Related categories
Siblings:
310 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 310
  1. Jesus Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff (eds.) (2009). Philosophy of Action: 5 Questions. Automatic Press/VIP.
  2. Mark Alicke & David Rose (2010). Culpable Control or Moral Concepts? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (04):330-331.
    Knobe argues in his target article that asymmetries in intentionality judgments can be explained by the view that concepts such as intentionality are suffused with moral considerations. We believe that the “culpable control” model of blame can account both for Knobe's side effect findings and for findings that do not involve side effects.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Katy Allen, Moral Responsibility and the Natural Order.
    Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2007-09-14 14:36:23.511.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Roman Altshuler (2010). An Unconditioned Will: The Role of Temporality in Freedom and Agency. Dissertation, SUNY Stony Brook
    Eliminativists about free will and moral responsibility argue that no action can be free and responsible because in order to be actions, our movements must be caused by features of our character or will. However, either the will is constituted by states that are themselves produced by events outside our control, or it is constituted by our own choices, which must themselves stem from our will in order to be up to us. Thus, any attempt to account for freedom and (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Susan Leigh Anderson (1996). Problems in Developing a Practical Theory of Moral Responsibility. Journal of Value Inquiry 30 (3):415-425.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Susan Leigh Anderson (1991). A Picture of the Self Which Supports Moral Responsibility. The Monist 74 (1):43-54.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Takuo Aoyama, Shogo Shimizu & Yuki Yamada (2015). Free Will and the Divergence Problem. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 23:1-18.
    This paper presents what the authors call the ‘divergence problem’ regarding choosing between different future possibilities. As is discussed in the first half, the central issue of the problem is the difficulty of temporally locating the ‘active cause’ on the modal divergent diagram. In the second half of this paper, we discuss the ‘second-person freedom’ which is, strictly, neither compatibilist negative freedom nor incompatibilist positive freedom. The divergence problem leads us to two hypothetical views (i.e. the view of single-line determination (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Richard L. Archer & Shirley Matile Ogletree (2011). Interpersonal Judgments: Moral Responsibility and Blame. Ethics and Behavior 21 (1):35-48.
    A deterministic perspective, believing choices are a function of hereditary and environmental factors, could theoretically impact perceived moral responsibility and lead to decreased blame in judging others. However, little consistent support has been found relating individual differences in deterministic attitudes to blame/tolerance for others. Perhaps, though, providing information regarding past background hardships affecting an individual's current lifestyle could potentially mediate harsh moralistic judgments of that individual. In the two studies reported here, we further explored the relation of free will/determinism scales (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Richard Arneson (2007). The Smart Theory of Moral Responsibility and Desert. In Serena Olsaretti (ed.), Desert and Justice. Clarendon Press
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder (1999). Praise, Blame and the Whole Self. Philosophical Studies 93 (2):161-188.
    What is that makes an act subject to either praise or blame? The question has often been taken to depend entirely on the free will debate for an answer, since it is widely agreed that an agent’s act is subject to praise or blame only if it was freely willed, but moral theory, action theory, and moral psychology are at least equally relevant to it. In the last quarter-century, following the lead of Harry Frankfurt’s (1971) seminal article “Freedom of the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. R. J. B. (1963). In Praise of Philosophy. Review of Metaphysics 17 (1):148-149.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. M. M. Bakhtin (1993). Toward a Philosophy of the Act. University of Texas Press.
    Rescued in 1972 from a storeroom in which rats and seeping water had severely damaged the fifty-year-old manuscript, this text is the earliest major work (1919-1921) of the great Russian philosopher M. M. Bakhtin. Toward a Philosophy of the Act contains the first occurrences of themes that occupied Bakhtin throughout his long career. The topics of authoring, responsibility, self and other, the moral significance of "outsideness," participatory thinking, the implications for the individual subject of having "no-alibi in existence," the difference (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Barry Barnes (2000). Understanding Agency: Social Theory and Responsible Action. Sage.
    Is human freedom and choice exaggerated in recent social theory? Should agency be the central in sociology? In this, penetrating and assured book, one of the leading commentators in the field asks where social theory is going. Barnes argues that social theory has taken the wrong turn in over-stating individual freedom. The result is that social contexts in which all individual actions are situated, is dangerously under-theorized. Barnes calls for a form of social theory that recognizes that sociability is the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Elizabeth Lane Beardsley (1957). Moral Worth and Moral Credit. Philosophical Review 66 (3):304-328.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Linda A. Bell (2009). Challenging the Genteel Supports of Atrocities: A Response to "The Atrocity Paradigm". Hypatia 24 (1):123 - 140.
