This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
162 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 162
  1. F. G. A. (1965). The Moral Philosophy of David Hume. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 18 (4):772-773.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Fred Adams (ed.) (2007). Ethics and the Life Sciences. Philosophy Document Center.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Leslie Allan, Is Morality Subjective?
    Subjectivists claim that the absence of a theological or metaphysical grounding to moral judgements renders them all as simply statements about our subjective wants and preferences. Leslie Allan argues that the subjectivists' case rests on a misunderstanding of the nature of moral objectivity. He presents the view that subjectivists mistakenly counterpoise the ideal of moral objectivity with the expression of individual preferences. Being objective in moral deliberation, Allan argues, should be regarded instead as the antithesis of parochial and biased reasoning. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Leslie Allan, Is Morality Subjective? – A Reply to Critics.
    Leslie Allan defends his thesis that ethics is objective in the sense of requiring moral agents to offer impartial reasons for acting. Radical subjectivists have attacked this requirement for impartiality on a number of grounds. Some critics make the charge that Allan's thesis is simply a version of subjectivism in disguise. He responds by showing how a broadly naturalist view of ethics accommodates objective moral constraints. Allan also counters cases in which impartiality is purportedly not morally required and considers the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Richard Edward Allen (2000). Reasoning About Values. Dissertation, Columbia University
    In Part One of this dissertation I imagine an agent who is omniscient in the domain of theoretical reason in order to explore whether such an agent could confront open questions about the value of his options, whether there exists a distinct form of rationality applicable to evaluative questions, and whether we can plausibly deny that evaluative reasoning ever arrives at true conclusions. I argue that our ability to engage in evaluative reasoning supports the moral realist claim that there exist (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. John Altmann, The Nature of Consequence.
    The Nature of Consequence is a sequel to the Treatise, and expounds more on the force that is Consequence and its significance as it pertains to what is "moral" or "immoral".
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. John Altmann, Treatise on Morality.
    The Treatise on Morality aims to put in place a logical framework for how moral philosophy should be perceived and discussed. It boils down certain aspects of morality to mere linguistics, and even goes as far as to delineate how we act into mathematics.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Alejandro Arango (2015). Moral Clumsiness. Think 14 (40):93-99.
    What would happen if one morning you wake up clumsy, as if your sense of touch were unreliable, arbitrarily on and off? And what would this clumsiness look like if we could transfer it to the moral sense? The article expounds an interesting analogy between the sense of touch, loosely construed, and the moral sense: just as a sort of consistency is necessary for the sense of touch to do its job, so it is for the moral sense to play (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Hilliard Aronovitch (1979). Rational Motivation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (2):173-193.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Nomy Arpaly (2011). The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 120 (4):607-609.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Caroline T. Arruda (2016). What Kind of Theory is the Humean Theory of Motivation? Ratio 29 (2).
    I consider an underappreciated problem for proponents of the Humean theory of motivation. Namely, it is unclear whether is it to be understood as a largely psychological or largely metaphysical theory. I show that the psychological interpretation of HTM will need to be modified in order to be a tenable view and, as it will turn out, the modifications required render it virtually philosophically empty. I then argue that the largely metaphysical interpretation is the only a plausible interpretation of HTM's (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Emad H. Atiq (2016). How to Be Impartial as a Subjectivist. Philosophical Studies 173 (3):757-779.
    The metaethical subjectivist claims that there is nothing more to a moral disagreement than a conflict in the desires of the parties involved. Recently, David Enoch has argued that metaethical subjectivism has unacceptable ethical implications. If the subjectivist is right about moral disagreement, then it follows, according to Enoch, that we cannot stand our ground in moral disagreements without violating the demands of impartiality. For being impartial, we’re told, involves being willing to compromise in conflicts that are merely due to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Robert Audi (2007). Practical Reason and the Status of Moral Obligation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 197-229.
    The article presents the author's views concerning the philosophical views regarding ethical obligation. He emphasizes the general, moral, and practical skepticism of the moral obligation. He provides information on the notions about normative externalism. The conflicting ideas between egoistic and intrapersonal are also discussed.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Carla Bagnoli (2011). The Exploration of Moral Life. In Justin Broakes (ed.), Iris Murdoch, Philosopher. Oxford
  15. Carla Bagnoli (2009). “Practical Necessity: The Subjective Experience”. In W. Huemer & B. Centi (eds.), Value and Ontology. Ontos-Verlag
  16. Luz Marina Barreto, Moral Reasoning. Moral Motivation and the Rational Foundation of Morals.
    In the following paper I will examine the possibility for a rational foundation of morals, rational in the sense that to ground a moral statement on reason amounts to being able to convince an unmotivated agent to conform to a moral rule - that is to say, to “rationally motivate” him (as Habermas would have said) to act in ways for which he or she had no previous reason to act. We will scrutinize the “internalist’s” objection (in Williams’ definition) to (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Christopher Bartel (2015). Free Will and Moral Responsibility in Video Games. Ethics and Information Technology 17 (4):285-293.
