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  1. F. G. A. (1965). The Moral Philosophy of David Hume. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 18 (4):772-773.
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  2. Fred Adams (ed.) (2007). Ethics and the Life Sciences. Philosophy Document Center.
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  3. Richard Edward Allen (2000). Reasoning About Values. Dissertation, Columbia University
    In Part One of this dissertation I imagine an agent who is omniscient in the domain of theoretical reason in order to explore whether such an agent could confront open questions about the value of his options, whether there exists a distinct form of rationality applicable to evaluative questions, and whether we can plausibly deny that evaluative reasoning ever arrives at true conclusions. I argue that our ability to engage in evaluative reasoning supports the moral realist claim that there exist (...)
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  4. John Altmann, The Nature of Consequence.
    The Nature of Consequence is a sequel to the Treatise, and expounds more on the force that is Consequence and its significance as it pertains to what is "moral" or "immoral".
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  5. John Altmann, Treatise on Morality.
    The Treatise on Morality aims to put in place a logical framework for how moral philosophy should be perceived and discussed. It boils down certain aspects of morality to mere linguistics, and even goes as far as to delineate how we act into mathematics.
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  6. Alejandro Arango (2015). Moral Clumsiness. Think 14 (40):93-99.
    What would happen if one morning you wake up clumsy, as if your sense of touch were unreliable, arbitrarily on and off? And what would this clumsiness look like if we could transfer it to the moral sense? The article expounds an interesting analogy between the sense of touch, loosely construed, and the moral sense: just as a sort of consistency is necessary for the sense of touch to do its job, so it is for the moral sense to play (...)
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  7. Hilliard Aronovitch (1979). Rational Motivation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (2):173-193.
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  8. Nomy Arpaly (2011). The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 120 (4):607-609.
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  9. Emad H. Atiq (forthcoming). How to Be Impartial as a Subjectivist. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    The metaethical subjectivist claims that there is nothing more to a moral disagreement than a conflict in the desires of the parties involved. Recently, David Enoch has argued that metaethical subjectivism has unacceptable ethical implications. If the subjectivist is right about moral disagreement, then it follows, according to Enoch, that we cannot stand our ground in moral disagreements without violating the demands of impartiality. For being impartial, we’re told, involves being willing to compromise in conflicts that are merely due to (...)
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  10. Robert Audi (2007). Practical Reason and the Status of Moral Obligation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 197-229.
    The article presents the author's views concerning the philosophical views regarding ethical obligation. He emphasizes the general, moral, and practical skepticism of the moral obligation. He provides information on the notions about normative externalism. The conflicting ideas between egoistic and intrapersonal are also discussed.
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  11. Carla Bagnoli (2011). The Exploration of Moral Life. In Justin Broakes (ed.), Iris Murdoch, Philosopher. Oxford
  12. Carla Bagnoli (2009). “Practical Necessity: The Subjective Experience”. In W. Huemer & B. Centi (eds.), Value and Ontology. Ontos-Verlag
  13. Luz Marina Barreto, Moral Reasoning. Moral Motivation and the Rational Foundation of Morals.
    In the following paper I will examine the possibility for a rational foundation of morals, rational in the sense that to ground a moral statement on reason amounts to being able to convince an unmotivated agent to conform to a moral rule - that is to say, to “rationally motivate” him (as Habermas would have said) to act in ways for which he or she had no previous reason to act. We will scrutinize the “internalist’s” objection (in Williams’ definition) to (...)
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  14. Michael D. Baumtrog, Considering the Roles of Values in Practical Reasoning Argumentation Evaluation. Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA).
    Building upon the role values take in Walton’s theory of practical reasoning, this paper will frame the question of how values should be evaluated into the broader question of what reasonable practical argumentation is. The thesis argued for is that if a positive evaluation of practical reasoning argumentation requires that the argument avoid a morally negative conclusion, then the role of values should be given a central, rather than supportive, position in practical argument evaluation.
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  15. Lawrence C. Becker (1973). On Justifying Moral Judgments. New York,Humanities Press.
    Much discussion of morality presupposes that moral judgments are always, at bottom, arbitrary. Moral scepticism, or at least moral relativism, has become common currency among the liberally educated. This remains the case even while political crises become intractable, and it is increasingly apparent that the scope of public policy formulated with no reference to moral justification is extremely limited. The thesis of On Justifying Moral Judgments insists, on the contrary, that rigorous justifications are possible for moral judgments. Crucially, Becker (...)
