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  1. Mark Alfano (2009). A Danger of Definition: Polar Predicates in Moral Theory. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3 (3).
    In this paper, I use an example from the history of philosophy to show how independently defining each side of a pair of contrary predicates is apt to lead to contradiction. In the Euthyphro, piety is defined as that which is loved by some of the gods while impiety is defined as that which is hated by some of the gods. Socrates points out that since the gods harbor contrary sentiments, some things are both pious and impious. But “pious” and (...)
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  2. Amrei Bahr & Markus Seidel (2016). Rule-Following and A Priori Biconditionals - A Sea of Tears? In Simon Derpmann & David Schweikard (eds.), Philip Pettit: Five Themes from his Work. Springer 19-31.
  3. D. J. Bradley (2011). Functionalist Response-Dependence Avoids Missing Explanations. Analysis 71 (2):297-300.
    I argue that there is a flaw in the way that response-dependence has been formulated in the literature, and this flawed formulation has been correctly attacked by Mark Johnston’s Missing Explanation Argument (1993, 1998). Moving to a better formulation, which is analogous to the move from behaviourism to functionalism, avoids the Missing Explanation Argument.
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  4. Dan López de Sa (2006). Values Vs. Secondary Qualities. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):197-210.
    McDowell, responding to Mackie’s argument from queerness, defended realism about values by analogy to secondary qualities. A certain tension between two inter- pretations of McDowell’s response is highlighted. According to one, realism about val- ues would indeed be vindicated, but at the cost of failing to provide an appropriate response to Mackie’s argument; whereas according to the other, McDowell does pro- vide an adequate response, but evaluative realism is jeopardized.
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  5. Joshua Gert (2010). Fitting-Attitudes, Secondary Qualities, and Values. Philosophical Topics 38 (1):87-105.
    Response-dispositional accounts of value defend a biconditional in which the possession of an evaluative property is said to covary with the disposition to cause a certain response. In contrast, a fitting-attitude account of the same property would claim that it is such as to merit or make fitting that same response. This paper argues that even for secondary qualities, response-dispositional accounts are inadequate; we need to import a normative notion such as appropriateness even into accounts of such descriptive properties as (...)
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  6. Joshua Gert (2006). Problems for Moral Twin Earth Arguments. Synthese 150 (2):171 - 183.
    Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons have recently presented a series of papers in which they argue against what has come to be called the ‘new wave’ moral realism and moral semantics of David Brink, Richard Boyd, Peter Railton, and a number of other philosophers. The central idea behind Horgan and Timmons’s criticism of these ‘new wave’ theories has been extended by Sean Holland to include the sort of realism that drops out of response-dependent accounts that make use of an analogy (...)
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  7. Nathaniel Goldberg (2009). Response-Dependence, Noumenalism, and Ontological Mystery. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (4):469-488.
    Philip Pettit has argued that all semantically basic terms are learned in response to ostended examples and all non-basic terms are defined via them. Michael Smith and Daniel Stoljar maintain that this “global response-dependence” entails noumenalism, the thesis that reality possesses an unknowable, intrinsic nature. Surprisingly Pettit acknowledges this, contending instead that his noumenalism, like Kant’s, can be construed ontologically or epistemically. Moreover, Pettit insists, construing his noumenalism epistemically renders it unproblematic. The article shows that construing noumenalism epistemically prevents Pettit (...)
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  8. Eline Busck Gundersen (2011). The Chameleon's Revenge: Response-Dependence, Finks and Provisoed Biconditionals. Philosophical Studies 153 (3):435 - 441.
    Response-dependence theses are usually formulated in terms of a priori true biconditionals of roughly the form 'something, x, falls under the concept 'F' ↔ x would elicit response R from subjects S under conditions C'. Such formulations are vulnerable to conditional fallacy problems; counterexamples threaten whenever the C-conditions' coming to obtain might alter the object with respect to F. Crispin Wright has suggested that such problems can be avoided by placing the C-conditions in a proviso. This ensures that any changes (...)
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  9. Jussi Haukioja (2006). Why the New Missing Explanation Argument Fails, Too. Erkenntnis 64 (2):169 - 175.
    The so-called missing explanation argument, put forward by Mark Johnston in the late 80’s purported to show that our ordinary concepts of secondary qualities such as the colours cannot be response-dependent. A number of flaws were soon found in the argument. Partly in response to the criticism directed at the original argument, Johnston presented a new version in 1998. In this paper I show that the new version fails, too, for a simple reason: the kind of explanation which Johnston claims (...)
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  10. Antti Kauppinen (2013). Sentimentalism (International Encyclopedia of Ethics). In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwell
    Sentimentalism comes in many varieties: explanatory sentimentalism, judgment sentimentalism, metaphysical sentimentalism, and epistemic sentimentalism. This encyclopedia entry gives an overview of the positions and main arguments pro and con.
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  11. Jason Kawall (2004). Moral Response-Dependence, Ideal Observers, and the Motive of Duty: Responding to Zangwill. Erkenntnis 60 (3):357-369.
    Moral response-dependent metaethical theories characterize moral properties in terms of the reactions of certain classes of individuals. Nick Zangwill has argued that such theories are flawed: they are unable to accommodate the motive of duty. That is, they are unable to provide a suitable reason for anyone to perform morally right actions simply because they are morally right. I argue that Zangwill ignores significant differences between various approvals, and various individuals, and that moral response-dependent theories can accommodate the motive of (...)
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  12. Jeremy Randel Koons (2003). Why Response-Dependence Theories of Morality Are False. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (3):275 - 294.
