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Subcategories:History/traditions: Moral Responsibility
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  1. Johan A. M. Aerts (ed.) (2005). Identiteit En Verantwoordelijkheid: Over Religie, Zingeving En Levensbeschouwing. Damon.
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  2. Robert Albin (2004). A Chronicle of the Decline of Rationality: Ethics in the Practice of Journalism. HaKibutz HaMeuchad & Sapir College Publishing.
    The book examines the ethical aspect of journalistic activity in an attempt to understand and render explicit the values which guide journalists in their work, but it emphasizes the point that while such values reflect society's existing professional mores, this particular profession is also placed in such a way as to shape the consciousness and values of those who consume its working product. The central question of this work has to do with the ethical implications of journalistic activity, and more (...)
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  3. Molly Aloian (2010). Live It-- Responsibility. Crabtree Pub..
    What is responsibility? -- Responsibility for familiy -- Responsibility for people in trouble -- Responsibility in big business -- Responsibility for other children -- Being responsible for the future -- Encouraging -- Responsible behavior.
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  4. Roman Altshuler (2012). The Origins of Responsibility. By François Raffoul. (Indiana UP, 2010. Pp. Xiv + 341.). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):217-220.
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  5. Martin Marchman Andersen (2014). What Does Society Owe Me If I Am Responsible for Being Worse Off? Journal of Applied Philosophy 31 (1).
    Luck egalitarians need to address the question of cost-responsibility: If an individual is responsible for being worse off than others, then what benefits, if any, is that individual uniquely cost-responsible for? By applying luck egalitarianism to justice in health I discuss different answers to this question inspired by two different interpretations of luck egalitarianism, namely ‘standard luck egalitarianism’ and ‘all luck egalitarianism’, respectively. Even though I argue that the latter is more plausible than the former, I ultimately suggest and defend (...)
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  6. Roberto R. Aramayo & María José Guerra (eds.) (2007). Los Laberintos de la Responsabilidad. Plaza y Valdes.
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  7. Steven Arkonovich (forthcoming). Review: Luck, Value, & Committment. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy.
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  8. Paul Benson (2001). Culture and Responsibility: A Reply to Moody-Adams. Journal of Social Philosophy 32 (4):610–620.
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  9. Jeffrey Blustein (2000). On Taking Responsibility for One’s Past. Journal of Applied Philosophy 17 (1):1–19.
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  10. Michael Boylan (2009). Institutions, Actors, and Moral Accountability. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 23 (2):335-345.
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  11. M. Braham & M. van Hees (2012). An Anatomy of Moral Responsibility. Mind 121 (483):601-634.
    This paper examines the structure of moral responsibility for outcomes. A central feature of the analysis is a condition that we term the ‘avoidance potential’, which gives precision to the idea that moral responsibility implies a reasonable demand that an agent should have acted otherwise. We show how our theory can allocate moral responsibility to individuals in complex collective action problems, an issue that sometimes goes by the name of ‘the problem of many hands’. We also show how it allocates (...)
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  12. Michael E. Bratman (1995). Review of Action, Intention, and Reason by Robert Audi. [REVIEW] Ethics 105 (4):927-.
  13. Alexander Brown (2005). If We Value Individual Responsibility, Which Policies Should We Favour? Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (1):23–44.
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  14. Dale E. Burrington (1999). Blameworthiness. Journal of Philosophical Research 24:505-527.
    In a way that harks back to Anglo-American philosophy of the 1950s and 1960s, this essay contends that the traditional “free will” problem is a spurious problem generated by systematic misuse of the terms employed in discussing moral responsibility. Illustrations of these misuses from sources old and new are provided, mainly in the footnotes. Attention is called to the proper use of the terms, which allows us to frame the questions pertinent to the determination of someone’s moral responsibility for a (...)
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  15. Antonio Camerano (2012). Erranza Delle Etiche: Responsabilità E Generazioni Future. Pagnini.
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  16. Robert Campbell (1984). Duress and Responsibility for Action. Journal of Applied Philosophy 1 (1):133-140.
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  17. Guozhen Cen (2008). Chinese Adolescents' Attitudes Towards Collective and Communicable Responsibility. Journal of Moral Education 37 (2):185-203.
    This research explored the attitudes of 386 Chinese adolescent students toward collective and communicable responsibility, using three scenarios involving school, society and history, with two different situations and two types of projections per scenario. The results showed that: (1) the majority of Chinese adolescents believed that collective and communicable responsibility was unjust, and this belief differed significantly with different age groups; (2) the majority expressed the view that collective and communicable responsibility could be understood and accepted; (3) their feelings toward (...)
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  18. Michael Cholbi (2014). Luck, Blame, and Desert. Philosophical Studies 169 (2):313-332.
    T.M. Scanlon has recently proposed what I term a ‘double attitude’ account of blame, wherein blame is the revision of one’s attitudes in light of another person’s conduct, conduct that we believe reveals that the individual lacks the normative attitudes we judge essential to our relationship with her. Scanlon proposes that this account justifies differences in blame that in turn reflect differences in outcome luck. Here I argue that although the double attitude account can justify blame’s being sensitive to outcome (...)
