Related categories
Siblings:
74 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 74
  1. Zed Adams (2011). Moral Mistakes. Philosophical Investigations 34 (1):1-21.
    Is it possible to show that a moral claim is mistaken without taking a moral stand with regard to it? A striking number of contemporary metaethicists suppose that it is. In this paper, I argue against a prominent line of support for this supposition. My goal is to cast suspicion on a general tendency to think that the epistemic standing of moral claims is something that can be assessed from outside the practices of making and critically evaluating moral judgements. I (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. David E. Alexander (2011). Problems for Moral/Natural Supervenience. Religious Studies 47 (1):73 - 84.
    'Everyone agrees that the moral features of things supervene on their natural features' (Smith (1994), 22). Everyone is wrong, or so I will argue. In the first section, I explain the version of moral supervenience that Smith and others argue everyone should accept. In the second section, I argue that the mere conceptual possibility of a divine command theory of morality (DCT) is sufficient to refute the version of moral supervenience under consideration. Lastly, I consider and respond to two objections, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Robert Audi (1991). Moral Epistemology and the Supervenience of Ethical Concepts. Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1):1-24.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Matthew S. Bedke (2012). Against Normative Naturalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):111 - 129.
    This paper considers normative naturalism, understood as the view that (i) normative sentences are descriptive of the way things are, and (ii) their truth/falsity does not require ontology beyond the ontology of the natural world. Assuming (i) for the sake of argument, I here show that (ii) is false not only as applied to ethics, but more generally as applied to practical and epistemic normativity across the board. The argument is a descendant of Moore's Open Question Argument and Hume's Is-Ought (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Simon Blackburn (1993). Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford University Press.
    This volume collects some influential essays in which Simon Blackburn, one of our leading philosophers, explores one of the most profound and fertile of philosophical problems: the way in which our judgments relate to the world. This debate has centered on realism, or the view that what we say is validated by the way things stand in the world, and a variety of oppositions to it. Prominent among the latter are expressive and projective theories, but also a relaxed pluralism that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Simon Blackburn (1971). Moral Realism. In John Casey (ed.), Morality and Moral Reasoning. Methuen.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Simon W. Blackburn (1984). Supervenience Revisited. In Ian Hacking (ed.), Exercises in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Lewy. Cambridge University Press. 59--74.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Luc Bovens & Dalia Drai (1999). Supervenience and Moral Realism. Philosophia 27 (1-2):241-245.
    Blackburn argues that moral supervenience in conjunction with the lack of entailments from naturalistic to moral judgments poses a challenge to moral realism. Klagge and McFetridge try to avert the challenge by appealing to synthetically necessary connections between natural and moral properties. Blackburn rejoins that, even if there are such connections, the challenge still remains. We remain agnostic on the question whether there are such connections, but argue against Blackburn that, if there are indeed such connections, then the challenge to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Campbell Brown (2012). Still No Redundant Properties: Reply to Wielenberg. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Campbell Brown (2011). A New and Improved Supervenience Argument for Ethical Descriptivism. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 6. Oup Oxford. 205-18.
    Ethical descriptivism is the view that all ethical properties are descriptive properties. Frank Jackson has proposed an argument for this view which begins with the premise that the ethical supervenes on the descriptive, any worlds that differ ethically must differ also descriptively. This paper observes that Jackson's argument has a curious structure, taking a linguistic detour between metaphysical starting and ending points, and raises some worries stemming from this. It then proposes an improved version of the argument, which avoids these (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Anthony Brueckner (2002). Blackburn's Modal Argument Against Moral Realism. Theoria 68 (1):67-70.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Richmond Campbell & Jennifer Woodrow (2003). Why Moore's Open Question is Open: The Evolution of Moral Supervenience. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 37 (3):353-372.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Richmond Campbell & Jennifer Woodrow (2003). Why Moore's Open Question is Open: The Evolution of Moral Supervenience. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 37 (3):353-372.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Timothy Chappell (2008). Moral Perception. Philosophy 83 (4):421-437.
    I develop an account of moral perception which is able to deal well with familiar naturalistic non-realist complaints about ontological extravagance and ‘queerness’. I show how this account can also ground a cogent response to familiar objections presented by Simon Blackburn (about supervenience) and J.L. Mackie (about motivation). The familiar realist's problem about relativism, however, remains.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Cristian Constantinescu (2014). Moral Vagueness: A Dilemma for Non-Naturalism. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 9. Oxford University Press. 152-185.
    In this paper I explore the implications of moral vagueness (viz., the vagueness of moral predicates) for non-naturalist metaethical theories like those recently championed by Shafer-Landau, Parfit, and others. I characterise non-naturalism in terms of its commitment to 7 theses: Cognitivism, Correspondence, Atomism, Objectivism, Supervenience, Non-reductivism, and Rationalism. I start by offering a number of reasons for thinking that moral predicates are vague in the same way in which ‘red’, ‘tall’, and ‘heap’ are said to be. I then argue that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Christian Coons (2011). How to Prove That Some Acts Are Wrong (Without Using Substantive Moral Premises). Philosophical Studies 155 (1):83–98.