    Inspired by Card's focus on atrocities, I reflect on attitudes and behaviors that buttress and support evil. Surely, the frequent anti-Semitic sermons in German churches helped to form and later to support the views of both Nazis and those who accepted and cooperated with them. Similarly, lynching, rape, and abuse occur within societies whose structures and laws reflect dominant, generally "genteel" racism and sexism and, in turn, help create perpetrators and at least somewhat sympathetic onlookers.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Michael Bergmann (2003). Agent Causation and Responsibility. Faith and Philosophy 20 (2):229-235.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Bernard Berofsky (2003). Classical Compatibilism: Not Dead Yet. In Michael McKenna & David Widerker (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate 107.
  18. John Bishop (1990). Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action. Cambridge University Press.
    From a moral point of view we think of ourselves as capable of responsible actions. From a scientific point of view we think of ourselves as animals whose behavior, however highly evolved, conforms to natural scientific laws. Natural Agency argues that these different perspectives can be reconciled, despite the skepticism of many philosophers who have argued that "free will" is impossible under "scientific determinism." This skepticism is best overcome according to the author, by defending a causal theory of action, that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Gunnar Björnsson & Bengt Brülde (forthcoming). Normative Responsibilities: Structure and Sources. In Kristien Hens, Dorothee Horstkötter & Daniela Cutas (eds.), Parental Responsibility in the Context of Neuroscience and Genetics. Springer
    Attributions of what we shall call normative responsibilities play a central role in everyday moral thinking. It is commonly thought, for example, that parents are responsible for the wellbeing of their children, and that this has important normative consequences. Depending on context, it might mean that parents are morally required to bring their children to the doctor, feed them well, attend to their emotional needs, or to see to it that someone else does. Similarly, it is sometimes argued that countries (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson (2013). A Unified Empirical Account of Responsibility Judgments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):611-639.
    Skeptical worries about moral responsibility seem to be widely appreciated and deeply felt. To address these worries—if nothing else to show that they are mistaken—theories of moral responsibility need to relate to whatever concept of responsibility underlies the worries. Unfortunately, the nature of that concept has proved hard to pin down. Not only do philosophers have conflicting intuitions; numerous recent empirical studies have suggested that both prosaic responsibility judgments and incompatibilist intuitions among the folk are influenced by a number of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson (2012). The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility. Noûs 46 (2):326-354.
    In this paper, we do three things. First, we put forth a novel hypothesis about judgments of moral responsibility according to which such judgments are a species of explanatory judgments. Second, we argue that this hypothesis explains both some general features of everyday thinking about responsibility and the appeal of skeptical arguments against moral responsibility. Finally, we argue that, if correct, the hypothesis provides a defense against these skeptical arguments.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson (2009). Judgments of Moral Responsibility – a Unified Account. In [2009] Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 35th Annual Meeting (Bloomington, IN; June 12-14). 326-354.
    Recent work in experimental philosophy shows that folk intuitions about moral responsibility are sensitive to a surprising variety of factors. Whether people take agents to be responsible for their actions in deterministic scenarios depends on whether the deterministic laws are couched in neurological or psychological terms (Nahmias et. al. 2007), on whether actions are described abstractly or concretely, and on how serious moral transgression they seem to represent (Nichols & Knobe 2007). Finally, people are more inclined to hold an agent (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Susanne Bobzien (2014). Choice and Moral Responsibility in Nicomachean Ethics Iii 1-5. In R. Polansky (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Nicomachean Ethics. Cambridge University Press 81-109.
    ABSTRACT: This paper serves two purposes: (i) it can be used by students as an introduction to chapters 1-5 of book iii of the NE; (ii) it suggests an answer to the unresolved question what overall objective this section of the NE has. The paper focuses primarily on Aristotle’s theory of what makes us responsible for our actions and character. After some preliminary observations about praise, blame and responsibility (Section 2), it sets out in detail how all the key notions (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Susanne Bobzien (2006). Moral Responsibility and Moral Development in Epicurus’ Philosophy. In B. Reis & S. Haffmans (eds.), The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics. CUP
    ABSTRACT: 1. This paper argues that Epicurus had a notion of moral responsibility based on the agent’s causal responsibility, as opposed to the agent’s ability to act or choose otherwise; that Epicurus considered it a necessary condition for praising or blaming an agent for an action, that it was the agent and not something else that brought the action about. Thus, the central question of moral responsibility was whether the agent was the, or a, cause of the action, or whether (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Susanne Bobzien (1997). Stoic Conceptions of Freedom and Their Relation to Ethics. Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 41 (S68):71-89.
