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Material to categorize
- Chrisoula Andreou (2008). The Newxin Puzzle. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):415 - 422.
- Chrisoula Andreou (2006). Getting On in a Varied World. Social Theory and Practice 32 (1):61-73.
- Audrey L. Anton (2006). Breaking the Habit. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 13 (2):58-66.
- James Wood Bailey (1998). Is It Rational to Maximize? Utilitas 10 (02):195-.
- Stephen W. Ball (2003). Robert Audi, The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, Pp. Vii + 286. Utilitas 15 (01):109-.
- R. Eric Barnes (1997). Constraint Games and the Orthodox Theory of Rationality. Utilitas 9 (03):329-.
- C. Daniel Batson (2008). Moral Masquerades: Experimental Exploration of the Nature of Moral Motivation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1).
- Avner Baz (2008). Being Right, and Being in the Right. Inquiry 51 (6):627 – 644.
- C. Bicchieri, E. Xiao & R. Muldoon (2011). Trustworthiness is a Social Norm, but Trusting is Not. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (2):170-187.
- Myles Brand (1987). Interpersonal Practical Reasoning. Grazer Philosophische Studien 30:77-95.
- Rachel Cohon (2012). Hume's Moral Sentiments As Motives. Hume Studies 36 (2):193-213.
- Meir Dan-Cohen (2006). Comments. Morality and the Logic of Caring / Christine M. Korsgaard ; a Thoughtful and Reasonable Stability / Michael E. Bratman ; Socializing Harry. [REVIEW] In Harry G. Frankfurt (ed.), Taking Ourselves Seriously & Getting It Right. Stanford University Press.
- Keith Dowding (1996). Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap and Yanis Varoufakis, Game Theory: A Critical Introduction, London, Routledge, 1995, Pp. 296. Utilitas 8 (02):252-.
- Ben Eggleston (2004). Alan H. Goldman, Practical Rules: When We Need Them and When We Don't (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Pp. XI+210. Utilitas 16 (1):113-115.
- Carl Elliott (1992). Diagnosing Blame: Responsibility and the Psychopath. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17 (2):199-214.
- Gustave A. Feingold (1914). The Psychophysical Basis of Moral Conduct. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 11 (25):680-687.
- Harry Frankfurt (1992). The Faintest Passion. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66 (3):5-16.
- Barbara H. Fried (2005). Moral Heuristics and the Means/End Distinction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):549-550.
- Rick Anthony Furtak (2004). Estrangement and Moral Agency. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 11 (2):37-44.
- Jyl Gentzler (2012). How Should I Be? A Defense of Platonic Rational Egoism. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4).
- Bennett Gilbert, Moral Impartialism and Moral Internalism.
- Michael Gill (2009). Indeterminacy and Variability in Meta-Ethics. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):215 - 234.
- Louis Groarke (2011). Moral Reasoning: Rediscovering the Ethical Tradition: Moral Reasoning: Rediscovering the Ethical Tradition. OUP Canada.
- Jonathan Haidt (2005). Invisible Fences of the Moral Domain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):552-553.
- Matthew Hanser (2005). Permissibility and Practical Inference. Ethics 115 (3):443-470.
- Carol Gibb Harding (ed.) (1985/2010). Moral Dilemmas and Ethical Reasoning. Transaction Publishers.
- John C. Harsanyi (1980). Rule Utilitarianism, Rights, Obligations and the Theory of Rational Behavior. Theory and Decision 12 (2):115-133.
- Thomas E. Hill Jr (1986). Review: Darwall on Practical Reason. [REVIEW] Ethics 96 (3):604-619.
- Edward Hinchman (forthcoming). Rational Requirements and 'Rational' Akrasia. Philosophical Studies.
- John F. Horty (2003). Reasoning with Moral Conflicts. Noûs 37 (4):557–605.
- Gary Jaeger (2012). Repression, Integrity and Practical Reasoning. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Robert Johnson (1998). Weakness Incorporated. History of Philosophy Quarterly 15 (3):349 - 367.
- Richard Joyce, [Penultimate Draft].
- Paul Katsafanas (forthcoming). Nietzsche's Philosophical Psychology. In John Richardson & Ken Gemes (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche. Oxford.