    I first argue that there are many true claims of the form: x-ing would be morally required, if anything is. I then explain why the following conditional-type is true: If x-ing would be morally required, if anything is, then x-ing is actually morally required. These results allow us to construct valid proofs for the existence of some substantive moral facts—proofs that some particular acts really are morally required. Most importantly, none of my argumentation presupposes any substantive moral claim; I use (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Terence Cuneo (2006). Moral Facts as Configuring Causes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):141–162.
    The overarching aim of this essay is to argue that moral realists should be "causalists" or claim that moral facts of certain kinds are causally efficacious. To this end, I engage in two tasks. The first is to develop an account of the sense in which moral facts of certain kinds are causally efficacious. After having sketched the concept of what I call a "configuring" cause, I contend that the exercise of the moral virtues is plausibly viewed as a configuring (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Terence Cuneo & Russ Shafer-Landau (2014). The Moral Fixed Points: New Directions for Moral Nonnaturalism. Philosophical Studies 171 (3):399-443.
    Our project in this essay is to showcase nonnaturalistic moral realism’s resources for responding to metaphysical and epistemological objections by taking the view in some new directions. The central thesis we will argue for is that there is a battery of substantive moral propositions that are also nonnaturalistic conceptual truths. We call these propositions the moral fixed points. We will argue that they must find a place in any system of moral norms that applies to beings like us, in worlds (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Michael R. Depaul (1987). Supervenience and Moral Dependence. Philosophical Studies 51 (3):425 - 439.
    One aim philosophers have in constructing moral theories is to identify the natural or non-Moral characteristics that make actions right or obligatory, Things good, Or persons virtuous. Yet we have no clear understanding of what it is for certain of a thing's non-Moral properties to be responsible for its moral properties. Given the recent interest in the concept of supervenience one might think that the dependence of moral on natural properties could be explained in terms of it. Unfortunately, None of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Dalia Drai (2000). Moral Supervenience and Moral Thinking. Disputatio:1-13.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. John H. Dreher (2002). Can There Be Brute, Contingent Moral Facts. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):23 - 30.
    In this paper I argue that whether or not a world is good can be a contingent fact about the world that is not dependent upon that world's natural facts, or, indeed, upon anyother facts. If so, the property, good, does not supervene upon the facts of nature (or upon any other facts). My argument for this claimis that it is possible to view the very world in which we live (viz. the natural facts that constitute it) as good and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. James Dreier (1992). The Supervenience Argument Against Moral Realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):13-38.
    In 1971, Simon Blackburn worked out an argument against moral realism appealing to the supervenience of the moral realm on the natural realm.1 He has since revised the argument, in part to take account of objections,2 but the basic structure remains intact. While commentators3 seem to agree that the argument is not successful, they have not agreed upon what goes wrong. I believe this is because no attempt has been made to see what happens when Blackburn's argument is addressed to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Aaron Elliott (2014). Can Moral Principles Explain Supervenience? Res Philosophica 91 (4):629-659.
    The distribution of moral properties supervenes on the distribution of natural properties, and this provides a puzzle for non-naturalism: what could explain supervenience if moral properties are not natural properties? Enoch claims moral principles explain supervenience. But this solution is incomplete without an account of what moral principles and properties are, and what relation holds between them. This paper begins to develop such an account by exploring analogous issues for Realism about Laws of nature in philosophy of science. Appealing to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Peter Forrest (1988). Supervenience: The Grand-Property Hypothesis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (March):1-12.
    THE ARTICLE IS AN ATTACK ON THE MYSTERY OR REDUCTION DILEMMA FOR SUPERVENIENCE. THIS IS THE DILEMMA THAT EITHER SUPERVENIENCE IS MYSTERIOUS OR THE SUPERVENIENT IS REDUCIBLE TO THE SUBVENIENT. A NONMYSTERIOUS, NONREDUCTIVE ACCOUNT OF SUPERVENIENCE IS PROPOSED, BASED ON THE METAPHYSICAL SPECULATION THAT SUPERVENIENT TERMS AND PHRASES APPLY TO OBJECTS WHOSE INTRINSIC NATURES THEMSELVES HAVE AN APPROPRIATE PROPERTY. SINCE THIS IS A PROPERTY OF A NATURE IT IS A PROPERTY OF A PROPERTY, THAT IS, A GRAND-PROPERTY. SUPERVENIENCE FOLLOWS FROM (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Scott Forschler (2013). Two Dogmas of Kantian Ethics. Journal of Value Inquiry 47 (3):255-269.
