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  1. Syed Danish Ali, Philosophical & Sociological Inquires in Material Aspects of the Human Life Namely Risk, Finance and Insurance.
    Given how much importance there is of economics and finance in our lives as humans (materialist side is foremost as per Marx), it should be given more importance by Philosophy and Sociology. This brief report is meant to highlight few research paradigms available in Philosophy and Sociology to give its proper social context and provide deep underlying of Risk, Insurance and Finance.
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  2. Stephen W. Ball (1990). Uncertainty in Moral Theory: An Epistemic Defense of Rule-Utilitarian Liberties. Theory and Decision 29 (2):133-160.
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  3. Christian Barry & Patrick Tomlin (forthcoming). Moral Uncertainty and Permissibility: Evaluating Option Sets. Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-26.
    In this essay, we explore an issue of moral uncertainty: what we are permitted to do when we are unsure about which moral principles are correct. We develop a novel approach to this issue that incorporates important insights from previous work on moral uncertainty, while avoiding some of the difficulties that beset existing alternative approaches. Our approach is based on evaluating and choosing between option sets rather than particular conduct options. We show how our approach is particularly well-suited to address (...)
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  4. William P. Cheshire (2004). A Response to Commentators on "Human Embryo Research and the Language of Moral Uncertainty". American Journal of Bioethics 4 (1):31-32.
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  5. William P. Cheshire (2004). Human Embryo Research and the Language of Moral Uncertainty. American Journal of Bioethics 4 (1):1 – 5.
    In bioethics as in the sciences, enormous discussions often concern the very small. Central to public debate over emerging reproductive and regenerative biotechnologies is the question of the moral status of the human embryo. Because news media have played a prominent role in framing the vocabulary of the debate, this study surveyed the use of language reporting on human embryo research in news articles spanning a two-year period. Terminology that devalued moral status - for example, the descriptors things, property, tissue, (...)
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  6. Alison Denham (2014). Tragedy Without the Gods: Autonomy, Necessity and the Real Self. British Journal of Aesthetics 54 (2):141-159.
    The classical tragedies relate conflicts, choices and dilemmas that have meaningful parallels in our own experience. Many of the normative dimensions of tragedy, however, rely critically on the causal and motivational efficacy of divine forces. In particular, these narratives present supernatural interventions invading their characters’ practical deliberations and undermining their claims to autonomous agency. Does this dynamic find any analogy in a contemporary, secular conception of moral agency? It does, but it is an analogy that challenges certain standard philosophical accounts (...)
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  7. David Enoch, Moral Deference.
    Everyone agrees, I think, that there is something fishy about moral deference and expertise, but that's where consensus ends. This paper has two aims – the first is to mount a defense of moral deference, and the second is to offer a (non-debunking) diagnosis of its fishiness. I defend moral deference by connecting the discussion of moral deference to the recent discussion of the appropriate response to uncertainty. It is, I argue, morally obligatory to minimize the risk of one's wrongdoing (...)
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  8. John Eriksson & Ragnar Francén Olinder (forthcoming). Non-Cognitivism and the Classification Account of Moral Uncertainty. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    ABSTRACTIt has been objected to moral non-cognitivism that it cannot account for fundamental moral uncertainty. A person is derivatively uncertain about whether an act is, say, morally wrong, when her certainty is at bottom due to uncertainty about whether the act has certain non-moral, descriptive, properties, which she takes to be wrong-making. She is fundamentally morally uncertain when her uncertainty directly concerns whether the properties of the act are wrong-making. In this paper we advance a new reply to the objection (...)
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  9. Edward J. Gracely (1996). On the Noncomparability of Judgments Made by Different Ethical Theories. Metaphilosophy 27 (3):327-332.
    A major focus of ethical argumentation is determining the relative merits of proposed ethical systems. Nevertheless, even the demonstration that a given ethical system was the one most likely to be correct would not establish that an agent should act in accord with that system. Consider, for example, a situation in which the ethical system most likely to be valid is modestly supportive of a certain action, whereas a less plausible system strongly condemns the same action. Should the agent perform (...)
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  10. Frederick Grinnell (2004). Human Embryo Research: From Moral Uncertainty to Death. American Journal of Bioethics 4 (1):12 – 13.
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  11. Alexander A. Guerrero (2007). Don't Know, Don't Kill: Moral Ignorance, Culpability, and Caution. Philosophical Studies 136 (1):59-97.
