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  1. Roman Altshuler (2013). Practical Necessity and the Constitution of Character. In Alexandra Perry & Chris Herrera (eds.), The Moral Philosophy of Bernard Williams. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
    Deliberation issues in decision, and so might be taken as a paradigmatic volitional activity. Character, on the other hand, may appear pre-volitional: the dispositions that constitute it provide the background against which decisions are made. Bernard Williams offers an intriguing picture of how the two may be connected via the concept of practical necessities, which are at once constitutive of character and deliverances of deliberation. Necessities are thus the glue binding character and the will, allowing us to take responsibility for (...)
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  2. Chrisoula Andreou (2008). The Newxin Puzzle. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):415 - 422.
    A variety of thought experiments suggest that, if the standard picture of practical rationality is correct, then practical rationality is sometimes an obstacle to practical success. For some, this in turn suggests that there is something wrong with the standard picture. In particular, it has been argued that we should revise the standard picture so that practical rationality and practical success emerge as more closely connected than the current picture allows. In this paper, I construct a choice situation—which I refer (...)
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  3. Chrisoula Andreou (2006). Getting On in a Varied World. Social Theory and Practice 32 (1):61-73.
    The core argument in favor of the view that immorality is a natural defect for human beings, which has been developed by Foot, assumes that if justice and compassion have important functions in human survival and reproduction, then injustice and cruelty are natural defects in human beings. But this ignores possibilities and results that cannot reasonably be ignored. Multiple and mixed naturally sound types can and do occur in nature. Moreover, research in the life sciences suggests that at least some (...)
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  4. Audrey L. Anton (2006). Breaking the Habit. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 13 (2):58-66.
    Aristotle’s virtue ethics can teach us about the relationship between our habits and our actions. Throughout his works, Aristotle explains much about how one may develop a virtuous character, and little about how one might change from one character type to another. In recent years criminal law has been concerned with the issue of recidivism and how our system might reform the criminals we return to society more effectively. This paper considers how Aristotle might say a vicious person could change (...)
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  5. Charles Bailey (1980). Morality Reason and Feeling. Journal of Moral Education 9 (2):114-121.
    Abstract and Introduction This paper argues that morality is largely to do with reason and little to do with feelings or affections. In the first section it is argued that there is a necessary connection between the idea of the moral life and the existence of creatures capable of reflection and judgment. The argument is extended in Section Two to include the notions of reason and justification. The nature of justification is examined in Section Three, and these three sections taken (...)
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  6. James Wood Bailey (1998). mIs It Rationale to Maximize? M. Utilitas 10 (2):195-.
    Most versions of utilitarianism depend on the plausibility and coherence of some conceptionof maximizing well-being, but these conceptions have been attacked on various grounds. This paper considers two such contentions. First, it addresses the argument that because goods are plural and incommensurable, maximization is incoherent. It is shown that any conception of incommensurability strong enough to show the incoherence of maximization leads to an intolerable paradox. Several misunderstandings of what maximization requires are also addressed. Second, this paper responds to the (...)
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  7. Stephen W. Ball (2003). Robert Audi, The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, Pp. Vii + 286. Utilitas 15 (01):109-.
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  8. Brian Barger & W. Pitt Derryberry (2013). Do Negative Mood States Impact Moral Reasoning? Journal of Moral Education 42 (4):443-459.
    This paper presents three studies exploring the relationship between emotional responses to classic cognitive developmental moral dilemmas and moral reasoning indices as measured by the Defining Issues Test (DIT). Each study indicated that certain moral dilemmas elicit varying levels of anger and sadness as compared to a neutral baseline. In each study, decreased moral reasoning was observed in those instances where reports in both sadness and anger were high following a dilemma. This did not occur, however, in those instances where (...)
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  9. Brian Barger & W. Pitt Derryberry (2013). Do Negative Mood States Impact Moral Reasoning? Journal of Moral Education 42 (4):443-459.
