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  1. Mark Alfano (2009). A Danger of Definition: Polar Predicates in Moral Theory. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3 (3).
    In this paper, I use an example from the history of philosophy to show how independently defining each side of a pair of contrary predicates is apt to lead to contradiction. In the Euthyphro, piety is defined as that which is loved by some of the gods while impiety is defined as that which is hated by some of the gods. Socrates points out that since the gods harbor contrary sentiments, some things are both pious and impious. But “pious” and (...)
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  2. Paul Bloomfield (2001). Moral Reality. Oxford University Press.
    We typically assume that the standard for what is beautiful lies in the eye of the beholder. Yet this is not the case when we consider morality; what we deem morally good is not usually a matter of opinion. Such thoughts push us toward being realists about moral properties, but a cogent theory of moral realism has long been an elusive philosophical goal. Paul Bloomfield here offers a rigorous defense of moral realism, developing an ontology for morality that models the (...)
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  3. Jan Bransen (2002). On the Incompleteness of McDowell's Moral Realism. Topoi 21 (1-2):187-198.
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  4. Josep Corbí (2004). Normativity, Moral Realism, and Unmasking Explanations. Theoria 19 (2):155-172.
    Moral Projectivism must be able to specify under what conditions a certain inner response counts as a moral response. I argue, however, that moral projectivists cannot coherently do so because they must assume that there are moral properties in the world in order to fix the content of our moral judgements. To show this, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism, which is, nowadays, the most promising version of moral projectivism. In this context, I call into question both (...)
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  5. Kevin Michael DeLapp (2009). The Merits of Dispositional Moral Realism. Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (1):1-18.
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  6. Dan Demetriou (2009). A Modest Intuitionist Reply to Greene's fMRI-Based Objections to Deontology. Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1):107-117.
    I argue that Greene’s research, although fascinating for many reasons, doesn’t undermine deontological moral philosophy. This is because both sentimentalist and rationalist moral epistemologies, applied to deontological value, predict exactly the data Greene has found. My discussion proceeds in three steps. In the first section I summarize Greene’s brief against deontology. In the second section I draw on standard accounts of moral emotions to suggest that there are ‘deontological emotions’ made rational by appearances of ‘deontological value.’ Finally, I outline a (...)
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  7. James Dreier (1996). Book Review: The Moral Problem by Michael Smith. [REVIEW] Mind 105 (418):363-367.
  8. Daniel Jacobson, Fitting Attitude Theories of Value. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  9. Antti Kauppinen (2014). Fittingness and Idealization. Ethics 124 (3):572-588.
    This note explores how ideal subjectivism in metanormative theory can help solve two important problems for Fitting Attitude analyses of value. The wrong-kind-of-reason problem is that there may be sufficient reason for attitude Y even if the object is not Y-able. The many-kinds-of-fittingness problem is that the same attitude can be fitting in many ways. Ideal subjectivism addresses both by maintaining that an attitude is W-ly fitting if and only if endorsed by any W-ly ideal subject. A subject is W-ly (...)
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  10. Antti Kauppinen (2013). Sentimentalism (International Encyclopedia of Ethics). In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwell.
    Sentimentalism comes in many varieties: explanatory sentimentalism, judgment sentimentalism, metaphysical sentimentalism, and epistemic sentimentalism. This encyclopedia entry gives an overview of the positions and main arguments pro and con.
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  11. Marc Lange (2000). Salience, Supervenience, and Layer Cakes in Sellars's Scientific Realism, McDowell's Moral Realism, and the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Studies 101 (2-3):213-251.
  12. Xiusheng Liu (2002). Mencius, Hume, and Sensibility Theory. Philosophy East and West 52 (1):75-97.
    Sensibility theory claims that, for any object x, x is good/right if and only if x is such as to make a certain sentiment appropriate. A realist position, sensibility theory claims conceptual and explanatory advantages over alternative metaethical theories. Sensibility theory, while revealing, presents a problem of its own: its central thesis involves an explanatory circularity. Here, a Mencius-Hume solution to that problem is offered.
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  13. Richard Norman (1997). Making Sense of Moral Realism. Philosophical Investigations 20 (2):117–135.
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  14. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (ed.) (1988). Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press.
    Introduction The Many Moral Realisms Geoffrey Sayre-McCord I. Introduction Recognizing the startling resurgence in realism, ...
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  15. Daniel Star (2013). Moral Metaphysics. In Roger Crisp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics. Oxford University Press.
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  16. Elizabeth Tropman (2010). Intuitionism and the Secondary-Quality Analogy in Ethics. Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (1):31-45.
    Sensibility theorists such as John McDowell have argued that once we appreciate certain similarities between moral values and secondary qualities, a new meta-ethical position might emerge, one that avoids the alleged difficulties with moral intuitionism and non-cognitivism. The aim of this paper is to examine the meta-ethical prospects of this secondary-quality analogy. Of particular concern will be the extent to which McDowell’s comparison of values to secondary qualities supports a viewpoint unique from that of the moral intuitionist. Once we disentangle (...)
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  17. Ralph Wedgwood (1997). The Essence of Response-Dependence. European Review of Philosophy 3:31-54.
    Many philosophers have thought that colours or flavours or values are in some way less objective than shape or mass or motion. This paper explores the approach to capturing this thought that is based on the idea of ‘response-dependence’. First, it is argued that the conceptions of response-dependence developed by Mark Johnston, Philip Pettit and Crispin Wright fail to capture this thought adequately. Then, the rest of the paper proposes an alternative conception, based in part on Kit Fine's notion of (...)
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