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  1. H. W. B. Acton (1948). Moral Subjectivism. Analysis 9 (1):1 - 8.
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  2. Brand Blanshard (1951). Subjectivism in Ethics--A Criticism. Philosophical Quarterly 1 (2):127-139.
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  3. Brand Blanshard (1949). The New Subjectivism in Ethics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 9 (3):504-511.
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  4. E. P. Brandon (1980). Subjectivism and Seriousness. Philosophical Quarterly 30 (119):97-107.
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  5. Richard Brown (2008). The Semantics of Moral Communication. Dissertation, The Graduate Center, CUNY
    Adviser: Professor Stefan Baumrin In the first chapter I introduce the distinction between metaethics and normative ethics and argue that metaethics, properly conceived, is a part of cognitive science. For example, the debate between rationalism and sentimentalism can be informed by recent empirical work in psychology and the neurosciences. In the second chapter I argue that the traditional view that one’s theory of semantics determines what one’s theory of justification must be is mistaken. Though it has been the case that (...)
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  6. Stewart Candlish (1975). The Origins of Subjectivism. Journal of Moral Education 4 (3):191-200.
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  7. Florian Cova & Jérôme Ravat (2008). Sens commun et objectivisme moral : Objectivisme "global" ou objectivisme "local" ? Une introduction par l'exemple à la philosophie expérimentale. Klesis 9:180-202.
    Dans cet article, nous proposons de montrer expérimentalement que le "sens commun" n'est en matière moral ni complètement objectiviste ni complètement relativiste, mais qu'un même individu peut être tantôt objectiviste tantôt relativiste. De même, nous montrons que les jugements de goût portant sur le prédicat "dégoûtant" ne sont pas toujours relativiste mais peuvent varier selon le contexte entre objectivisme et relativisme.
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  8. Theodore de Laguna (1904). Ethical Subjectivism. Philosophical Review 13 (6):642-659.
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  9. Darren Domsky (2004). Keeping a Place for Metaethics: Assessing Elliot's Dismissal of the Subjectivism/Objectivism Debate in Environmental Ethics. Metaphilosophy 35 (5):675-694.
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  10. D. Dorsey (2012). Subjectivism Without Desire. Philosophical Review 121 (3):407-442.
    Subjectivism about well-being holds that ϕ is intrinsically good for x if and only if, and to the extent that, ϕ is valued, under the proper conditions, by x. Given this statement of the view, there is room for intramural dissent among subjectivists. One important source of dispute is the phrase “under the proper conditions”: Should the proper conditions of valuing be actual or idealized? What sort of idealization is appropriate? And so forth. Though these concerns are of the first (...)
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  11. A. C. Ewing (1949). Moral Subjectivism: A Further Reply to Prof. H. B. Acton. Analysis 10 (1):15 - 16.
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  12. A. C. Ewing (1948). Moral Subjectivism: Reply to Professor Acton. Analysis 9 (2):17 - 23.
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  13. A. C. Ewing (1944). Subjectivism and Naturalism in Ethics. Mind 53 (210):120-141.
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  14. Philippa Foot (2000). Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake? Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 46 (1):107-.
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  15. Michael Gorman (2003). Subjectivism About Normativity and the Normativity of Intentional States. International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):5-14.
    Subjectivism about normativity (SN) is the view that norms are never intrinsic to things but are instead always imposed from without. After clarifying what SN is, I argue against it on the basis of its implications concerning intentionality. Intentional states with the mind-to-world direction of fit are essentially norm-subservient, i.e., essentially subject to norms such as truth, coherence, and the like. SN implies that nothing is intrinsically an intentional state of the mind-to-world sort: its being such a state is only (...)
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  16. Peter A. Graham (2010). In Defense of Objectivism About Moral Obligation. Ethics 121 (1):88-115.
    There is a debate in normative ethics about whether or not our moral obligations depend solely on either our evidence concerning, or our beliefs about, the world. Subjectivists maintain that they do and objectivists maintain that they do not. I shall offer some arguments in support of objectivism and respond to the strongest argument for subjectivism. I shall also briefly consider the significance of my discussion to the debate over whether one’s future voluntary actions are relevant to one’s current moral (...)
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  17. R. E. Jennings (1974). Pseudo-Subjectivism in Ethics. Dialogue 13 (03):515-518.
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  18. Oliver A. Johnson (1990). Blanshard's Critique of Ethical Subjectivism. Idealistic Studies 20 (2):140-154.