    Can a player be held morally responsible for the choices that she makes within a videogame? Do the moral choices that the player makes reflect in any way on the player’s actual moral sensibilities? Many videogames offer players the options to make numerous choices within the game, including moral choices. But the scope of these choices is quite limited. I attempt to analyze these issues by drawing on philosophical debates about the nature of free will. Many philosophers worry that, if (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Michael D. Baumtrog, Considering the Roles of Values in Practical Reasoning Argumentation Evaluation. Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA).
    Building upon the role values take in Walton’s theory of practical reasoning, this paper will frame the question of how values should be evaluated into the broader question of what reasonable practical argumentation is. The thesis argued for is that if a positive evaluation of practical reasoning argumentation requires that the argument avoid a morally negative conclusion, then the role of values should be given a central, rather than supportive, position in practical argument evaluation.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. James E. Bayley (1986). Moral Reasoning and Personal Decision. In Martin Tamny & K. D. Irani (eds.), Rationality in Thought and Action. Greenwood Press 29--19.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Lawrence C. Becker (1973). On Justifying Moral Judgments. New York,Humanities Press.
    Much discussion of morality presupposes that moral judgments are always, at bottom, arbitrary. Moral scepticism, or at least moral relativism, has become common currency among the liberally educated. This remains the case even while political crises become intractable, and it is increasingly apparent that the scope of public policy formulated with no reference to moral justification is extremely limited. The thesis of On Justifying Moral Judgments insists, on the contrary, that rigorous justifications are possible for moral judgments. Crucially, Becker argues (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  21. Stanley I. Benn (2011). A Theory of Freedom. Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a major contribution to the study of the philosophy of action, moral philosophy, and political philosophy. Its central idea is a radically unorthodox theory of rational action. Most contemporary Anglo-American philosophers believe that action is motivated by desire. Professor Benn rejects the doctrine and replaces it with a reformulation of Kant's ethical and political theory, in which rational action can be determined simply by principles, regardless of consequences. The book analyzes the way in which value conflicts can (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Stanley I. Benn (2009). A Theory of Freedom. Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a major contribution to the study of the philosophy of action, moral philosophy, and political philosophy. Its central idea is a radically unorthodox theory of rational action. Most contemporary Anglo-American philosophers believe that action is motivated by desire. Professor Benn rejects the doctrine and replaces it with a reformulation of Kant's ethical and political theory, in which rational action can be determined simply by principles, regardless of consequences. The book analyzes the way in which value conflicts can (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Sam Black & Evan Tiffany (eds.) (2010). Reasons to Be Moral Revisted: Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 33. University of Calgary Press.
    H.A. Prichard argued that the “why should I be moral?” question is the central subject matter of moral theory. Prichard famously claimed to have proved that all efforts to answer that question are doomed. Many contributors to this volume of contemporary papers attempt to reconstruct Prichard’s argument. They claim either explicitly or implicitly that Prichard was mistaken, and philosophy can contribute to meaningful engagement with the ‘why be moral?’ question. A theme to emerge from these papers is that arguments like (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Jan Bransen (1998). True to Ourselves. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (1):67 – 85.
    The paper addresses the problem of authenticity from a point of view that diverges from the more usual social, political, or moral approaches, by focusing very explicitly on the internal psychological make-up of human agents in an attempt to identify the conditions that would enable us to use the colloquial phrase 'being true to ourselves' in a way that is philosophically tenable. First, it is argued that the most important and problematic condition is the requirement that agents can be the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Michael E. Bratman (2014). Temptation and the Agent’s Standpoint. Inquiry 57 (3):293-310.
    Suppose you resolve now to resist an expected temptation later while knowing that once the temptation arrives your preference or evaluative assessment will shift in favor of that temptation. Are there defensible norms of rational planning agency that support sticking with your prior intention in the face of such a shift at the time of temptation and in the absence of relevant new information? This article defends the idea that it might be rational to stick with your prior intention in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  26. Geoffrey Brennan & Daniel Moseley (forthcoming). Economics and Ethics. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell
    We identify three points of intersection between economics and ethics: the ethics of economics, ethics in economics and ethics out of economics. These points of intersection reveal three types of conversation between economists and moral philosophers that have produced, and may continue to produce, fruitful exchange between the disciplines.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. David O. Brink, Handout #2: Moral Motivation and Rationalism.
