Bookmark and Share

Morality of Procreation

Edited by Ruchika Mishra (Program in Medicine and Human Values, California Pacific Medical Center)
Related categories
Siblings:
90 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 90
  1. Stuart Rachels - (1999). Review Essay of Contingent Future Persons, Jan C. Heller and Nick Fotion, Eds. [REVIEW] Bioethics 13:160-167.
    This essay critically comments on Contingent Future Persons (1997), an anthology of thirteen papers on the same topic as Obligations to Future Generations (1978), namely, the morality of decisions affecting the existence, number and identity of future persons. In my discussion, I identify the basic point of dispute between R. M. Hare and Michael Lockwood on potentiality; I criticize Nick Fotion's thesis that the Repugnant Conclusion is too far-fetched to be philosophically valuable; I object to Clark Wolf's "Impure Consequentialist Theory (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Leslie Allan, Contraception and Abortion: A Utilitarian View.
    Conservative and liberal approaches to the problem of abortion are oversimplified and deeply flawed. Accepting that the moral status of the conceptus changes during gestation, the author advances a more nuanced perspective. Through applying a form of rules in practice utilitarianism within the context of overall population policy, he provides a compelling ethical and legal framework for regulating contraception and abortion practices.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Judith Andre, Leonard M. Fleck & Thomas Tomlinson (2000). On Being Genetically "Irresponsible". Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 10 (2):129-146.
    : New genetic technologies continue to emerge that allow us to control the genetic endowment of future children. Increasingly the claim is made that it is morally "irresponsible" for parents to fail to use such technologies when they know their possible children are at risk for a serious genetic disorder. We believe such charges are often unwarranted. Our goal in this article is to offer a careful conceptual analysis of the language of irresponsibility in an effort to encourage more care (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4. Jonny Anomaly (2014). Public Goods and Procreation. Monash Bioethics Review 32:172-188.
    Procreation is the ultimate public goods problem. Each new child affects the welfare of many other people, and some (but not all) children produce uncompensated value that future people will enjoy. This essay addresses challenges that arise if we think of procreation and parenting as public goods. These include whether private choices are likely to lead to a socially desirable outcome over the long run, and whether changes in laws, social norms, or access to genetic engineering and embryo selection might (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Adrienne Asch & David Wasserman (2010). 'Healthy' Human Embryos and Reproduction Making Embryos Healthy or Making Healthy Embryos: How Much of a Difference Between Prenatal Treatment and Selection? In The 'Healthy' Embryo: Social, Biomedical, Legal and Philosophical Perspectives. 201-18.
  6. R. Barcaro (1996). M. Mori, La fecondazione artificiale. Una nuova forma di riproduzione umana. [REVIEW] Epistemologia 19 (2):347-348.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Elizabeth Barnes (2014). Valuing Disability, Causing Disability. Ethics 125 (1):88-113.
    Disability rights activists often claim that disability is not—by itself—something that makes disabled people worse off. A popular objection to such a view of disability is this: were it correct, it would make it permissible to cause disability and impermissible to cause nondisability. The aim of this article is to show that these twin objections don’t succeed.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  8. Andrew Botterell & Carolyn McLeod, Can a Right to Reproduce Justify the Status Quo on Parental Licensing?
    The status quo on parental licensing in most Western jurisdictions is that licensing is required in the case of adoption but not in the case of assisted or unassisted biological reproduction. To have a child via adoption, one must fulfill licensing requirements, which, beyond the usual home study, can include mandatory participation in parenting classes. One is exempt from these requirements, however, if one has a child via biological reproduction, including assisted reproduction involving donor gametes or a contract pregnancy. In (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Ben Bradley (2013). Asymmetries in Benefiting, Harming and Creating. Journal of Ethics 17 (1-2):37-49.
    It is often said that while we have a strong reason not to create someone who will be badly off, we have no strong reason for creating someone who will be well off. In this paper I argue that this asymmetry is incompatible with a plausible principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives, and that a more general asymmetry between harming and benefiting is difficult to defend. I then argue that, contrary to what many have claimed, it is possible to harm (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  10. Sylvia Burrow (2012). On The Cutting Edge: Ethical Responsiveness to Cesarean Section Rates. American Journal of Bioethics 12 (7):44-52.
