Moral Motivation
- C. Daniel Batson & Laura L. Shaw (1991). Evidence for Altruism: Toward a Pluralism of Prosocial Motives. Psychological Inquiry 2 (2):107-122.
- Hilary Bok (1996). Acting Without Choosing. Noûs 30 (2):174-196.
- David Brax (2009). Hedonism as the Explanation of Value. Dissertation, Lund University
- Danielle Bromwich (2010). Clearing Conceptual Space for Cognitivist Motivational Internalism. Philosophical Studies 148 (3).
- Lara Denis (2005). Autonomy and the Highest Good. Kantian Review 10 (1):33-59.
- Pablo Gilabert (2005). A Substantivist Construal of Discourse Ethics. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (3):405 – 437.
- Irwin Goldstein (2002). The Good's Magnetism and Ethical Realism. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):1-14.
- Barbara Herman (1981). On the Value of Acting From the Motive of Duty. Philosophical Review 90 (3):359-382.
- Richard Holton (2003). How is Strength of Will Possible? In Christine Tappolet & Sarah Stroud (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford.
- Jeanette Kennett (1993). Mixed Motives. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (3):256 – 269.
- Christine M. Korsgaard, Natural Motives and the Motive of Duty: Hume and Kant on Our Duties to Others.
- Errol Lord (2008). Dancy on Acting for the Right Reason. Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy:1-7.
- Michael Smith (1988). On Humeans, Anti-Humeans, and Motivation: A Reply to Pettit. Mind 97 (388):589-595.
- Michael Smith (1987). The Humean Theory of Motivation. Mind 96 (381):36-61.
- Tamler Sommers (2009). A Very Bad Wizard: Morality Behind the Curtain. McSweeney's Press.
- Philip Stratton-Lake (2000). Kant, Duty, and Moral Worth. Routledge.
- Sigrun Svavarsdottir (1999). Moral Cognitivism and Motivation. Philosophical Review 108 (2):161-219.
- Sergio Tenenbaum (2006). Direction of Fit and Motivational Cognitivism. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press.
- David Wiggins (1995). Categorical Requirements: Kant and Hume on the Idea of Duty. In Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence & Warren Quinn (eds.), Virtues and Reasons. Clarendon Press.
- David Wiggins (1991). Categorical Requirements: Kant and Hume on the Idea of Duty. The Monist 74:83-106.
Moral Reasons
- Stephen L. Darwall (2006). The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability. Harvard University Press.
- Daan Evers (2009). Humean Agent-Neutral Reasons? Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):55 – 67.
- P. S. Greenspan (1975). Conditional Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives. Journal of Philosophy 72 (10):259-276.
- Patricia Greenspan, Practical Reasons and Moral 'Ought'.
- Patricia Greenspan, Moral Reasons, Imperfect Duties, and Choice.
- Ulrike Heuer (forthcoming). Wrongness and Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
- Vaughn E. Huckfeldt (2007). Categorical and Agent-Neutral Reasons in Kantian Justifications of Morality. Philosophia 35 (1).
- Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (2009). Reasons as Evidence. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4.
- Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (2008). Reasons: Explanations or Evidence? Ethics 119 (1).
- Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming). ‘Ought’, ‘Can’, and Practical Reasons. American Philosophical Quarterly.
- Douglas W. Portmore, Chapter 5: Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism: Reasons, Morality, and Overridingness.
- Douglas W. Portmore, Moral Reasons, Overridingness, and Supererogation.
- Douglas W. Portmore (2008). Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4).
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