    This paper takes on several distinct but related tasks. First, I present and discuss what I will call the “Ignorance Thesis,” which states that whenever an agent acts from ignorance, whether factual or moral, she is culpable for the act only if she is culpable for the ignorance from which she acts. Second, I offer a counterexample to the Ignorance Thesis, an example that applies most directly to the part I call the “Moral Ignorance Thesis.” Third, I argue for a (...)
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  12. Johan E. Gustafsson & Olle Torpman (2014). In Defence of My Favourite Theory. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (2):159–174.
    One of the principles on how to act under moral uncertainty, My Favourite Theory, says roughly that a morally conscientious agent chooses an option that is permitted by the most credible moral theory. In defence of this principle, we argue that it prescribes consistent choices over time, without relying on intertheoretic comparisons of value, while its main rivals are either plagued by moral analogues of money pumps or in need of a method for making non-arbitrary intertheoretic comparisons. We rebut the (...)
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  13. Oswald Hanfling (2008). Moral Knowledge and Moral Uncertainty. Philosophical Investigations 31 (2):105–123.
    Applying a broadly Wittgensteinian view of knowledge and its relation to the conditions in which the word “know” is ordinarily used, the paper defends the claim that there can be knowledge in moral matters and rejects the idea that a cross‐culturally homogeneous moral language is a necessary condition for this. However, the fact that moral knowledge is available sometimes does not imply that it is available always. Taking issue in particular with Ronald Dworkin, the paper also argues that where moral (...)
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  14. James L. Hudson (1989). Subjectivization in Ethics. American Philosophical Quarterly 26 (3):221 - 229.
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  15. Benjamin Kiesewetter (forthcoming). You Ought to Φ Only If You May Believe That You Ought to Φ. Philosophical Quarterly.
    In this paper I present an argument for the claim that you ought to do something only if you may believe that you ought to do it. More exactly, I defend the following principle about normative reasons: An agent A has decisive reason to φ only if she also has sufficient reason to believe that she has decisive reason to φ. I argue that this principle follows from the plausible assumption that it must be possible for an agent to respond (...)
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  16. Justin Lawson, Quantum Mechanics and Ethical Antirealism: A Counter-Analogy to Boyd.
    In his paper How to Be a Moral Realist Boyd attempts to show how cases of ethical indeterminacy can be accounted for from an ethical realist’s standpoint. Boyd describes cases of extensional vagueness in the life-sciences which arise from knowable and definite underlying structures and draws an analogy to ethics to argue his case. This paper argues that an equally compelling analogy can be drawn between another type of scientific indeterminacy – that in quantum mechanics – and the related ethical (...)
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  17. Ted Lockhart (2000). Moral Uncertainty and its Consequences. Oxford University Press.
    We are often uncertain how to behave morally in complex situations. In this controversial study, Ted Lockhart contends that moral philosophy has failed to address how we make such moral decisions. Adapting decision theory to the task of decision-making under moral uncertainly, he proposes that we should not always act how we feel we ought to act, and that sometimes we should act against what we feel to be morally right. Lockhart also discusses abortion extensively and proposes new ways to (...)
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  18. Ted Lockhart (1992). Professions, Confidentiality, and Moral Uncertainty. Professional Ethics 1 (3/4):33-52.
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  19. Laurence B. McCullough (1995). Preventive Ethics, Professional Integrity, and Boundary Setting: The Clinical Management of Moral Uncertainty. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 20 (1):1-11.
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  20. D. Moller (2011). Abortion and Moral Risk. Philosophy 86 (3):425-443.
    It is natural for those with permissive attitudes toward abortion to suppose that, if they have examined all of the arguments they know against abortion and have concluded that they fail, their moral deliberations are at an end. Surprisingly, this is not the case, as I argue. This is because the mere risk that one of those arguments succeeds can generate a moral reason that counts against the act. If this is so, then liberals may be mistaken about the morality (...)
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  21. Dan Moller, Moral Risk.
    It is natural for those with permissive attitudes toward abortion to suppose that, if they have examined all of the arguments they know against abortion and have concluded that they fail, their moral deliberations are at an end. Surprisingly, this is not the case, as I argue. This is because the mere risk that one of those arguments succeeds can generate a moral reason that counts against the act. If this is so, then liberals may be mistaken about the morality (...)
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  22. Dan Moller (2009). Book Reviews:Living with Uncertainty: The Moral Significance of Ignorance. [REVIEW] Ethics 119 (3):606-611.
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  23. Daniel Nica (2013). Narrative and Justification in Moral Particularism. Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy (2):22-32.