    Cesarean delivery rates have been steadily increasing worldwide. In response, many countries have introduced target goals to reduce rates. But a focus on target goals fails to address practices embedded in standards of care that encourage, rather than discourage, cesarean sections. Obstetrical standards of care normalize use of technology, creating an imperative to use technology during labor and birth. A technological imperative is implicated in rising cesarean rates if physicians or patients fear refusing use of technology. Reproductive autonomy is at (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  11. Stephen M. Campbell (2007). Hare on Possible People. Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (4):408–424.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Michael Cholbi (forthcoming). The Compensatory Basis of Procreative Parental Rights. In Michael Cholbi & Jaime Ahlberg (eds.), Procreation, Parenthood, and Educational Rights Ethical and Philosophical Issues. Routledge
    Philosophical defenses of parents’ rights typically appeal to the interests of parents, the interests of children, or some combination of these. Here I propose that at least in the case of biological, non-adoptive parents, these rights have a different normative basis: namely, these rights should be accorded to biological parents because of the compensatory duties such parents owe their children by virtue of having brought them into existence. Inspried by Seana Shiffrin, I argue that procreation inevitably encumbers the wills of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Michael Cholbi & Jaime Ahlberg (eds.) (2016). Procreation, Parenthood, and Educational Rights: Ethical and Philosophical Issues. Routledge.
    _Procreation, Parenthood, and Educational Rights_ explores important issues at the nexus of two burgeoning areas within moral and social philosophy: procreative ethics and parental rights. Surprisingly, there has been comparatively little scholarly engagement across these subdisciplinary boundaries, despite the fact that parental rights are paradigmatically ascribed to individuals responsible for procreating particular children. This collection thus aims to bring expert practitioners from these literatures into fruitful and innovative dialogue around questions at the intersection of procreation and parenthood. Among these questions (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Jan Deckers (2010). The Right to Life and Abortion Legislation in England and Wales: A Proposal for Change. Diametros 26:1-22.
    In England and Wales, there is significant controversy on the law related to abortion. Recent discussions have focussed predominantly on the health professional's right to conscientious objection. This article argues for a comprehensive overhaul of the law from the perspective of an author who adopts the view that all unborn human beings should be granted the prima facie right to life. It is argued that, should the law be modified in accordance with this stance, it need not imply that health (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Ezio Di Nucci (2014). Fathers and Abortion. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 39 (4):444-458.
    I argue that it is possible for prospective mothers to wrong prospective fathers by bearing their child; and that lifting paternal liability for child support does not correct the wrong inflicted to fathers. It is therefore sometimes wrong for prospective mothers to bear a child, or so I argue here. I show that my argument for considering the legitimate interests of prospective fathers is not a unique exception to an obvious right to procreate. It is, rather, part of a growing (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16. Ezio Di Nucci (2013). Killing Fetuses and Killing Newborns. Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (5):19-20.
    The argument for the moral permissibility of killing newborns is a challenge to liberal positions on abortion because it can be considered a reductio of their defence of abortion. Here I defend the liberal stance on abortion by arguing that the argument for the moral permissibility of killing newborns on ground of the social, psychological and economic burden on the parents recently put forward by Giubilini and Minerva is not valid; this is because they fail to show that newborns cannot (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Brian D. Earp, Anders Sandberg & Julian Savulescu (2012). Natural Selection, Childrearing, and the Ethics of Marriage (and Divorce): Building a Case for the Neuroenhancement of Human Relationships. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Technology 25 (4):561-587.
    We argue that the fragility of contemporary marriages—and the corresponding high rates of divorce—can be explained (in large part) by a three-part mismatch: between our relationship values, our evolved psychobiological natures, and our modern social, physical, and technological environment. “Love drugs” could help address this mismatch by boosting our psychobiologies while keeping our values and our environment intact. While individual couples should be free to use pharmacological interventions to sustain and improve their romantic connection, we suggest that they may have (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  18. Luara Ferracioli (forthcoming). Why the Family? Law, Ethics and Philosophy.
    Among the most pressing philosophical questions occupying those interested in the ethics of the family is why should parents, as opposed to charity workers or state officials, raise children. In their recent Family Values, Brighouse and Swift have further articulated and strengthen their own justification of the parent-child relationship by appealing to its crucial role in enabling the child’s proper development and in allowing parents to play a valuable fiduciary role in the lives of children. In this paper, I argue (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Luara Ferracioli (2014). On the Value of Intimacy in Procreation. Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (3):349-369.
    She’ll get paid…we don’t need to see her. As long asshe’s healthy and delivers my babies healthily,she’s done a job for us.British woman referring to her Indian surrogate, in Poonam Taneja, “The couple having four babies by two surrogates,” BBC Asian Network (2013) at .IntroductionWhen two adults meet, fall in love, and commit themselves to a romantic relationship, a time will come when they must decide whether or not to have children. It is no exaggeration to say that this particular (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Luara Ferracioli (2014). The State’s Duty to Ensure Children Are Loved. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (2):1-19.