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  19. Guy Kahane (2009). Pain, Dislike and Experience. Utilitas 21 (3):327-336.
    It is widely held that it is only contingent that the sensation of pain is disliked, and that when pain is not disliked, it is not intrinsically bad. This conjunction of claims has often been taken to support a subjectivist view of pain’s badness on which pain is bad simply because it is the object of a negative attitude and not because of what it feels like. In this paper, I argue that accepting this conjunction of claims does not commit (...)
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  20. Antti Kauppinen (2014). Fittingness and Idealization. Ethics 124 (3):572-588.
    This note explores how ideal subjectivism in metanormative theory can help solve two important problems for Fitting Attitude analyses of value. The wrong-kind-of-reason problem is that there may be sufficient reason for attitude Y even if the object is not Y-able. The many-kinds-of-fittingness problem is that the same attitude can be fitting in many ways. Ideal subjectivism addresses both by maintaining that an attitude is W-ly fitting if and only if endorsed by any W-ly ideal subject. A subject is W-ly (...)
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  21. Sebastian Köhler (2012). Expressivism, Subjectivism and Moral Disagreement. Thought 1 (1):71-78.
    One worry about metaethical expressivism is that it reduces to some form of subjectivism. This worry is enforced by subjectivists who argue that subjectivism can explain certain phenomena thought to support expressivism equally well. Recently, authors have started to suggest that subjectivism can take away what has often been seen as expressivism's biggest explanatory advantage, namely expressivism's ability to explain the possibility of moral disagreement. In this paper, I will give a response to an argument recently given by Frank Jackson (...)
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  22. William S. Kraemer (1952). Ethical Subjectivism and the Rational Good. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12 (4):526-537.
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  23. Theodore De Laguna (1904). Ethical Subjectivism. Philosophical Review 13 (6):642 - 659.
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  24. Ramon M. Lemos (1965). Objectivism, Relativism, and Subjectivism in Ethics. International Philosophical Quarterly 5 (1):56-65.
    The relativist contends that one has a duty to do something if and only if one's society holds that one does. The subjectivist maintains that one has a duty to do something if and only if one believes that one does. The objectivist argues that men have objective duties which are sometimes independent of what either they or their societies believe they are. My object is to indicate what seem to be some obvious, Yet fatal, Objections to relativism and subjectivism, (...)
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  25. Judith Lichtenberg (1983). Subjectivism as Moral Weakness Projected. Philosophical Quarterly 33 (133):378-385.
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  26. Hallvard Lillehammer (2013). The Argument From Queerness. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics.
  27. Kenneth MacKendrick (2000). The Moral Imaginary of Discourse Ethics. Critical Horizons 1 (2):247-269.
    The central claim of this essay is that Habermas' program of discourse ethics fails to establish the necessary immanent connection between the universality of discourse ethics and the quasi-transcendentalism, which is supposed to provide its ground. Habermas' attempt to avoid the spectre of subjectivism leads him to develop an understanding of universalism that hinges on a critical error, the confusion of subjectivity with ethical substance. Using Castoriadis' theory of the imagination to illuminate this failure, I demonstrate the way (...)
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  28. Hugo Meynell (2008). Metaethical Subjectivism. By Richard Double. Heythrop Journal 49 (3):492–494.
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  29. D. H. Monro (1950). Subjectivism Versus Relativism in Ethics. Analysis 11 (1):19 - 24.
    In this article I argue that ethical subjectivism does not lead to relativism, If that is defined as the theory that men do genuinely differ in their ultimate moral judgments, And that there are no grounds for preferring one such moral judgment to another. On the contrary, This view is inconsistent with subjectivism, Since it rests on the objective truth of some such premise as that one ought not to condemn another simply because his tastes are different from one's own.
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  30. Kai Nielsen (1974). Does Ethical Subjectivism Have a Coherent Form? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (1):93-99.
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  31. Ragnar Francén Olinder (2013). Moral Relativism, Error-Theory, and Ascriptions of Mistakes. Journal of Philosophy 110 (10):564-580.
    Moral error-theorists and relativists agree that there are no absolute moral facts, but disagree whether that makes all moral judgments false. Who is right? This paper examines a type of objection used by moral error-theorists against relativists, and vice versa: objections from implausible ascriptions of mistakes. Relativists (and others) object to error-theory that it implausibly implies that people, in having moral beliefs, are systematically mistaken about what exists. Error-theorists (and others) object to relativism that it implausibly implies that people are (...)