    In this paper I will discuss the problem of justification in moral particularism. The first part is concerned with Jonathan Dancy’s account of justification, which is a narrative one. To justify one’s choice is to present a persuasive description of the context in a narrative fashion, not to subordinate singular cases to universal rules. Since it dismisses arguments and employs persuasiveness, this view seems irrational, so the second part of my paper will consist of a personal reconstruction and reformulation of (...)
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  24. Ittay Nissan-Rozen (2015). Against Moral Hedging. Economics and Philosophy (3):1-21.
    It has been argued by several philosophers that a morally motivated rational agent who has to make decisions under conditions of moral uncertainty ought to maximize expected moral value in his choices, where the expectation is calculated relative to the agent's moral uncertainty. I present a counter-example to this thesis and to a larger family of decision rules for choice under conditions of moral uncertainty. Based on this counter-example, I argue against the thesis and suggest a reason for its failure (...)
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  25. Ittay Nissan-Rozen (2015). A Triviality Result for the “Desire by Necessity” Thesis. Synthese 192 (8):2535-2556.
    A triviality result for what Lewis called “the Desire by Necessity Thesis” and Broome : 265–267, 1991) called “the Desire as Expectation Thesis” is presented. The result shows that this thesis and three other reasonable conditions can be jointly satisfied only in trivial cases. Some meta-ethical implications of the result are discussed. The discussion also highlights several issues regarding Lewis ’ original triviality result for “the Desire as Belief Thesis” that have not been properly understood in the literature.
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  26. Ittay Nissan-Rozen (2012). Doing the Best One Can: A New Justification for the Use of Lotteries. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 5 (1):45-72.
    : In some cases in which rational and moral agents experience moral uncertainty, they are unable to assign exact degrees of moral value—in a non-arbitrary way—to some of the different acts available to them, and so are unable to choose with certainty the best act. This article presents a new justification for the use of lotteries in this kind of situation. It is argued that sometimes the only rational thing for a morally motivated agent to do here is to use (...)
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  27. Ittay Nissan-Rozen, Can an Irrational Agent Reason Himself to Rationality? Working Papers- The Choice Group.
    When an agent that accepts transitivity of preferences as a principle of rationality finds himself expressing intransitive preferences, he has to change some of his expressed preferences so that transitivity will be restored. When such an agent also believes in the existence of some independent betterness relation among the alternatives over which he forms his preferences, it is reasonable to demand that the way he changes his intransitive expressed preferences will be sensitive to his beliefs regarding this betterness relation. It (...)
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  28. John Pittard & Alex Worsnip (forthcoming). Metanormative Contextualism and Normative Uncertainty. Mind.
    We offer a new argument in favor of metanormative contextualism, the thesis that the semantic value of a normative ‘ought’ claim of the form ‘S ought to Φ’ depends on the value of one or more parameters whose values vary in a way that is determined by the context of utterance. The debate over this contextualist thesis has centered on cases that involve ‘ought’ claims made in the face of uncertainty regarding certain descriptive facts. Contextualists, relativists, and invariantists all have (...)
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  29. Douglas W. Portmore (forthcoming). Uncertainty, Indeterminacy, and Agent-Centered Constraints. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-15.
    Commonsense morality includes various agent-centered constraints, including ones against killing unnecessarily, breaking a promise, and punishing the innocent. However, it’s not always clear whether, had an agent φ-ed, she would have violated a constraint. And sometimes the reason for this is not that we lack knowledge of the relevant facts, but that there is no fact about whether her φ-ing would have constituted a constraint-violation. What, then, is a constraint-accepting theory (i.e., a theory that accepts that there are such constraints) (...)
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  30. Douglas W. Portmore (2015). Zimmerman, Michael J..Ignorance and Moral Obligation.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. Ix+149. $55.00. Ethics 125 (4):1236-1241.
    Review of Michael J. Zimmerman's Ignorance and Moral Obligation.
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  31. Linda Radzik (2009). Living with Uncertainty: The Moral Significance of Ignorance * By MICHAEL J. ZIMMERMAN. [REVIEW] Analysis 69 (4):785-787.
    Michael J. Zimmerman offers a conceptual analysis of the moral ‘ought’ that focuses on moral decision-making under uncertainty. His central case, originally presented by Frank Jackson, concerns a doctor who must choose among three treatments for a minor ailment. Her evidence suggests that drug B will partially cure her patient, that one of either drug A or C would cure him completely, but that the other drug would kill him. Accepting the intuition that the doctor ought to choose drug B, (...)
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  32. Peter Railton (2008). Coping with Moral Uncertainty. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):794-801.
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  33. Jacob Ross (2006). Rejecting Ethical Deflationism. Ethics 116 (4):742-768.
