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  1. Zed Adams (2006). Ethics Without Ontology. [REVIEW] Ethics 116 (2).
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  2. Thomas Bennigson (1996). Irresolvable Disagreement and the Case Against Moral Realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (4):411-437.
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  3. Rufus Black (2000). Christian Moral Realism: Natural Law, Narrative, Virtue, and the Gospel. Oxford University Press.
    This book describes the shape of a Christian ethic that arises from a conversation between contemporary accounts of natural law theory, and virtue ethics. The ethic that emerges from this conversation seeks to resolve the tensions in Christian ethics between creation and eschatology, narrative and natural law, and objectivity and relativity. Black moves from this analytic foundation to conclude that worship lies at the heart of a theologically grounded ethic whose central concern is the flourishing of the whole human person (...)
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  4. Anthony Robert Booth (2006). Can There Be Epistemic Reasons for Action? Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):133-144.
    In this paper I consider whether there can be such things as epistemic reasons for action. I consider three arguments to the contrary and argue that none are successful, being either somewhat question-begging or too strong by ruling out what most epistemologists think is a necessary feature of epistemic justification, namely the epistemic basing relation. I end by suggesting a "non-cognitivist" model of epistemic reasons that makes room for there being epistemic reasons for action and suggest that this model may (...)
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  5. David O. Brink (1984). Moral Realism and the Sceptical Arguments From Disagreement and Queerness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):111 – 125.
  6. Peter Carruthers & Scott M. James (2008). Evolution and the Possibility of Moral Realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):237-244.
    A commentary on Richard Joyce's The Evolution of Morality.
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  7. Marc Champagne (2011). Axiomatizing Umwelt Normativity. Sign Systems Studies 39 (11):9-59.
    Prompted by the thesis that an organism’s umwelt possesses not just a descriptive dimension, but a normative one as well, some have sought to annex semiotics with ethics. Yet the pronouncements made in this vein have consisted mainly in rehearsing accepted moral intuitions, and have failed to concretely further our knowledge of why or how a creature comes to order objects in its environment in accordance with axiological charges of value or disvalue. For want of a more explicit account, theorists (...)
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  8. Justin Clarke-Doane, Moral Realism and Mathematical Realism.
    Ethics and mathematics are normally treated independently in philosophical discussions. When comparisons are drawn between problems in the two areas, those comparisons tend to be highly local, concerning just one or two issues. Nevertheless, certain metaethicists have made bold claims to the effect that moral realism is on “no worse footing” than mathematical realism -- i.e. that one cannot reasonably reject moral realism without also rejecting mathematical realism. -/- In the absence of any remotely systematic survey of the relevant arguments, (...)
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  9. Justin Clarke-Doane (forthcoming). Moral Epistemology: The Mathematics Analogy. Noûs.
    In this paper I discuss apparent similarities and differences between moral knowledge and mathematical knowledge, realistically conceived. I argue that many of these are only apparent, while others are less philosophically significant than might be thought. The picture that emerges is surprising. There are definitely differences between epistemological arguments in the two areas. However, these differences, if anything, increase the plausibility of moral realism as compared to mathematical realism. It is hard to see how one might argue, on epistemological grounds, (...)
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  10. John Collier & Michael Stingl, Evolutionary Moral Realism.
    1. Evolutionary Moral Realism. On most contemporary approaches to evolution and ethics, morality is not a real part of the environment in which social and intelligent creatures evolve.1 According to such approaches, certain cooperative behavioural patterns develop, and thus become biologically real, but morality doesn’t become possible until creatures evolve a sophisticated enough cognitive ability to mistake the goals of such behavioural patterns for objective moral values. At a metaethical level, this line of thought has led evolutionary biologists and moral (...)
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  11. Terence Cuneo (2007). The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism. Oxford University Press.
    Moral realism of a paradigmatic sort -- Defending the parallel -- The parity premise -- Epistemic nihilism -- Epistemic expressivism : traditional views -- Epistemic expressivism : nontraditional views -- Epistemic reductionism -- Three objections to the core argument.
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  12. Terence Cuneo (2006). Moral Facts as Configuring Causes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):141–162.
    The overarching aim of this essay is to argue that moral realists should be "causalists" or claim that moral facts of certain kinds are causally efficacious. To this end, I engage in two tasks. The first is to develop an account of the sense in which moral facts of certain kinds are causally efficacious. After having sketched the concept of what I call a "configuring" cause, I contend that the exercise of the moral virtues is plausibly viewed as a configuring (...)