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  16. Jan Bransen (1998). True to Ourselves. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (1):67 – 85.
    The paper addresses the problem of authenticity from a point of view that diverges from the more usual social, political, or moral approaches, by focusing very explicitly on the internal psychological make-up of human agents in an attempt to identify the conditions that would enable us to use the colloquial phrase 'being true to ourselves' in a way that is philosophically tenable. First, it is argued that the most important and problematic condition is the requirement that agents can be the (...)
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  17. Michael E. Bratman (2014). Temptation and the Agent’s Standpoint. Inquiry 57 (3):293-310.
    Suppose you resolve now to resist an expected temptation later while knowing that once the temptation arrives your preference or evaluative assessment will shift in favor of that temptation. Are there defensible norms of rational planning agency that support sticking with your prior intention in the face of such a shift at the time of temptation and in the absence of relevant new information? This article defends the idea that it might be rational to stick with your prior intention in (...)
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  18. Geoffrey Brennan & Daniel Moseley (forthcoming). Economics and Ethics. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell
    We identify three points of intersection between economics and ethics: the ethics of economics, ethics in economics and ethics out of economics. These points of intersection reveal three types of conversation between economists and moral philosophers that have produced, and may continue to produce, fruitful exchange between the disciplines.
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  19. David O. Brink, Handout #2: Moral Motivation and Rationalism.
    We have looked at worries about expressivism and other forms of noncognitivism. The externalist solution may also seem to be a solution of last resort, because it may seem to deny the platitude that moral judgments are motivationally efficacious. For this reason, we might look seriously at rationalist theories of moral motivation, because they promise to represent moral judgments as intrinsically motivational without giving up cognitivism.
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  20. Hugh Chandler, Some Remarks on Hills's The Beloved Self.
    Here are a few remarks in regard to the first section of Alison Hills’s The Beloved Self. The topic is various forms of ‘Egoism.’ These are taken to be theories of practical reason – alternative answers to the question ‘what have I reason to do?’.
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  21. Richard Yetter Chappell, A Non-Natural Reason by Any Other Name...
    Are non-natural properties worth caring about? I consider two (related) objections to metaethical non-naturalism. According to the "intelligibility" objection, it would be positively unintelligible to care about non-natural properties that float free from the causal fabric of the cosmos. According to the "ethical idlers" objection, there is no compelling motivation to posit non-natural normative properties because the natural properties suffice to provide us with reasons. In both cases, I argue, the objection stems from misunderstanding the role that non-natural properties play (...)
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  22. Hunsang Chun (2004). Wish, Deliberation, and Action: A Study of Aristotle's Moral Psychology. Dissertation, Harvard University
    This thesis explores Aristotle's conception of practical reason through examining his discussion of 'wish [ bou&d12;l hsiv ]' and 'deliberation [ bou&d12;l 3usiv ]'. In chapter 1, which focuses on Aristotle's claim that all wishes are directed at 'acting well [ 3u&d12;pr axi&d12;a ]', I argue that this claim indicates that wish, unlike nonrational desires, involves the agent's reflective endorsement of an initial desirable and thus demonstrates a double aspect structure of human motivation. In chapter 2, which concerns Aristotle's view (...)
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  23. Christine Clavien (2010). An Affective Approach to Moral Motivation. Journal of Cognitive Science 11 (2):129-160.
    Over the last few years, there has been a surge of work in a new field called “moral psychology”, which uses experimental methods to test the psychological processes underlying human moral activity. In this paper, I shall follow this line of approach with the aim of working out a model of how people form value judgements and how they are motivated to act morally. I call this model an “affective picture”: ‘picture’ because it remains strictly at the descriptive level and (...)
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  24. Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield (2010). Rational Capacities, Resolve, and Weakness of Will. Mind 119 (476):907 - 932.
    In this paper we present an account of practical rationality and weakness of will in terms of rational capacities. We show how our account rectifies various shortcomings in Michael Smith's related theory. In particular, our account is capable of accommodating cases of weak-willed behaviour that are not `akratic', or otherwise contrary to the agent's better judgement. Our account differs from Smith's primarily by incorporating resolve: a third rational capacity for resolute maintenance of one's intentions. We discuss further two ways to (...)
