Related categories
Siblings:History/traditions: Moral Relativism
189 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 189
  1. Robin Attfield (1979). How Not to Be a Moral Relativist. The Monist 62 (4):510-523.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Eric Bain-Selbo (2006). Judge and Be Judged: Moral Reflection in an Age of Relativism and Fundamentalism. Lexington Books.
    Judge and Be Judged offers insights into moral life and moral judgment that aim to help in understanding our society's tendency towards either fundamentalism or relativism. By examining the social function of shame, the possibility of cross-cultural understanding, and obstacles to moral judgment in the classroom, this book charts a path that helps to avoid both fundamentalism and relativism.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. James E. Bayley (1992). Aspects of Relativism: Moral, Cognitive and Literary. Upa.
    In this book nine philosophers and one literary critic address aspects of the relativism issue currently of philosophic interest.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. James Beebe (2010). Moral Relativism in Context. Noûs 44 (4):691-724.
    Consider the following facts about the average, philosophically untrained moral relativist: (1.1) The average moral relativist denies the existence of “absolute moral truths.” (1.2) The average moral relativist often expresses her commitment to moral relativism with slogans like ‘What’s true (or right) for you may not be what’s true (or right) for me’ or ‘What’s true (or right) for your culture may not be what’s true (or right) for my culture.’ (1.3) The average moral relativist endorses relativistic views of morality (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Julien Beillard (2013). Moral Relativism is Incoherent. Philosophy Now 97:23-24.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. T. Bennigson (1999). The Truth in Vulgar Relativism. Philosophical Studies 96 (3):269-300.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. J. S. Biehl (2005). Ethical Instrumentalism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):353 - 369.
    The present essay offers a sketch of a philosophy of value, what I shall here refer to as ‘ethical instrumentalism.’ My primary aim is to say just what this view involves and what its commitments are. In the course of doing so, I find it necessary to distinguish this view from another with which it shares a common basis and which, in reference to its most influential proponent, I refer to as ‘Humeanism.’ A second, more general, aim is to make (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Gunnar Björnsson (2012). Do 'Objectivist' Features of Moral Discourse and Thinking Support Moral Objectivism? Journal of Ethics 16 (4):367-393.
    Many philosophers think that moral objectivism is supported by stable features of moral discourse and thinking. When engaged in moral reasoning and discourse, people behave ‘as if’ objectivism were correct, and the seemingly most straightforward way of making sense of this is to assume that objectivism is correct; this is how we think that such behavior is explained in paradigmatically objectivist domains. By comparison, relativist, error-theoretic or non-cognitivist accounts of this behavior seem contrived and ad hoc. After explaining why this (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Simon Blackburn (1999). Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-Realist Foundation? Inquiry 42 (2):213 – 227.
    This essay juxtaposes the position in metaethics defended, expressivism with quasirealistic trimmings, with the ancient problem of relativism. It argues that, perhaps surprisingly, there is less of a problem of normative truth on this approach than on others. Because ethics is not in the business of representing aspects of the world, there is no way to argue for a plurality of moral truths, simply from the existence of a plurality of moral opinions. The essay also argues that other approaches, which (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Simon Blackburn (1998). Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):195-198.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Paul Boghossian (2011). Three Kinds of Relativism. In Steven Hales (ed.), A Companion to Relativism. Blackwell
    The paper looks at three big ideas that have been associated with the term “relativism.” The first maintains that some property has a higher-degree than might have been thought. The second that the judgments in a particular domain of discourse are capable only of relative truth and not of absolute truth (an idea that is sometimes associated with the idea of “faultless disagreement.”) And the third, which I dub with the oxymoronic label “absolutist relativism,” seeks to locate relativism in our (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Paul Boghossian (2011). The Maze of Moral Relativism. The New York Times.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Michael Brannigan (2000). Cultural Diversity and the Case Against Ethical Relativism. Health Care Analysis 8 (3):321-327.
    The movement to respect culturaldiversity, known as multiculturalism, poses a dauntingchallenge to healthcare ethics. Can we construct adefensible passage from the fact of culturaldifferences to any claims regarding morality? Or doesmulticulturalism lead to ethical relativism? Macklinargues that, in view of a leading distinction betweenuniversalism in ethics and moral absolutism, the onlyreasonable passage avoids both absolutism andrelativism. She presents a strong case againstethical relativism and its pernicious consequences forcross-cultural issues in healthcare. She alsoprovides sound criteria for the assessment of aculture's moral (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Berit Brogaard (2012). Moral Relativism and Moral Expressivism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):538-556.