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  13. Terence Cuneo (2002). Reconciling Realism with Humeanism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):465 – 486.
    The central purpose of this essay is to consider some of the more prominent reasons why realists have rejected the Humean theory of motivation. I shall argue that these reasons are not persuasive, and that there is nothing about being a moral realist that should make us suspicious of Humeanism.
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  14. Rafael de Clercq (2002). Two Conceptions of Response-Dependence. Philosophical Studies 107 (2):159-177.
    The traditional conception of response-dependence isinadequate because it cannot account for all intuitivecases of response-dependence. In particular, it is unableto account for the response-dependence of (aesthetic, moral, epistemic ...) values. I therefore propose tosupplement the traditional conception with an alternativeone. My claim is that only a combination of the twoconceptions is able to account for all intuitivecases of response-dependence.
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  15. Ben Dixon (2005). Achieving Moral Progress Despite Moral Regress. Social Philosophy Today 21:157-172.
    Moral progress and some of the conditions under which groups can make it is the focus of this paper. More specifically, I address a problem arising from the use of pluralistic criteria for determining moral progress. Pluralistic criteria can allow for judgments that moral progress has taken place where there is causally related moral regression. Indeed, an otherwise well-argued pluralistic theory put forward by Michelle Moody-Adams allows for such conflicting judgments. I argue, however, that the way in which Moody-Adams handles (...)
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  16. David Enoch (2003). An Argument for Robust Metanormative Realism. Dissertation, New York University
    In this essay, I defend a view I call “Robust Realism” about normativity. According to this view, there are irreducibly, perfectly objective, normative truths, that when successful in our normative inquiries we discover rather than create or construct. My argument in support of Robust Realism is modeled after arguments from explanatory indispensability common in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of mathematics. I argue that irreducibly normative truths, though not explanatorily indispensable, are nevertheless deliberatively indispensable, and that this kind (...)
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  17. William J. FitzPatrick (2009). Recent Work on Ethical Realism. Analysis 69 (4):746-760.
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  18. Guy Fletcher (2009). Uneasy Companions. Ratio 22 (3):359-368.
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  19. Guy Fletcher (2007). Wrongness, Welfarism and Evolution: Crisp on Reasons and the Good. Ratio 20 (3):341–347.
  20. James Franklin, Natural Law Ethics in Disciplines Abstract to Applied.
    Language suggestive of natural law ethics, similar to the Catholic understanding of ethical foundations, is prevalent in a number of disciplines. But it does not always issue in a full-blooded commitment to objective ethics, being undermined by relativist ethical currents. In law and politics, there is a robust conception of "human rights", but it has become somewhat detached from both the worth of persons in themselves and from duties. In education, talk of "values" imports ethical considerations but hints at a (...)
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  21. James Franklin, Ethics From the Ground Up.
    Talk about ethics involves a great number of different sorts of concepts – rules, virtues, values, outcomes, rights, etc … Ethics is about all those things, but it is not fundamentally about them. Let’s review them with a view to seeing why they are not basic.
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  22. James Franklin (2006). Traditional Catholic Philosophy: Baby and Bathwater. In M. Whelan (ed.), Issues for Church and Society in Australia. St Pauls.
    The teaching of the Aquinas Academy in its first thirty years was based on the scholastic philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, then regarded as the official philosophy of the Catholic Church. That philosophy has not been so much heard of in the last thirty years, but it has a strong presence below the surface. Its natural law theory of ethics, especially, still informs Vatican pronouncements on moral topics such as contraception and euthanasia. It has also been important in Australia in the (...)
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  23. Alan Gilbert (1986). Moral Realism, Individuality, and Justice in War. Political Theory 14 (1):105-135.
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  24. Irwin Goldstein (2002). The Good's Magnetism and Ethical Realism. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):1-14.
    People support ethical antirealism with various arguments. Gilbert Harman thinks if a property of goodness existed, it would have detectable effects on objects that have it. However, Harman reasons, the good has no such detectable effects. Internalists think if good objects had some goodness property, that property would bond to desire and action in a way inconsistent with ethical realism. I defend ethical realism from the two arguments. I explain how good can both name a property and how objects with (...)
