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Moral Value

Edited by Francesco Orsi (University of Tartu)
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Subcategories:History/traditions: Moral Value
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  1. Robert Audi (2003). Intrinsic Value, Inherent Value, and Experience: A Reply to Stephen Barker Robert Audi. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):323-327.
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  2. Stephen Barker (2003). Comments: The Experiential Thesis: Audi on Intrinsic Value. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (Supplement):57-61.
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  3. Panayot Butchvarov (2003). Saying and Showing the Good. In Heather Dyke (ed.), Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. Kluwer Academic Publishers 137--158.
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  4. Antoine C. Dussault (2014). Attitudes, valeurs et environnement : Introduction. Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 9 (2):50-56.
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  5. R. M. Chisholm (2005). Organic Unities. In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer 305--318.
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  6. Richard Garrett (1979). Value Conflict in a Skinnerian Analysis. Behaviorism 7 (1):9-16.
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  7. John-Stewart Gordon (2008). Hedonistic Utilitarianism and the Argument of the Experience Machine. Conjectura: Filosofia E Educação 13 (1):25-36.
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  8. Chris Kelly (2014). Value Monism, Richness, And Environmental Ethics. Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 9 (2):110-129.
    The intuitions at the core of environmental ethics and of other neglected value realms put pressure on traditional anthropocentric ethics based on monistic value theories. Such pressure is so severe that it has led many to give up on the idea of monistic value theories altogether. I argue that value monism is still preferable to value pluralism and that, indeed, these new challenges are opportunities to vastly improve impoverished traditional theories. I suggest an alternative monistic theory, Richness Theory, and show (...)
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  9. Henry E. Kyburg (1962). Reviewed Work: Prediction and Optimal Decision: Philosophical Issues of a Science of Values by C. West Churchman. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 59 (20):549-554.
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  10. Sean Mckeever & Michael Ridge (2013). Organic Unities. In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking About Reasons: Themes From the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press 265.
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  11. Richard Oxenberg, Love and Death in the First Epistle of John: A Phenomenological Reflection.
    “Whoever does not love abides in death,” writes John in his first epistle (1Jn 3:10). The statement, on the face of it, presents us with a paradox. Death, so we suppose, is precisely that in which one cannot abide. To ‘abide’ is to live in, to make one’s home in. Our first thought is to interpret this as metaphor. John is saying that a life devoid of love is a life somehow like death. And yet a moment’s reflection reveals that (...)
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  12. Pete Porter (2014). The True Rescuers: Big Miracle, Dolphin Tale, and Buck. Society and Animals 22 (2):211-217.
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  13. Timothy Bruce Snow (1992). Subjectivity and Objectivity in Theories of Well-Being. Dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago
    My dissertation primarily concerns two theories of well-being: hedonism and the desire theory. These two theories are commonly classified as subjective, and thus it is usually assumed that any argument against subjectivity in general, is an argument against both theories. However, I argue that hedonism can be considered to be an objective theory, and that a version of objective hedonism can avoid the problems plaguing subjective theories. ;Subjective theories of well-being claim that well-being should be defined in terms of a (...)
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  14. E. A. Sonnenschein (1905). Hale and Buck's Latin Grammar A Latin Grammar. By W. G. Hale and C. D. Buck. Ginn and Co., Boston, U.S.A., and London. Pp. Xi + 388. 1903. 4s. 6d. [REVIEW] The Classical Review 19 (01):66-69.
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  15. Naly Thaler (2009). Using ʻthe Goodʼ as a Criterion: Comments on Krautʼs What is Good and Why. Iyyun 58:245-250.
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Theories of Moral Value
  1. Metaethics After Moore (2008). The Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. Utilitas 20 (4).
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  2. S. Ahmed (1999). `She'll Wake Up One of These Days and Find She's Turned Into a Nigger': Passing Through Hybridity. Theory, Culture and Society 16 (2):87-106.
    In this article, I examine racial narratives of passing and their relationship to discourses of hybridity. Rather than defining passing as inherently transgressive, or as one side of identity politics or the other, I suggest that passing must be understood in relationship to forms of social antagonism. I ask the following questions: how are differences that threaten the system recuperated? How do ambiguous or hybrid bodies get read in a way which further supports the enunciative power of those who are (...)
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  3. Andrew Altman (2003). Review of Joseph Raz's Value, Respect and Attachment. Utilitas 15 (3):376-378.
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  4. Gregory J. Anderson (1999). A Fitting 50th Celebration. BioScience 49 (12):943-943.
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  5. Charles M. Bakewell (1904). Professor Strong on the Passing Thought. Philosophical Review 13 (5):552-559.
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  6. Matt Bedke (2011). Passing the Deontic Buck. Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 6 6:128.
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  7. Kathleen Boscawen (1916). The Passing on of Life.
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  8. Borden Parker Bowne (1923). The Passing of Educational Fiatism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 4 (2):77.
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  9. W. J. Brown (1903). The Passing of Conviction. Hibbert Journal 2:553.
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  10. Brenda Brueggemann (2006). Interlude 1: On (Almost) Passing. In Lennard J. Davis (ed.), The Disability Studies Reader. Psychology Press 321--330.
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  11. K. Bykvist (2009). No Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value Fails. Mind 118 (469):1-30.
    Understanding value in terms of fitting attitudes is all the rage these days. According to this fitting attitude analysis of value (FA-analysis for short) what is good is what it is fitting to favour in some sense. Many aspects of the FA-analysis have been discussed. In particular, a lot of discussion has been concerned with the wrong-reason objection: it can be fitting to have an attitude towards something for reasons that have nothing to do with the value the thing has (...)
