Related categories
Siblings:
389 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 389
  1. Jesus Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff (eds.) (2009). Philosophy of Action: 5 Questions. Automatic Press/VIP.
  2. Craig K. Agule (2016). Resisting Tracing's Siren Song. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 10 (1):1-24.
    Drunk drivers and other culpably incapacitated wrongdoers are often taken to pose a problem for reasons-responsiveness accounts of moral responsibility. These accounts predicate moral responsibility upon an agent having the capacities to perceive and act upon moral reasons, and the culpably incapacitated wrongdoers lack exactly those capacities at the time of their wrongdoing. Many reasons-responsiveness advocates thus expand their account of responsibility to include a tracing condition: The culpably incapacitated wrongdoer is blameworthy despite his incapacitation precisely because he is responsible (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Mark Alicke & David Rose (2010). Culpable Control or Moral Concepts? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (04):330-331.
    Knobe argues in his target article that asymmetries in intentionality judgments can be explained by the view that concepts such as intentionality are suffused with moral considerations. We believe that the “culpable control” model of blame can account both for Knobe's side effect findings and for findings that do not involve side effects.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  4. Katy Allen, Moral Responsibility and the Natural Order.
    Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2007-09-14 14:36:23.511.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Roman Altshuler (2016). Character, Will, and Agency. In Jonathan Webber & Alberto Masala (eds.), From Personality to Virtue: Essays on the Philosophy of Character. Oxford University Press 62-80.
    Character and the will are rarely discussed together. At most, philosophers working on the one mention the other in an eliminativist vein—if character is represented as something chosen, for example, it can be chalked up to the work of the will; if the will consists merely of a certain arrangement of mental states, it can be seen as little more than a manifestation of character. This mutual neglect appears perfectly justified. If both character and will are determinants of action, to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Roman Altshuler (2010). An Unconditioned Will: The Role of Temporality in Freedom and Agency. Dissertation, SUNY Stony Brook
    Eliminativists about free will and moral responsibility argue that no action can be free and responsible because in order to be actions, our movements must be caused by features of our character or will. However, either the will is constituted by states that are themselves produced by events outside our control, or it is constituted by our own choices, which must themselves stem from our will in order to be up to us. Thus, any attempt to account for freedom and (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Maria Alvarez & Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming). When Ignorance is No Excuse. In Philip Robichaud & Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), Responsibility - The Epistemic Condition. Oxford University Press
    Ignorance is often a perfectly good excuse. There are interesting debates about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake subvert obligation, but little disagreement about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake exculpate. What about agents who have all the relevant facts in view but fail to meet their obligations because they do not have the right moral beliefs? If their ignorance of their obligations derives from mistaken moral beliefs or from ignorance of the moral significance of the facts they have in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Susan Leigh Anderson (1996). Problems in Developing a Practical Theory of Moral Responsibility. Journal of Value Inquiry 30 (3):415-425.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Susan Leigh Anderson (1991). A Picture of the Self Which Supports Moral Responsibility. The Monist 74 (1):43-54.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Vuko Andrić (2015). The Ramifications of Error Theories About the Deontic. Acta Analytica 30 (4):429-445.
    Error theories about practical deontic judgements claim that no substantive practical deontic judgement is true. Practical deontic judgements are practical in the sense that they concern actions, and they are deontic in the sense that they are about reasons, rightness, wrongness, and obligations. This paper assumes the truth of an error theory about practical deontic judgements in order to examine its ramifications. I defend three contentions. The first is that, if so-called fitting-attitude analyses of value fail, the truth of some (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Rani Lill Anjum & Stephen Mumford, With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility - On Causation and Responsibility in Spider-Man, and Possibly Moore. Critical Essays on "Causation and Responsibility".