    Two fundamental assumptions of Kant’s procedure for testing a maxim’s morality via the Formula of Universal Law are that a contradiction in will is 1) generated by the universal practice of immoral maxims, and 2) constituted by the impossibility of an agent’s therein satisfying certain ends. These features are the source of two types of false positive counter-examples, involving maxims where 1) the harmful effects of the maxims are non-linear and hence vanish when universalized, and 2) even the universal practice (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Scott Forschler (2012). From Supervenience to “Universal Law”: How Kantian Ethics Become Heteronomous. In Dietmar Heidemann (ed.), Kant and Contemporary Moral Philosophy. De Gruyter.
    In his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant’s desiderata for a supreme principle of practical reasoning and morality require that the subjective conditions under which some action is thought of as justified via some maxim be sufficient for judging the same action as justified by any agent in those conditions. This describes the kind of universalization conditions now known as moral supervenience. But when he specifies his “formula of universal law” (FUL) Kant replaces this condition with a quite different (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Gerald K. Harrison (2013). The Moral Supervenience Thesis is Not a Conceptual Truth. Analysis 73 (1):62-68.
    Virtually everyone takes the moral supervenience thesis to be a basic conceptual truth about morality. As a result, if a metaethical theory has difficulties respecting or adequately explaining the supervenience relationship it is deemed to be in big trouble. However, the moral supervenience thesis is a not a conceptual truth (though it may be true) and as such it is not a problem if a metaethical theory cannot respect or explain it.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Tim Henning (2011). Moral Realism and Two-Dimensional Semantics. Ethics 121 (4):717-748.
    Moral realists can, and should, allow that the truth-conditional content of moral judgments is in part attitudinal. I develop a two-dimensional semantics that embraces attitudinal content while preserving realist convictions about the independence of moral facts from our attitudes. Relative to worlds “considered as counterfactual,” moral terms rigidly track objective, response-independent properties. But relative to different ways the actual world turns out to be, they nonrigidly track whatever properties turn out to be the objects of our relevant attitudes. This theory (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Alison Hills (2009). Supervenience and Moral Realism. In Hieke Alexander & Leitgeb Hannes (eds.), Reduction, Abstraction, Analysis. Ontos Verlag. 11--163.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Terence E. Horgan (1993). From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World. Mind 102 (408):555-86.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons (1992). Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revived. Synthese 92 (2):221 - 260.
    J. L. Mackie argued that if there were objective moral properties or facts, then the supervenience relation linking the nonmoral to the moral would be metaphysically queer. Moral realists reply that objective supervenience relations are ubiquitous according to contemporary versions of metaphysical naturalism and, hence, that there is nothing especially queer about moral supervenience. In this paper we revive Mackie's challenge to moral realism. We argue: (i) that objective supervenience relations of any kind, moral or otherwise, should be explainable rather (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1996). Moral Functionalism, Supervenience and Reductionism. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):82-86.
    We respond to Mark van Roojen's discussion of our 'Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation', "Philosophical Quarterly", 45 (January, 1995): 20-40. There we assumed that ethical language makes claims about how things are and sought to make plausible under this assumption a view of moral language modelled on David Lewis's treatment of theoretical terms. Van Roojen finds the idea of treating ethical terms as theoretical terms attractive but doubts that we 'have succeeded in offering a reduction of evaluative properties to natural (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. James Klagge (1991). Rationalism, Supervenience, and Moral Epistemology. Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1):25-28.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. James C. Klagge (1987). Supervenience: Perspectives V. Possible Worlds. Philosophical Quarterly 37 (148):312-315.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. James C. Klagge (1984). An Alleged Difficulty Concerning Moral Properties. Mind 93 (371):370-380.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Matthew- H. Kramer (2005). Supervenience As an Ethical Phenomenon. American Journal of Jurisprudence 50 (1):173-224.
    All or virtually all moral philosophers agree that moral properties supervene on natural properties; that is, two actions or situations cannot differ in their moral properties unless there are differences in their natural properties that account for the moral difference between them. Virtually all moral philosophers also believe that supervenience is a conceptual or logical feature of moral discourse and judgments. While accepting that supervenience is a fundamental feature of morality, this essay contends that it is a basic substantive moral (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Brad Majors (2009). The Natural and the Normative. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:29-52.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. I. G. McFetridge (1985). Supervenience, Realism, Necessity. Philosophical Quarterly 35 (140):245-258.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Tristram McPherson (2012). Ethical Non-Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Supervenience. In Oxford Studies in Metaethics Vol 7. 205.