    ABSTRACT: In contemporary discussions of freedom in Stoic philosophy we often encounter the following assumptions: (i) the Stoics discussed the problem of free will and determinis; (ii) since in Stoic philosophy freedom of the will is in the end just an illusion, the Stoics took the freedom of the sage as a substitute for it and as the only true freedom; (iii) in the c. 500 years of live Stoic philosophical debate, the Stoics were largely concerned with the same philosophical (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Edgar Bodenheimer (1980). Philosophy of Responsibility. F. B. Rothman.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Hilary Bok (2002). Wallace's ‘Normative Approach’ to Moral Responsibility. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):682–686.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Hilary Bok (1998). Freedom and Responsibility. Princeton University Press.
    Can we reconcile the idea that we are free and responsible agents with the idea that what we do is determined according to natural laws? For centuries, philosophers have tried in different ways to show that we can. Hilary Bok takes a fresh approach here, as she seeks to show that the two ideas are compatible by drawing on the distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning.Bok argues that when we engage in practical reasoning--the kind that involves asking "what should I (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Karin Boxer (2014). Hart's Senses of 'Responsibility'. In C. G. Pulman (ed.), Hart on Responsibility.
  30. David O. Brink & Dana K. Nelkin (2013). Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility. Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 1:284-313.
    This essay explores a conception of responsibility at work in moral and criminal responsibility. Our conception draws on work in the compatibilist tradition that focuses on the choices of agents who are reasons-responsive and work in criminal jurisprudence that understands responsibility in terms of the choices of agents who have capacities for practical reason and whose situation affords them the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. Our conception brings together the dimensions of normative competence and situational control, and we factor normative (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Alexander Brown (2009). Personal Responsibility: Why It Matters. Continuum.
    Introduction -- What is personal responsibility? -- Ordinary language -- Common conceptions -- What do philosophers mean by responsibility? -- Personally responsible for what? -- What do philosophers think? part I -- Causes -- Capacity -- Control -- Choice versus brute luck -- Second-order attitudes -- Equality of opportunity -- Deservingness -- Reasonableness -- Reciprocity -- Equal shares -- Combining criteria -- What do philosophers think? part II -- Utility -- Self-respect -- Autonomy -- Human flourishing -- Natural duties and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Sylvia Burrow (2012). Protecting One's Commitments: Integrity and Self-Defense. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (1):49-66.
    Living in a culture of violence against women leads women to employ any number of avoidance and defensive strategies on a daily basis. Such strategies may be self protective but do little to counter women’s fear of violence. A pervasive fear of violence comes with a cost to integrity not addressed in moral philosophy. Restricting choice and action to avoid possibility of harm compromises the ability to stand for one’s commitments before others. If Calhoun is right that integrity is a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. J. D. C. (1970). In Praise of Play. Review of Metaphysics 24 (1):141-141.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Laurie Calhoun (1996). Moral Blindness and Moral Responsibility: What Can We Learn From Rhoda Penmark? Journal of Applied Philosophy 13 (1):41-50.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. C. Daryl Cameron, Joshua Knobe & B. Keith Payne (2010). Do Theories of Implicit Race Bias Change Moral Judgments? Social Justice Research 23:272-289.
    Recent work in social psychology suggests that people harbor “implicit race biases,” biases which can be unconscious or uncontrollable. Because awareness and control have traditionally been deemed necessary for the ascription of moral responsibility, implicit biases present a unique challenge: do we pardon discrimination based on implicit biases because of its unintentional nature, or do we punish discrimination regardless of how it comes about? The present experiments investigated the impact such theories have upon moral judgments about racial discrimination. The results (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Justin Caouette (2013). Moral Responsibility and Psychopathy: Why We Do Not Have Special Obligations To The Psychopath. AJOB Neuroscience 4 (2):26-27.
  37. Justin Caouette & David Boutland (2013). Perception of Addiction and Its Effects on One's Moral Responsibility. AJOB Neuroscience 4 (3):43-44.