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  19. Barbara Chyrowicz (ed.) (2007). Odpowiedzialność Na Miarę Możliwości. Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła Ii.
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  20. David M. Ciocchi (1998). One Step Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism. Journal of Philosophical Research 23:459-478.
    This paper addresses the libertarian’s “proportion issue,” i.e., the question of what part, or proportion, of the acts for which an agent is morally responsible are freely chosen acts. Many libertarians tacitly assume the absolutist position or the generous position on this issue according to which all or most of an agent’s morally accountable actions are freely chosen. Given that libertarian free choices are inherently unpredictable and that most human acts by contrast are predictable and often predicted, the absolutist and (...)
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  21. Michelle Ciurria (2013). Situationism, Moral Responsibility and Blame. Philosophia 41 (1):179-193.
    In Moral philosophy meets social psychology, Gilbert Harman argues that social psychology can educate folk morality to prevent us from committing the ‘fundamental attribution error,’ i.e. ‘the error of ignoring situational factors and overconfidently assuming that distinctive behaviour or patterns of behaviour are due to an agent’s distinctive character traits’ (Harman, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 99, 315–331, 1999). An overview of the literature shows that while situationists unanimously agree with Harman on this point, they disagree on whether we also (...)
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  22. Randolph Clarke (2012). Responsibility, Mechanisms, and Capacities. Modern Schoolman 88 (1/2):161-169.
    Frankfurt-style cases are supposed to show that an agent can be responsible for doing something even though the agent wasn’t able to do otherwise. Neil Levy has argued that the cases fail. Agents in such cases, he says, lack a capacity that they’d have to have in order to be responsible for doing what they do. Here it’s argued that Levy is mistaken. Although it may be that agents in Frankfurt-style cases lack some kind of capability, what they lack isn’t (...)
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  23. Randolph Clarke (2010). Freedom and Responsibility. In John Skorupski (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Ethics. Routledge.
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  24. Randolph Clarke (1994). Ability and Responsibility for Omissions. Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):195 - 208.
    Most philosophers now accept that an agent may be responsible for an action even though she could not have acted otherwise. However, many who accept such a view about responsibility for actions nevertheless maintain that, when it comes to omissions, an agent is responsible only if she could have done what she omitted to do. If this Principle of Possible Action (PPA), as it is sometimes called, is correct, then there is an important asymmetry between what is required for responsibility (...)
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  25. D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini (eds.) (2013). Blame: Its Nature and Norms. Oxford University Press.
    One mark of interpersonal relationships is a tendency to blame. But what precise evaluations and responses constitute blame? Is it most centrally a judgment, or is it an emotion, or something else? Does blame express a demand, or embody a protest, or does it simply mark an impaired relationship? What accounts for its force or sting, and how similar is it to punishment? -/- The essays in this volume explore answers to these (and other) questions about the nature of blame, (...)
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  26. Neil Cooper (1987). On Evading Responsibility. Journal of Applied Philosophy 4 (1):89-94.
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  27. David Copp (2012). The Collective Moral Autonomy Thesis: Reply to Ludwig and Miller. Journal of Social Philosophy 43 (1):78-95.
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  28. William Corlett (2012). The Politics of Responsibility. Contemporary Political Theory 11 (3):e1.
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  29. José de Matos Correia (2010). A Responsabilidade Política. Universidade Lusíada Editora.
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  30. Richard H. Corrigan (2008). Would I Endorse My Determined Endorsement? Moral Responsibility and Reflective Endorsement. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:43-51.
    In her recent article ‘Moral Responsibility Without Libertarianism’, Lynne Rudder Baker contends that libertarian intuitions can be accommodated by compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility. She proposes a principle called the ‘Reflective Endorsement View’ which she believes is capable of achieving this end. The Reflective Endorsement View holds that once an agent reflectively identifies with his actions in a particular way, he is morally responsible for those actions, irrespective of whether he has the power to do otherwise or the cause of (...)
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  31. Norman Daniels (1985). Family Responsibility Initiatives and Justice Between Age Groups. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 13 (4):153-159.
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  32. Stephen Darwall (2007). Moral Obligation and Accountability. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Ii. Clarendon Press.
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  33. Pietro Denaro (2012). Moral Harm and Moral Responsibility: A Defence of Ascriptivism. Ratio Juris 25 (2):149-179.
    This paper investigates the relations between the concepts of moral harm and moral responsibility, arguing for a circularity between the two. On this basis the conceptual soundness of descriptivism, on which consequentialist and non-consequentialist arguments are often grounded, is questioned. In the last section a certain version of ascriptivism is defended: The circularity is relevant in order to understand how a restricted version of ascriptivism may in fact be well founded.
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  34. Kenneth Dorter (2003). Free Will, Luck, and Happiness in the Myth of Er. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:129-142.