    Though moral relativism has had its supporters over the years, it is not a dominant position in philosophy. I will argue here, though, that the view is an attractive position. It evades some hardcore challenges that face absolutism, and it is reconcilable with an appealing emotivist approach to moral attitudes. In previous work, I have offered considerations in favor of a version of moral relativism that I call “perspectivalism.” These considerations are primarily grounded in linguistic data. Here I offer a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Berit Brogaard (2008). Moral Contextualism and Moral Relativism. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):385 - 409.
    Moral relativism provides a compelling explanation of linguistic data involving ordinary moral expressions like 'right' and 'wrong'. But it is a very radical view. Because relativism relativizes sentence truth to contexts of assessment it forces us to revise standard linguistic theory. If, however, no competing theory explains all of the evidence, perhaps it is time for a paradigm shift. However, I argue that a version of moral contextualism can account for the same data as relativism without relativizing sentence truth to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Harry Bunting (1996). A Single True Morality? The Challenge of Relativism. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 40:73-85.
    Ethical objectivists hold that there is one and only one correct system of moral beliefs. From such a standpoint it follows that conflicting basic moral principles cannot both be true and that the only moral principles which are binding on rational human agents are those described by the single true morality. However sincerely they may be held, all other moral principles are incorrect. Objectivism is an influential tradition, covering most of the rationalist and naturalist standpoints which have dominated nineteenth and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. David Capps, Michael P. Lynch & Daniel Massey (2009). A Coherent Moral Relativism. Synthese 166 (2):413 - 430.
    Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by considering a few problems such a position might face.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. E. López Castellón (1996). Sobre el relativismo ético de Gilbert Harman. Anales Del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía 1 (1):209.
    La cuestión práctica más importante del relativismo ético es sin duda la legitimidad de las valoraciones morales respecto a sociedades con sistemas morales diferentes del sistema de quien emite el juido de valor. El comunitarismo de la última década1 representado en esta cuestión por M. Walzer ha cuestionado precisamente dicha legitimidad y ha abogado por un «enfoque interno» que parta de los criterios de que toda forma de vida es «correcta» si sevive «de manera fiel a las concepciones compartidas por (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. S. R. L. Clark (1991). Book Review : Ethics After Babel, by Jeffrey Stout. Cambridge, James Clarke, 1990. Xiv + 338 Pp. 9.95. [REVIEW] Studies in Christian Ethics 4 (2):92-93.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Robert Coburn (1976). Relativism and the Basis of Morality. Philosophical Review 85 (1):87-93.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Annalisa Coliva & Sebastiano Moruzzi (2012). Truth Relativists Can't Trump Moral Progress. Analytic Philosophy 53 (1):48-57.
  22. John W. Cook (1999). Morality and Cultural Differences. Oxford University Press.
    The scholars who defend or dispute moral relativism, the idea that a moral principle cannot be applied to people whose culture does not accept it, have concerned themselves with either the philosophical or anthropological aspects of relativism. This study, shows that in order to arrive at a definitive appraisal of moral relativism, it is necessary to understand and investigate both its anthropological and philosophical aspects. Carefully examining the arguments for and against moral relativism, Cook exposes not only that anthropologists have (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. David E. Cooper (1978). Moral Relativism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3 (1):97-108.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. A. S. Cua (1985). Moral Relativity. Review of Metaphysics 39 (2):381-383.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Peter Cvek (2007). Samuel Zinaich, Jr., John Locke’s Moral Revolution: From Natural Law to Moral Relativism. [REVIEW] Vera Lex 8 (1/2):73-82.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Stephen L. Darwall (1977). Harman and Moral Relativism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 58 (3):199.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. John K. Davis (2010). An Alternative to Relativism. Philosophical Topics 38 (2):17-37.
    Some moral disagreements are so persistent that we suspect they are deep: we would disagree even when we have all relevant information and no one makes any mistakes (this is also known as faultless disagreement). The possibility of deep disagreement is thought to drive cognitivists toward relativism, but most cognitivists reject relativism. There is an alternative. According to divergentism, cognitivists can reject relativism while allowing for deep disagreement. This view has rarely been defended at length, but many philosophers have implicitly (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Judith Wagner DeCew (1990). Moral Conflicts and Ethical Relativism. Ethics 101 (1):27-41.