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  10. R. Eric Barnes (1997). Constraint Games and the Orthodox Theory of Rationality. Utilitas 9 (03):329-.
    Moral theorists and game theorists are both interested in situations where rational agents are to constrain their future actions and co-operate with others instead of being free riders. These theorists have constructed a variety of hypothetical games which illuminate this problem of constraint. In this paper, I draw a distinction between like the Newcomb paradox and like Kavka's toxin puzzle, a prisoner's dilemma and Parfit's hitchhiker example. I then employ this distinction to argue that agents who subscribe to the orthodox (...)
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  11. C. Daniel Batson (2008). Moral Masquerades: Experimental Exploration of the Nature of Moral Motivation. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):51-66.
    Why do people act morally – when they do? Moral philosophers and psychologists often assume that acting morally in the absence of incentives or sanctions is a product of a desire to uphold one or another moral principle (e.g., fairness). This form of motivation might be called moral integrity because the goal is to actually be moral. In a series of experiments designed to explore the nature of moral motivation, colleagues and I have found little evidence of moral integrity. We (...)
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  12. Rachel Baumsteiger, Tiffany Chenneville & Joseph F. McGuire (2013). The Roles of Religiosity and Spirituality in Moral Reasoning. Ethics and Behavior 23 (4):266-277.
    To better understand the influence of religiosity and spirituality on moral reasoning, 1,037 college students completed a survey including demographic questions, a religiosity measure, a spirituality measure, and Forsyth's Ethical Position Questionnaire. Religiosity and spirituality positively correlated with moral idealism, whereas spirituality negatively correlated with moral relativism. However, religiosity and spirituality accounted for a very little variability in moral reasoning, suggesting that they do not directly influence moral reasoning. In addition, female participants reported higher spirituality, but there were no gender (...)
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  13. Françoise Baylis (2000). Expert Testimony by Persons Trained in Ethical Reasoning: The Case of Andrew Sawatzky. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 28 (3):224-231.
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  14. Avner Baz (2008). Being Right, and Being in the Right. Inquiry 51 (6):627 – 644.
    This paper presents a critique of a prevailing conception of the relation between moral reasoning and judgment on the one hand, and moral goodness on the other. I argue that moral reasoning is inescapably vulnerable to moral, as opposed to merely theoretical, failure. This, I argue, means that there is something deeply misleading in the way that Kant's moral theory, and some of its main rivals, have invited us to conceive of their subject matter.
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  15. Marinus Gcj Beerthuizen, Daniel Brugman & Karen S. Basinger (2013). Oppositional Defiance, Moral Reasoning and Moral Value Evaluation as Predictors of Self-Reported Juvenile Delinquency. Journal of Moral Education 42 (4):1-15.
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  16. Timothy Berard (1998). Attributions and Avowals of Motive in the Study of Deviance: Resource or Topic? Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 28 (2):193–213.
    In explaining human actions, scholars and laypeople alike employ explanatory devices such as ‘motives’. This paper critically reevaluates the relationship between ‘professional’ and ‘lay’ invocations of motive, proposing a general reorientation of theory and research. This reorientation emphasizes the mundane ‘practical grammar’ of motives, and argues that motive deployment is inextricably tied to deviance, and therefore irremediably moral. It is argued, therefore, that motives should serve as a topic for scholarship, not a resourcefor scholarly use. Several landmark theories of motives, (...)
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  17. C. Bicchieri, E. Xiao & R. Muldoon (2011). Trustworthiness is a Social Norm, but Trusting is Not. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (2):170-187.
    Previous literature has demonstrated the important role that trust plays in developing and maintaining well-functioning societies. However, if we are to learn how to increase levels of trust in society, we must first understand why people choose to trust others. One potential answer to this is that people view trust as normative: there is a social norm for trusting that imposes punishment for noncompliance. To test this, we report data from a survey with salient rewards to elicit people’s attitudes regarding (...)