    One of the perennial challenges of ethical theory has been to provide an answer to a number of views that appear to undermine the importance of ethical questions. We may refer to such views collectively as “deflationary ethical theories.” These include theories, such as nihilism, according to which no action is better than any other, as well as relativistic theories according to which no ethical theory is better than any other. In this article I present a new response to such (...)
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  34. Andrew Sepielli (forthcoming). Moral Uncertainty and Fetishistic Motivation. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    Sometimes it’s not certain which of several mutually exclusive moral views is correct. Like almost everyone, I think that there’s some sense in which what one should do depends on which of these theories is correct, plus the way the world is non-morally. But I also think there’s an important sense in which what one should do depends upon the probabilities of each of these views being correct. Call this second claim “moral uncertaintism”. In this paper, I want to address (...)
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  35. Andrew Sepielli (forthcoming). Subjective and Objective Reasons. In Daniel Star (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford
  36. Andrew Sepielli (2014). Should You Look Before You Leap? The Philosophers' Magazine 66:89-93.
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  37. Andrew Sepielli (2013). What to Do When You Don't Know What to Do When You Don't Know What to Do…. Noûs 47 (1):521-544.
  38. Andrew Sepielli (2013). Moral Uncertainty and the Principle of Equity Among Moral Theories1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):580-589.
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  39. Andrew Sepielli (2012). Normative Uncertainty for Non-Cognitivists. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):191-207.
    Normative judgments involve two gradable features. First, the judgments themselves can come in degrees; second, the strength of reasons represented in the judgments can come in degrees. Michael Smith has argued that non-cognitivism cannot accommodate both of these gradable dimensions. The degrees of a non-cognitive state can stand in for degrees of judgment, or degrees of reason strength represented in judgment, but not both. I argue that (a) there are brands of noncognitivism that can surmount Smith’s challenge, and (b) any (...)
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  40. Andrew Sepielli (2012). Subjective Normativity and Action Guidance. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol. II. Oxford University Press
  41. Andrew Sepielli (2009). What to Do When You Don't Know What to Do. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:5-28.
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  42. Andrew Sepielli (2006). Ted Lockhart, Moral Uncertainty and Its Consequences:Moral Uncertainty and Its Consequences. Ethics 116 (3):601-604.
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  43. Andrew Christopher Sepielli, 'Along an Imperfectly-Lighted Path': Practical Rationality and Normative Uncertainty.
    Nobody's going to object to the advice "Do the right thing", but that doesn't mean everyone's always going to follow it. Sometimes this is because of our volitional limitations; we cannot always bring ourselves to make the sacrifices that right action requires. But sometimes this is because of our cognitive limitations; we cannot always be sure of what is right. Sometimes we can't be sure of what's right because we don't know the non-normative facts. But sometimes, even if we were (...)
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  44. Michael Smith & Frank Jackson (2006). Absolutist Moral Theories and Uncertainty. Journal of Philosophy 103 (6):267-283.
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  45. Daniel Star (forthcoming). Précis of Knowing Better. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
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  46. Kevin Timpe (2009). Review of Michael Zimmerman, Living with Uncertainty: The Moral Significance of Ignorance. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (9).
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  47. Howard Trachtman (2004). Full Court Press: A Response to "Human Embryo Research and the Language of Moral Uncertainty" by William P. Cheshire. American Journal of Bioethics 4 (1):33-34.
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  48. Brian Weatherson (2002). Review: Moral Uncertainty and its Consequences. [REVIEW] Mind 111 (443):693-696.
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  49. Michael J. Zimmerman (2008). Living with Uncertainty: The Moral Significance of Ignorance. Cambridge University Press.
    Every choice we make is set against a background of massive ignorance about our past, our future, our circumstances, and ourselves. Philosophers are divided on the moral significance of such ignorance. Some say that it has a direct impact on how we ought to behave - the question of what our moral obligations are; others deny this, claiming that it only affects how we ought to be judged in light of the behaviour in which we choose to engage - the (...)
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  50. Tomasz Żuradzki (2016). Meta-Reasoning in Making Moral Decisions Under Normative Uncertainty. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński (eds.), Argumentation and Reasoned Action. College Publications 1093-1104.
    I analyze recent discussions about making moral decisions under normative uncertainty. I discuss whether this kind of uncertainty should have practical consequences for decisions and whether there are reliable methods of reasoning that deal with the possibility that we are wrong about some moral issues. I defend a limited use of the decision theory model of reasoning in cases of normative uncertainty.
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