  38. Justin A. Capes (2010). The W-Defense. Philosophical Studies 150 (1):61-77.
    There has been a great deal of critical discussion of Harry Frankfurt’s argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), almost all of which has focused on whether the Frankfurt-style examples, which are designed to be counterexamples to PAP, can be given a coherent formulation. Recently, however, David Widerker has argued that even if Frankfurt-style examples can be given a coherent formulation, there is reason to believe that an agent in those examples could never be morally blameworthy for what she (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Antonio Capizzi (1971). Impegno E Disponibilità. Roma,Oe.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Gregg Caruso (forthcoming). Free Will Skepticism and Its Implications: An Argument for Optimism. In Elizabeth Shaw (ed.), Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society.
  41. Gregg Caruso (forthcoming). Précis of Neil Levy’s Consciousness and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Consciousness Studies.
  42. Gregg Caruso (ed.) (2013). Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Lexington Books.
    This book explores the philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism and their implications. Skepticism about free will and moral responsibility has been on the rise in recent years. In fact, a significant number of philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists now either doubt or outright deny the existence of free will and/or moral responsibility—and the list of prominent skeptics appears to grow by the day. Given the profound importance that the concepts of free will and moral responsibility play in our (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Gregg D. Caruso (forthcoming). Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Behavior: A Public Health-Quarantine Model. Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (1).
    One of the most frequently voiced criticisms of free will skepticism is that it is unable to adequately deal with criminal behavior and that the responses it would permit as justified are insufficient for acceptable social policy. This concern is fueled by two factors. The first is that one of the most prominent justifications for punishing criminals, retributivism, is incompatible with free will skepticism. The second concern is that alternative justifications that are not ruled out by the skeptical view per (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Mason Cash (2010). Extended Cognition, Personal Responsibility, and Relational Autonomy. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):645-671.
    The Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC)—that many cognitive processes are carried out by a hybrid coalition of neural, bodily and environmental factors—entails that the intentional states that are reasons for action might best be ascribed to wider entities of which individual persons are only parts. I look at different kinds of extended cognition and agency, exploring their consequences for concerns about the moral agency and personal responsibility of such extended entities. Can extended entities be moral agents and bear responsibility for (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. David K. Chan (2000). Intention and Responsibility in Double Effect Cases. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3 (4):405-434.
    I argue that the moral distinction in double effect cases rests on a difference not in intention as traditionally stated in the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), but in desire. The traditional DDE has difficulty ensuring that an agent intends the bad effect just in those cases where what he does is morally objectionable. I show firstly that the mental state of a rational agent who is certain that a side-effect will occur satisfies Bratman's criteria for intending that effect. I (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Ian Chowcat (1999). George Sher, Approximate Justice: Studies in Non-Ideal Theory Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 19 (2):146-148.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Ian Chowcat (1999). George Sher, Approximate Justice: Studies in Non-Ideal Theory. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 19:146-148.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Michelle Ciurria (2014). The Case of Jojo and Our Pretheoretical Intuitions: An Externalist Interpretation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):265-276.
    In their contribution to the Review of philosophy and psychology (19 March 2010), David Faraci and David Shoemaker object to Susan Wolf’s sane deep self view of moral responsibility, which is supposed to accord with our pretheoretical intuitions about deprived childhood victims better than the plain deep-self view. Wolf’s account hinges on the intuitiveness of a particular example, which asks us to consider JoJo, the son of an evil dictator of a small, undeveloped country who grows up to adopt his (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Randolph Clarke (2014). Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
    Philosophical theories of agency have focused primarily on actions and activities. But, besides acting, we often omit to do or refrain from doing certain things. How is this aspect of our agency to be conceived? This book offers a comprehensive account of omitting and refraining, addressing issues ranging from the nature of agency and moral responsibility to the metaphysics of absences and causation. Topics addressed include the role of intention in intentional omission, the connection between negligence and omission, the distinction (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Randolph Clarke (2005). On an Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):13-24.
    Galen Strawson has published several versions of an argument to the effect that moral responsibility is impossible, whether determinism is true or not. Few philosophers have been persuaded by the argument, which Strawson remarks is often dismissed “as wrong, or irrelevant, or fatuous, or too rapid, or an expression of metaphysical megalomania.” I offer here a two-part explanation of why Strawson’s argument has impressed so few. First, as he usually states it, the argument is lacking at least one key premise. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 310