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  25. Rachel Cohon (1986). The Rationality of Moral Conduct: A Preliminary Study. Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
    The present work lays the foundations for a proposed longer work in which I shall defend an answer to the question whether immoral action is necessarily irrational. Here I first examine the traditional formulations, by Hume and Kant, of the crucial positions in the controversy over whether reason does or does not require us to do right or act well, or forbid us to do wrong or be villainous, and I criticize the views of each of these philosophers. I then (...)
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  26. Mark Colby (1995). Moral Traditions, MacIntyre and Historicist Practical Reason. Philosophy and Social Criticism 21 (3):53-78.
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  27. Peggy Connolly, David R. Keller, Martin G. Leever & Becky Cox White (2009). Ethics In Action. John Wiley & Sons.
    Through the analysis of forty ethical dilemmas drawn from real-life situations, _Ethics in Action_ guides the reader through a process of moral deliberation that leads to the resolution of a variety of moral dilemmas. Fosters critical thinking by evaluating the reasons people give to support their choices and actions Challenges the paradigm of moral relativism that often impedes efforts to resolve moral dilemmas Incorporates international perspectives often lacking in texts published for a U.S. audience.
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  28. Roger Crisp (1993). Motivation, Universality and the Good. Ratio 6 (2):181-190.
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  29. Paul Crittenden (1990). Learning to Be Moral: Philosophical Thoughts About Moral Development. Humanities Press International.
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  30. Ciaran Patrick Cronin (1991). Towards a Theory of Rationality in Moral Discourse: Wittgenstein and Habermas on Practical Reason. Dissertation, Northwestern University
    The dissertation defends the cognitivist position that the practical considerations expressed in moral judgments can give agents objective prima facie reasons for action which are potentially universal in scope. The widely-held presumption against the cognitivist view is a reflection of an underlying foundationalist understanding of reason and philosophical method and associated conceptions of agency and the practical subject, which have dominated modern philosophy and are deeply entrenched in Western culture as a whole. Against this presumption it is argued that foundationalism (...)
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  31. Terence Cuneo (2008). Intuitionism's Burden: Thomas Reid on the Problem of Moral Motivation. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 6 (1):21-44.
    Hume bequeathed to rational intuitionists a problem concerning moral judgment and the will – a problem of sufficient severity that it is still cited as one of the major reasons why intuitionism is untenable.1 Stated in general terms, the problem concerns how an intuitionist moral theory can account for the intimate connection between moral judgment and moral motivation. One reason that this is still considered to be a problem for intuitionists is that it is widely assumed that the early intuitionists (...)
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  32. Adriano Naves de Brito (2008). The Role of Reasons and Sentiments in Tugendhat's Moral Philosophy. Critica 40 (119):29-43.
    En este artículo discuto la filosofía moral de Tugendhat mediante la investigación de su concepción de justificación moral y del papel que los sentimientos desempeñan en ella. Para comprender y criticar la relación entre razones y sentimientos en la filosofía moral de Tugendhat, analizo la correlación entre juicio y afecto. Sostengo, además, que, en lo que atañe a la estructura más básica de la moralidad, los individuos tienen mucho menos autonomía para aceptar o rechazar un sistema moral de lo que (...)
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  33. A. E. Denham (2011). Psychopathy, Empathy & Moral Motivation. In Justin Broakes (ed.), Iris Murdoch: Philosopher. Oxford University Press
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  34. Jamie Dreier (2011). Humean Doubts. In Xu Xiangdong (ed.), Practical Reason. Zhejiang University Press
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  35. A. R. C. Duncan (1959). Practical Reason and Morality. Philosophical Review 68 (3):400-402.
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  36. A. R. C. Duncan (1957). Practical Reason and Morality a Study of Immanuel Kant's Foundations for the Metaphysics of Morals. Nelson.
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  37. Robert M. Ellis (2013). Middle Way Philosophy 2: The Integration of Desire. Lulu.
    An argument that there is a common pattern in conflict between desires and the dialectical integration of those conflicts, at both individual and socio-political levels. Philosophical, psychological, poltical and Buddhist approaches to integration are brought together here to show how the integration of desire contributes to moral objectivity.
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  38. Andrzej Elżanowski (2013). Moral Progress: A Present-Day Perspective on the Leading Enlightenment Idea. ARGUMENT 3 (1):9-26.
    Most Enlightenment thinkers believed that the World’s order (as ultimately based on divine laws) is good and thus every gain of knowledge will have good consequences. Scientific process was assumed to entail moral progress. In fact some moral progress did occur in the Western civilization and science contributed to it, but it is widely incommensurate with the progress of science. The Enlightenment’s concept of a concerted scientific and moral progress proved largely wrong for several reasons. (1) Public morality and science (...)