    The article focuses on the study on moral conflicts and ethical relativism. There are few theories in the history ethics that stated that a moral dilemma can not be adhered by to moral requirements. According to philosophy professor David Wong, occurrence of irresolvable moral disagreement is one of the normative problems. On the other hand, the author asserted that single-agent moral conflicts do not necessarily fall under the relativism theory.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Nenad Dimitrijevic (2010). Moral Knowledge and Mass Crime: A Critical Reading of Moral Relativism. Philosophy and Social Criticism 36 (2):131-156.
    In this article I ask how moral relativism applies to the analysis of responsibility for mass crime. The focus is on the critical reading of two influential relativist attempts to offer a theoretically consistent response to the challenges imposed by extreme criminal practices. First, I explore Gilbert Harman’s analytical effort to conceptualize the reach of moral discourse. According to Harman, mass crime creates a contextually specific relationship to which moral judgments do not apply any more. Second, I analyze the inability (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. David Drebushenko & Stephen Sullivan (1998). Harman on Relativism and Moral Diversity. Critica 30 (89):95-104.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Shane D. Drefcinski (2008). The Superficial Sophistication of Moral Relativism. Logos 11 (3).
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. James Dreier (1996). Book Review: The Moral Problem by Michael Smith. [REVIEW] Mind 105 (418):363-367.
  33. James Dreier (1990). Internalism and Speaker Relativism. Ethics 101 (1):6-26.
    In this article I set out a reason for believing in a form of metaethical relativism. In rough terms, the reason is this: a widely held thesis, internalism, tells us that to accept (sincerely assert, believe, etc.) a moral judgment logically requires having a motivating reason. Since the connection is logical, or conceptual, it must be explained by a theory of what it is to accept a moral claim. I argue that the internalist feature of moral expressions can best be (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. James Lawrence Dreier (1989). Moral Relativism and Political Justice. Dissertation, Princeton University
    My dissertation aims to spell out the implications of moral relativism for political justice. The first part develops and defends a kind of moral relativism I call "Speaker Relativism". According to this view, moral expressions are indexicals; their content depends on the moral system of the speaker. I defend Speaker Relativism from some prominent objections, and provide an argument in favor of the view. ;The second part investigates the question of how, given relativism, citizens might establish public and mutually acceptable (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Justin D’Arms (2005). Relationality, Relativism, and Realism About Moral Value. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 126 (3):433 - 448.
    Among the many virtues of Facts, Values and Norms, is the articulation of an especially subtle and detailed form of naturalistic value realism. The theory aspires to vindicate the objective purport of value discourse while granting, indeed insisting, that value is subjective in important respects. Evaluative thought and inquiry are understood to be continuous with empirical inquiry in the human sciences, so that ethical and evaluative conclusions can ultimately be defended on a posteriori grounds. Railton argues that talk of what (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Abraham Edel (1970). On a Certain Value-Dimension in Analyses of Moral Relativism. Journal of Philosophy 67 (17):584-588.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. William Atkins Edmundson (1982). Moral Relativism and the Basis of Obligation. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
    The central problem of moral philosophy is to reconcile the universality of morals with the fact that morality arises from and engages our individual motives. Relativism is the view that universalism must be given up because this reconciliation is impossible. Typical strategies toward solving the central problem attempt to base morality on a motivating psychological universal viz. reason, sympathy or self-interest. These strategies assume that the universality of moral rules must be founded upon some antecedent universal element inherent in the (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Stephen Eide (2007). John Locke’s Moral Revolution: From Natural Law to Moral Relativism. [REVIEW] Interpretation 34 (3):275-281.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. David Enoch, Why I Am an Objectivist About Ethics (And Why You Are, Too).
    You may think that you're a moral relativist or subjectivist - many people today seem to. But I don't think you are. In fact, when we start doing metaethics - when we start, that is, thinking philosophically about our moral discourse and practice - thoughts about morality's objectivity become almost irresistible. Now, as is always the case in philosophy, that some thoughts seem irresistible is only the starting point for the discussion, and under argumentative pressure we may need to revise (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Daan Evers, Is There Enough Evidence for Moral Error Theory?
