupplement the traditional conception with an alternativeone. My claim is that only a combination of the twoconceptions is able to account for all intuitivecases of response-dependence.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Dan Demetriou (forthcoming). What Should Realists Say About Honor Cultures? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-19.
    Richard Nisbett and Dov Cohen’s (1996) influential account of “cultures of honor” speculates that honor norms are a socially-adaptive deterrence strategy. This theory has been appealed to by multiple empirically-minded philosophers, and plays an important role in John Doris and Alexandra Plakias’ (2008) antirealist argument from disagreement. In this essay, I raise four objections to the Nisbett-Cohen deterrence thesis, and offer another theory of honor in its place that sees honor as an agonistic normative system regulating prestige competitions. Since my (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Ben Dixon (2005). Achieving Moral Progress Despite Moral Regress. Social Philosophy Today 21:157-172.
    Moral progress and some of the conditions under which groups can make it is the focus of this paper. More specifically, I address a problem arising from the use of pluralistic criteria for determining moral progress. Pluralistic criteria can allow for judgments that moral progress has taken place where there is causally related moral regression. Indeed, an otherwise well-argued pluralistic theory put forward by Michelle Moody-Adams allows for such conflicting judgments. I argue, however, that the way in which Moody-Adams handles (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. David Enoch (2003). An Argument for Robust Metanormative Realism. Dissertation, New York University
    In this essay, I defend a view I call “Robust Realism” about normativity. According to this view, there are irreducibly, perfectly objective, normative truths, that when successful in our normative inquiries we discover rather than create or construct. My argument in support of Robust Realism is modeled after arguments from explanatory indispensability common in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of mathematics. I argue that irreducibly normative truths, though not explanatorily indispensable, are nevertheless deliberatively indispensable, and that this kind (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. William J. FitzPatrick (2009). Recent Work on Ethical Realism. Analysis 69 (4):746-760.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Guy Fletcher (2009). Uneasy Companions. Ratio 22 (3):359-368.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Guy Fletcher (2007). Wrongness, Welfarism and Evolution: Crisp on Reasons and the Good. Ratio 20 (3):341–347.
  25. James Franklin, Ethics From the Ground Up.
    Talk about ethics involves a great number of different sorts of concepts – rules, virtues, values, outcomes, rights, etc … Ethics is about all those things, but it is not fundamentally about them. Let’s review them with a view to seeing why they are not basic.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. James Franklin, Natural Law Ethics in Disciplines Abstract to Applied.
    Language suggestive of natural law ethics, similar to the Catholic understanding of ethical foundations, is prevalent in a number of disciplines. But it does not always issue in a full-blooded commitment to objective ethics, being undermined by relativist ethical currents. In law and politics, there is a robust conception of "human rights", but it has become somewhat detached from both the worth of persons in themselves and from duties. In education, talk of "values" imports ethical considerations but hints at a (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. James Franklin (2006). Traditional Catholic Philosophy: Baby and Bathwater. In M. Whelan (ed.), Issues for Church and Society in Australia. St Pauls.
    The teaching of the Aquinas Academy in its first thirty years was based on the scholastic philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, then regarded as the official philosophy of the Catholic Church. That philosophy has not been so much heard of in the last thirty years, but it has a strong presence below the surface. Its natural law theory of ethics, especially, still informs Vatican pronouncements on moral topics such as contraception and euthanasia. It has also been important in Australia in the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Alan Gilbert (1986). Moral Realism, Individuality, and Justice in War. Political Theory 14 (1):105-135.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Irwin Goldstein (2002). The Good's Magnetism and Ethical Realism. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):1-14.
    People support ethical antirealism with various arguments. Gilbert Harman thinks if a property of goodness existed, it would have detectable effects on objects that have it. However, Harman reasons, the good has no such detectable effects. Internalists think if good objects had some goodness property, that property would bond to desire and action in a way inconsistent with ethical realism. I defend ethical realism from the two arguments. I explain how good can both name a property and how objects with (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Irwin Goldstein (1980). Why People Prefer Pleasure to Pain. Philosophy 55 (July):349-362.
    Against Hume and Epicurus I argue that our selection of pleasure, pain and other objects as our ultimate ends is guided by reason. There are two parts to the explanation of our attraction to pleasure, our aversion to pain, and our consequent preference of pleasure to pain: 1. Pleasure presents us with reason to seek it, pain presents us reason to avoid it, and 2. Being intelligent, human beings (and to a degree, many animals) are disposed to be guided by (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Peter H. Hare (2008). Pragmatic Moral Realism: A Transcendental Defense. By Sami Pihlström. Metaphilosophy 39 (2):256–261.
    Peter Hare's review of Sami Pihlstrom's book.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. William F. Harms (2000). Adaptation and Moral Realism. Biology and Philosophy 15 (5):699-712.
    Conventional wisdom has it that evolution makes a sham of morality, even if morality is an adaptation. I disagree. I argue that our best current adaptationist theory of meaning offers objective truth conditionsfor signaling systems of all sorts. The objectivity is, however, relative to species – specifically to the adaptive history of the signaling system in question. While evolution may not provide the kind of species independent objective standards that (e.g.) Kantians desire, this should be enough for the practical work (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Chris Heathwood (forthcoming). Irreducibly Normative Properties. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 10.
    Metaethical non-naturalists maintain that normative or evaluative properties cannot be reduced to, or otherwise explained in terms of, natural properties. They thus have difficulty explaining what these irreducibly normative properties are supposed to be, other than by saying what they are not. I offer a partial, positive characterization of irreducible normativity in naturalistic terms. At a first pass, it is this: that to attribute a normative property to something is necessarily to commend or condemn that thing, due to the nature (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Robert Heinaman (ed.) (1995). Aristotle and Moral Realism. Westview Press.