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  25. Irwin Goldstein (1980). Why People Prefer Pleasure to Pain. Philosophy 55 (July):349-362.
    Against Hume and Epicurus I argue that our selection of pleasure, pain and other objects as our ultimate ends is guided by reason. There are two parts to the explanation of our attraction to pleasure, our aversion to pain, and our consequent preference of pleasure to pain: 1. Pleasure presents us with reason to seek it, pain presents us reason to avoid it, and 2. Being intelligent, human beings (and to a degree, many animals) are disposed to be guided by (...)
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  26. Peter H. Hare (2008). Pragmatic Moral Realism: A Transcendental Defense. By Sami Pihlström. Metaphilosophy 39 (2):256–261.
    Peter Hare's review of Sami Pihlstrom's book.
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  27. William F. Harms (2000). Adaptation and Moral Realism. Biology and Philosophy 15 (5).
    Conventional wisdom has it that evolution makes a sham of morality, even if morality is an adaptation. I disagree. I argue that our best current adaptationist theory of meaning offers objective truth conditionsfor signaling systems of all sorts. The objectivity is, however, relative to species – specifically to the adaptive history of the signaling system in question. While evolution may not provide the kind of species independent objective standards that (e.g.) Kantians desire, this should be enough for the practical work (...)
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  28. Robert Heinaman (ed.) (1995). Aristotle and Moral Realism. Westview Press.
    The question of moral realism—whether our ethical beliefs rest on some objective foundation—is one that mattered as much to Aristotle as it does to us today, and his writings on this topic continue to provide inspiration for the contemporary debate. This volume of essays expands the fruitful conversation among scholars of ancient philosophy and contemporary ethical theorists on this question and related issues such as the virtues, justice, and Aristotle’s theory of tragedy.The distinguished contributors to this volume enrich and clarify (...)
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  29. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2010). Mandelbaum on Moral Phenomenology and Moral Realism. In Ian Verstegen (ed.), Maurice Mandelbaum and American Critical Realism. Routledge.
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  30. Michael Huemer, Reason, Objectivity, and Goodness.
    This paper will focus on my conception of the nature of morality, which I call intuitionism. My conception is inspired in large part by earlier intuitionists (Moore, Ross, and Prichard), though I do not claim they would all agree exactly with everything I say.
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  31. Michael Huemer (2009). Précis of Ethical Intuitionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):192-196.
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  32. Richard Joyce (2002). Moral Realism and Teleosemantics. Biology and Philosophy 16 (5):723-31.
    In a recent article, William F. Harms (2000) argues in a novel way for a form of moral realism. He does not actually argue that moral realism is true, but rather that if morality is the product of natural selection.
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  33. Patrick Kain (2006). Realism and Anti-Realism in Kant's Second Critique. Philosophy Compass 1 (5):449–465.
    This critical survey of recent work on Kant's doctrine of the fact of reason and his doctrine of the practical postulates (of freedom, God, and immortality) assesses the implications of these doctrines for the debate about realism and antirealism in Kant's moral philosophy. Section 1 briefly surveys some salient considerations from the first Critique and Groundwork. In section 2, I argue that recent work on the role, content, "factual" nature, and epistemic status of the fact of reason does not support (...)
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  34. Patrick Kain (2004). Self-Legislation in Kant's Moral Philosophy. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 86 (3):257-306.
    Kant famously insisted that “the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislative will” is the supreme principle of morality. Recent interpreters have taken this emphasis on the self-legislation of the moral law as evidence that Kant endorsed a distinctively constructivist conception of morality according to which the moral law is a positive law, created by us. But a closer historical examination suggests otherwise. Kant developed his conception of legislation in the context of his opposition to (...)
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  35. Shin Kim, Moral Realism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  36. Simon Kirchin (2009). The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism • by Terence Cuneo. Analysis 69 (1):189-190.
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  37. Joel J. Kupperman (1987). Moral Realism and Metaphysical Anti-Realism. Metaphilosophy 18 (2):95–107.
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  38. Hallvard Lillehammer (forthcoming). The Argument From Queerness. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics.
  39. Hallvard Lillehammer (2002). Moral Realism, Normative Reasons, and Rational Intelligibility. Erkenntnis 57 (1):47-69.