    Jonas Olson defends a moral error theory in (2014). I will first argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral nonnaturalism in his own opinion. I will then argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral contextualism either (although the latter is not a matter of his own opinion). Stephen Finlay (2008) also provides an argument for the latter conclusion, but I will argue that it fails.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Daan Evers, Relativism and the Metaphysics of Value.
    I argue that relativists about evaluative language face some of the same objections as non-naturalists in ethics. If these objections have force, there is reason to doubt the existence of relative evaluative states of affairs. In they do not exist, then relativism leads to an error theory. This is unattractive, as the position was specifically designed to preserve the truth of many evaluative claims.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Daan Evers (2014). Moral Contextualism and the Problem of Triviality. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):285-297.
    Moral contextualism is the view that claims like ‘A ought to X’ are implicitly relative to some (contextually variable) standard. This leads to a problem: what are fundamental moral claims like ‘You ought to maximize happiness’ relative to? If this claim is relative to a utilitarian standard, then its truth conditions are trivial: ‘Relative to utilitarianism, you ought to maximize happiness’. But it certainly doesn’t seem trivial that you ought to maximize happiness (utilitarianism is a highly controversial position). Some people (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Daan Evers (2011). The Standard-Relational Theory of 'Ought' and the Oughtistic Theory of Reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):131-147.
    The idea that normative statements implicitly refer to standards has been around for quite some time. It is usually defended by normative antirealists, who tend to be attracted to Humean theories of reasons. But this is an awkward combination: 'A ought to X' entails that there are reasons for A to X, and 'A ought to X all things considered' entails that the balance of reasons favours X-ing. If the standards implicitly referred to are not those of the agent, then (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. E. U. Ezedike (2007). Ethics, Moral Values and the Logic of Cultural Relativism. Sophia: An African Journal of Philosophy 8 (2).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Samuel Fleischacker (1992). Integrity and Moral Relativism. E.J. Brill.
    As long as there is a language for these possibilities, the book argues, an individual can see ethics as culturally based without compromising his or her own ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Phillippa Foot (1984). Moral Relativism. Journal of Philosophy 81 (6):326-333.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Ragnar Francén Olinder (2012). Moral and Metaethical Pluralism: Unity in Variation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):583-601.
    The most basic argument for moral relativism is that different people are (fundamentally) disposed to apply moral terms, such as ‘morally right’ and ‘morally wrong’, and the corresponding concepts, to different (types of) acts. In this paper, I argue that the standard forms of moral relativism fail to account for certain instances of fundamental variation, namely, variation in metaethical intuitions, and I develop a form of relativism—pluralism—that does account for them. I identify two challenges that pluralism faces. To answer the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Ragnar Francén (2010). No Deep Disagreement for New Relativists. Philosophical Studies 151 (1):19--37.
    Recently a number of writers have argued that a new form of relativism involves a form of semantic context-dependence which helps it escape the perhaps most common objection to ordinary contextualism; that it cannot accommodate our intuitions about disagreement. I argue: (i) In order to evaluate this claim we have to pay closer attention to the nature of our intuitions about disagreement. (ii) We have different such intuitions concerning different questions: we have more stable disagreement intuitions about moral disputes than (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Ragnar Francén (2009). Comment on Erler: Speaker Relativism and Semantic Intuitions. Praxis 2 (1):30-44.
    Metaethical relativists sometimes use an interesting analogy with relativism in physics to defend their view. In this article I comment on Erler’s discussion of this analogy and take the discussion further into methodological matters that it raises. I argue that Erler misplaces the analogy in the dialectic between relativists and absolutists: the analogy cannot be dismissed by simply pointing to the fact that we have absolutist intuitions – this is exactly the kind of objection the analogy is supposed to be (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Ragnar Francén (2007). Metaethical Relativism: Against the Single Analysis Assumption. Dissertation, University of Gothenburg
    This dissertation investigates the plausibility of metaethical relativism, or more specifically, what I call “moral truth-value relativism”: the idea that the truth of a moral statement or belief depends on who utters or has it, or who assesses it. According to the most prevalent variants of this view in philosophical literature – “standard relativism” – the truth-values are relative to people’s moralities, often understood as some subset of their affective or desirelike attitudes. Standard relativism has two main contenders: absolutism – (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 189