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  18. Myles Brand (1987). Interpersonal Practical Reasoning. Grazer Philosophische Studien 30:77-95.
    According to one version of the Causal Theory, an action is a mental or bodily event caused by an intention to act. Deliberate action requires prior planning. The practical syllogism is interpreted as a summary description of the planning process, where the conclusion reports the agent's intention. Social action differs from individual action in that only the former requires coordination of one's action with members of a group. This difference is reflected in the intention with which we act, labeled 'we-intention' (...)
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  19. Myles Brand (1980). Philosophical Action Theory and the Foundations of Motivational Psychology. Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 2:1-19.
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  20. Martin Bunzl (1977). The Moral Development of Moral Philosophers. Journal of Moral Education 7 (1):3-8.
    Abstract Lawrence Kohlberg thinks that Utilitarianism and Rawls? theory of justice are formal elaborations of different stages in the psychological development of moral reasoning. He also thinks that there are psychological reasons to favour the stage of reasoning of which he thinks Rawls? theory is an elaboration, and he believes that these reasons are isomorphic with philosophical criteria of adequacy that are normally used in evaluating moral theories. I argue that if he is right, then Rawls? own arguments for the (...)
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  21. Edward Cannon (2008). Promoting Moral Reasoning and Multicultural Competence During Internship. Journal of Moral Education 37 (4):503-518.
    This paper reports a study designed to increase the moral reasoning and multicultural competence of White students in a counselling internship. An intervention was conducted to determine the effectiveness of using a deliberate psychological education approach that incorporated issues of cultural competence, oppression and diversity. This study attempted to discern if the DPE model could make a difference in the promotion of moral reasoning and multicultural competence of counsellor interns. The Intervention Group showed significant gains compared to Comparison Group 1 (...)
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  22. Rachel Cohon (2012). Hume's Moral Sentiments As Motives. Hume Studies 36 (2):193-213.
    There is considerable evidence that Hume thinks the moral sentiments (approval and disapproval) move us to action, at least in some circumstances. For one thing, he relies on the premise that moral evaluations move us to action to argue that moral evaluations are not derived from reason alone, in his most famous anti-rationalist argument. Presumably, this capacity of moral evaluations can be explained by the fact that (as Hume sees it) such evaluations are, or are the product of, moral sentiments. (...)
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  23. Meir Dan-Cohen (2006). Comments. Morality and the Logic of Caring / Christine M. Korsgaard ; a Thoughtful and Reasonable Stability / Michael E. Bratman ; Socializing Harry. [REVIEW] In Harry G. Frankfurt (ed.), Taking Ourselves Seriously & Getting It Right. Stanford University Press.
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  24. Ulrich Diehl (2012). Jaspers on Drives, Wants and Volitions. Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Karl-Jaspers-Gesellschaft 25:101-125.
    In § 6 of his General Psychopathology (1st edition 1913) Jaspers distinguished between drives, wants and volitions as three different and irreducible kinds of motivational phenomena which are involved in human decision making and which may lead to successful actions. He has characterized the qualitative differences between volitions in comparison with basic vital drives and emotional wants such as being (a.) intentional, (b.) content-specific and (b.) directed towards concrete objects and actions as goals. Furthermore, Jaspers has presented and discussed three (...)
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  25. Ivan Domingues (1995). A questão da fundamentação última na filosofia. Belo Horizonte. Kriterion 91:29-44.
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  26. Dale Dorsey (2013). Two Dualisms of Practical Reason1. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8:114.
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  27. Keith Dowding (1996). Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap and Yanis Varoufakis, Game Theory: A Critical Introduction, London, Routledge, 1995, Pp. 296. Utilitas 8 (02):252-.
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  28. Ben Eggleston (2004). Alan H. Goldman, Practical Rules: When We Need Them and When We Don't (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Pp. XI+210. [REVIEW] Utilitas 16 (1):113-115.