    This paper concerns a prima facie tension between the claims that (a) agents have normative reasons obtaining in virtue of the nature of the options that confront them, and (b) there is a non-trivial connection between the grounds of normative reasons and the upshots of sound practical reasoning. Joint commitment to these claims is shown to give rise to a dilemma. I argue that the dilemma is avoidable on a response dependent account of normative reasons accommodating both (a) and (b) (...)
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  40. JeeLoo Liu (2007). Confucian Moral Realism. Asian Philosophy 17 (2):167 – 184.
    In this paper I construct Confucian moral realism as a metaethical theory that is compatible with, or even derivable from, traditional Confucianism. The paper is at once interpretative and constructive. In my analysis, Confucians can establish the realist's claims on moral properties because they embrace the view of a moralistic universe. Moral properties in Confucian ethics not only are presented as objective, naturalistic properties, but also are seen as 'causally efficacious'. There are several theses commonly endorsed by contemporary moral realists. (...)
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  41. D. Loeb (1998). Moral Realism and the Argument From Disagreement. Philosophical Studies 90 (3):281-303.
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  42. Edouard Machery, Daniel Kelly & Stephen P. Stich (2005). Moral Realism and Cross-Cultural Normative Diversity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):830-830.
    We discuss the implications of the findings reported in the target article for moral theory, and argue that they represent a clear and genuine case of fundamental moral disagreement. As such, the findings support a moderate form of moral anti-realism – the position that, for some moral issues, there is no fact of the matter about what is right and wrong.
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  43. Diego E. Machuca (2011). Review of R. Joyce & S. Kirchin (Eds.), A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory (Springer, 2010). [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 31:354-358.
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  44. Sarah McGrath (2011). Skepticism About Moral Expertise as a Puzzle for Moral Realism. Journal of Philosophy 108 (3):111-137.
    In this paper, I develop a neglected puzzle for the moral realist. I then canvass some potential responses. Although I endorse one response as the most promising of those I survey, my primary goal is to make vivid how formidable the puzzle is, as opposed to offering a definitive solution.
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  45. Owen Mcleod (2005). Daniel N. Robinson, Praise and Blame: Moral Realism and its Applications (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), Pp. XII + 225. Utilitas 17 (2):236-238.
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  46. Christian Miller (forthcoming). Moral Realism and Anti-Realism. In Jerome Gellman (ed.), The History of Evil. Acumen Press.
    This chapter surveys work in meta-ethics in the past fifty years which explicitly deals with issues associated with evil. It discusses two examples from secular discussions: the argument developed by Gilbert Harman on the explanatory role of moral facts, and the argument developed by Gilbert Harman and John Doris on the empirical inadequacy of the virtues. The chapter then turns to two topics related to theistic meta-ethics: the problem of evil and moral realism, and theological voluntarism and evil.
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  47. Christian Miller (2011). Introduction to Contemporary Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethical Theory. In Christian Miller (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum.
    The study of morality continues to flourish in contemporary philosophy. As the chapters of this Companion illustrate, new and exciting work is being done on a wide range of topics from the objectivity of morality to the relationship between morality and religious, biological, and feminist concerns. Along with this vast amount of work has come a proliferation of technical terminology and competing positions. The goal of this chapter is to provide an overview of the terrain in contemporary ethics.
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  48. Christian Miller (2009). The Conditions of Moral Realism. Journal of Philosophical Research 34:123-155.
    In this paper, I hope to provide an account of the conditions of moral realism whereby there are still significant metaphysical commitments made by the realist which set the view apart as a distinct position in the contemporary meta-ethical landscape. In order to do so, I will be appealing to a general account of what it is for realism to be true in any domain of experience, whether it be realism about universals, realism about unobservable scientific entities, realism about artifacts, (...)
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  49. Christian Miller (2009). Divine Will Theory: Desires or Intentions? In Jonathan Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press.
    Due largely to the work of Mark Murphy and Philip Quinn, divine will theory has emerged as a legitimate alternative to divine command theory in recent years. As an initial characterization, divine will theory is a view of deontological properties according to which, for instance, an agent S‟s obligation to perform action A in circumstances C is grounded in God‟s will that S A in C. Characterized this abstractly, divine will theory does not specify which kind of mental state is (...)
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  50. Christian Miller (2005). Review of Alexander Miller, An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83:279-281.