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  32. Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Dycus Miller & Jeffrey Paul (eds.) (2008). Objectivism, Subjectivism, and Relativism in Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
    Some essays in this book consider whether objective moral truths can be grounded in an understanding of the nature of human beings as rational and social ...
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  33. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (1986). Hutcheson's Perceptual and Moral Subjectivism. History of Philosophy Quarterly 3 (4):407 - 421.
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  34. George W. Roberts (1971). Some Refutations of Private Subjectivism in Ethics. Journal of Value Inquiry 5 (4):292-309.
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  35. Philip J. Ross (1994). Utility, Subjectivism and Moral Ontology. Journal of Applied Philosophy 11 (2):189-199.
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  36. Amir Saemi (2009). Intention and Permissibility. Ethical Perspectives 16 (1):81-101.
    There are two kinds of view in the literature concerning the relevance of intention to permissibility. While subjectivism assumes that an agent acts permissibly if he or she believes that the conduct is necessary for a moral purpose, for objectivism the de facto presence of an objective reason to justify one’s deeds is what matters. Recently, Scanlon and Hanser defend a moderate version of objectivism and subjectivism, respectively. Although I have a degree of sympathy toward both views, I will argue (...)
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  37. Richard Schmitt (1960). Book Review:Naturalism and Subjectivism. Marvin Farber. [REVIEW] Ethics 71 (1):58-.
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  38. Mark Schroeder, Does Expressivism Have Subjectivist Consequences?
    Metaethical expressivists claim that we can explain what moral words like ‘wrong’ mean without having to know what they are about – but rather by saying what it is to think that something is wrong – namely, to disapprove of it. Given the close connection between expressivists’ theory of the meaning of moral words and our attitudes of approval and disapproval, expressivists have had a hard time shaking the intuitive charge that theirs is an objectionably subjectivist or mind-dependent view of (...)
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  39. Seana Valentine Shiffrin (1999). Moral Overridingness and Moral Subjectivism. Ethics 109 (4):772-794.
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  40. R. L. Simpson (1976). Nielsen on Ethical Subjectivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (1):121-122.
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  41. Neil Sinclair (2008). Free Thinking for Expressivists. Philosophical Papers 37 (2):263-287.
    This paper elaborates and defends an expressivist account of the claims of mind-independence embedded in ordinary moral thought. In response to objections from Zangwill and Jenkins it is argued that the expressivist 'internal reading' of such claims is compatible with their conceptual status and that the only 'external reading' available doesn't commit expressivisists to any sort of subjectivism. In the process a 'commitment-theoretic' account of the semantics of conditionals and negations is defended.
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  42. James Ward Smith (1948). Senses of Subjectivism in Value Theory. Journal of Philosophy 45 (15):393-405.
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  43. David Sobel (2011). Parfit's Case Against Subjectivism. In Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 6. Oup Oxford.
    I argue that Parfit's On What Matters does not make a compelling case against subjective accounts of reasons for action.
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  44. David Sobel (2009). Subjectivism and Idealization. Ethics 119 (2):336-352.
  45. David Sobel (2007). Subjectivism and Blame. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 149-170.
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  46. Caj Strandberg (2007). Metaethical Subjectivism – Richard Double. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):690–693.
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  47. Jussi Suikkanen (2009). The Subjectivist Consequences of Expressivism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):364-387.
    Jackson and Pettit argue that expressivism in metaethics collapses into subjectivism. A sincere utterer of a moral claim must believe that she has certain attitudes to be expressed. The truth-conditions of that belief then allegedly provide truth-conditions also for the moral utterance. Thus, the expressivist cannot deny that moral claims have subjectivist truth-conditions. Critics have argued that this argument fails as stated. I try to show that expressivism does have subjectivist repercussions in a way that avoids the problems of the (...)
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  48. F. E. Trainer (1983). Ethical Objectivism‐Subjectivism: A Neglected Dimension in the Study of Moral Thought∗. Journal of Moral Education 12 (3):192-207.
    Abstract Previous conceptual analyses and empirical research concerning moral development and moral education have almost completely failed to take into account the distinction between objectivist and subjectivist positions on the nature of morality. This paper begins by outlining the essential elements in the two positions and pointing to the significance of the issue for the study of moral thought and for the discussion of moral maturity. Reference is briefly made to problems in current theories arising from the neglect of the (...)
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  49. Anthony Weston (1984). Toward the Reconstruction of Subjectivism: Love as a Paradigm of Values. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 18 (3):181-194.
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  50. David Wiggins (1987). A Sensible Subjectivism? Basil Blackwell.
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