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  39. W. D. Falk (1947). "Ought" and Motivation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 48:111 - 138.
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  40. David Faraci (2012). David Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (2):259-267.
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  41. Joel Feinberg (1971). Reason and Responsibility. Encino, Calif.,Dickenson Pub. Co..
    The book's clear organization structures selections so that readings complement each other guiding you through contrasting positions on key concepts in ...
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  42. Julian Fink (2013). What is (Correct) Practical Reasoning? Acta Analytica 28 (4):471-482.
    This paper argues that practical reasoning is a mental process which leads a person from a set of existent mental states to an intention. In Section 1, I defend this view against two other proposals according to which practical reasoning either concludes in an action itself or in a normative belief. Section 2 discusses the correctness of practical reasoning and explains how the correctness of instrumental reasoning can be explained by the logical relations that hold between the contents of the (...)
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  43. Philippa Foot (2004). Rationality and Goodness. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 54:1-13.
    The problem I am going to discuss here concerns practical rationality, rationality not in thought but in action. More particularly, I am going to discuss the rationality, or absence of rationality of moral action. And ‘moral action’ shall mean here something done by someone who believes that to act otherwise would be contrary to, say, justice or charity; or again not done because it is thought that it would be unjust or uncharitable to do it. The question is whether in (...)
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  44. David Forman (2012). Principled and Unprincipled Maxims. Kant-Studien 103 (3):318-336.
    Kant frequently speaks as if all voluntary actions arise from our maxims as the subjective principles of our practical reason. But, as Michael Albrecht has pointed out, Kant also occasionally speaks as if it is only the rare person of “character” who acts according to principles or maxims. I argue that Kant’s seemingly contradictory claims on this front result from the fact that there are two fundamentally different ways that maxims of action can figure in the deliberation of the agent: (...)
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  45. Afschin Gandjour (2007). Is It Rational to Pursue Utilitarianism? Ethical Perspectives 14 (2):139-158.
    The purpose of this paper is to discuss the rational foundation of utilitarianism and the moral motivation to pursue utilitarianism. To this end, the paper discusses a variety of theories including not only utilitarianism and theories of rationality, but also economic theory and evolutionary theories of cooperation.The paper shows that both the rational foundation of utilitarianism and the motivation to pursue utilitarianism are questionable. Agent-relative theories are a recent attempt to attenuate the problem of motivation for utilitarianism. This paper shows, (...)
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  46. Gardiner, Katherine Elizabeth, Why Care? On Motivation in Care Ethics.
    Just how care moves us is the subject of Katherine Gardiner’s thesis. Gardiner wants to know how care moves us – or in philosophical terms, how it motivates us. She describes caring as a morally ‘necessary’ activity, which means that we cannot escape responding to the care appeal. However, Gardiner uses the example of ‘Pim’, who cannot care and feels really bad about it - not because he is incapable of caring, but who just can’t. She reviews several versions of (...)
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  47. Joshua Gert (2014). Perform a Justified Option. Utilitas 26 (2):206-217.
    In a number of recent publications, Douglas Portmore has defended consequentialism, largely on the basis of a maximizing view of practical rationality. I have criticized such maximizing views, arguing that we need to distinguish two independent dimensions of normative strength: justifying strength and requiring strength. I have also argued that this distinction helps to explain why we typically have so many rational options. Engaging with these arguments, Portmore has (a) developed his own novel maximization-friendly method of explaining the ubiquity of (...)
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  48. Joshua Gert (2008). Normativity and the Will: Selected Essays in Moral Psychology and Practical Reason – R. Jay Wallace. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):559-563.
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  49. Joshua Gert & Michael McKenna (2008). Review of Normativity and the Will by R. Jay Wallace. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):559–563.
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  50. Jessy Giroux (2011). The Origin of Moral Norms: A Moderate Nativist Account. Dialogue 50 (02):281-306.
    In this paper, I distinguish between two families of theories which view moral norms as either “inputs” or “outputs.” I argue that the most plausible version of each model can ultimately be seen as the two sides of the same model, which I call Moderate Nativism. The difference between these two apparently antagonistic models is one of perspective rather than content: while the Input model explains how emotional dispositions constrain the historical evolution of moral norms, the Output model explains how (...)
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