- Paul Katsafanas (2012). Nietzsche on Agency and Self-Ignorance. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 43 (1):5-17.
- Paul Katsafanas (2011). The Concept of Unified Agency in Nietzsche, Plato, and Schiller. Journal of the History of Philosophy 49 (1):87-113.
- Jason Kawall (2005). Moral Realism and Arbitrariness. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):109-129.
- Frederick Kroon (2009). Imaginative Motivation. Utilitas 21 (2):181-196.
- Richard Kyte (1996). Moral Reasoning as Perception: A Reading of Carol Gilligan. Hypatia 11 (3):97 - 113.
- Noa Latham (2003). Are There Any Nonmotivating Reasons for Action? In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation.
- James Lenman (2009). Michael Smith and the Daleks: Reason, Morality, and Contingency. Utilitas 11 (02):164-.
- JeeLoo Liu, Moral Reason, Moral Sentiments and the Realization of Altruism: A Comparative Study of Nagel, ZHANG Zai and WANG FUZHI.
- Paisley Livingston (1994). What is Mimetic Desire? Philosophical Psychology 7 (3):291 – 305.
- Alex London, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 10.4, December 2000.
- Alex John London (2000). Amenable to Reason: Aristotle's Rhetoric and the Moral Psychology of Practical Ethics. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 10 (4):287-305.
- Maksymilian T. Madelr, Moral Experience and Legal Education.
- Carolyn Mason (2006). Internal Reasons and Practical Limits on Rational Deliberation. Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):163 – 177.
- Elaine McGivern & James Weber (2006). Studying Moral Reasoning in Business Settings. Proceedings of the International Association for Business and Society 17:18-23.
- David McNaughton (1988). Moral Vision: An Introduction to Ethics. B. Blackwell.
- Christopher Megone (1999). Reasoning About Rationality. Utilitas 11 (03):359-.
- Alfred R. Mele (2002). Autonomy and Akrasia. Philosophical Explorations 5 (3):207 – 216.
- Hugo Mercier (2011). What Good is Moral Reasoning? Mind and Society 10 (2):131-148.
- Bert Molewijk, Dick Kleinlugtenbelt & Guy Widdershoven (2011). The Role of Emotions in Moral Case Deliberation: Theory, Practice, and Methodology. Bioethics 25 (7):383-393.
- Peter Morriss (1995). Keith M. Dowding, Rational Choice and Political Power, Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1991, Pp. 208. Utilitas 7 (01):181-.
- Thomas Nadelhoffer (2004). The Butler Problem Revisited. Analysis 64 (3):277–284.
- Daniel E. Palmer (2006). Joseph Raz, Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), Pp. 336 Joseph Raz, The Practice of Value, Ed. R. Jay Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), Pp. Vii + 161. [REVIEW] Utilitas 18 (03):321-.
- Dan Passell (1995). Natural Fact, Moral Reason. Journal of Philosophical Research 20:463-480.
- Michael Philips (1987). Moralism and the Good. Philosophical Studies 52 (1):131 - 139.
- Robert Pippin (2007). Can There Be 'Unprincipled Virtue'? Comments on Nomy Arpaly. Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):291 – 301.
- Nigel Pleasants (2010). Moral Argument Is Not Enough. Philosophical Topics 38 (1):159-180.
- Michael Quinn (1990). Self-Interest, the Common Good, and the 'New Orthodoxy'. Utilitas 2 (01):144-.
- Wlodek Rabinowicz & Bertil Strömberg (1996). What If I Were in His Shoes? On Hare's Argument for Preference Utilitarianism. Theoria 62 (1-2):95-123.
- Stuart Rachels (2009). On Three Alleged Theories of Rational Behavior. Utilitas 21 (4):506-520.
- Juha Räikkä (2000). The Problem of the Second Best: Conceptual Issues. Utilitas 12 (02):204-.
- Peter Railton (2008). Reply to John Skorupski. Utilitas 20 (2):230-242.
- Elizabeth Rapaport (1973). Explaining Moral Weakness. Philosophical Studies 24 (3):174-182.
- Joseph Raz, On the Guise of the Good.
- James Reid (1935). Why Be Good? London, Hodder & Stoughton, Limited.