    Do children have a right to be loved? An affirmative answer faces two immediate challenges: (i) a child's basic needs can be met without love, therefore a defence of such a right cannot appeal to the role of love in protecting children's most basic needs, and (ii) since love is non-voluntary, it seems that there cannot be a corresponding duty on the part of parents to love their child. In this essay, I defend an affirmative answer that overcomes both of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Rachel Fredericks (2013). Review of Christine Overall, Why Have Children? The Ethical Debate. [REVIEW] Hypatia Reviews Online.
  22. Manolito Gallegos (2011). Problems and Solutions for a Hypothetical Right Not to Exist. Logoi -- Heidelberger Graduiertenjournal für Geisteswissenschaften 1 (1):N/A.
    In this paper I will describe and attempt to resolve one of the main problems of David Benatar’s text "Better Never To Have Been: The Harm of Coming Into Existence": whether it is possible for a right not to exist to be posited without there ever being a person in existence to hold such a right. I will conclude that this is indeed possible given an experience oriented view of personhood that I shall outline, and what other conclusions might be (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Molly Gardner (forthcoming). On the Strength of the Reason Against Harming. New Content is Available for Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    _ Source: _Page Count 15 According to action-relative accounts of harming, an action harms someone only if it makes her worse off in some respect than she would have been, had the action not been performed. Action-relative accounts can be contrasted with effect-relative accounts, which hold that an action may harm an individual in virtue of its effects on that individual, regardless of whether the individual would have been better off in the absence of the action. In this paper, I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Molly Gardner (2016). Beneficence and Procreation. Philosophical Studies 173 (2):321-336.
    Consider a duty of beneficence towards a particular individual, S, and call a reason that is grounded in that duty a “beneficence reason towards S.” Call a person who will be brought into existence by an act of procreation the “resultant person.” Is there ever a beneficence reason towards the resultant person for an agent to procreate? In this paper, I argue for such a reason by appealing to two main premises. First, we owe a pro tanto duty of beneficence (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  25. Molly Gardner (2015). Review of The Non-Identity Problem and the Ethics of Future People. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Molly Gardner (2015). A Harm-Based Solution to the Non-Identity Problem. Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  27. Anca Gheaus (2016). Parental Enhancement and Symmetry of Power in the Parent–Child Relationship. Journal of Medical Ethics 42:70-89.
    Many instances of parental enhancement are objectionable on egalitarian grounds because they unnecessarily amplify one kind of asymmetry of power between parents and children. Because children have full moral status, we ought to seek egalitarian relationships with them. Such relationships are compatible with asymmetries of power only to the extent to which the asymmetry is necessary for (1) advancing the child's level of advantage up to what justice requires or (2) instilling in the child morally required features. This is a (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Anca Gheaus (2016). The Normative Importance of Pregnancy Challenges Surrogacy Contracts. Analize. Journal of Gender and Feminist Studies 6 (20):20-31.
    Birth mothers usually have a moral right to parent their newborns in virtue of a mutual attachment formed, during gestation, between the gestational mother and the fetus. The attachment is formed, in part, thanks to the burdens of pregnancy, and it serves the interest of the newborn; the gestational mother, too, has a powerful interest in the protection of this attachment. Given its justification, the right to parent one's gestated baby cannot be transferred at will to other people who would (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Anca Gheaus (2014). The Parental Love Argument Against 'Designing' Babies: The Harm in Knowing That One has Been Selected or Enhanced. In Ruth Chadwick, Mairi Levitt & Darren Shickle (eds.), The Right to Know and the Right Not to Know Genetic Privacy and Responsibility. Cambridge University Press 151-164.
    In this chapter, I argue that children who were selected for particular traits or genetically enhanced might feel, for this reason, less securely, spontaneously and fairly loved by their parents, which would constitute significant harm. ‘Parents’ refers, throughout this chapter, to the people who perform the social function of rearing children, rather than to procreators. I rely on an understanding of adequate parental love which includes several characteristics: parents should not make children feel they are loved conditionally, for features such (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Gerald K. Harrison (2012). Antinatalism, Asymmetry, and an Ethic of Prima Facie Duties. South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):94-103.
    Benatar’s central argument for antinatalism develops an asymmetry between the pain and pleasure in a potential life. I am going to present an alternative route to the antinatalist conclusion. I argue that duties require victims and that as a result there is no duty to create the pleasures contained within a prospective life but a duty not to create any of its sufferings. My argument can supplement Benatar’s, but it also enjoys some advantages: it achieves a better fit with our (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Gerald K. Harrison & Julia Tanner (2011). Better Not to Have Children. Think, 10(27), 113-121 (27):113-121.