    We have looked at worries about expressivism and other forms of noncognitivism. The externalist solution may also seem to be a solution of last resort, because it may seem to deny the platitude that moral judgments are motivationally efficacious. For this reason, we might look seriously at rationalist theories of moral motivation, because they promise to represent moral judgments as intrinsically motivational without giving up cognitivism.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Hugh Chandler, Some Remarks on Hills's The Beloved Self.
    Here are a few remarks in regard to the first section of Alison Hills’s The Beloved Self. The topic is various forms of ‘Egoism.’ These are taken to be theories of practical reason – alternative answers to the question ‘what have I reason to do?’.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Richard Yetter Chappell, Why Care About Non-Natural Reasons?
    Are non-natural properties worth caring about? I consider two (related) objections to metaethical non-naturalism. According to the "intelligibility" objection, it would be positively unintelligible to care about non-natural properties that float free from the causal fabric of the cosmos. According to the "ethical idlers" objection, there is no compelling motivation to posit non-natural normative properties because the natural properties suffice to provide us with reasons. In both cases, I argue, the objection stems from misunderstanding the role that non-natural properties play (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Andreas Christiansen (forthcoming). Similarity Arguments in the Genetic Modification Debate. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.
    In the ethical debate on genetic modification, it is common to encounter the claim that some anti-GM argument would also apply an established, ethically accepted technology, and that the anti-GM argument is therefore unsuccessful. The paper discusses whether this argumentative strategy, the Similarity Argument, is sound. It presents a logically valid, generic form of the Similarity Argument and then shows that it is subject to three types of objection: It does not respect the difference between pro tanto reasons and all-things-considered (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Hunsang Chun (2004). Wish, Deliberation, and Action: A Study of Aristotle's Moral Psychology. Dissertation, Harvard University
    This thesis explores Aristotle's conception of practical reason through examining his discussion of 'wish [ bou&d12;l hsiv ]' and 'deliberation [ bou&d12;l 3usiv ]'. In chapter 1, which focuses on Aristotle's claim that all wishes are directed at 'acting well [ 3u&d12;pr axi&d12;a ]', I argue that this claim indicates that wish, unlike nonrational desires, involves the agent's reflective endorsement of an initial desirable and thus demonstrates a double aspect structure of human motivation. In chapter 2, which concerns Aristotle's view (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Christine Clavien (2010). An Affective Approach to Moral Motivation. Journal of Cognitive Science 11 (2):129-160.
    Over the last few years, there has been a surge of work in a new field called “moral psychology”, which uses experimental methods to test the psychological processes underlying human moral activity. In this paper, I shall follow this line of approach with the aim of working out a model of how people form value judgements and how they are motivated to act morally. I call this model an “affective picture”: ‘picture’ because it remains strictly at the descriptive level and (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield (2010). Rational Capacities, Resolve, and Weakness of Will. Mind 119 (476):907 - 932.
    In this paper we present an account of practical rationality and weakness of will in terms of rational capacities. We show how our account rectifies various shortcomings in Michael Smith's related theory. In particular, our account is capable of accommodating cases of weak-willed behaviour that are not `akratic', or otherwise contrary to the agent's better judgement. Our account differs from Smith's primarily by incorporating resolve: a third rational capacity for resolute maintenance of one's intentions. We discuss further two ways to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  34. Marc A. Cohen (2012). Empathy in Business Ethics Education. Journal of Business Ethics Education 9:359-375.
    This paper addresses the tactical question of how we ought to proceed in teachingbusiness ethics, taking as a starting point that business ethics should be concerned with cooperative,mutually beneficial outcomes, and in particular with fostering behavior that contributes to thoseoutcomes. This paper suggests that focus on moral reasoning as a tactical outcome—as a way ofachieving behavior in support of cooperative outcomes—is misplaced. Instead, we ought to focuson cultivating empathetic experiences. Intuitively, the problem we need to address in business ethicsis not (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Rachel Cohon (1986). The Rationality of Moral Conduct: A Preliminary Study. Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
    The present work lays the foundations for a proposed longer work in which I shall defend an answer to the question whether immoral action is necessarily irrational. Here I first examine the traditional formulations, by Hume and Kant, of the crucial positions in the controversy over whether reason does or does not require us to do right or act well, or forbid us to do wrong or be villainous, and I criticize the views of each of these philosophers. I then (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Mark Colby (1995). Moral Traditions, MacIntyre and Historicist Practical Reason. Philosophy and Social Criticism 21 (3):53-78.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Peggy Connolly, David R. Keller, Martin G. Leever & Becky Cox White (2009). Ethics In Action. John Wiley & Sons.
