Moral Skepticism Edited by Christopher Cloos (San Jose State University)

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  • Marshall Cohen (1984). Moral Skepticism and International Relations. Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (4):299-346.
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  • David Copp (2008). Darwinian Skepticism About Moral Realism. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):186-206.
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  • David Copp (1991). Moral Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 62 (3).
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  • Michael DePaul (2009). Pyrrhonian Moral Skepticism and the Problem of the Criterion. Philosophical Issues 19 (1):38-56.
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  • Peter J. Graham (2007). Review of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Skepticisms. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (3).
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  • Daniel Howard-Snyder, Epistemic Humility, Arguments From Evil, and Moral Skepticism.
    Many arguments from evil at least tacitly rely on something like the following line of thought: The Inference. On sustained reflection, we don’t see how any reason we know of would justify God in permitting all the evil in the world; therefore, there is no reason that would justify God.1 The conclusion is frequently more nuanced: “it is very likely that there is no such reason” or “more likely than not” or “more likely than it otherwise would be”. Some critics (...)
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  • Paul Kurtz (1985). Moral Faith and Ethical Skepticism Reconsidered. Journal of Value Inquiry 19 (1).
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  • Brian Leiter, Moral Skepticism and Moral Disagreement in Nietzsche.
    This essay offers a new interpretation of Nietzsche's argument for moral skepticism (i.e., the metaphysical thesis that there do not exist any objective moral properties or facts), an argument that should be of independent philosophical interest as well. On this account, Nietzsche offers a version of the argument from moral disagreement, but, unlike familiar varieties, it does not purport to exploit anthropological reports about the moral views of exotic cultures, or even garden-variety conflicting moral intuitions about concrete cases. Nietzsche, instead, (...)
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  • Diego E. Machuca (2006). The Local Nature of Modern Moral Skepticism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):315–324.
    Julia Annas has affirmed that the kind of modern moral skepticism which denies the existence of objective moral values rests upon a contrast between morality and some other system of beliefs about the world which is not called into doubt. Richard Bett, on the other hand, has argued that the existence of such a contrast is not a necessary condition for espousing that kind of moral skepticism. My purpose in this paper is to show that Bett fails to make a (...)
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  • Stephen Maitzen (2009). Skeptical Theism and Moral Obligation. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 65 (2).
    Skeptical theism claims that the probability of a perfect God’s existence isn’t at all reduced by our failure to see how such a God could allow the horrific suffering that occurs in our world. Given our finite grasp of the realm of value, skeptical theists argue, it shouldn’t surprise us that we fail to see the reasons that justify God in allowing such suffering, and thus our failure to see those reasons is no evidence against God’s existence or perfection. Critics (...)
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  • Thomas McClintock (1971). Skepticism About Basic Moral Principles. Metaphilosophy 2 (2):150–157.
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  • Sarah McGrath, Skepticism About Moral Expertise as a Puzzle for Moral Realism.
    In this paper, I develop a neglected puzzle for the moral realist. I then canvass some potential responses. Although I endorse one response as the most promising of those I survey, my primary goal is to make vivid how formidable the puzzle is, as opposed to offering a definitive solution.
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  • Elijah Millgram (2007). Applied Ethics, Moral Skepticism, and Reasons with Expiration Dates. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 263-280.
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  • Robert G. Olson (1959). Emotivism and Moral Skepticism. Journal of Philosophy 56 (18):722-730.
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  • Gideon Rosen (2004). Skepticism About Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):295–313.
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  • Gary Seay (2002). Theory Skepticism and Moral Dilemmas. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12 (3).
    : Moral-theory skepticism not an option in any sort of thinking that could actually be used in resolving dilemmas in applied ethics, since its characteristic doctrines entail positions that in practice often will lead to a kind of paralysis in moral reasoning, where persons faced with having to decide what to do in particularly difficult cases are unable to rule out the most implausible conclusions. Moral-theory skepticism thus makes it difficult to formulate decision-making procedures that will provide guidance in action (...)
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  • Lee Shepski (2008). The Vanishing Argument From Queerness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):371 – 387.
    The 'argument from queerness', made famous by J. L. Mackie, remains one of the most influential arguments in metaethics. However, many philosophers focus on just one or two of its strands, while others assume a particular but by no means universal reading of it. This essay attempts to disentangle and evaluate all strands of the argument. Surprisingly, when this is done, not much is left as a distinct argument from queerness. Much of the argument collapses into other types of argument, (...)
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  • Mark Silcox (2006). Virtue Epistemology and Moral Luck. Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2):179--192.
    Thomas Nagel has proposed that the existence of moral luck mandates a general attitude of skepticism in ethics. One popular way of arguing against Nagel’s claim is to insist that the phenomenon of moral luck itself is an illusion , in the sense that situations in which it seems to occur may be plausibly re-described so as to show that agents need not be held responsible for the unlucky outcomes of their actions. Here I argue that this strategy for explaining (...)
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  • Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2008). Moderate Classy Pyrrhonian Moral Scepticism. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):448–456.
    This précis summarizes my book Moral Skepticisms, with emphasis on my contrastivist analysis of justified moral belief and my Pyrrhonian moral scepticism based on meta-scepticism about relevance. This complex moral epistemology escapes a common paradox facing moral philosophers.
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  • Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2006). Moral Skepticisms. Oxford University Press.
    All contentious moral issues--from gay marriage to abortion and affirmative action--raise difficult questions about the justification of moral beliefs. How can we be justified in holding on to our own moral beliefs while recognizing that other intelligent people feel quite differently and that many moral beliefs are distorted by self-interest and by corrupt cultures? Even when almost everyone agrees--e.g. that experimental surgery without consent is immoral--can we know that such beliefs are true? If so, how? These profound questions lead to (...)
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  • Nick Trakakis & Yujin Nagasawa, Skeptical Theism and Moral Skepticism.
    Skeptical theists purport to undermine evidential arguments from evil by appealing to the fact that our knowledge of goods, evils, and their interconnections is signi cantly limited. Michael J. Almeida and Graham Oppy have recently argued that skeptical theism is unacceptable because it results in a form of moral skepticism which rejects inferences that play an important role in our ordinary moral reasoning. In this reply to Almeida and Oppy's argument we offer some reasons for thinking that skeptical theism need (...)
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  • Pekka Vayrynen (2004). Review of Christian Illies, The Grounds of Ethical Judgement: New Transcendental Arguments in Moral Philosophy. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (3).
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  • Edward Witherspoon (2002). Houses, Flowers, and Frameworks: Cavell and Mulhall on the Moral of Skepticism. European Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):196–208.
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