    It is widely accepted that the ethical supervenes on the natural, where this is roughly the claim that it is impossible for two circumstances to be identical in all natural respects, but different in their ethical respects. This chapter refines and defends the traditional thought that this fact poses a significant challenge to ethical non-naturalism, a view on which ethical properties are fundamentally different in kind from natural properties. The challenge can be encapsulated in three core claims which the chapter (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Tristram McPherson (2009). Unnatural Normativity? Critical Notice of Ralph Wedgwood's Nature of Normativity. [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 50 (2):63-82.
    Ralph Wedgwood’s The Nature of Normativity significantly advances our understanding of metaethical realism. After briefly reviewing the overall structure of Wedgwood’s argument for a Platonist realism about normativity, this critical notice focuses on three of the central metaphysical and epistemological claims that he defends. I first explain and raise difficulties for Wedgwood’s core claim that the intentional is normative. I then argue that his innovative attempt to finesse the supervenience problem that faces metaethical Platonists fails. Finally, I critically examine his (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Chris Meyers (2012). Expressivism, Constructivism, and the Supervenience of Moral Properties. Philosophical Explorations 15 (1):17-31.
    One of the most familiar arguments for expressivist metaethics is the claim that the rival theory, moral realism, cannot provide a satisfying explanation of why moral properties supervene on natural properties. Non-cognitivism, however, has its own problems explaining supervenience. Expressivists try to establish supervenience either by second-order disapproval of type-inconsistent moral evaluations or by pragmatic considerations. But disapproval of inconsistency is merely a contingent attitude that people happen to have; and pragmatic justification does not allow for appraisers to take their (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.) (2011). Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates. Cambridge University Press.
    Machine generated contents note: Introduction; 1. Naturalism in moral philosophy Gilbert Harman; 2. Normativity and reasons: five arguments from Parfit against normative naturalism David Copp; 3. Naturalism: feel the width Roger Crisp; 4. On ethical naturalism and the philosophy of language Frank Jackson; 5. Metaethical pluralism: how both moral naturalism and moral skepticism may be permissible positions Richard Joyce; 6. Moral naturalism and categorical reasons Terence Cuneo; 7. Does analytical moral naturalism rest on a mistake? Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay; (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Graham Oddie (1991). Supervenience, Goodness, and Higher-Order Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (1):20 – 47.
    Supervenience theses promise ontological economy without reducibility. The problem is that they face a dilemma: either the relation of supervenience entails reducibility or it is mysterious. Recently higher-order universals have been invoked to avoid the dilemma. This article develops a higher-order framework in which this claim can be assessed. It is shown that reducibility can be avoided, but only at the cost of a rather radical metaphysical proposal.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Alvin Plantinga (2010). Naturalism, Theism, Obligation and Supervenience. Faith and Philosophy 27 (3):247-272.
    Take naturalism to be the idea that there is no such person as God or anything like God. Many philosophers hold that naturalism can accommodate serious moral realism. Many philosophers (and many of the same philosophers) also believe that moral properties supervene on non-moral properties, and even on naturalistic properties (where a naturalistic property is one such that its exemplification is compatible with naturalism). I agree that they do thus supervene, and argue that this makes trouble for anyone hoping to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Michael Ridge (2007). Anti-Reductionism and Supervenience. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):330-348.
    In this paper, I argue that anti-reductionist moral realism still has trouble explaining supervenience. My main target here will be Russ Shafer-Landau's attempt to explain the supervenience of the moral on the natural in terms of the constitution of moral property instantiations by natural property instantiations. First, though, I discuss a recent challenge to the very idea of using supervenience as a dialectical weapon posed by Nicholas Sturgeon. With a suitably formulated supervenience thesis in hand, I try to show how (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2008). Love, Value and Supervenience. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (4):495-508.
    People are prone to ascribe value to persons they love. However, the relation between love and value is far from straightforward. This is particularly evident given certain views on the nature of love. Setting out from the idea that what causes us to have an attitude towards an object need not be found in the intentional content of the attitude, this paper depicts love as an attitude that takes non?fungible persons as intentional objects. Taking this view as a starting point, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Johannes Schmitt & Mark Schroeder (2011). Supervenience Arguments Under Relaxed Assumptions. Philosophical Studies 155 (1):133 - 160.
    When it comes to evaluating reductive hypotheses in metaphysics, supervenience arguments are the tools of the trade. Jaegwon Kim and Frank Jackson have argued, respectively, that strong and global supervenience are sufficient for reduction, and others have argued that supervenience theses stand in need of the kind of explanation that reductive hypotheses are particularly suited to provide. Simon Blackburn's arguments about what he claims are the specifically problematic features of the supervenience of the moral on the natural have also been (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.) (2010). Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press.
    The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.) (2006). Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 3. Oxford University Press.
    The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves ...
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Russ Shafer-Landau (2003/2005). Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford University Press.
    Moral Realism is a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. His central thesis, as well as the many novel supporting arguments used to defend it, will spark much controversy among those concerned with the foundations of ethics.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 74