    Through the analysis of forty ethical dilemmas drawn from real-life situations, _Ethics in Action_ guides the reader through a process of moral deliberation that leads to the resolution of a variety of moral dilemmas. Fosters critical thinking by evaluating the reasons people give to support their choices and actions Challenges the paradigm of moral relativism that often impedes efforts to resolve moral dilemmas Incorporates international perspectives often lacking in texts published for a U.S. audience.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Roger Crisp (1993). Motivation, Universality and the Good. Ratio 6 (2):181-190.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  39. Paul Crittenden (1990). Learning to Be Moral: Philosophical Thoughts About Moral Development. Humanities Press International.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  40. Ciaran Patrick Cronin (1991). Towards a Theory of Rationality in Moral Discourse: Wittgenstein and Habermas on Practical Reason. Dissertation, Northwestern University
    The dissertation defends the cognitivist position that the practical considerations expressed in moral judgments can give agents objective prima facie reasons for action which are potentially universal in scope. The widely-held presumption against the cognitivist view is a reflection of an underlying foundationalist understanding of reason and philosophical method and associated conceptions of agency and the practical subject, which have dominated modern philosophy and are deeply entrenched in Western culture as a whole. Against this presumption it is argued that foundationalism (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Terence Cuneo (2008). Intuitionism's Burden: Thomas Reid on the Problem of Moral Motivation. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 6 (1):21-44.
    Hume bequeathed to rational intuitionists a problem concerning moral judgment and the will – a problem of sufficient severity that it is still cited as one of the major reasons why intuitionism is untenable.1 Stated in general terms, the problem concerns how an intuitionist moral theory can account for the intimate connection between moral judgment and moral motivation. One reason that this is still considered to be a problem for intuitionists is that it is widely assumed that the early intuitionists (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  42. Adriano Naves de Brito (2008). The Role of Reasons and Sentiments in Tugendhat's Moral Philosophy. Critica 40 (119):29-43.
    En este artículo discuto la filosofía moral de Tugendhat mediante la investigación de su concepción de justificación moral y del papel que los sentimientos desempeñan en ella. Para comprender y criticar la relación entre razones y sentimientos en la filosofía moral de Tugendhat, analizo la correlación entre juicio y afecto. Sostengo, además, que, en lo que atañe a la estructura más básica de la moralidad, los individuos tienen mucho menos autonomía para aceptar o rechazar un sistema moral de lo que (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. A. E. Denham (2011). Psychopathy, Empathy & Moral Motivation. In Justin Broakes (ed.), Iris Murdoch: Philosopher. Oxford University Press
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Jamie Dreier (2011). Humean Doubts. In Xu Xiangdong (ed.), Practical Reason. Zhejiang University Press
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. A. R. C. Duncan (1959). Practical Reason and Morality. Philosophical Review 68 (3):400-402.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. A. R. C. Duncan (1957). Practical Reason and Morality a Study of Immanuel Kant's Foundations for the Metaphysics of Morals. Nelson.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Gerald Dworkin (1982). A Journal Of Mathematical Ethics: A Proposal. Philosophical Forum 13 (4):413.
    A humorous essay on the idea of using mathematical ideas to think about ethical issues.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Robert M. Ellis (2013). Middle Way Philosophy 2: The Integration of Desire. Lulu.
    An argument that there is a common pattern in conflict between desires and the dialectical integration of those conflicts, at both individual and socio-political levels. Philosophical, psychological, poltical and Buddhist approaches to integration are brought together here to show how the integration of desire contributes to moral objectivity.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. Andrzej Elżanowski (2013). Moral Progress: A Present-Day Perspective on the Leading Enlightenment Idea. Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 3 (1):9-26.
    Most Enlightenment thinkers believed that the World’s order (as ultimately based on divine laws) is good and thus every gain of knowledge will have good consequences. Scientific process was assumed to entail moral progress. In fact some moral progress did occur in the Western civilization and science contributed to it, but it is widely incommensurate with the progress of science. The Enlightenment’s concept of a concerted scientific and moral progress proved largely wrong for several reasons. (1) Public morality and science (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. Andrzej ELŻANOWSKI (2013). Moral Progress: A Present-Day Perspective on the Leading Enlightenment Idea. Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 3 (1):9-26.
    Most Enlightenment thinkers believed that the World’s order (as ultimately based on divine laws) is good and thus every gain of knowledge will have good consequences. Scientific process was assumed to entail moral progress. In fact some moral progress did occur in the Western civilization and science contributed to it, but it is widely incommensurate with the progress of science. The Enlightenment’s concept of a concerted scientific and moral progress proved largely wrong for several reasons. (1) Public morality and science (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 162