    My initial hope when I first saw Miller’s book was that here at least would be a work which satisfies the long standing need for a comprehensive introduction to contemporary metaethics which is accessible enough to be employed in advanced undergraduate courses and introductory graduate seminars. This hope was only partially realized, however, as Miller ends up oscillating between clear presentations of extant debates in the recent literature and his own extended attempts to determine where the truth of the matter (...)
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  51. Christian Miller (2005). Review of William Casebeer, Natural Ethical Facts. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 55:532-534.
    The aim of William Casebeer’s book is ‘to show that, theoretically speaking, there is no reason to rule out a scientific naturalized ethics tout court, and that, practical speaking, by taking into account recent developments in evolutionary biology and the cognitive sciences, the outlines of one promising form of such an ethics can be sketched’ (p. 1-2). The result is an interesting treatment of a wide variety of issues at the intersection of cognitive science, meta-ethics, normative theory, and evolutionary psychology, (...)
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  52. Christian Miller (2004). Agency and Moral Realism. Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    Much of the literature in contemporary analytic metaethics has grown rather stale – the range of possible positions seems to have been exhaustively delineated, and most of the important arguments on all sides have been clearly articulated and evaluated. In order to advance discussion in this area, I examine more fundamental issues about the nature of agency. In my view, the heart of what it is to exhibit intentional agency in the world is to identify with the relevant components of (...)
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  53. Michael K. Morris (1997). Book Review: Being True to the World: Moral Realism and Practical Wisdom, by Jonathan A. Jacobs. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 31 (2):285-288.
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  54. James Lindemann Nelson (2001). Marcel S. Lieberman: Commitment, Value and Moral Realism. Journal of Value Inquiry 35 (1):131-135.
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  55. Mark T. Nelson (2002). John Hare God's Call: Moral Realism, God's Commands, and Human Autonomy. (Grand Rapids MI/Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans, 2001). Pp. X+122. $14.00 (Hbk). ISBN 0 8028 3903 7. $11.00 (Pbk). ISBN 0 8028 4997. [REVIEW] Religious Studies 38 (2):225-246.
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  56. David Fate Norton (1985). Hutcheson's Moral Realism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 23 (3):397-418.
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  57. Graham Oddie (1998). Moral Realism, Moral Relativism and Moral Rules (a Compatibility Argument). Synthese 117 (2):251-274.
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  58. Seungbae Park (2012). Against Moral Truths. Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology 9 (1):179-194.
    I criticize the following three arguments for moral objectivism. 1. Since we assess moral statements, we can arrive at some moral truths (Thomson, 2006). 2. One culture can be closer to truths than another in moral matters because the former can be closer to truths than the latter in scientific matters (Pojman, 2008). 3. A moral judgment is shown to be true when it is backed up by reason (Rachels and Rachels, 2010). Finally, I construct a dilemma against the view (...)
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  59. Rik Peels (forthcoming). "Are Naturalism and Moral Realism Incompatible?". Religious Studies.
    In a recent paper, Alvin Plantinga has argued that there is good reason to think that naturalism and moral realism are incompatible. He has done so by arguing that the most important argument for the compatibility of these two theses, which has been provided by Frank Jackson, fails and that any other argument that serves the same purpose is likely to fail for the same reason. His argument against the compatibility of naturalism and more realism, then, is indirect: he argues (...)
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  60. Tapio Puolimatka (1989). Moral Realism and Justification. Distributor, Akateeminen Kirjakauppa.
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  61. Olga Ramirez (2011). Between Non-Cognitivism and Realism in Ethics: A Three Fold Model. Prolegomena (Croatia) 10 (1):101-11202.
    Abstracts The aim of the paper is to propose an alternative model to realist and non-cognitive explanations of the rule-guided use of thick ethical concepts and to examine the implications that may be drawn from this and similar cases for our general understanding of rule-following and the relation between criteria of application, truth and correctness. It addresses McDowell’s non-cognitivism critique and challenges his defence of the entanglement thesis for thick ethical concepts. Contrary to non-cognitivists, however, I propose to view the (...)
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  62. Steven L. Reynolds (2009). Making Up the Truth. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):315-335.
    A recent account of the meaning of 'real' leads to a view of what anti-realism should be that resembles fictionalism, while not being committed to fictionalism as such or being subject to some of the more obvious objections to that view. This account of anti-realism explains how we might 'make up' what is true in areas such as mathematics or ethics, and yet these made-up truths are resistant to alterations, even by our collective decisions. Finally it is argued that the (...)