    Most people take it for granted that it's morally permissible to have children. They may raise questions about the number of children it's responsible to have or whether it's permissible to reproduce when there's a strong risk of serious disability. But in general, having children is considered a good thing to do, something that's morally permissible in most cases (perhaps even obligatory).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  32. Trevor Hedberg (2016). Unraveling the Asymmetry in Procreative Ethics. APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Medicine 15 (2):18-21.
    The Asymmetry in procreative ethics consists of two claims. The first is that it is morally wrong to bring into existence a child who will have an abjectly miserable life; the second is that it is permissible not to bring into existence a child who will enjoy a very happy life. In this paper, I distinguish between two variations of the Asymmetry. The first is the Abstract Asymmetry, the idealized variation of the Asymmetry that many philosophers have been trying to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Tim Henning (2014). Retter-Kinder, Instrumentalisierung und Kants Zweckformel. Ethik in der Medizin 26 (3):195-209.
    Definition of the problem The creation and selection of children as tissue donors is ethically controversial. Critics often appeal to Kant’s Formula of Humanity, i.e. the requirement that people be treated not merely as means but as ends in themselves. As many defenders of the procedure point out, these appeals usually do not explain the sense of the requirement and hence remain obscure. Arguments This article proposes an interpretation of Kant’s principle, and it proposes that two different instrumental stances be (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Colin Hickey, Travis N. Rieder & Jake Earl (forthcoming). Population Engineering and the Fight Against Climate Change. Social Theory and Practice.
    Contrary to political and philosophical consensus, we argue that the threats posed by climate change justify population engineering, the intentional manipulation of the size and structure of human populations. Specifically, we defend three types of policies aimed at reducing fertility rates: (1) choice enhancement, (2) preference adjustment, and (3) incentivization. While few object to the first type of policy, the latter two are generally rejected because of their potential for coercion or morally objectionable manipulation. We argue that forms of each (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. R. Juha (2001). Coercive Population Policies, Procreative Freedom, and Morality. Philosophy and Geography 4 (1):67 – 77.
    I shall briefly evaluate the common claim that ethically acceptable population policies must let individuals to decide freely on the number of their children. I shall ask, first, what exactly is the relation between population policies that we find intuitively appealing, on the one hand, and population policies that maximize procreative freedom, on the other, and second, what is the relation between population policies that we tend to reject on moral grounds, on the one hand, and population policies that use (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Guy Kahane (2009). Non-Identity, Self-Defeat, and Attitudes to Future Children. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):193 - 214.
    Although most people believe that it is morally wrong to intentionally create children who have an impairment, it is widely held that we cannot criticize such procreative choices unless we find a solution to Parfit’s non-identity problem. I argue that we can. Jonathan Glover has recently argued that, in certain circumstances, such choices would be self-defeating even if morally permissible. I argue that although the scope of Glover’s argument is too limited, it nevertheless directs attention to a moral defect in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  37. Hannelore Koerner (1989). Ethics in Reproductive Medicine in the German Democratic Republic. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 14 (3):335-341.
    The paper discusses the practice of genetic counseling and elective abortion in the German Democratic Republic. Keywords: elective abortion, embryo transfer, in vitro fertilization, protection of human life, reproductive ethics, German Democratic Republic, bioethics CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Gusztáv Kovács (2014). Új szülők, új gyermekek: Miképpen változtatja meg szülői felelősségünket a reprodukciós medicina. PPHF.
    The book discusses the development of reproductive medicine from the perspective of the parent-child relationship. -/- A könyv a reprodukciós medicina fejlődését vizsgálja a szülői felelősség szempontjából.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Why We Should Ignore the 'Octomom'.
    Thanks to the “Octomom” - a single, low-income, California mother of six, who recently gave birth to octuplets conceived through IVF - the American public this year turned its attention to assisted reproductive technology. In this essay, I take issue with one set of proposals to arise from the controversy: embryo-transfer limits, variations on which have been proposed in Georgia, Missouri, and, most recently, by Naomi Cahn and Jennifer Collins. Examining national and international multiple-birth rates, as well as similar limits (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. Jacqueline A. Laing (2008). Inter-Species Embryos and Human Clones: Issues of Free Movement and Gestation. European Journal of Health Law 15: 421-431.