- Robert Rosthal (1967). Moral Weakness and Remorse. Mind 76 (304):576-579.
- Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Desires…and Beliefs…of One's Own.
- Karl Schafer (2008). Practical Reasoning and Practical Reasons in Hume. Hume Studies 34 (2):189-208.
- Ira M. Schnall (forthcoming). Weak Reasons-Responsiveness Meets its Match: In Defense of David Widerker's Attack on Pap. Philosophical Studies.
- Yonatan Shemmer (2004). Desiring at Will and Humeanism in Practical Reason. Philosophical Studies 119 (3):265-294.
- Marcus G. Singer (1989). Review Essay: Impartial Reason. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (3):507-515.
- Michael Smith (1999). The Non-Arbitrariness of Reasons: Reply to Lenman. Utilitas 11 (02):178-.
- Laurence Thomas (1994). Must We Care About Morality? Philosophical Psychology 7 (3):383 – 394.
- Sam Black Evan Tiffany (2007). Moral Philosophy Does Not Rest on a Mistake: Reasons to Be Moral Revisited. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. vii-xl.
- John J. Tilley (2012). Exciting Reasons and Moral Rationalism in Hutcheson's Illustrations Upon the Moral Sense. Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (1):53-83.
- Rachel Tillman (2013). Ethical Embodiment and Moral Reasoning: A Challenge to Peter Singer. Hypatia 28 (1):18-31.
- Charles Travis (2006). Morally Alien Thought. In Tomáš Marvan (ed.), What Determines Content?: The Internalism/Externalism Dispute. Cambridge Scholars Press.
- Peter Vallentyne (1991). Motivational Ties and Doing What One Most Wats. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:443-445.
- Stan Van Hooft (2001). Abstract. Philosophical Explorations 4 (2):135 – 149.
- J. David Velleman (2002). Motivation by Ideal. Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):89 – 103.
- Megan Wallace, The Weak-Willed Vs. The Vicious.
- Sean Drysdale Walsh (2012). Kant's Theory of Right as Aristotelian Phronesis. International Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):227-246.
- Kenneth R. Westphal (2005). ‘Kant, Hegel, and Determining Our Duties’. Jahrbuch für Recht and Ethik/Annual Review of Law & Ethics 13:335-354.
- Nick Zangwill (2012). Rationality and Moral Realism. Ratio 25 (3):345-364.
- Nick Zangwill (2008). Besires and the Motivation Debate. Theoria 74 (1):50-59.
- Kevin Zaragoza (2006). What Happens When Someone Acts Compulsively? Philosophical Studies 131 (2):251 - 268.
Moral Concepts
- Erik Baldwin (2011). On Buddhist and Taoist Morality. Forum Philosophicum 16 (2):99-110.
- Sylvia Burrow (2012). Protecting One's Commitments: Integrity and Self-Defense. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (1):49-66.
- Michael Clark (1999). Moral Incapacity and Deliberation. Ratio 12 (1):1–13.
- Ulrike Heuer (forthcoming). Thick Concepts and Internal Reasons. In Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang (eds.), Luck, Value and Commitment. Themes from the Ethics of Bernard Williams. Oxford University Press.
- Leonard Kahn (2011). Moral Blameworthiness and the Reactive Attitudes. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):131-142.
- Edwin D. Mares & Paul McNamara (1997). Supererogation in Deontic Logic: Metatheory for DWE and Some Close Neighbours. Studia Logica 59 (3):397-415.
- Paul McNamara, Deontic Logic. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Paul McNamara (1996). Doing Well Enough: Toward a Logic for Common-Sense Morality. Studia Logica 57 (1):167 - 192.
- David Merli (2009). Possessing Moral Concepts. Philosophia 37 (3).
- T. Mooney, John Williams & Mark Nowacki (2011). Kovesi and the Formal and Material Elements of Concepts. Philosophia 39 (4):699-720.
- Carolyn Parkinson, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Philipp E. Koralus, Angela Mendelovici, Victoria McGeer & Thalia Wheatley (2011). Is Morality Unified? Evidence That Distinct Neural Systems Underlie Moral Judgments of Harm, Dishonesty, and Disgust. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 23 (10):3162-3180.
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