  12. Audrey L. Anton (2015). Moral Responsibility and Desert of Praise and Blame. Lexington Books.
    Through critical examination of three main contemporary approaches to describing moral responsibility, this book illustrates why philosophers must take into account the relationship between retrospective moral responsibility and desert of praise or blame. The author advances the moral attitude account, whereby desert of praise and blame depends on the agent’s moral attitudes in response to moral reasons, and retrospective moral responsibility results from expressions of those attitudes in overt behavior.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Takuo Aoyama, Shogo Shimizu & Yuki Yamada (2015). Free Will and the Divergence Problem. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 23:1-18.
    This paper presents what the authors call the ‘divergence problem’ regarding choosing between different future possibilities. As is discussed in the first half, the central issue of the problem is the difficulty of temporally locating the ‘active cause’ on the modal divergent diagram. In the second half of this paper, we discuss the ‘second-person freedom’ which is, strictly, neither compatibilist negative freedom nor incompatibilist positive freedom. The divergence problem leads us to two hypothetical views (i.e. the view of single-line determination (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Richard L. Archer & Shirley Matile Ogletree (2011). Interpersonal Judgments: Moral Responsibility and Blame. Ethics and Behavior 21 (1):35-48.
    A deterministic perspective, believing choices are a function of hereditary and environmental factors, could theoretically impact perceived moral responsibility and lead to decreased blame in judging others. However, little consistent support has been found relating individual differences in deterministic attitudes to blame/tolerance for others. Perhaps, though, providing information regarding past background hardships affecting an individual's current lifestyle could potentially mediate harsh moralistic judgments of that individual. In the two studies reported here, we further explored the relation of free will/determinism scales (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Richard Arneson (2007). The Smart Theory of Moral Responsibility and Desert. In Serena Olsaretti (ed.), Desert and Justice. Clarendon Press
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder (1999). Praise, Blame and the Whole Self. Philosophical Studies 93 (2):161-188.
    What is that makes an act subject to either praise or blame? The question has often been taken to depend entirely on the free will debate for an answer, since it is widely agreed that an agent’s act is subject to praise or blame only if it was freely willed, but moral theory, action theory, and moral psychology are at least equally relevant to it. In the last quarter-century, following the lead of Harry Frankfurt’s (1971) seminal article “Freedom of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   20 citations  
  17. R. J. B. (1963). In Praise of Philosophy. Review of Metaphysics 17 (1):148-149.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. M. M. Bakhtin (1993). Toward a Philosophy of the Act. University of Texas Press.
    Rescued in 1972 from a storeroom in which rats and seeping water had severely damaged the fifty-year-old manuscript, this text is the earliest major work (1919-1921) of the great Russian philosopher M. M. Bakhtin. Toward a Philosophy of the Act contains the first occurrences of themes that occupied Bakhtin throughout his long career. The topics of authoring, responsibility, self and other, the moral significance of "outsideness," participatory thinking, the implications for the individual subject of having "no-alibi in existence," the difference (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   24 citations  
  19. Barry Barnes (2000). Understanding Agency: Social Theory and Responsible Action. Sage.
    Is human freedom and choice exaggerated in recent social theory? Should agency be the central in sociology? In this, penetrating and assured book, one of the leading commentators in the field asks where social theory is going. Barnes argues that social theory has taken the wrong turn in over-stating individual freedom. The result is that social contexts in which all individual actions are situated, is dangerously under-theorized. Barnes calls for a form of social theory that recognizes that sociability is the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  20. Elizabeth Lane Beardsley (1957). Moral Worth and Moral Credit. Philosophical Review 66 (3):304-328.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  21. Linda A. Bell (2009). Challenging the Genteel Supports of Atrocities: A Response to "The Atrocity Paradigm". Hypatia 24 (1):123 - 140.
    Inspired by Card's focus on atrocities, I reflect on attitudes and behaviors that buttress and support evil. Surely, the frequent anti-Semitic sermons in German churches helped to form and later to support the views of both Nazis and those who accepted and cooperated with them. Similarly, lynching, rape, and abuse occur within societies whose structures and laws reflect dominant, generally "genteel" racism and sexism and, in turn, help create perpetrators and at least somewhat sympathetic onlookers.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Michael Bergmann (2003). Agent Causation and Responsibility. Faith and Philosophy 20 (2):229-235.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Sara Bernstein, Causal Proportions and Moral Responsibility.