    The question of moral realism—whether our ethical beliefs rest on some objective foundation—is one that mattered as much to Aristotle as it does to us today, and his writings on this topic continue to provide inspiration for the contemporary debate. This volume of essays expands the fruitful conversation among scholars of ancient philosophy and contemporary ethical theorists on this question and related issues such as the virtues, justice, and Aristotle’s theory of tragedy.The distinguished contributors to this volume enrich and clarify (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2010). Mandelbaum on Moral Phenomenology and Moral Realism. In Ian Verstegen (ed.), Maurice Mandelbaum and American Critical Realism. Routledge. 105.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Michael Huemer, A Liberal Realist Answer to Debunking Skepticism: The Empirical Case for Realism.
    Debunking skeptics claim that our moral beliefs are formed by processes unsuited to identifying objective facts, such as emotions inculcated by our genes and culture; therefore, they say, even if there are objective moral facts, we probably don’t know them. I argue that the debunking skeptics cannot explain the pervasive trend toward liberalization of values over human history, and that the best explanation is the realist’s: humanity is becoming increasingly liberal because liberalism is the objectively correct moral stance.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Michael Huemer, Reason, Objectivity, and Goodness.
    This paper will focus on my conception of the nature of morality, which I call intuitionism. My conception is inspired in large part by earlier intuitionists (Moore, Ross, and Prichard), though I do not claim they would all agree exactly with everything I say.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Michael Huemer (2009). Précis of Ethical Intuitionism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):192-196.
    I summarize the main conclusions of my 2005 book, Ethical Intuitionism, for the book symposium in this issue.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Richard Joyce (2002). Moral Realism and Teleosemantics. Biology and Philosophy 16 (5):723-31.
    In a recent article, William F. Harms (2000) argues in a novel way for a form of moral realism. He does not actually argue that moral realism is true, but rather that if morality is the product of natural selection.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Patrick Kain (2006). Realism and Anti-Realism in Kant's Second Critique. Philosophy Compass 1 (5):449–465.
    This critical survey of recent work on Kant's doctrine of the fact of reason and his doctrine of the practical postulates (of freedom, God, and immortality) assesses the implications of these doctrines for the debate about realism and antirealism in Kant's moral philosophy. Section 1 briefly surveys some salient considerations from the first Critique and Groundwork. In section 2, I argue that recent work on the role, content, "factual" nature, and epistemic status of the fact of reason does not support (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Patrick Kain (2004). Self-Legislation in Kant's Moral Philosophy. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 86 (3):257-306.
    Kant famously insisted that “the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislative will” is the supreme principle of morality. Recent interpreters have taken this emphasis on the self-legislation of the moral law as evidence that Kant endorsed a distinctively constructivist conception of morality according to which the moral law is a positive law, created by us. But a closer historical examination suggests otherwise. Kant developed his conception of legislation in the context of his opposition to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Shin Kim, Moral Realism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Simon Kirchin (2009). The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism • by Terence Cuneo. Analysis 69 (1):189-190.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Joel J. Kupperman (1987). Moral Realism and Metaphysical Anti-Realism. Metaphilosophy 18 (2):95–107.
    The essay has two purposes. One is to point out connections and parallels between, On one hand, The debates of metaphysical realists and anti-Realists, And on the other hand, The debates surrounding moral realism. The second is to provide the outlines of a case for a kind of position that would generally be classified as moral realism. One feature of this position is that it emerges as parallel to, And compatible with, A metaphysical position that would generally be classified as (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Hallvard Lillehammer (2013). The Argument From Queerness. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics.
  46. Hallvard Lillehammer (2002). Moral Realism, Normative Reasons, and Rational Intelligibility. Erkenntnis 57 (1):47-69.
    This paper concerns a prima facie tension between the claims that (a) agents have normative reasons obtaining in virtue of the nature of the options that confront them, and (b) there is a non-trivial connection between the grounds of normative reasons and the upshots of sound practical reasoning. Joint commitment to these claims is shown to give rise to a dilemma. I argue that the dilemma is avoidable on a response dependent account of normative reasons accommodating both (a) and (b) (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. JeeLoo Liu (2007). Confucian Moral Realism. Asian Philosophy 17 (2):167 – 184.
    In this paper I construct Confucian moral realism as a metaethical theory that is compatible with, or even derivable from, traditional Confucianism. The paper is at once interpretative and constructive. In my analysis, Confucians can establish the realist's claims on moral properties because they embrace the view of a moralistic universe. Moral properties in Confucian ethics not only are presented as objective, naturalistic properties, but also are seen as 'causally efficacious'. There are several theses commonly endorsed by contemporary moral realists. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. D. Loeb (1998). Moral Realism and the Argument From Disagreement. Philosophical Studies 90 (3):281-303.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Edouard Machery, Daniel Kelly & Stephen P. Stich (2005). Moral Realism and Cross-Cultural Normative Diversity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):830-830.
    We discuss the implications of the findings reported in the target article for moral theory, and argue that they represent a clear and genuine case of fundamental moral disagreement. As such, the findings support a moderate form of moral anti-realism – the position that, for some moral issues, there is no fact of the matter about what is right and wrong.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Diego E. Machuca (2011). Review of R. Joyce & S. Kirchin (Eds.), A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory (Springer, 2010). [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 31 (5):354-358.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 100