    According to the Myth of Er we are responsible for our character because we chose it before birth. But any choice is determined by our present character, sothere is an indefinite regress and we cannot be entirely responsible for our character. The Myth of Er can be seen as the first formulation of the problem of free will, which Aristotle demythologizes in Nicomachean Ethics III.5. Plato's solution is that freedom is compatible with causal determinism because it does not mean indeterminism (...)
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  35. Thomas Douglas (2014). The Relationship Between Effort and Moral Worth: Three Amendments to Sorensen's Model. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):325-334.
    Kelly Sorensen defends a model of the relationship between effort and moral worth in which the effort exerted in performing a morally desirable action contributes positively to the action’s moral worth, but the effort required to perform the action detracts from its moral worth. I argue that Sorensen’s model, though on the right track, is mistaken in three ways. First, it fails to capture the relevance of counterfactual effort to moral worth. Second, it wrongly implies that exerting unnecessary effort confers (...)
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  36. Richard Duble (1999). In Defense of the Smart Aleck. Journal of Philosophical Research 24:305-309.
    In “Honderich on the Consequences of Determinism” I argued that contrary to Ted Honderich’s thesis in his How Free Are You? determinism has no consequences, whether logical, moral, or psychological, about how we must view persons we beIieve to be determined. Honderich replied in “Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and the Smart Aleck” that there is a sense in which our belief in determinism has consequences that any reasonable human being must recognize. My present paper examines Honderich’s reply.
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  37. David Enoch (2011). Being Responsible, Taking Responsibility, and Penumbral Agency. In Heuer and Lang (ed.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes from the Ethics of Bernard Williams. Oxford University Press, Usa.
    In "Moral Luck" Bernard Williams famously drew on our intuitive judgments about agent-regret – mostly, on our judgment that agent-regret is often appropriate – in his argument about the role of luck in rational and moral evaluation. I think that Williams is importantly right about the appropriateness of agent-regret, but importantly wrong about the implications of this observation. In this paper, I suggest an alternative understanding of the normative judgment Williams is putting forward, the one about the appropriateness of agent-regret. (...)
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  38. David Enoch (2011). Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism. Oxford University Press.
    David Enoch develops, argues for, and defends Robust Realism--a strongly realist and objectivist view of ethics and normativity, according to which there are perfectly universal and objective moral truths.
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  39. Edmund L. Erde (1981). Notions of Teams and Team Talk in Health Care: Implications for Responsibilities. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 9 (6):26-28.
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  40. Joel Feinberg (1988). Responsibility for the Future. Philosophy Research Archives 14:93-113.
    Prospective ascription of responsibility is hypothetical, commonly noting or setting conditions for critical judgment or liability if some event occurs or fails to occur, thus determining vulnerability to retrospective judgments. Prospective liabilities can be classified by source, by type or degree (if any) of accompanying control, and by structure or stages.But not all prospective responsibility can be understood in terms of liability. Actual or de facto control over X and/or responsibility for Y (persons, animals, inanimate things, etc.), though they may (...)
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  41. Menachem Fisch (2011). The View From Within: Normativity and the Limits of Self-Criticism. University of Notre Dame Press.
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  42. John Martin Fischer (ed.) (2005). Free Will. Routledge.
    Over the last three decades there has been a tremendous amount of philosophical work in the Anglo-American tradition on the cluster of topics pertaining to Free Will. Contemporary work has in some instances been in the form of lively debates between proponents of different viewpoints, and literature surrounding the area is therefore characterized by a genuine vitality. This collection selects the very best of this material and presents it in a single, accessible set of volumes.
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  43. Christopher Evan Franklin (2013). A Theory of the Normative Force of Pleas. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):479-502.
    A familiar feature of our moral responsibility practices are pleas: considerations, such as “That was an accident”, or “I didn’t know what else to do”, that attempt to get agents accused of wrongdoing off the hook. But why do these pleas have the normative force they do in fact have? Why does physical constraint excuse one from responsibility, while forgetfulness or laziness does not? I begin by laying out R. Jay Wallace’s (Responsibility and the moral sentiments, 1994 ) theory of (...)
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  44. Richard Gelles (2006). Review Essay / Children's Rights and Parents' Responsibilities. Criminal Justice Ethics 25 (2):40-45.
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  45. Doris Gerber & Véronique Zanetti (eds.) (2010). Kollektive Verantwortung Und Internationale Beziehungen. Suhrkamp.
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  46. Harold M. Ginzburg (1986). Intravenous Drug Abusers and HIV Infections: A Consequence of Their Actions. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 14 (5-6):268-272.
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  47. E. S. Godoy (2013). Reconceiving Responsibility: A Review of Iris Marion Young's Responsibility for Justice. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Social Criticism 39 (6):591-595.
  48. Michael J. Gorr & Sterling Harwood (eds.) (1992). Controversies in Criminal Law: Philosophical Essays on Responsibility and Procedure. Westview Press.
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  49. Stefano Guglielminotti Trivel (2006). Sui Limiti Del Dovere. L'autore Libri Firenze.
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  50. Ishtiyaque Haji (1996). Blameworthiness, Character, and Cultural Norms. Journal of Social Philosophy 27 (3):116-135.
1 — 50 / 824