    This paper poses an original puzzle about the relationship between causation and moral responsibility called The Moral Difference Puzzle. Using the puzzle, the paper argues for three related ideas: (1) the existence of a new sort of moral luck; (2) an intractable conflict between the causal concepts used in moral assessment; and (3) inability of leading theories of causation to capture the sorts of causal differences that matter for moral evaluation of agents’ causal contributions to outcomes.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Bernard Berofsky (2003). Classical Compatibilism: Not Dead Yet. In Michael McKenna & David Widerker (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate 107.
  25. Dieter Birnbacher & David Hommen (2012). Negative Kausalität. De Gruyter.
    „Negative Kausalität“ bezeichnet ein hochkontroverses metaphysisches Problem. Können negative Entitäten wie Abwesenheiten oder das Nicht-Eintreten bestimmter Ereignisse Ursachen oder Ursachenfaktoren sein? Diese Frage steht im Schnittpunkt einer Reihe disziplinübergreifender Grundfragen: der Frage nach dem Wesen von Kausalität, der Frage nach der Natur von Handlungen und Ereignissen und der Frage nach der Beziehung zwischen Kausalität und normativer - moralischer und rechtlicher - Verantwortlichkeit. Die vorliegende Studie entwickelt im ersten Schritt eine Konzeption von negativer Kausalität ausgehend vom Sonderfall der handlungsförmigen negativen Kausalität, (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. John Bishop (1990). Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action. Cambridge University Press.
    From a moral point of view we think of ourselves as capable of responsible actions. From a scientific point of view we think of ourselves as animals whose behavior, however highly evolved, conforms to natural scientific laws. Natural Agency argues that these different perspectives can be reconciled, despite the skepticism of many philosophers who have argued that "free will" is impossible under "scientific determinism." This skepticism is best overcome according to the author, by defending a causal theory of action, that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   48 citations  
  27. Gunnar Björnsson (forthcoming). Explaining (Away) the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility. In Philip Robichaud & Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), Responsibility - The Epistemic Condition. Oxford University Press
    It is clear that lack of awareness of the consequences of an action can undermine moral responsibility and blame for these consequences. But when and how it does so is controversial. Sometimes an agent believing that the outcome might occur is excused because it seemed unlikely to her, and sometimes an agent having no idea that it would occur is nevertheless to blame. A low or zero degree of belief might seem to excuse unless the agent “should have known better”, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Gunnar Björnsson (2016). Outsourcing the Deep Self: Deep Self Discordance Does Not Explain Away Intuitions in Manipulation Arguments. Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):637-653.
    According to manipulation arguments for incompatibilism, manipulation might undermine an agent’s responsibility even when the agent satisfies plausible compatibilist conditions on responsibility. According to Sripada, however, empirical data suggest that people take manipulation to undermine responsibility largely because they think that the manipulated act is in discord with the agent’s “deep self,” thus violating the plausible compatibilist condition of deep self concordance. This paper defends Sripada’s general methodological approach but presents data that strongly suggest that, contrary to Sripada’s contention, most (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Gunnar Björnsson & Bengt Brülde (forthcoming). Normative Responsibilities: Structure and Sources. In Kristien Hens, Dorothee Horstkötter & Daniela Cutas (eds.), Parental Responsibility in the Context of Neuroscience and Genetics. Springer
    Attributions of what we shall call normative responsibilities play a central role in everyday moral thinking. It is commonly thought, for example, that parents are responsible for the wellbeing of their children, and that this has important normative consequences. Depending on context, it might mean that parents are morally required to bring their children to the doctor, feed them well, attend to their emotional needs, or to see to it that someone else does. Similarly, it is sometimes argued that countries (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  30. Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson (2013). A Unified Empirical Account of Responsibility Judgments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):611-639.