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  29. Carl Elliott (1992). Diagnosing Blame: Responsibility and the Psychopath. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17 (2):199-214.
    The diagnosis of psychopathy is controversial largely because of two notions: first, that because of their defects, psychopaths cannot understand morality, and second, that these defects should thus excuse psychopaths from moral responsibility for their actions. However, it is not clear just what is involved in understanding morality. The argument that the psychopath is ignorant of morality in the same way that one might be ignorant of facts is difficult to sustain. However, a closer examination of the psychopath's peculiar deficiencies (...)
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  30. Andrew Eshleman (2004). Responsibility for Character. Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):65-94.
    In this work I argue that an agent assumes responsibility for her traits of character by making them her own during the process of their formation. One makes a character trait one's own by identifying oneself with its constitutive desires, or in the case of a particular kind of vice, by failing to identify oneself with desires to act in the corresponding virtuous manner. Unlike the view traditionally attributed to Aristotle, this view does not require that an agent be the (...)
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  31. Gustave A. Feingold (1914). The Psychophysical Basis of Moral Conduct. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 11 (25):680-687.
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  32. Harry Frankfurt (1992). The Faintest Passion. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66 (3):5-16.
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  33. Barbara H. Fried (2005). Moral Heuristics and the Means/End Distinction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):549-550.
    A mental heuristic is a shortcut (means) to a desired end. In the moral (as opposed to factual) realm, the means/end distinction is not self-evident: How do we decide whether a given moral intuition is a mere heuristic to achieve some freestanding moral principle, or instead a freestanding moral principle in its own right? I discuss Sunstein's solution to that threshold difficulty in translating “heuristics” to the moral realm.
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  34. Rick Anthony Furtak (2004). Estrangement and Moral Agency. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 11 (2):37-44.
    By taking seriously the state of moral estrangement, we may learn something about the conditions of moral participation. Yet analytic discussions of this topic (for instance, by Hare and Nagel) have frequently been handicapped by an inadequate understanding of the intentionality of emotion. In the work of Albert Camus, we find a superior appreciation of the sense in which the individual’s revolt against prevailing values could be a justified response to objective conditions. Although a sense of the absurd is itself (...)
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  35. Jyl Gentzler (2012). How Should I Be? A Defense of Platonic Rational Egoism. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):n/a-n/a.
    There has been a long tradition of interpreting Plato as a rational egoist. Over the past few decades, however, some scholars have challenged this reading. While Rational Egoism appeals to many ordinary folk, in sophisticated philosophical circles it has fallen out of favor as a general and complete account of the nature of reasons for action. I argue that while the theory of practical rationality that is often equated with rational egoism—a view that I call ‘Simple-Minded Rational Egoism'—is neither plausible (...)
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  36. Joshua Gert & Alfred Mele (2005). Lenman on Externalism and Amoralism: An Interplanetary Exploration. Philosophia 32 (1-4):275-283.
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  37. Bennett Gilbert, Moral Impartialism and Moral Internalism.
    A. Moral impartialism is a theory in normative ethics. Moral internalism is a theory in meta-ethics. One’s manner of twining normative ethics and meta-ethics varies according to his or her position on the relations of normative ethics and metaphysics, as to in what ways ethics needs analysis, or ontology, or metaphysics, if it needs any of these at all. This large question is the deeper background of this paper. Here I will show why impartialism and internalism both need each other (...)
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  38. Michael Gill (2009). Indeterminacy and Variability in Meta-Ethics. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):215 - 234.
    In the mid-20th century, descriptive meta-ethics addressed a number of central questions, such as whether there is a necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation, whether moral reasons are absolute or relative, and whether moral judgments express attitudes or describe states of affairs. I maintain that much of this work in mid-20th century meta-ethics proceeded on an assumption that there is good reason to question. The assumption was that our ordinary discourse is uniform and determinate enough to vindicate one side (...)