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  12. Roger Crisp (1992). Thomas Baldwin, G. E. Moore, London, Routledge, 1990, Pp. 337. Utilitas 4 (01):169-.
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  13. Jonathan Dancy (2005). Should We Pass the Buck? In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer 33--44.
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  14. Julia Driver (2011). Roger Crisp, Reasons and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), Pp. 178. Utilitas 23 (2):235-237.
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  15. Guy Fletcher (2013). A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being. Utilitas 25 (2):206-220.
    So-called theories of well-being (prudential value, welfare) are under-represented in discussions of well-being. I do four things in this article to redress this. First, I develop a new taxonomy of theories of well-being, one that divides theories in a more subtle and illuminating way. Second, I use this taxonomy to undermine some misconceptions that have made people reluctant to hold objective-list theories. Third, I provide a new objective-list theory and show that it captures a powerful motivation for the main competitor (...)
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  16. Tom Flynn (2003). No Passing. Free Inquiry 23.
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  17. William Leighton Grane (1912). The Passing of War.
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  18. Adolf Grünbaum (1963). Comments on Professor Roger Buck's Paper "Reflexive Predictions.". Philosophy of Science 30 (4):370-372.
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  19. Pamela Hieronymi, Research Overview.
    In this document I survey my work to date (i.e., to September 2010) and connect it to the larger themes that have been animating it.
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  20. Joyce L. Jenkins (2011). Dead and Gone. Utilitas 23 (2):228-234.
    I argue that desire satisfaction theories of welfare are not committed to the view that changes in welfare levels can happen after death, or that events that occur after death impact the agent's welfare levels now. My argument is that events that occur after death have only epistemological import. They may reveal that the person was successful (unsuccessful) in life, but the desire was already frustrated or satisfied before the person died. The virtue of the account is that it gives (...)
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  21. Jens Johansson & Karl Ekendahl (2013). Dead and Gone? Reply to Jenkins. Utilitas 26 (2):1-3.
    In a recent article, Joyce L. Jenkins challenges the common belief that desire satisfactionists are committed to the view that a person's welfare can be affected by posthumous events. Jenkins argues that desire satisfactionists can and should say that posthumous events only play an epistemic role: though such events cannot harm me, they can reveal that I have already been harmed by something else. In this response, however, we show that Jenkins's approach collapses into the view she aims to avoid.
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  22. Mark Johnson (2014). Morality for Humans: Ethical Understanding From the Perspective of Cognitive Science. University of Chicago Press.
    What is the difference between right and wrong? This is no easy question to answer, yet we constantly try to make it so, frequently appealing to some hidden cache of cut-and-dried absolutes, whether drawn from God, universal reason, or societal authority. Combining cognitive science with a pragmatist philosophical framework in Morality for Humans: Ethical Understanding from the Perspective of Cognitive Science, Mark Johnson argues that appealing solely to absolute principles and values is not only scientifically unsound but even morally suspect. (...)
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  23. David McNaughton & Piers Rawling (2003). Can Scanlon Avoid Redundancy by Passing the Buck? Analysis 63 (4):328–331.
    Scanlon suggests a buck-passing account of goodness. To say that something is good is not to give a reason to, say, favour it; rather it is to say that there are such reasons. When it comes to wrongness, however, Scanlon rejects a buck-passing account: to say that j ing is wrong is, on his view, to give a sufficient moral reason not to j. Philip Stratton-Lake 2003 argues that Scanlon can evade a redundancy objection against his (Scanlon’s) view of wrongness (...)
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  24. In J. Myung & Mark A. Pitt (2003). Model Fitting. In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group
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  25. Péter Nádas (2005). The Citizen of the World and the Buck Goat. Common Knowledge 11 (1):8-17.
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  26. Jonas Olson (2013). Buck‐Passing Accounts. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell
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  27. Philip Pettit (2012). A Question for Tomorrow: The Robust Demands of the Good. Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 7 (3):7-12.
  28. Engaging Reason (2006). Darwall on Rational Care. Utilitas 18 (4).
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  29. Kathryn Rummell (2007). Rewriting the Passing Novel: Danzy Senna's< Em> Caucasia. The Griot 26 (2).
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  30. Dave Salerno (2005). Versatile Buck-Boost Converter Offers High Efficiency in a Wide Variety of Applications. In Alan F. Blackwell & David MacKay (eds.), Power. Cambridge University Press 10--1.
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  31. Lars Samuelsson (2013). The Right Version of 'the Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem'. Utilitas 25 (3):383-404.
    In a recent article in Utilitas, Gerald Lang suggests a solution to the so-called (WKR problem) for the buck-passing account of value. In two separate replies to Lang, Jonas Olson and John Brunero, respectively, point out serious problems with Lang's suggestion, and at least Olson concludes that the solution Lang opts for is of the wrong kind for solving the WKR problem. I argue that while both Olson and Brunero have indeed identified considerable flaws in Lang's suggestion for a solution (...)
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  32. Minot Judson Savage (1901). The Passing and the Permanent in Religion.
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  33. Fritz Senn (forthcoming). " In the Original": Buck Mulligan and Stephen Dedalus. Arion.
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  34. Yonatan Shemmer (2011). Full Information, Well-Being, and Reasonable Desires. Utilitas 23 (2):206-227.
    According to Railton: x is good for me iff my Fully Informed Self (FIS) while contemplating my situation would want me to want x. I offer four interpretations of this view. The first three are inadequate. Their inadequacy rests on the following two facts: (a) my FIS cannot want me to want what would be irrational for me to want, (b) when contemplating what is rational for me to want we must specify a particular way in which I could rationally (...)
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  35. Michael Smith (2013). The Ideal of Orthonomous Action, or the How and Why of Buck-Passing. In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking About Reasons: Themes From the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press 50.
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