    Many response-dependence theorists equate moral truth with the generation of some affective psychological response: what makes this action wrong, as opposed to right, is that it would cause (or merit) affective response of type R (perhaps under ideal conditions). Since our affective nature is purely contingent, and not necessarily shared by all rational creatures (or even by all humans), response-dependence threatens to lead to relativism. In this paper, I will argue that emotional responses and moral features do not align in (...)
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  13. Dan López de Sa (2010). The Makings of Truth : Realism, Response-Dependence, and Relativism. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan
    This paper is in five sections. In the first one, I summarize some views on truthmaking I will be presupposing, emphasizing however the various controversies on which I will remain neutral. In section two and three, I present the characterization of a response-dependent property. In section four, I present two ways in which a property can be response-dependent, in the characterized sense. In final section five, I present how these correspond to different versions of moderate relativism, namely indexical and nonindexical (...)
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  14. John McDowell (1985). Values and Secondary Qualities. In Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and Objectivity. Routledge 110-129.
    J.L. Mackie insists that ordinary evaluative thought presents itself as a matter of sensitivity to aspects of the world. And this phenomenological thesis seems correct. When one or another variety of philosophical non-cognitivism claims to capture the truth about what the experience of value is like, or (in a familiar surrogate for phenomenology) about what we mean by our evaluative language, the claim is never based on careful attention to the lived character of evaluative thought or discourse. The idea is, (...)
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  15. Duncan McFarland & Alexander Miller (1998). Response-Dependence Without Reduction? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3):407 – 425.
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  16. Alexander Miller (2001). The Missing-Explanation Argument Revisited. Analysis 61 (1):76-86.
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  17. Nenad Miščević (2006). Moral Concepts: From Thickness to Response-Dependence. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 21 (1):3-32.
    The paper examines three tenets of Dancy’s meta-ethics, finds them incompatible, and proposes a response-dependentist (or response-dispositional) solution. The first tenet is the central importance of thick concepts and properties. The second is that such concepts essentially involve response(s) of observers, which Dancy interprets in a way that fits the pattern of context-dependent resultance: thick concepts are well suited for the particularist grounding of moral theory. However, and this is the third tenet, in his earlier paper (1986) Dancy forcefully argues (...)
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  18. Christopher Norris (2007). Response-Dependence: What's in It for the Realist? Journal of Critical Realism 1 (2):61-88.
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  19. C. Naomi Osorio-Kupferblum (2015). Conceptualising ‘Authority’. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (2):223-236.
    This paper attempts a conceptualisation of authority intended to be useful across all areas where the concept is relevant. It begins by setting off authority against power, on the one hand, and respect, on the other, and then spells out S1’s authority as consisting in S2’s voluntary action performed in the belief that S1 would approve of it. While this definition should hold for authority generally, a distinction is made between three different kinds of authority according to what grounds them: (...)
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  20. P. Pettit (1991). Realism and Response-Dependence. Mind 100 (4):587-626.
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  21. Barry Smith (2001). The Chinese Rune Argument. Philosophical Explorations 4 (2):66-74.
    Searle’s tool for understanding culture, law and society is the opposition between brute reality and institutional reality, or in other words between: observer-independent features of the world, such as force, mass and gravitational attraction, and observer-relative features of the world, such as money, property, marriage and government. The question posed here is: under which of these two headings do moral concepts fall? This is an important question because there are moral facts – for example pertaining to guilt and responsibility – (...)
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  22. Ásta Kristjana Sveinsdóttir (2010). Siding with Euthyphro: Response-Dependence and Conferred Properties. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):108-125.
    : I argue that a response‐dependence account of a concept can yield metaphysical results, and not merely epistemological or semantical results, which has been a prevalent view in the literature on response‐dependence. In particular, I show how one can argue for a conferralist account of a certain property by arguing that the concept of the property is response‐dependent, if certain assumptions are made.
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  23. Brad Thompson (2006). Moral Value, Response-Dependence, and Rigid Designation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):71-94.
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  24. Eric Vogelstein (2016). A New Moral Sentimentalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):346-368.
    This paper argues for a novel sentimentalist realist metaethical theory, according to which moral wrongness is analyzed in terms of the sentiments one has most reason to have. As opposed to standard sentimentalist views, the theory does not employ sentiments that are had in response to morally wrong action, but rather sentiments that antecedently dispose people to refrain from immoral behavior, specifically the sentiments of compassion and respect.
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  25. Lisa Warenski (2014). Defending Moral Mind-Independence: The Expressivist's Precarious Turn. Philosophia 42 (3):861-69.
    A central feature of ordinary moral thought is that moral judgment is mind-independent in the following sense: judging something to be morally wrong does not thereby make it morally wrong. To deny this would be to accept a form of subjectivism. Neil Sinclair (2008) makes a novel attempt to show how expressivism is simultaneously committed to (1) an understanding of moral judgments as expressions of attitudes and (2) the rejection of subjectivism. In this paper, I discuss Sinclair’s defense of anti-subjectivist (...)
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  26. Ralph Wedgwood (1997). The Essence of Response-Dependence. European Review of Philosophy 3:31-54.
    Many philosophers have thought that colours or flavours or values are in some way less objective than shape or mass or motion. This paper explores the approach to capturing this thought that is based on the idea of ‘ response-dependence ’. First, it is argued that the conceptions of response-dependence developed by Mark Johnston, Philip Pettit and Crispin Wright fail to capture this thought adequately. Then, the rest of the paper proposes an alternative conception, based in part on Kit Fine's (...)
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  27. David Yates (2008). Recent Work on Response-Dependence. Philosophical Books 49 (4):344-354.
    The paper covers a range of topics of recent interest in relation to response-depdendence: its characterisation in terms of 'basic equations', its application to areas such as ethics, colour theory and philosophy of mind, and the 'missing explanation' argument.
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