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  39. Alan H. Goldman (1991). The Expressivist Theory of Normative Judgment. Inquiry 34 (4):509-523.
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  40. Louis Groarke (2011). Moral Reasoning: Rediscovering the Ethical Tradition: Moral Reasoning: Rediscovering the Ethical Tradition. Oup Canada.
    Every day we are faced with moral dilemmas in both our personal and professional lives. The choices we make, the ways in which we behave, and our responses to these dilemmas are grounded in our personal understandings of ethics and morality. But this understanding is not black and white: What is deplorable to one person may be perfectly acceptable to another. -/- In Moral Reasoning: Rediscovering the Ethical Tradition, author Louis Groarke guides readers through a honing of their critical skills (...)
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  41. Jonathan Haidt (2005). Invisible Fences of the Moral Domain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):552-553.
    Crossing the border into the moral domain changes moral thinking in two ways: (1) the facts at hand become “anthropocentric” facts not easily open to revision, and (2) moral reasoning is often the servant of moral intuitions, making it difficult for people to challenge their own intuitions. Sunstein's argument is sound, but policy makers are likely to resist.
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  42. Richard Hanks (1985). Moral Reasoning in Adolescents: A Feature of Intelligence or Social Adjustment? Journal of Moral Education 14 (1):43-55.
    Abstract This paper summarizes certain aspects of an assessment of the level of the moral judgement of three groups of children: mildly educationally subnormal children, ESN(M), who are also maladjusted; stable ESN(M) children; and stable children of approximately average intelligence. A minimum age of 12.0 years was stipulated; all the children attended secondary school with the oldest in the total sample being 15 years 9 months. The assessment procedure which, although owing much if not all of its rationale to Piaget, (...)
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  43. Matthew Hanser (2008). Actions, Acting, and Acting Well. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 3. Oxford University Press.
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  44. Matthew Hanser (2005). Permissibility and Practical Inference. Ethics 115 (3):443-470.
    I wish to examine a rather different way of thinking about permissibility, one according to which, roughly speaking, an agent acts impermissibly if and only if he acts for reasons insufficient to justify him in doing what he does. For reasons that will emerge in Section II, I call this the inferential account of permissibility. I shall not here try to prove that this account is superior to its rivals. My aims are more modest. I shall develop the inferential account, (...)
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  45. Carol Gibb Harding (ed.) (1985/2010). Moral Dilemmas and Ethical Reasoning. Transaction Publishers.
    This book deals with moral dilemmas and the development of ethical reasoning in two senses.
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  46. R. M. Hare (1987). Moral Reasoning About the Environment. Journal of Applied Philosophy 4 (1):3-14.
  47. John C. Harsanyi (1980). Rule Utilitarianism, Rights, Obligations and the Theory of Rational Behavior. Theory and Decision 12 (2):115-133.
  48. Donald Hill (1988). On Reasoning Morally About the Environment. Journal of Applied Philosophy 5 (1):101-105.
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  49. Edward Hinchman (2013). Rational Requirements and 'Rational' Akrasia. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):529-552.
    On one conception of practical rationality, being rational is most fundamentally a matter of avoiding incoherent combinations of attitudes. This conception construes the norms of rationality as codified by rational requirements, and one plausible rational requirement is that you not be akratic: that you not judge, all things considered, that you ought to ϕ while failing to choose or intend to ϕ. On another conception of practical rationality, being rational is most fundamentally a matter of thinking or acting in a (...)
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  50. John F. Horty (2003). Reasoning with Moral Conflicts. Noûs 37 (4):557–605.
    Let us say that a normative conflict is a situation in which an agent ought to perform an action A, and also ought to perform an action B, but in which it is impossible for the agent to perform both A and B. Not all normative conflicts are moral conflicts, of course. It may be that the agent ought to perform the action A for reasons of personal generosity, but ought to perform the action B for reasons of prudence: perhaps (...)
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