    The United Kingdom's Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill, introduced into Parliament on the 8th of November 2007 contains a number of controversial proposals inter alia expressly permitting the creation of inter-species embryos for research and destruction and increasing the scope for human cloning also for destructive research. It is supposed that there ought not to be a blanket ban on the creation of human clones, hybrids, cybrids and chimeras because these embryos are valuable for research purposes. The prohibition on the (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Jacqueline A. Laing (2005). Artificial Reproduction, the 'Welfare Principle', and the Common Good. Medical Law Review 13:328-356.
    This article challenges the view most recently expounded by Emily Jackson that ‘decisional privacy’ ought to be respected in the realm of artificial reproduction (AR). On this view, it is considered an unjust infringement of individual liberty for the state to interfere with individual or group freedom artificially to produce a child. It is our contention that a proper evaluation of AR and of the relevance of welfare will be sensitive not only to the rights of ‘commissioning parties’ to AR (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  42. Mianna Lotz (2009). Procreative Reasons-Relevance: On the Moral Significance of Why We Have Children. Bioethics 23 (5):291-299.
    Advances in reproductive technologies – in particular in genetic screening and selection – have occasioned renewed interest in the moral justifiability of the reasons that motivate the decision to have a child. The capacity to select for desired blood and tissue compatibilities has led to the much discussed 'saviour sibling' cases in which parents seek to 'have one child to save another'. Heightened interest in procreative reasons is to be welcomed, since it prompts a more general philosophical interrogation of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  43. Rob Lovering (2014). The Substance View: A Critique (Part 2). Bioethics 28 (7):378-86.
    In my initial critique of the substance view, I raised reductio-style objections to the substance view's conclusion that the standard human fetus has the same intrinsic value and moral standing as the standard adult human being, among others. In this follow-up critique, I raise objections to some of the premises invoked in support of this conclusion. I begin by briefly presenting the substance view as well as its defense. (For a more thorough presentation, see the first part of my critique.) (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. James Edwin Mahon (2014). Innocent Burdens. Washington and Lee Law Review 71.
    In this article Judith Jarvis Thomson's Good Samaritan Argument in defense of abortion in the case of rape is defended from two objections: the Kill vs. Let Die Objection, and the Intend to Kill vs. Merely Foresee Death Objection. The article concludes that these defenses do not defend Thomson from further objections from Peter Singer and David Oderberg.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Jason Marsh (2015). Procreative Ethics and the Problem of Evil. In Sarah Hannan, Samantha Brennan & Vernon Richard (eds.), Permissible Progeny? The Morality of Procreation and Parenting. Oxford University Press 65-86.
    Many people think that the amount of evil and suffering we observe provides important and perhaps decisive evidence against the claim that a loving God created our world. Yet almost nobody worries about the ethics of human procreation. Can these attitudes be consistently maintained? This chapter argues that the most obvious attempts to justify a positive answer fail. The upshot is not that procreation is impermissible, but rather that we should either revise our beliefs about the severity of global arguments (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Jason Marsh (2014). Conscientious Refusals and Reason‐Giving. Bioethics 28 (6):313-319.
    Some philosophers have argued for what I call the reason-giving requirement for conscientious refusal in reproductive healthcare. According to this requirement, healthcare practitioners who conscientiously object to administering standard forms of treatment must have arguments to back up their conscience, arguments that are purely public in character. I argue that such a requirement, though attractive in some ways, faces an overlooked epistemic problem: it is either too easy or too difficult to satisfy in standard cases. I close by briefly considering (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  47. Jason Marsh (2014). Quality of Life Assessments, Cognitive Reliability, and Procreative Responsibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):436-466.
    Recent work in the psychology of happiness has led some to conclude that we are unreliable assessors of our lives and that skepticism about whether we are happy is a genuine possibility worth taking very seriously. I argue that such claims, if true, have worrisome implications for procreation. In particular, they show that skepticism about whether many if not most people are well positioned to create persons is a genuine possibility worth taking very seriously. This skeptical worry should not be (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Lawrence Masek (2011). The Contralife Argument and the Principle of Double Effect. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11 (1):83-97.
  49. Lawrence Masek (2010). On Some Proposals for Producing Human Stem Cells. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10 (2):257-264.
  50. Lawrence Masek (2008). Treating Humanity as an Inviolable End. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 33 (1):1-16.
    I argue that contraception is morally wrong but that periodic abstinence (or natural family planning) is not. Further, I argue that altered nuclear transfer—a proposed technique for creating human stem cells without destroying human embryos—is morally wrong for the same reason that contraception is. Contrary to what readers might expect, my argument assumes nothing about the morality of cloning or abortion and requires no premises about God or natural teleology. Instead, I argue that contraception and altered nuclear transfer are morally (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 90