    Skeptical worries about moral responsibility seem to be widely appreciated and deeply felt. To address these worries—if nothing else to show that they are mistaken—theories of moral responsibility need to relate to whatever concept of responsibility underlies the worries. Unfortunately, the nature of that concept has proved hard to pin down. Not only do philosophers have conflicting intuitions; numerous recent empirical studies have suggested that both prosaic responsibility judgments and incompatibilist intuitions among the folk are influenced by a number of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  31. Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson (2012). The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility. Noûs 46 (2):326-354.
    In this paper, we do three things. First, we put forth a novel hypothesis about judgments of moral responsibility according to which such judgments are a species of explanatory judgments. Second, we argue that this hypothesis explains both some general features of everyday thinking about responsibility and the appeal of skeptical arguments against moral responsibility. Finally, we argue that, if correct, the hypothesis provides a defense against these skeptical arguments.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  32. Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson (2009). Judgments of Moral Responsibility – a Unified Account. In [2009] Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 35th Annual Meeting (Bloomington, IN; June 12-14). 326-354.
    Recent work in experimental philosophy shows that folk intuitions about moral responsibility are sensitive to a surprising variety of factors. Whether people take agents to be responsible for their actions in deterministic scenarios depends on whether the deterministic laws are couched in neurological or psychological terms (Nahmias et. al. 2007), on whether actions are described abstractly or concretely, and on how serious moral transgression they seem to represent (Nichols & Knobe 2007). Finally, people are more inclined to hold an agent (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  33. Reid Blackman (forthcoming). Why Compatibilists Need Alternative Possibilities. Erkenntnis:1-16.
    Defenders of compatibilism occupy one of two camps: those who think that free will requires the ability to do otherwise, and those who deny this. Those compatibilists who think that free will requires the ability to do otherwise are interested in defending a reading of ‘can’ such that one can do otherwise even if determinism is true. By contrast, those compatibilists who think that free will does not require the ability to do otherwise tend to join incompatibilists in denying that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Susanne Bobzien (2014). Choice and Moral Responsibility in Nicomachean Ethics III 1-5. In R. Polansky (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Nicomachean Ethics. Cambridge University Press 81-109.
    ABSTRACT: This paper serves two purposes: (i) it can be used by students as an introduction to chapters 1-5 of book iii of the NE; (ii) it suggests an answer to the unresolved question what overall objective this section of the NE has. The paper focuses primarily on Aristotle’s theory of what makes us responsible for our actions and character. After some preliminary observations about praise, blame and responsibility (Section 2), it sets out in detail how all the key notions (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Susanne Bobzien (2006). Moral Responsibility and Moral Development in Epicurus’ Philosophy. In B. Reis & S. Haffmans (eds.), The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics. CUP
    ABSTRACT: 1. This paper argues that Epicurus had a notion of moral responsibility based on the agent’s causal responsibility, as opposed to the agent’s ability to act or choose otherwise; that Epicurus considered it a necessary condition for praising or blaming an agent for an action, that it was the agent and not something else that brought the action about. Thus, the central question of moral responsibility was whether the agent was the, or a, cause of the action, or whether (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Susanne Bobzien (1997). Stoic Conceptions of Freedom and Their Relation to Ethics. Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 41 (S68):71-89.
    ABSTRACT: In contemporary discussions of freedom in Stoic philosophy we often encounter the following assumptions: (i) the Stoics discussed the problem of free will and determinis; (ii) since in Stoic philosophy freedom of the will is in the end just an illusion, the Stoics took the freedom of the sage as a substitute for it and as the only true freedom; (iii) in the c. 500 years of live Stoic philosophical debate, the Stoics were largely concerned with the same philosophical (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Edgar Bodenheimer (1980). Philosophy of Responsibility. F. B. Rothman.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Hilary Bok (2002). Wallace's ‘Normative Approach’ to Moral Responsibility. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):682–686.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Hilary Bok (1998). Freedom and Responsibility. Princeton University Press.