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  63. Daniel N. Robinson (2002). Praise and Blame: Moral Realism and Its Applications. Princeton Univ. Press.
    "This book is a significant contribution to the analytic study of ethics, to the history of ethics, and to the growing field of philosophical psychology.
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  64. David Robjant (2012). Good, Evil and the Virtuous Iris Murdoch Commentary Iris Murdoch, Philosopher, Edited by Justin Broackes . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 400 Pp. ISBN 978-0-19-928990-5 Hb £35.00. [REVIEW] European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):621-635.
    While Iris Murdoch lived, Charles Taylor found philosophers as yet ‘too close’ to her rich philosophical contribution to see its true importance (Taylor 1996: 3). Twelve years from her death, Iris Murdoch, Philosopher is the first collection of essays on Murdoch’s philosophy edited by a philosopher, for a readership in academic philosophy. The collection is not yet the fulfilment of Taylor’s prophecy, but has the energy of a giant leap.
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  65. Michael Rosen (1991). Must We Return to Moral Realism? Inquiry 34 (2):183 – 194.
    In this paper I discuss Taylor's criticism of contemporary moral philosophy and the role which this plays in his wider account of the development of Western moral consciousness, an account which I compare with Hans Blumenberg's The Legitimacy of the ModernAge. While I endorse Taylor's rejection of ?naturalism?, I deny that this entails the rejection of non?realism and I maintain that, indeed, the non?realist conception of a social foundation for morality represents the most cogent response to the contemporary dilemmas Taylor (...)
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  66. Steven Ross (2006). Intentional Realism and Moral Realism. Philosophical Forum 37 (2):205–225.
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  67. Mark Schroeder (2012). Précis of Slaves of the Passions. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):431-434.
    Précis of Slaves of the Passions Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9658-1 Authors Mark Schroeder, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  68. Laura Schroeter & Francois Schroeter (2005). Is Gibbard a Realist? Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (2):1-18.
    In Thinking How to Live, Allan Gibbard claims that expressivists can vindicate realism about moral discourse. This paper argues that Gibbard’s expressivism does not provide such a vindication.
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  69. G. F. Schueler (1988). Modus Ponens and Moral Realism. Ethics 98 (3):492-500.
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  70. Neil Sinclair (2013). Moral Explanations. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwell.
    "The arc of the moral universe is long but it bends towards justice." (Martin Luther King) -/- A moral explanation is an explanation of a particular or type of event (or fact or state of affairs) that features moral terms in the explaining phrase. Here are some examples. First, one way of the above quote is as the claim that, in the broad sweep of history, societies tend toward more just institutions, and that they do so precisely because these institutions (...)
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  71. Neil Sinclair (2012). Moral Realism, Face-Values and Presumptions. Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):158-179.
    Many philosophers argue that the face-value of moral practice provides presumptive support to moral realism. This paper analyses such arguments into three steps. (1) Moral practice has a certain face-value, (2) only realism can vindicate this face value, and (3) the face-value needs vindicating. Two potential problems with such arguments are discussed. The first is taking the relevant face-value to involve explicitly realist commitments; the second is underestimating the power of non-realist strategies to vindicate that face-value. Case studies of each (...)
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  72. Neil Sinclair (2011). The Explanationist Argument for Moral Realism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):1-24.
    In this paper I argue that the explanationist argument in favour of moral realism fails. According to this argument, the ability of putative moral properties to feature in good explanations provides strong evidence for, or entails, the metaphysical claims of moral realism. Some have rejected this argument by denying that moral explanations are ever good explanations. My criticism is different. I argue that even if we accept that moral explanations are (sometimes) good explanations the metaphysical claims of realism do not (...)
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  73. Knut Olav Skarsaune (2011). Darwin and Moral Realism: Survival of the Iffiest. Philosophical Studies 152 (2):229-243.
    This paper defends moral realism against Sharon Street’s “Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value” (this journal, 2006). I argue by separation of cases: From the assumption that a certain normative claim is true, I argue that the first horn of the dilemma is tenable for realists. Then, from the assumption that the same normative claim is false, I argue that the second horn is tenable. Either way, then, the Darwinian dilemma does not add anything to realists’ epistemic worries.
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  74. Holly M. Smith (1986). Moral Realism, Moral Conflict, and Compound Acts. Journal of Philosophy 83 (6):341-345.
    Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
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  75. Andrew Sneddon (2009). Normative Ethics and the Prospects of an Empirical Contribution to Assessment of Moral Disagreement and Moral Realism. Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (4).
    The familiar argument from disagreement has been an important focal point of discussion in contemporary meta-ethics. Over the past decade, there has been an explosion of interdisciplinary work between philosophers and psychologists about moral psychology. Working within this trend, John Doris and Alexandra Plakias have made a tentative version of the argument from disagreement on empirical grounds. Doris and Plakias present empirical evidence in support of premise 4, that ethics is beset by fundamental disagreement. They examine Richard Brandt on Hopi (...)
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  76. Daniel Star (2010). Moral Skepticism for Foxes. Boston University Law Review 90:497-508.
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  77. Daniel Star (2010). Review of Terence Cuneo, The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism (OUP, 2007). [REVIEW] Mind 119 (473):210-215.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  78. StevenRoss (2004). Real, Modest Moral Realism. Philosophical Forum 35 (4):411–421.
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  79. David Sussman (2003). Review of Daniel Robinson, Praise and Blame: Moral Realism and its Applications. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (1).
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  80. Torbjorn Tannsjo (1985). Moral Conflict and Moral Realism. Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):113-117.
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  81. Mark van Roojen (2005). Rationalist Realism and Constructivist Accounts of Morality. Philosophical Studies 126 (2):285-295.
    This is a review essay about Russ Shafer-Landau's Moral Realism. In Moral Realism, Russ Shafer-Landau divides cognitivist moral theories between realist and constructivist versions, where constructivists characterize morality as necessarily connected to the responses of agents under some conditions. This division is misleading; some constructivist or response-invoking characterizations of ethics are fully realist. We need not deny that reasons must be able to motivate rational agents in order to vindicate realism. Rationalists such as Shafer-Landau are committed to the truth of (...)
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  82. Pekka Väyrynen (2004). Review of Christian Illies, The Grounds of Ethical Judgement: New Transcendental Arguments in Moral Philosophy. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (3).
    This is a review of Christian Illies: The Grounds of Ethical Judgement: New Transcendental Arguments in Moral Philosophy (Clarendon Press, 2003).
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  83. Ralph Wedgwood (2010). The Nature of Normativity: Reply to Holton, Railton, and Lenman. Philosophical Studies 151 (3):479-491.
    In this article, I reply to the comments that Richard Holton, Peter Railton, and James Lenman have made on my 2007 book "The Nature of Normativity".
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  84. Patricia H. Werhane (1992). Wittgenstein and Moral Realism. Journal of Value Inquiry 26 (3):381-393.
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  85. Erik J. Wielenberg (2010). On the Evolutionary Debunking of Morality. Ethics 120 (3):441-464.
    Evolutionary debunkers of morality hold this thesis: If S’s moral belief that P can be given an evolutionary explanation, then S’s moral belief that P is not knowledge. In this paper, I debunk a variety of arguments for this thesis. I first sketch a possible evolutionary explanation for some human moral beliefs. Next, I explain how, given a reliabilist approach to warrant, my account implies that humans possess moral knowledge. Finally, I examine the debunking arguments of Michael Ruse, Sharon Street, (...)
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  86. Jeff Wisdom (2012). Why a Diachronic View of Base Property Exemplification is Necessary in Metaethics. Metaphysica 13 (1):43-50.
    In a recent issue of this journal, Jorn Sonderholm presents two main criticisms of my 2008 case for a diachronic view of base property exemplification in metaethics. This essay contends that neither of Sonderholm’s criticisms hit their mark, and that there are additional reasons to adopt a diachronic view of base property exemplification. Thus, the case for a diachronic view of base property exemplification in metaethics is stronger than previously thought.
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  87. Jeff Wisdom (2008). Base Property Exemplification and Mixed Worlds: Remarks on the Shafer-Landau/Mabrito Exchange. Philosophical Studies 138 (3):429-434.
    In this essay I distinguish between a synchronic view of base property exemplification and a diachronic one. I argue that only a diachronic view of base property exemplification can substantiate a ban on morally mixed worlds. I then argue that one of Robert Mabrito’s recent criticisms of Russ Shafer-Landau’s moral realism fails on either a synchronic or a diachronic view.
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