    Can we reconcile the idea that we are free and responsible agents with the idea that what we do is determined according to natural laws? For centuries, philosophers have tried in different ways to show that we can. Hilary Bok takes a fresh approach here, as she seeks to show that the two ideas are compatible by drawing on the distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning.Bok argues that when we engage in practical reasoning--the kind that involves asking "what should I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  40. Cameron Boult (forthcoming). Epistemic Conditions on "Ought": E=K as a Case Study. Acta Analytica:1-22.
    In The Norm of Belief, John Gibbons claims that there is a “natural reaction” to the general idea that one can be normatively required to Ø when that requirement is in some sense outside of one’s first person perspective or inaccessible to one. The reaction amounts to the claim that this isn’t possible. Whether this is a natural or intuitive idea or not, it is difficult to articulate exactly why we might think it is correct. To do so, we need (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Karin Boxer (2014). Hart's Senses of 'Responsibility'. In C. G. Pulman (ed.), Hart on Responsibility.
  42. David O. Brink & Dana K. Nelkin (2013). Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility. Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 1:284-313.
    This essay explores a conception of responsibility at work in moral and criminal responsibility. Our conception draws on work in the compatibilist tradition that focuses on the choices of agents who are reasons-responsive and work in criminal jurisprudence that understands responsibility in terms of the choices of agents who have capacities for practical reason and whose situation affords them the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. Our conception brings together the dimensions of normative competence and situational control, and we factor normative (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  43. Alexander Brown (2009). Personal Responsibility: Why It Matters. Continuum.
    Introduction -- What is personal responsibility? -- Ordinary language -- Common conceptions -- What do philosophers mean by responsibility? -- Personally responsible for what? -- What do philosophers think? part I -- Causes -- Capacity -- Control -- Choice versus brute luck -- Second-order attitudes -- Equality of opportunity -- Deservingness -- Reasonableness -- Reciprocity -- Equal shares -- Combining criteria -- What do philosophers think? part II -- Utility -- Self-respect -- Autonomy -- Human flourishing -- Natural duties and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  44. Eva Buddeberg & Frieder Vogelmann (2016). Schwerpunkt: Verantwortung – ein umkämpfter Begriff. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 64 (2):228-231.
    Introduction to the Special Issue "Responsibility - a Contested Concept".
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Sylvia Burrow (2012). Protecting One's Commitments: Integrity and Self-Defense. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (1):49-66.
    Living in a culture of violence against women leads women to employ any number of avoidance and defensive strategies on a daily basis. Such strategies may be self protective but do little to counter women’s fear of violence. A pervasive fear of violence comes with a cost to integrity not addressed in moral philosophy. Restricting choice and action to avoid possibility of harm compromises the ability to stand for one’s commitments before others. If Calhoun is right that integrity is a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. J. D. C. (1970). In Praise of Play. Review of Metaphysics 24 (1):141-141.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Laurie Calhoun (1996). Moral Blindness and Moral Responsibility: What Can We Learn From Rhoda Penmark? Journal of Applied Philosophy 13 (1):41-50.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. C. Daryl Cameron, Joshua Knobe & B. Keith Payne (2010). Do Theories of Implicit Race Bias Change Moral Judgments? Social Justice Research 23:272-289.
    Recent work in social psychology suggests that people harbor “implicit race biases,” biases which can be unconscious or uncontrollable. Because awareness and control have traditionally been deemed necessary for the ascription of moral responsibility, implicit biases present a unique challenge: do we pardon discrimination based on implicit biases because of its unintentional nature, or do we punish discrimination regardless of how it comes about? The present experiments investigated the impact such theories have upon moral judgments about racial discrimination. The results (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  49. Justin Caouette (2013). Moral Responsibility and Psychopathy: Why We Do Not Have Special Obligations To The Psychopath. AJOB Neuroscience 4 (2):26-27.
  50. Justin Caouette & David Boutland (2013). Perception of Addiction and Its Effects on One's Moral Responsibility. AJOB Neuroscience 4 (3):43-44.
1 — 50 / 389